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Abstract 
Tlus thesis is an exanlination of the influence of theological ideas on the 
development of liberal political philosophy in the seventeenth century. The basis of 
this account will be a detailed exanlination of the ethical and political ideas in the 
published and unpublished writings of the Cambridge Platonist, Ralph Cudworth. 
As the reputation of the Cambridge Platonists as other-worldly thinkers is well 
established in intellectual IUs tory, tlUs thesis, in rejecting this common view, will 
exanline how tIUs image of the Cambridge Platonists came to prevail. I will argue 
that, when the Cambridge Platonists are viewed within their philosopIUcal, 
theological and IUstorical context, their thought contains a powerful critique of 
contemporary theological and political ideas. By a detailed analysis of Cudworth's 
theology, in particular IUs Trinitarianism, I will argue that Cudworth creates a 
soplusticated defence of political society based on the moral self-deternlination and 
political responsibility of the individual. Cudworth's defence of the political realm is 
deflned by IUs belief in the democratic revelation made to all men, in the form of 
reason, through the active power of a Neoplatonically understood Trinity. 
Cudworth allows for a political society (what I term an ethical l'otJlJJJtllli(y), in wluch 
the individual must make the most of IUs God-given potential, and in wluch the 
eternal and immutable truths in the intellect of God, and not the will of the 
sovereign, underpin the legitimacy and efficacy of that society. Cudworth's thought, 
far from being the apolitical system it is often assumed to be, provided ethical and 
political arguments wIUch were, I argue, very influential on the late-seventeenth 
century debates for toleration and comprehension, and in particular the role played 
ill 
by the Latitudinarian divines in those debates. What we find in Cudworth's thought 
is a defence of the self-determining power of the individual which is defined by, and 
grows directly out of, a Trinitarian understanding of reality. This thesis will 
therefore show the way in which liberal political principles can be identified as 
growing positively out of the theological debates of tlle late-seventeenth century. 
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General Introduction 
This thesis will seek to identify and explore the political arguments in the thought of 
Ralph Cudworth. I am not the first person to identify political arguments in 
Cudworth's writing,! however this thesis is the first full-length study to examine 
how Cudworth's political ideas develop from widlin his Christian Neoplatonic 
world view. For this reason I believe that this thesis is an important addition to 
scholarship. Beyond the specific questions concerning the Cambridge Platonists this 
thesis will also attempt to broaden our understanding of the nature and form of 
political debate in the seventeenth century. That this political element widlin the 
thought of the Cambridge Platonists has not been identified in great detail before is 
not, I believe, because these ideas are particularly difficult to fmd. Rather, it is 
because they are presented in a form that, to our modern eyes, is explicidy 
theological. Modern scholarship has often been unwilling, or unable, to recognise 
political arguments that develop out of such explicitly theological premises. Of 
course, dle relationship between theology and politics has been recognised before, 
but this has traditionally been seen either as a negative relationship, i.e. modern 
political ideas growing in inverse proportion to the power and influence of religion 
widlin a society; or as an intellectual basis and legitimisation of a specific political 
structure, e.g. the use of the established church to legitimise the form and 'apostolic' 
1 G.R. Cragg, From Pllritalls to the Age ~fReasoll: A stlldJ! ~f challges ill Religiolls tho/lght withill the Cbllrch ~f 
Ellglalld, 1600-1700 (CUP, Cambridge, 1950), p.60; G.R. Cragg, ed. The Camblidge Platollists, (OUP, 
Oxford, 1968), especially 'On Political Sovereignty,' pp.347-365; Sarah Hutton, 'Liberty and Self-
determination: Ethics Power and ~-\ction in Ralph Cudworth,' in Del/lel'essmio al possible. Dete!7JJillisJJJo e 
Libet1a Ilel pellJelio Allglo-Olalldese de XVII J"wtio, ed. L. Simonutti (Angeli, 2001), pp.81-97; G.A.]. 
Rogers, 'The Other-worldly philosophers and the real world: The Cambridge Platonists, Theology 
and Politics,' in The Cambridge Platollists ill Philosophical COlltext: Politil'S, 111etapl!J!sit'S & Religioll, ed. G.A.]. 
Rogers, et aL (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1997), pp.3-15; and G.A]. Rogers, ':More, Locke, and the Issue of 
Liberty,' in Hm!]!1110re (1614-1687) Tercelltella!]! Stlldies, ed. Sarah Hutton (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1991), 
pp.189-199. 
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right of a specific monarch. This thesis will therefore outline arguments in which 
political ideas develop direcdy out of traditional theological principles, in particular 
the doctrine of the Trinity. 
As Cudworth, and the Cambridge Platonists in general, have never 
traditionally been associated with the political debates and upheavals of the 
seventeenth century, this thesis will seek to overcome many of the prevailing 
assumptions about them. This revision of the accepted reputation of the Cambridge 
Platonists is the subject of the first chapter of this thesis. In this I will argue that for 
a fuller understanding of Cudworth's thought we have to overcome two main 
obstacles at the outset. Firsdy, one has to reject many assumptions of the other-
worldly nature of the Cambridge Platonists. I will argue that this reading has relied 
on an interpretation of dleir 'mystical' Neoplatonism, which is in reality alien to 
their use of Neoplatonic thought. Secondly, I will argue that to appreciate the 
political nature of the thought of Cudworth one must take a broader view of the 
nature and form of political debate in the seventeenth century than the one 
currendy accepted. In particular, I will argue dlat political arguments can be 
identified not simply in overdy political discussions, but also in more broadly 
theological discussions over how God acts within the world. 
Cudworth's political arguments are based on two key premises. The first is 
Cudworth's use and defence of an intellectt/alist, against a voltilltarist understanding of 
God. Chapters Two and Three explore not only the philosophical form of this 
debate, but also how these differing understandings of the working of the mind of 
God underpinned the theological arguments from which the Cambridge Platonists 
first developed. Nowhere is this influence more clearly seen than in Benjamin 
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Whichcote's correspondence with Anthony Tuckney, a discussion of which forms 
the opening to Chapter Three. These letters show that the intellectualism of the 
Cambridge Platonists was defmed from the outset as a reaction to the voluntarism 
implicit in the orthodox Calvinism espoused by Tuckney. This reaction is made 
more interesting in that it occurs from within the boundaries of the Puritanism that 
is traditionally seen to be synonymous with the orthodox Calvinism of the early- to 
mid-seventeenth century. The Cambridge Platonists therefore create from the 
outset a specific response to the theological and political upheavals of the time. This 
response will then be explored through an examination of Cudworth's earliest 
writings, in which we can recognise the beginnings of Cudworth's Trinitarianism 
and theory of ethical C0111JJltlJlity. 
The second premise that underpins Cudworth's political ideas is his 
doctrine of the Trinity. This is discussed at length in Chapter Four. Cudworth's 
Trinitarianism, which is identifiable in his early writings, develops direcdy out of the 
intellectualism that underpins his dleology. This is most clearly identifiable in 
Cudworth's Yrtte Intel/ectllal SYJtem if the Ulliver.re, which I argue is essentially a 
Christian apology for the Trinity. Central to this Trinitarianism is a belief in the 
active and perceptive power of the divine as reason which man is able to appreciate 
through the revelation of Christ as the second person of the Trinity. Cudworth 
argues that knowledge of this active power implicit in dle divine is available to all 
men through the exercise of their reason. The universal and democratic nature of 
this revelation to man through reason is the principle that underpins all of 
Cudworth's political thought. 
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Once the Trinitarianism implicit in all Cudworth's philosophy is 
established, it is then possible to understand the form and implications of 
Cudworth's ethical and political thought. As I argue at the end of Chapter Four, 
Cudworth's Trinitarianism allows us to understand Cudworth's continual attacks on 
Atheism, and the thought of Thomas Hobbes in particular, as a perverted 
understanding of the created, and therefore political world. It also allows Cudworth, 
as I argue in Chapter Five, to undermine the determinism that is implicit in the 
voluntarism of Calvinism and Hobbism. These arguments, which are found in 
Cudworth's unpublished freewill manuscripts, use his intellectualism to refute what 
he sees as the illogical causal assumptions that underpin the determinism of 
Calvinism in particular. In place of this determinism, Cudworth presents us with a 
defence of freewill that places man's freewill within an infinite web of possible 
future events. This allows Cudworth to present a broad understanding of the 
providential power of God, while at the same time allowing man the freedom and 
choice to act freely within the world. 
The fmal two chapters of this thesis are an examination of how this 
intellectualist and Trinitarian structure was used by Cudworth to create explicidy 
political arguments, and then how these arguments influenced later thinkers, in 
particular the Latitudinarians. In Chapter Si" I argue that at the heart of Cudworth's 
political ideas lies the need for man to know and appreciate the absolute moral and 
ethical norms implicit in his intellectualism. Cudworth therefore unites the ethical 
implications of his intellectualism with his arguments for freewill, to create a belief 
in political society that is based on dle common acceptance and understanding of 
absolute moral truths held within the mind of the divine. In suggesting this 
4 
structure, Cudworth assumes three things. Firstly, he assumes that each member of 
the community is equally able to gain access to, and through his reason understand, 
these absolute tmths. Secondly, Cudworth argues that man is drawn to these truths 
by the knowledge that his eventual judgment and salvation will depend on how 
effectively he chooses good over evil in his lifetime. Thirdly, Cudworth assumes that 
for this to be an effective etllical and political structure, men must acknowledge 
their equality, through their shared rationality, with others within the political 
society. Cudworth therefore argues that man is, because of the Trinitarian principle 
that underpins all creation, implicitly drawn into an etlllcal community with other 
men. 
The principles of political self-determination implicit in Cudworth's thought 
were, I believe, a powerful influence on the development of the arguments for 
liberal individualism that we can identify in the political debates of the late 
seventeenth century. Nowhere is tllls more evident than in the influence of 
Cudworth on the theological and political arguments of the Latitudinarians. In 
Chapter Seven I show how, by identifying Cudworth's influence on the thought of 
John Tillotson and Edward Fowler in particular, we can see the manner in which 
Cudworth's Trinitarianism influenced the Latitudinarians in the debates for 
toleration and comprehension that dominated tl1e final decades of tl1e seventeenth 
centuty. Neither Fowler nor Tillotson defend the Trinity as the inviolable mystety 
that legitimises the Established Church, as argued by high-churchmen and 
countered by their anti-Trinitarian republican critics. Instead, both men defend tl1e 
Trinity on the terms outlined by Cudworth, as the principle that defines the 
humanity and moral responsibility of the individual. Fowler in particular uses this 
5 
philosophical assumption to then defend a version of political society where 
legitimacy is created by the collective assent of all its members, an argument which 
echoes Cudworth's uses of the same argument in his Treatise 011 Etel7lal and ImJJJutabie 
}l.10raliry. 
We can find in Cudworth's thought, and that of those he directly influenced, 
a sophisticated defence of political society legitimised by the collective will and 
understanding of its members. This political society is based on the mutual 
recognition of the self-determining power implicit in all men. The theoretical basis 
of this theory is the Platorused Trinity that Cudworth advocates so forcefully as the 
Intellectual SysteJJJ 0/ the Unil)erse. By making tlus link, tlUs thesis will not only show 
how political ideas have developed naturally out of theological prenlises, but also, I 
believe, the importance of Cudworth and certain forms of theological belief for the 
creation of liberal political philosophy. 
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Chapter I - De-Mythologising the Cambridge Platonists 
1.1. Introduction 
The explicit political statement made by Ralph Cudworth in his Tl7le Intel!edNo! 
System of the Ulliverse, that 'Religioll . . .is a necessary Vinculum of Civd S ociery,'l does not 
sit easily with the common conception of Cudworth and the Cambridge Platonists.2 
The Cambridge Platonists are traditionally viewed as being consciously detached 
from the 'bitter antagonisms of the Great Rebellion and the Restoration.'3 They 
were, tradition would have it, apolitical in the most political of times, looking 
backwards philosophically to the ancient agora when the great leaps forward of the 
new science were being made, and, crucially, self-consciously theological in a less 
theological age. As Frederick Copleston puts it, 'The Cambridge Platonists ... were 
not in sympathy with the prevailing philosophical and religious movements of their 
country and time.'4 Even for their own champions they are viewed as something of 
an anomaly, Frederick Powicke claiming in 1929 tint their work cannot be viewed 
as 'anything more than a rich quarry to which tile occasional student has been 
indebted for apt quotations and curious references.'s 
For a group so roundly and commonly dismissed, the Cambridge Platonists 
have shown remarkable staying power. They continue to attract academic interest 
l TISU, p.697. 
2 The thought of Ralph Cudworth is the central theme of this thesis. This chapter, however, is 
concerned primarily widl understanding the perception and interpretation of Cudworth and the 
Cambridge Platorusts by previous commentators. As iliese dUnkers have almost entirely conceived 
the Cambridge Platorusts as a urufied group, I believe it is acceptable to talk collectively of dle 
Cambridge Platorusts at dlls stage before discussing Cudwordl's iliought more specifically in later 
chapters. 
3 \X1.R.Inge, 'Introduction,' in Benjamin \V'hichcote, JI10rai alld Religio/ls Apb0l7sms (Elkin Mailiews & 
Marrot, London, 1930), pp.m-x, poiv . 
.j Frederick Copleston, A HistolJl qfPbilosop!!JI, 9 vols. (Burns and Oates, London, 1946-1975), V:63. 
5 Frederick J. Powicke, Tbe Cambl7dge Platollists: A St/ld), 0.1\1. Dent & Son, London, 1929), p.116. 
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and have been part of, if not central to, developments in the growing contextual 
understanding of the scientific and philosophical developments of the seventeenth 
century, a development I will discuss in more detail later. However, in the field of 
political theory the Cambridge Platorusts remain beyond the pale. The common 
assumption of the Cambridge Platorusts, as other-worldly thinkers unconcerned 
with the upheavals of their day, has stuck fast. Yet the quote from Cudworth above 
suggests that the political arena was not an area that the Cambridge Platorusts either 
rejected or rose above. Is there then a hidden political dimension to the Cambridge 
Platorusts that has not yet been fully uncovered? I believe there is. The contention 
of this thesis is that not only were the Cambridge Platorusts involved with the 
political arguments of their day, but that they played an important role in the 
development of the liberal, tolerant, latitudinarian tradition that heavily influenced 
the development of political liberalism. 
The problem when seeking to rediscover this political dimension is: how can 
we recover these political arguments from within a theological and philosophical 
world view so far removed from our own? The purpose of this chapter is to suggest 
how we might go about attempting such an endeavour. This will be attempted in 
two ways. The first section of this chapter will examine the ways in which the 
common view of the Cambridge Platorusts as otherworldly and a philosophical 
irrelevance came about. This will involve, firsdy, an examination of nineteenth 
century interpretations of their philosophical and theological positions. Secondly, I 
will examine the way in which traditional histories of philosophy have marginalised 
the Cambridge Platorusts as a means to the end of a broader philosophical 
argument. The second part of this chapter will examine whether more contextually-
8 
minded methodologies in both the history of science and the history of political 
thought can help in establishing an historically informed understanding of the 
political arguments of the Cambridge Platorusts. 
I will argue that in traditional histories of philosophy and in some modern 
contextual approaches to intellectual history the Cambridge Platorusts have not 
been allowed to speak on their own terms. Instead these modern approaches by the 
methods they employ simply confIrm the partial view of the Cambridge Platorusts 
that developed through the nineteenth century. Consequently, I shall argue that 
these approaches have selved to mythologise the Cambridge Platorusts as 'other-
worldly' thinkers. Therefore it is necessary, in a thesis which aims to interpret the 
political philosophy of the Cambridge Platorusts, to de-mythologise our 
understanding of the Cambridge Platonists at the outset. This, I will argue, is 
possible if one brings to the study of the history of political tllOught some of the 
methodological advances made in recent years in the history of science. Only once 
this process has been carried out will it be possible to understand the Cambridge 
Platorusts as actively involved in, and influential on, the political arguments of their 
day. It will then be possible to understand tlle influence the Cambridge Platorusts 
had on the developments in the tolerant liberal politics that we fIrst see appearing in 
the late-seventeenth century. 
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1.2. Creating the Myth 
Interpretations of the Cambridge Platonists have inevitably concentrated on two 
related factors: the Platonic tradition and their theology. What will be argued in dus 
section is that clUefly nineteenth century interpretations of the nature of the 
Neoplatonism and theology attributed to the Cambridge Platonists rely on versions 
of these categories that the Cambridge Platonists would not have recognised. These 
interpretations projected back onto the Cambridge Platonists the prejudices of their 
own day. This has allowed commentators to mythologise the Cambridge Platonists 
as mystical, ivoq-towered and other-worldly thinkers divorced from contemporary 
conflicts and troubles. 
In dUs section I will examine how these prejudices came to be projected 
onto the Cambridge Platonists. Firsdy, I will examine the manner in which 
nineteenth century interpretations of Platonic philosophy affected dle interpretation 
of the Cambridge Platonists. In particular, I will examine dle distinction between 
the pure Platonic tradition and the Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato which was 
first identified in the late eighteenth century. By examining the interpretations of 
Neoplatonic thought of Thomas Taylor and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, I will show 
how the commonly held conception of Neoplatonism as implicidy mystical and 
other-worldly came about. Then I will argue that because of this nineteendl century 
distinction (between the Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition), dUnkers within the 
N eoplatonic tradition, in particular Plotinus, continue to be interpreted as more 
mystical dlan philosoplUcal. TlUs mystical interpretation, I will argue, both 
misintetprets the transcendent elements within Plotinus' thought and, as a 
10 
consequence, continues to lead to misinterpretations of the other thinkers within 
the Neoplatonic tradition, such as the Cambridge Platonists. 
Secondly, I shall show the way in which nineteenth century interpretations 
of the Cambridge Platonists, in particular John Tulloch's Rational Theology and 
Ch,istian Philomp!?), il1 England in the Seventeenth Cel1ttll)', moved the Cambridge 
Platonists into the relative orthodoxy of the tolerant, liberal Anglican tradition. 
Tulloch's interpretation distanced the Cambridge Platonists from the nineteenth 
century perception of the philosophical excesses of Neoplatonism. As a 
consequence, the Cambridge Platonists came to be interpreted as exclusively 
theological dUnkers. Such an interpretation moved the Cambridge Platonists into 
direct opposition to the supposed seclt/ar nature of the mainstream of seventeenth 
century society. Both these philosophical and theological interpretations of the 
Cambridge Platonists rely on distinctions that would have been alien to the 
Cambridge Platonists. Just as the Cambridge Platonists would have rejected a 
philosophical distinction between the Platonic and Neoplatonic, so they would not 
have recognised a bifurcation of society into the sacred and dle profane. Both dlese 
readings have therefore done much to mythologise dle Cambridge Platonists and 
limit the historical understanding of their dlought. 
I.2.i. Neoplatonism 
Many of the philosophical assumptions concerning the Neoplatonic tradition can be 
traced to dle reactions and interpretations placed on such philosophy in the 
eighteendl and nineteenth centuries. The dominant interpretation of Platonic 
11 
thought for the previous 1,500 years was what we now recognise as the Neoplatonic 
interpretation of Plato. This reading of Plato stresses, in particular, the theological 
and transcendent elements and themes within Plato's thought. The most important 
figure in the N eoplatonic inte1pretation of Plato was Plotinus. It was through the 
overtly theological writings ofPlotinus and his followers that the Neoplatonic 
tradition came into contact with, and intertwined with, Christianity, forming the 
synthesis of Christian-Platonism within which the Cambridge Platonists worked. 
This synthesis was solidified by suggestions by Christian Platonic philosophers, 
including the Cambridge Platonists, that one can find anticipations of Christian 
doctrine, in particular the doctrine of tlle Trinity, within Platonic philosophy. This 
synthesis began to unravel during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when 
certain thinkers began to distinguish Plato's thought from the interpretations placed 
upon it by later, Neoplatonic thinkers. This process involved the teasing apart of the 
Platonic, Neoplatonic and Christian influences which had gone to make up the 
Christian-Platonic orthodoxy of tlle previous 1,500 years.6 Many of the problems we 
now face when dealing with Neoplatonic philosophers such as the Cambridge 
Platonists can be traced to this intellectual and philosophical project. Through the 
systematic destruction of tlle Christian-Platonic synthesis during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, philosophers who had worked within the Christian Platonic 
tradition, including the Cambridge Platonists, came to be discredited and their 
philosophic importance downplayed. The common conclusion created by this 
purification of the Platonic blood line was that the newly recognised Neoplatonic 
tradition was not true philosophy but essentially a form of mystical thought. 
6 By far the best and most accessible account of the Neoplatonic tradition is E.N. Tigerstedt's Tbe 
Dedine alld Fall q( tbe Neoplatollic Illte/prelalioll Of Plato (Societas Scientiamm F ennica, Helsinki, 1974). 
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Consequendy, it is only possible to understand the political and 'worldly' nature of 
the Cambridge Platonists if we ftrst understand how the commonly accepted view 
of Neoplatonism as 'mystical' and un-philosophical came about. 
It is widely thought that the emphasis on the authentic Plato, as opposed to 
dle Neoplatonic intel-pretation of Plato, came with Schleiermacher's nineteenth 
century translations and introductions to Plato's dialogues.7 However it is possible 
to see this interpretation stretching further back to attempts in eighteenth century 
Germany to remove Platonic influences from Christian thought. The most 
influential of these attempts was Brucker's Critical Ristol]! ofPbilosopl?J from tbe First 
beginllillgs of tbe U/or/d to 0111' Times. In this work Brucker sought to show the distance 
that there was between the reality of Platonic thought and the Neoplatonic 
perversion of Plato's philosophy. By doing this, Brucker aimed to show how great 
the distance was between the authentic Plato and the doctrines of the Christian 
Church.S This interpretation entailed criticism of philosophers who had sought to 
emphasise dle relationship between the Christian and Platonic traditions, in 
particular dle Florentine and Cambridge Platonists.9 Brucker's analysis became dle 
benchmark to which later interpretations of dle Platonic tradition would return. 
Despite the success of Brucker's analysis on the continent, both his and 
SchleielIDacher's cl1.ticisms of the Neoplatonic tradition were litde known in Britain 
7 Schleieremacher's critique of N eoplatonism did not appear in Britain until William Dobson's 
translation of Schleiermacher's edition in 1831, see Frank ]\LTurner, The Greek Heritage ill VidOliall 
B,itaill (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981), pp.370-1. 
8 Tigerstedt, Decline alld Fall, pp.58-61. 
9 c\ powerful influence on Brucker's history was his colleague Johann Mosheim who translated the 
TISU in its entirety into Latin as S)'SteJJJa illtelledllale hllills /(JIiversi a ena, 1733). In his footnotes to 
Cudworth's S),stelll, Mosheim constantly criticised Cudwortll's uncritical use of all tlle Platonic 
tradition. For Mosheim's influence on Brucker see Sarah Hutton, 'Classicism and Baroque - A Note 
on l\Iosheim's footnotes to Cudworth's The True Illtellectllal S)'Stem qlthe Ulliverse, ' in Johallll Lorenz 
Mosheim: Theolgie ill spallllhugsfeid VOII Philosophie, Philologie IIlId GeSl'hide 1693-1755, ed. Martin l\Iuslow 
(Harrassowitz, \\leisbaden, 1997), pp.211-27, p.225. 
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at the beginning of the nineteenth century.10 This should not be a sUlprise, as British 
dlOught had remained largely indifferent to dle Platonic tradition throughout dle 
eighteenth centmy. A Platonic resurgence began in British thought widl the rise of 
Romantic thought at the beginning of the nineteendl century.1 1 Firsdy through the 
Neoplatonism of Thomas Taylor, and secondly the Romantic Platonism of 
Coleridge, a particular understanding of the Platonic tradition developed within 
British dlOught, which, if not following Brucker's analysis, certainly mirrored it by 
stressing the difference that existed between Neoplatonism and authentic 
Platonism. The introduction of this distinction allowed the common prejudice 
against the philosophical validity of Neoplatonic thought to develop. 
It is not clear whether Thomas Taylor was aware of Brucker's attacks on 
Neoplatonism. It is, however, interesting to compare bodl men's approaches to 
Platonic philosophy. Taylor, W{e Blucker, wished to separate the Christian 
influences and assumptions from Platonic thought. But Taylor's motive in doing 
this was the direct opposite to Brucker's. Brucker was seeking to recreate the 
'authenticity' of Christianity, whereas Taylor's desire was to recreate the 
'authenticity' of a Neoplatonic Platonism, a tradition which, in Taylor's opinion, had 
been perverted by Christianity. Taylor therefore criticises dle corrupting Christian 
influence of 'Pseudo-Platonists' such as the Cambridge Platonists. 12 Taylor, dlrough 
his translations of Plato, gives a distincdy Neoplatonic gloss to the dialogues. This 
10 Brucker was, however, cited in Edward Gibbon, The HistolJl of the Dec/i!le and Fall of the RolJ/a11 
Empire, 7 vols (l\Iethuen, London, 1905), II:336, n.12&13, first published in 1781. This reference is in 
relation to the links between Platonism and Christianity within the early Church; one of the other 
sources quoted is Cudworth. In making this comparison Gibbon does not, however, appear to adopt 
Brucker's explicit distinctions between Platonic and Neoplatonic thought. 
11 John H. Muirhead's The Platollic Traditiolllil Allglo Saxon Philosophy: Studies ill the HistolJl ~rIdealism Iii 
Ellgland alld Amelim (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1931), only examines the relatively obscure 
figures John Norris and Arthur Collier from the eighteenth century. 
12 George Mills Harper, The NeoplatollislJl Of WIlliam Blake (Chapel Hill, The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1961), p.l1. 
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pure Neoplatonism leads Taylor to re-emphasise the hidden nature of the 
Neoplatonic doctrines he found in the dialogues. In doing this, Taylor emphasises 
the deliberate obscurity of Plato. As George Harper has commented, 'One of 
Taylor's often reiterated dogmas ... was that the ancients, Plato in particular, 
intentionally veiled their sublimest doctrines in obscurity.'13 There is, therefore, in 
this de-Christianised Neoplatonism a belief that the 'ttuth' of Plato's philosophy can 
only be earned by the most dese1\Ting of disciples. 
It was through criticisms of Taylor's self-consciously pagan Neoplatonism 
that the distinction of Neoplatonism as weak thinking, which we first encountered 
in Bmcker, entered English thought. In an 1809 review of Taylor's translations in 
The Edillbll1;gh Review, James Mill used Brucker's argument to denounce 
Neoplatonists as 'the Charlatalls of Ancient philosophy.'14 What Taylor's 
Neoplatonism did was stigmatise the Neoplatonic reading of Plato as at best 
mystical and at worst poor philosophy. Consequently, Neoplatonism was 
increasingly perceived as a philosophical cul-de-sac. For example, J,S. Mill, following 
his father's influence, was scathing in his criticism of Neoplatonism, describing it as 
'an aftergrowth of late date and little intrinsic value ... a hybrid product of Greek and 
Oriental speculation, and its place in history is by the side of Gnosticism.'15 
The common thread of nineteenth century thinking was that, although 
Platonism had its place, the rigours of modern life and society were met more 
adequately by Aristotelian philosophy. W.B.Yeats' poem Amollg Schoo! Childrell, from 
nearly 100 years later, betrays the pe1\Tasiveness of tlns distinction: 
13 Ibid., p.48. 
14 Quoted in Tigerstedt, Declille alld Fa/I, p.63; see also Turner, Greek Heritage, p.371. 
15] .S. 1Iill, DisSCItatiolls alld Dismssiolls: Po/itim/, Philosophim/ and HistOlim/, 4 vols (Longmans, Green, 
Reader & Dyer, London, 1854-1875), III:276. 
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Plato thought nature but a spume that plays 
Upon a ghostly paradigm of things; 
Solider Aristotle played the taws 
Upon the bottom of a Icing of kings;16 
TIlls distinction was enforced by two other factors wlllch have, by implication, 
played against the Cambridge Platonists: firstly, Coleridge's assertion of a natural 
distinction between the two schools of thought, that '[e]very man is born an 
Aristotelian, or a Platonist;'17 secondly, the manner in wlllch tllls distinction was 
perceived to exist in the Aristotelian and Platonic natures of Oxford and Cambridge 
respectively. Arguably a large element of Cambridge University's Platonic reputation 
was due to the Cambridge Platonists. Because of the nineteenth century 
interpretation of Platonism discussed above, Cambridge came to be interpreted as 
the home of esoteric arts. In contrast the Aristotelian University of Oxford became 
synonymous with rigorous scientific learning. A comment by Gladstone is indicative 
of tllls belief: 
The merit of Plato's philosophy is in a quasi-spiritual and lllghly imaginative 
element that runs through it; Aristotle deals in a most sharp, searching and 
faithful analysis of the facts of human life and human nature. All the reasons 
16 W.BYeats, Collected Poellls riflf:?:B. Yeats, (lvIacl\<iillan, London, 1933) p.244. 
17 Coleridge, 'Specimens of table talk,' 2 July, 1830, quoted in David Newsome, Tivo Classe.r rifMeJl, 
Platol/islJJ alld Ellglish RolJJal/tic Thollght, Oohn j\Iurray, London, 1974). 
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that have bound Aristode so wonderfully to Oxford should, I think, 
recommend him to you. 1S 
Coleridge, a Cambridge educated Platonist himself, did much to restore 
something of the rigorous, practical nature of Platonic thought. He achieved this by 
removing from Platonism some of the excesses of Neoplatonism which, if not 
caused by Taylor's Neoplatonism, was certainly exacerbated by it. Coleridge, 
although influenced and supportive of the Cambridge Platonists, criticises them in 
the same manner that Mosheim had a century before.19 Coleridge questions the 
Cambridge Platonists' uncritical use of the Platonic tradition, famously describing 
them as not so much Platonists, but 'more truly Plotinists.' Coleridge argues that the 
Cambridge Platonists, by confusing 'Plotinism with Platonism,' claimed to fmd 
anticipations of Christianity in Greek Philosophy that are not there.20 
The overdy mystical reading of Neoplatonism created by the nineteenth 
century interpretations of the Platonic tradition continues today, nowhere more 
clearly dlan in interpretations of the thought of Plotinus. Evidence for dle seeming 
mysticism of Plotinus' thought would not seem difficult to fmd. Plotinus' own 
deadl-bed claim that he had in his life sought 'to bring dle divine in man to the 
divine in all,' would seem to contain in it the philosophical vagueness indicative of 
much mystical thought. 21 Within Plotinus' thought this supposed mysticism is also 
identifiable by his constant illusions to the cormpting power of the material world 
18 Ibid., p.74. 
19 For Coleridge's relationship to the Cambridge Platonists see Douglas Hedley, Coleridge, Pbi/oJopll)' 
alld Religioll: Aid.r to Rej7edioll alld tbe lvIin'O/' of the Spirit (CUP, Cambridge, 2000), in particular chapter 
one. 
20 S.T.Coleridge, Cole/idge 011 tbe SeveJlteeJltb Cmtllry, ed. Roberta Florence Brinkly (Duke University 
Press, Durham N.C., 1955), p.366. 
21 A.H.Armstrong, 'Plotinus' in The Camblidge Hi.rtol]' ~fLater Greek & Earb' Medieval PbiloJopll)', ed. 
A.H.Armstrong (CUP, Cambridge, 1967), pp.195-268, p.222. 
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and the free principles found in the immaterial,22 His influence on Christian mystics 
such as Meister Eckhart, John of the Cross and Jacob Boehme, has led to 
inte1pretations of Plotinus' asceticism that increasingly separates his thought from 
the practical implications of ethics and politics.23 
The metaphysical themes in the writings of Plotinus are undeniable. The 
problem is not the existence of such themes, but how one defmes and understands 
these themes of transcendence in a coherent philosophical form, rather than in 
terms of a shapeless mysticism. The general problem is that the central assertion of 
Plotinus' thought, that the transcendent realm of intellect and ideas is more 'real' 
than the material world, can at fIrst appear to be hostile to ethical questions and 
indifferent to the dictates of philosophical reasoning.24 English language 
interpretations of philosophical systems that deal with notions of transcendence, 
such as the philosophy of Plotinus, have a tendency to subsume several of the 
conflicting implications of this transcendence under the catch-all term of 'mystical.' 
Although this interpretation of the mysticism of Plotinus' thought is not incorrect, 
the term mystical is, I believe, too broad. Consequently, like, and perhaps largely 
because of, the nineteenth century inte1pretations of N eoplatonism, mysticism 
within the thought of a certain thinker has become synonymous with a lack of 
philosophical rigour. This interpretation of the un-philosophical nature of mystical 
thought is a peculiarly Anglophone phenomenon. W.R. Inge has argued that this is 
the fault of terminology. Inge argues that English lacks the more subtle linguistic 
distinctions that might allow us to account for the different forms that mysticism 
22 ElllleadJ-, 3.1.8, 6.8.6. 
23 W.R.Inge, The Pbilosopl!J1 q(PlotiIllIS, 2 vols (Longman, Green and Co., London, 1918), II:142; 
Dominic J. O'1Ieara, Plotill/Is: All Illtrodm'fioll to the Elll!eads (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993), p.106. 
24 John Rist, PlotilillJ: The Road to Realio!, (CUP, Cambridge, 1967), p.213. 
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can take within philosophy. By contrast, Inge argues that German, for instance, can 
deal with mystical themes more easily because of its distinction between the higher 
and lower forms of mysticism as 'Mystick' and 'Mysticimus.'25 This linguistic 
distinction, however, betrays a deeper cultural and philosophical divergence. In the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries dle dominant trends in English philosophy 
were empirical and utilitarian, and so were traditionally hostile to the transcendence 
found in the Neoplatonic tradition. German philosophy at the same time proved 
much more receptive to the transcendent aspects of much mediaeval mystical 
thought, much of which owed a conscious debt to the thought of Plotrnus. 
Therefore it would be un-controversial, although perhaps a litde simplistic, to argue 
that there is an acceptance of the philosophical validity of ideas of the transcendent 
in German Idealism that one would never find in the empirical British philosophy 
of the same period.26 
The task then is not to deny the transcendent themes in Plotinus but to 
recognise the philosophical rigour with which he deploys the traditional mystical 
forms of transcendence and participation. Such an approach is lost if Plotinus, and 
as a consequence the Neoplatonic tradition, is simply glossed over as 'mysticism.' 
The purpose of life, Plotinus argues, is to enter into a philosophical contemplation 
that brings man into a state of full participation with the divine, and consequendy 
into the realm of moral perfection.27 There is an undeniable hostility in much of 
25 Inge, Tbe Pbilosopl!J! ~lP/otil/tls, 1:1. For a more detailed discussion on the language and philosophical 
form oLMysticism see Rist, Plot iI/liS, p.214; R.c. Zaehner, kIpti{isllI: Saovd alld Pr~/{lIIe. All IlIqlliO' iI/to 
sOllie Vmieties ~lPraetematllra/ ExpeJie!l{e (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1957). 
26 The obvious exceptions to this crude distinction are Bishop Berkeley and Coleridge. For the 
influence of mysticism on German idealist thought see Ernst Benz, Tbe kIpti{a/ SOllrces ofGemJaJ/ 
Romalltic Pbi/osoplJ)!, trans Blair Reynolds and Eunice M. Paul (pickwick Publications, Allinson Park, 
p"-l., 1983), and Robert Tucker, Pbi/osoplJ)! and lVlytb ill Kad J}Imx (CUP, Cambridge, 1972). 
27 Armstrong, 'Plotinus,' p.227. 
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Plotinus' writings to the material world,28 but it would be wrong to see this hostility 
as an ascetic rejection of, and indifference to the material. The material world plays 
a cmcial role in Plotinus' thought. Firstly, it exists within the overarching intellect of 
the divine as part of one unified creation. The divine 'soul,' as Plotinus terms it, 
touches every part of creation, and so intimations of the divine can be found, if only 
in a diminished form, in all parts of creation. As Plotinus argues, 
It is not tlUe that the earth is adorned with all plants and every sort of 
animal, and the power of soul has reached to the sea, but all the air and 
ether and the whole heaven is without a share of soul; but up there are all 
good souls, giving life to the stars and to the well-ordered everlasting circuit 
of the heaven, which in imitations of Intellect wisely circles round the same 
centre for ever; for it seeks nothing outside itself. Everything in me seeks 
after the Good, but each attains it in proportion to its own power.29 
Through this contemplation of the material world, Plotinus argues that man is able 
to understand that the perfection of the divine should not be sought in the lesser 
forms of the created world, but in the purer forms of the intellectual realm. The 
introspection that is such a central feature of Plotinus' thought involves an 
engagement with the material world. Plotinus is not hostile to the material world in 
principle; rather, he is hostile to the cormpting influence of the material world on 
the ability of the soul of man to participate in the divine. Plotinus' idea of 
introspection and rejection of the material is therefore a critique of sense-perception 
28 See for instance, Elllleads, 3.1.8. 
29 Ibid., 3.2.3. 
20 
in favour of the higher intellectual ideals of the mind.30 For Plotinus, dle moral 
quest of man necessarily involves an introspection and turning away from the 
material, but only through an engagement widl the material world. 
In this way, Plotinus' philosophical notion of introspection is far removed 
from the poetic and hypnotic mysticism usually attributed to the excesses of dle 
Neoplatonic tradition.31 Plotinus' principle of introspection, which has been 
descl1bed as an 'educs of escape,'32 can easily be interpreted as a conscious rejection 
of the ethical and political dilemmas of the material world. This, however, is not the 
intention of Plotinus' theory. Introspection is used by Plotinus to move one away 
from dle lower, baser principle of the material world and closer to the purer, higher 
principles that he believes are implicit in all creation. This principle of ethical 
separation over ascetic indifference is a central principle for understanding dle 
ethical thought of Cudworth. Introspection, Plotinus argues, does not turn man 
from the world, but rather makes him a fuller participant in that world. 'What then 
is the nobly good man?' Plotinus asks. His answer is an afflrmation of the ethical 
virtues of introspection: '[he] is the man who acts by his better part ... for intellect is 
active in the good man. '33 
There is obviously a great difference between the Plato we now know from 
the dialogues and the interpretation of Plato that developed through the 
N eoplatonic tradition. That being said, just because dus distinction has been made, 
it should not render the Neoplatonic tradition, which after all was until the 
Renaissance the accepted interpretation of Platonic thought, philosophically 
30 Ibid., 3.4.2. 
31 Inge, The Phi/osop/!)' ~rplotill/'s, II:153. 
32 O'Meara, PlotillllS, p.l08. 
33 Elllleads, 3.4.6. 
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redundant. As I have argued, if one is able to understand the principle of 
transcendence within N eoplatorusm not in mystical but in philosophical terms, it is 
then possible to come to a deeper understanding of the ethical and political 
elements in Neoplatonic thought and the philosophy of the Cambridge Platorusts in 
particular. 
I.2.ii. The Theological Interpretation 
From the late nineteenth century, with the publication of John Tulloch's 
monumental work of 1872, Ratiollal Theology and ChristiaJl Philosopl?)1 ill EnglaJld ill the 
SeventeeJlth century, through to Frederick Powicke's The Camblidge Platollists-A StttrfJl 
in 1929, the emphasis moved from viewing the Cambridge Platorusts as 
philosophers to seeing them as a self-consciously 'theological' school of thought. In 
these works, the Cambridge Platonists are interpreted as being primarily concerned 
with matters of religious practice, belief and meaning. As I shall show, this reading 
moves the Cambridge Platonists away from the realities of the seventeenth century 
to what is perceived to be the higher pursuits of the dleologian. As with the 
Neoplatonic reading, this does the Cambridge Plato rusts a disservice as it imposes 
on them an intellectual distinction that was alien to them. Just as the Cambridge 
Platonists would be unaware of the distinctions of Platoruc and Neoplatoruc as 
understood in the nineteenth century, so they would reject the separation of secular 
and theological that the theological readings of Tulloch and odlers assume. 
In examining this theological interpretation of the Cambridge Platorusts, I 
shall concentrate on Tulloch's work. Although odlers follow this line, in particular 
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Powicke and Rufus M. J ones, in Spirittfa! RiformeJ'S of the 1lh & 1lh ce!lttllies, they are 
all consciously indebted to Tulloch's work and analysis.34 Tulloch's reading of the 
Cambridge Platonists is much more sympathetic and subde dlan simply to deny any 
philosophical influence or form to dleir argument. He argues that the eclectic nature 
of their thought was largely due to the 'theological dogmatism and narrowness of 
their time.'35 This method, Tulloch argues, was used by the Cambridge Platonists to 
create a unity between philosophy and religion that would create an 'indestructible 
basis of reason and higher humanity.'3G In doing this the Cambridge Platonists were 
replying to and appreciating the developments of the new philosophy of their day.37 
However, their use of this new philosophy was to create a synthesis dlat was 
exclusively religious in its form: 'Without exception the Cambridge latitudinarian 
divines may be termed religious philosophers.'38 
This would not seem to be a contentious fact when interpreting the 
Cambridge Platonists. However, if one examines the way in which Tulloch defInes 
the nature of this religious thought, a view of the Cambridge Platonists emerges of 
men who were becoming separated from an increasingly secularised, political age. 
Tulloch blames litde of this on the Cambridge Platonists, but more on the spirit of 
the age. As Tulloch argues, 'They enjoyed dle vague repute of thinkers in a frivolous 
and ignorant age.'39 
Again, this interpretation relies on Tulloch imposing his own agenda on the 
Cambridge Platonists. Tulloch's work was written against the backdrop of 
3~ Rufus 11. Jones, The S piritllal RefoI7JJeI:r qlthe 16th & flh cmtllries (London, MacMillan, 1928) p.30S, 
Powicke, The Cambridge Platollists, pp.v, vii. 
35 John Tulloch, Ratiollal Theolo!!J! alld Christiall PhilosoP/:!)! ill Ellglalld ill the S evellteelltb cmtlll)', 2 vols 
(\\1illiam Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh, 1872), II:13. 
36 Ibid., II:l1,13. 
37 Ibid., II:8, 24. 
38 Ibid., II:13, 200. 
39 Ibid., II:38. 
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Gladstone's threatened reforms of the established Church.4o In this context, 
Tulloch's work can be interpreted as a defence of the peculiarities of the established, 
Anglican Church. Tulloch fInds the Anglican virtues of moderation and toleration in 
the rational liberal divines of the seventeenth century, in particular the Cambridge 
Platonists. Tulloch, however, continually stresses dlat these liberal virtues can only 
exist within the confmes and structures of dle Church. To remove this structure 
would be to remove the form in which these liberal, tolerant virtues had been able 
to grow and flourish. 41 The Cambridge Platonists are therefore criticised for failing 
to defend the structures of the Church at one of its hours of greatest need, for the 
'fatal practical timidity on the part of men who yet did so much to advance the 
cause of liberty.'42 Cudworth's thought in particular, which contains litde in the way 
of ecclesial theology, is criticised for not speaking up for 'liberal church interests' in 
their time. The erastian agenda that Tulloch imposed on the Cambridge Platonists 
has done as much as the eclectic Neoplatonism of the early nineteenth century to 
perpetuate the image of the Cambridge Platonists as other-worldly thinkers divorced 
from their own time. 
As has been shown, both the Neoplatonic and theological interpretations of 
the Cambridge Platonists rely on distinctions dlat would have been unknown to 
them. Nevertheless these interpretations have acted to mythologise dle Cambridge 
Platonists as thinkers not only divorced from, but in some cases actively hostile to, 
the political and social upheavals of their day. Consequendy, it is common to see the 
Cambridge Platonists accused of 'standing aside' from the controversies of the 
~o Richard Kroll, 'Introduction,' in Pbi/osopl!)', Science alld Religioll ill Ellg/mld 1640-1700, ed. Richard 
Kroll, Richard Ashcraft & Perez Zagorin (Cambridge, CUP, 1992), ppl-28, p.5. 
~l Ibid., pp.5-7. 
~2 Tulloch, Ratiolla/ Tbe%g)', II:214. 
24 
seventeenth century.43 Any attempt to understand the influence and impact of the 
Cambridge Platonists on the ethical and political arguments of dleir day must first 
scrape dtrough dle veneer placed upon them by these later Neoplatonic and 
Theological interpretations. In fact the particular world-view of the Cambridge 
Platonists was adopted to counter the limits and other-worldliness they encountered 
around them. The Cambridge Platonists hold that both the logical philosophy of 
Aristotelian Scholasticism and the theology of strict Calvinism in their own ways 
reject and belitde the created world. The task of philosophy is, in the eyes of the 
Cambridge Platonists, to engage with the created world and to understand the 
nature and form of the divine. This 'participation' in the divine not only teaches 
men how to act towards God, but how to act towards other men as well. It is a 
theology that not only appreciates the created world but also one that sees 
participating in it as a vital central act. As Cudworth preached to the House of 
Commons in 1644, 'Inke and paper can never make us Christians, can never beget a 
new nature, a living principle within us: can never form Christ, or any true notions 
of spirituall things in our hearts.'44 Crucially for the Cambridge Platonists, and 
Cudworth in particular, this participation is not simply an act of personal devotion, 
but an invocation to make the active Christ-like principle touch every facet of life. 
Consequendy implicit within this principle of participation is an implicidy political 
dimension. 
43 Inge, 'Introduction,' p.lli. 
H First SeI7JlOII, p.92. 
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I.2.iii. Histories of Philosophy 
In the twentieth century there was a move back to understanding the Cambridge 
Platorusts as part of the flow and development of European philosophy. The most 
influential of these studies were Arthur J. Lovejoy's short essay 'Kant and the 
English Platorusts' and Ernst Cassirer's The Platollic Rellaissallce ill Englalld. Although 
arguing from different positions and to different conclusions, both of these 
interpretations share one common theme: how did the Cambridge Platonists help in 
the development and formation of the Enlightenment? Both examine the central 
theme of reason and rationality within the thought of the Cambridge Platorusts. 
Accordingly both interpret the Cambridge Platonists as part of a philosophical 
movement that necessarily led to the Enlightenment rationality. The thought of the 
Cambridge Platorusts becomes intrinsically wound up in a wider discussion of the 
development of European philosophy. The Cambridge Platorusts in both these 
cases do not become philosophers in their own right but philosophers playing a part 
on 'one stage of this journey.'45 
One of the fIrst attempts to assess the philosophical influence of the 
Cambridge Platonists came with Arthur J. Lovejoy's contribution to William James' 
Festschrift, 'Kant and the English Platonists. '46 The basic premise of this paper is that 
the Cambridge Platorusts, and Ralph Cudworth in particular, in some way 
45 Ernst Cassirer, Tbe Platollil' Rellaissalll'e ill Ellglalld, trans James, P. Pettegrove (Thomas Nelson & 
Son, London, 1953), p.202. 
4(, Coleridge, SeveJlteelltb l'elltlll)', p.l09; Arthur J. Lovejoy, 'Kant and the English Platonists,' in Essq)'s 
Fbilosopbical alld PDh·bologica/.· III bOllollr ~rJT7illialJ/ James 0' bis l'olleaglles at CollIll/bia UlliIJersif)', (Longmans, 
Green & Co. New York, 1908), pp.263-302. Lovejoy employs the term 'English Platonists' instead of 
'Cambridge Platonists' as he claims the ideas of early idealism found in seventeenth century English 
Platonism were not exclusive to those who had attended Cambridge University. However it is fair to 
say that the leading actors in Lovejoy's analysis were the Cambridge Platonists and Cudworth in 
particular. So for the sake of this analysis it would seem to be justified to see the two terms as 
synonymous. 
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anticipated the ethical thought of Kant. Although the similarities with Kant's 
thought were noted by Coleridge, this theory was not fully expounded until this 
point. Lovejoy claims that the inspiration for the arguments in his paper came from 
a suggestion made by William James in his lectures on Pragmatism.47 Lovejoy 
expands this relationship by arguing that the Pragmatism of James and the thought 
of the English Platonists all belong to a tradition of philosophy exemplified by 
Kant's 'primacy of practical reason.'48 Lovejoy's analysis works by the direct 
comparison of the philosophical arguments of the English Platonists and Kant. The 
first major claim made by Lovejoy is that Kant's idealist reaction to the empiricism 
of Bume was 'entirely analogous' to Cudworth's reaction to the thought of 
Bobbes.49 The major result of dus reaction for Lovejoy is that Cudworth, in the 
TISU, foreshadows Kant's Copernican revolution by arguing that objects gain their 
form because of dle nature of the mind's mode of cognition of those objects, not by 
the mind's cognition conforming to the nature of the object.5o 
, This form of argument is consistent widl the methodological theories we 
fmd in Lovejoy's seminal work, The Great Chain ofBeillg. Lovejoy argues that the 
history of philosophy should be understood as the examination and understanding 
of various 'unit ideas.' These 'unit ideas' represent the recurrence of various 
attempts by different cultures at different times to deal with certain perennial 
philosophical problems. As such, dlese 'unit ideas' are understood by Lovejoy as the 
enunciation of principles by all the major European philosophers.51 The obvious 
example of this with regard to Lovejoy's analysis of the Cambridge Platonists is that 
-17 Ibid., p.265. 
-18 Ibid., p.266, 
-19 Ibid., p.272; Stephen Darwall, The B,itish M~ora/ists aJld the IJltema/ 'OlIght': 1640-1740 (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1995), p.109. 
50 Lovejoy, 'Kant and the English Platonists' pp.271, 274, 
51 Arthur J. Lovejoy, The Great Gail! ofBeillg (Harper & Row, New York, 1960), ppA-5, 14, 
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the reaction to Hobbes was analogous to Kant's reaction to Hume. The Cambridge 
Platonists are therefore interpreted as taking and developing certain 'unit ideas' and 
returning them to the great 'canon' of philosophical ideas. Such ideas could then be 
taken on by later philosophers, and eventually Kant, and be developed into those 
ideas that we recognise today. This approach to the histmy of philosophy remained 
dominant throughout most of the twentieth century. According to this 
interpretation, philosophers were understood not to be working in relation to their 
surroundings and times, but were treated as part of a higher trans-historical debate 
of the great 'unit ideas'. In Lovejoy's terms a philosopher is not judged on their own 
terms, but on whether or not they successfully develop and pass on a particular 
trans-historical philosophical principle to future generations. The assessment of 
philosophical importance therefore becomes not one of historical judgment but 
philosophical analysis. 
This teleological understanding of the history of philosophy appears, 
although in a much mme refIned manner, in Cassirer's The Platollic RellaiJJallce ill 
Ellglal1d. Although Lovejoy's essay had appeared in 1908, Cassirer's book, along 
with Muirhead's Platol1ic traditiol1 ill Allglo-Sax:ol1 philoJopl:y, was the fIrst lengthy study 
since Tulloch's signifIcantly to re-interpret the role and signifIcance of the 
Cambridge Platonists. The coincidence of both books appearing in tlle early 1930s 
(1932 and 1931 respectively) meant that they had no influence on each other's 
formation. 52 Although the arguments of the two wmks are very different in nature, 
both authors again present the Cambridge Platonists as involved in a wider 
historical project. I will concentrate on Cassirer's work, which is both the more 
52 Cassirer acknowledges ]'vIuirhead's work, but admits that he had no time to consult it before the 
publication of his own work, see Cassirer, Platollic Rellaissallce, p.5. 
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comprehensive of the works and still the most complete survey of d1e work of d1e 
Cambridge Platonists available. 
At the opening of his work Cassirer is very clear in his criticism of d1e 
readings of the Cambridge Platonists to that point in time: 
Tulloch's theological orientation has been retained since his time ... and 
consequendy, not even the most recent English publications have 
superseded Tulloch's results either in content or in principle. 53 
Cassirer is therefore clear in his criticism of the limited perspective this theological 
reading has placed on the Cambridge Platonists. This being said, Cassirer does not 
ignore the centrality of theology to the broader philosophical output of the 
Cambridge Platonists. Cassirer places the Cambridge Platonists in the perennial 
debate over freewill and determinism. In a long chapter, broadly tided 'The 
significance of Cambridge Platonism in the general histoq of religion,' Cassirer 
argues that d1e central theological debate since the early Church has been over d1e 
extent of human agency and freewill in the face of divine providence. The arch-
determinism of Augustine, in which man's post-Iapsarian self could not be saved 
except by the direct intervention of divine grace, had swept away all opposing 
explanations. 54 Cassirer argues that it was not until the growth of Platonic thought 
in the Renaissance that a suitable alternative to Augustine's determinism was 
suggested. This was, Cassirer argues, through the Platonism of the Florentine 
Renaissance, which argued for the divine form of love as 'Eros,' discoverable by all 
53 Ibid., p.5. 
5~ Ibid., p.95. 
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in the world in the form of beauty. There was, Cassirer continues, in this Florentine 
world view not an irreversible schism between man and God, but participation with 
the divine in the world through 'intellectual love.' This argument allowed man to 
seek salvation and reconciliation with God through his free actions. Cassirer 
believes that this argument was the ftrst successful attack on Augustinian 
determinism. 55 The Cambridge Platonists are therefore interpreted in tllls argument 
as defenders of 'intellectual love' as a basis for human agency against the 
determinism of high Calvinism. Instead of promoting the poverty of man in the face 
of the divine, Cassirer argues that the Cambridge Platonists asserted 'the will of man 
and the creation of tlle world ... [as] revelations of one and the same principle of 
creative love.' 56 
It is, Cassirer argues, because of their place within this tlleological tradition 
of Platonic 'love' that Cambridge Platonists attempted to bridge the gap between 
theology and philosophyY Cassirer is clear in making this link between the 
philosophical arguments of the Cambridge Platonists and their theological heritage. 
He does, however, go on to argue that it is because of their use of Platonic 
arguments that they became consciously separated from their surroundings. Not 
only does Cassirer argue that the Cambridge Platonists separated themselves from 
the prevalent 'spirit of Puritanism' but he also asserts that this led to a separation 
from the philosophical corollary of the Puritan spirit, empiricism. Therefore 
Cassirer argues that the relationship of the Cambridge Platonists to the issues of 
their day was, because of theu' Platonism, entirely negative in form. 58 
55 Ibid., pp.1 02-3, 106. 
56 Ibid., p.124. 
57 Ibid., p.124. 
58 Ibid., ppA, 157, 159. 
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The manner in which Cassirer appears to play down the philosophical 
significance of the Cambridge Platonists as a group in their own right can be 
explained by the structure of the argument that Cassirer employs. The underlying 
influence in Cassirer's work, as with other histories of philosophy that he wrote 
during the 1930s, is to explain the 'philosophical spirit of the modern world.' In this 
sense there is an implicit teleology in Cassirer's account of the history of 
philosophy, seeking as he does to present what he terms a 'phenomenology of the 
philosophical spirit.'59 In Cassirer's case, this journey leads to an appreciation of the 
Enlightenment tradition of freedom, which he sees beginning in Luther and finding 
its zenith in Kant.60 Cassirer is keen to stress that this was not an exclusively 
German, but rather a comprehensively European tradition. Therefore it is important 
for Cassirer's wider argument to highlight those places within the history of 
philosophy where 'the liberal humanitarian ideals of individuals within society 
possessing inalienable rights' had occurred, however obscure or seemingly 
irrelevant.61 In that sense the value of the Cambridge Platonists was not their 
philosophy as such, but their part in the flow of philosophical ideas that helped to 
create modern liberal enlightened values. Cassirer's wider project becomes easier to 
understand when he is understood as a liberal Jewish intellectual, living and working 
in the heightened tensions of 1930s Germany. In the face of dle growing 
intolerance and anti-Semitism of his day Cassirer's constant desire was to encourage 
59 Donald Philip Verene, 'Introduction,' in Ernst Cassirier, Symbol, J\!1yth alld Cultllre: Essays alld Lecfllres 
ofEmst Casstiier 1935-1945, ed. Donald Philip Verene (\7 ale University Press, New Haven, 1979), 
pp.1-4S, p.19. 
60 Cassirer, Plafolli.- Rmaissa!l.-e, p.8S. 
61 David R. Lipton, Emsf Cassirlil:' The Dilemma ofa UberalIlifelledllal ill Gem/all)' 1914-33 (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1978), p.1S9. 
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the German people to 'live up to the high standard of dleir philosophical 
tradition. '62 
For Cassirer, it is not of central importance to recognise the relationship 
between the Cambridge Platonists and the philosophy of dleir own day, instead they 
should be recognised as players in a historical game that was still being played out. 
The historical role of the Cambridge Platonists for Cassirer can be summed up in a 
few sentences from dle conclusion to his work: 
The Cambridge School is merely one stage of this journey, and the thinkers 
of this school play only a modest role in this great intellectual process of 
development. But it is their undisputed achievement that they did not let the 
torch they bore go out; and dlat, in spite of all opposition of contemporary 
philosophy and all attacks of theological dogmatism, they preserved a 
nucleus of genuine ancient philosophical tradition, and passed it 
uncontaminated to dle centuries to come.63 
Philosophically it would seem that they should be celebrated for their tenacity, a 
tenacity that allowed others, in this case Shaftsbury and dle aesthetic ideals that 
inspired dle German Enlightenment, to fulfil the philosophical potential that the 
Cambridge Platonists were unable to fulfil. Even for dlOse influenced by the 
Cambridge Platonists they remained a historical anomaly; for Cassirer, they were 
members of a 'forgotten world,' and would remain only of 'scholarly interest' at 
best.64 
62 Ibid., p.167. 
63 Cassirer, Platollie Rellaissallce, p.202. 
6-1 Ibid., p.200. 
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We can still detect something of the teleological method found in Lovejoy 
and Cassirer in some recent studies on the Cambridge Platonists. Stephen Darwall 
in his book The Blitish Moralists and the intemal 'ought' and Frederick Beiser in his The 
Sovereigllty rifReasol1 both give accounts of the Cambridge Platonists that paint them 
as useful but essentially marginal figures in the development of European 
philosophy. In doing this, both books follow views we have already encountered in 
Lovejoy and Cassirer respectively. Both essentially argue that the thought of the 
Cambridge Platonists served to create the conclusions of the Enlightenment. 
Darwall's work, primarily concerned with ethical theory, adopts much of 
Lovejoy's analysis and approach. Cudworth is therefore described as discovering 
'the path that led to Kant's view of morality as "laws of freedom."'65 Darwall's 
argument paints Cudworth as a prophet for Kantian ethical thought, attributing to 
him the lmowledge and acceptance of the Kantian distinctions between pure and 
practical reason. Cudworth is therefore credited by Darwall with the Kantian insight 
that 'ethics is possible only if pure reason can be practical.'66 Accordingly, Danvall 
argues that Cudworth's thought contains within it 'the seeds of some of the most 
important and profound ideas in modern moral philosophy.'67 Cudworth's role in 
Darwall's work is therefore to prepare the path for Kant. By projecting back 
Kantian ethical distinctions onto Cudworth's thought, Danvall would appear to be 
falling into dle trap created by Lovejoy's belief in 'unit-ideas' and perennial 
questions. By viewing the Cambridge Platonists dltDugh a Kantian perspective, 
Darwall creates a false image of the Cambridge Platonists. They cease to be 
65 Darwall, British lvIora/ists, p.325. 
66 Ibid., p.322, also p.17. 
67 Ibid., p.117. 
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historical figures in their own right and become interpreted as thinkers preparing the 
philosophical way for Kant. 
Frederick Beiser's work follows more closely the argument we encountered 
in Cassirer, primarily linking the philosophical development of the Cambridge 
Platonists to the wider theological debates they were engaged in. In particular, 
Beiser argues that the centrality of reason within the philosophy of the Cambridge 
Platonists was used to counter the theological dogmatism of Calvinist nominalism 
and its secularised counter-part, the materialism of Thomas Hobbes. In both cases, 
Beiser argues that the Cambridge Platonists employ reason as 'the voice of 
conscience, the guide to salvation, the badge of Christian liberty, and the sign of 
grace.'68 This, again, is not a controversial conclusion taken on its own. However, as 
with Cassirer, this conclusion is used and related to a wider desire to tell the story of 
dle development of reason and rationality through the Enlightenment, a theme that 
runs through all of Beiser's work. In the case of the Cambridge Platonists, they are 
understood as preparing the way for the secularism of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. They are congratulated for introducing and developing a philosophical 
account of reason, but attacked for confusing that rationality with questions of faith. 
The Cambridge Platonists are therefore criticised for failing to possess the requisite 
secular rationality of their successors. This failure comes, Beiser concludes, because 
the Cambridge Platonists can never overcome the problem of revelation by reason 
alone.69 
Beiser's history, like Cassirer's, can be read as a defence of the 
Enlightenment project. Besier's declared desire is to defend what he sees as the 
68 Frederick C. Beiser, The Sovereigllty q(Rtasoll: The d~(ellce ofRatiollalit), ill the Earl), Ellglish ElllightellmeJ/t 
(princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996), p.140. 
69 Ibid., p.1S3. 
34 
philosophical virtues of the Enlightenment. His motivation is, however, not the real 
political threat that Cassirer faced but, more specifically, what he views as the 
academic, post-modern attack on the virtues of rationalityJo The ideals of the 
Enlightenment are not 'lazy dogmas,' Beiser argues, but 'hard won conclusions' 
worth defendingJl Beiser defends his project by making the methodological claim 
that one must possess the historian's eye for detail and the philosopher's critical 
obligation towards tmth. 
In all the accounts above the Cambridge Platorusts have been used to a 
lesser or greater extent as stepping stones on the way to a greater theoq. When they 
are dealt with individually, they are criticised for failing to have the insight or good 
sense of philosophers of later generations. In making these criticisms, all the above 
accounts have attributed the alleged philosophical weakness of the Cambridge 
Platorusts to their supposed mysticism and other-worldliness. These criticisms fail in 
two ways. Firstly, they simply adopt uncritically many of the prejudices about 
theology and Neoplatorusm created by the nineteenth century readings of the 
Cambridge Platorusts. Secondly, they seek to criticise the thought of the Cambridge 
Platorusts in terms of the standards of today. Such accounts have inevitably 
misinterpreted the philosophy of the Cambridge Platorusts. The task of the 
intellectual historian of the Cambl1dge Platorusts is not to judge their ideas against 
the criteria and values of contemporary philosophical thinking; instead the 
intellectual historian must allow the ideas of the past, however eclectic their sources 
and influence, to speak in their own terms. 
70 Ibid., p.ix:. 
71 Ibid., p.i.''-
35 
1.3. Methods of interpretation - the role of context 
How then can the historian of ideas approach the Cambridge Platorusts in such a 
way as to allow them to speak on their own terms? The main means of approach to 
dus task in intellectual histmy in recent years has been to approach the historical 
context within which a particular philosopher worked with much greater 
understanding and sympathy. The task becomes a desire less to understand the wOlth 
of a particular philosophy by our standards and more to understand its task on its 
own terms. To use Collingwood's useful short hand, one must analyse not only 
what a historical figure is saying, but what questions they are attempting to answer,72 
The Cambridge Platorusts have certainly benefited from dUs new trend in 
recent years. Several recent volumes of essays have sought to understand the 
Cambridge Platorusts more clearly within their own context,73 These contextually 
aware readings have brought about a broader understanding of the relationship 
between the Cambridge Platorusts and their historical context, and also allowed us 
to appreciate more fully their influence on the development of scientific, edUcal and 
religious thought in the seventeenth century. The question is, can dus new 
contextual approach bring us to a closer understanding of the Cambridge Platorusts 
as involved in the specific political controversies of their day? 
In dUs section I shall approach dUs question in two ways. Firsdy, I will 
examine the way in which recent developments in the histo1)' of science have 
helped transform our understanding of the Cambridge Platorusts. Secondly, I will 
72 R.G. Collingwood,AIIAlltobiograp/~)' (aUF, Oxford, 1939), p.31. 
73 In particular see: PhilosopID', Science, alld Religioll, ed. Richard Kroll, et al.; Hen')l M~o,.e (1614-1687) -
Ten:enteJlary Stlldies, ed. Sarah Hutton (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1991); The Cambridge PlatollistJ, ed. Rogers et 
al. 
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examine the contextual methodology employed by the historians of political 
thought of the Cambridge school of historians, in particular J.G.A. Pocock and 
Quentin Skinner. In this analysis I will argue that the Cambridge school of 
historians' concentration on 'available languages' as the key to contextual 
understanding can never give us the breadth of understanding needed to appreciate 
a philosophical and political position dlat is so rooted in theological belief. Instead, 
they present the student of intellectual histoq with a methodological structure that 
presents a modern idea of the 'political.' This modern idea shows litde appreciation 
of the depth and breadth of religious belief that exists within the thought of the 
Cambridge Platonists. 
I.3.i. The History of Science 
Theological influences have become more and more important in interpretations of 
seventeenth centuq thought within the histoq of science. It is true to say that the 
Whiggishness betrayed by traditions in the histoq of philosophy we have already 
examined have always existed within the histoq of science.74 With regard to 
religious belief, the tendency has been to see it as implicidy antagonistic towards 
scientific development. The historical story of science has therefore been 
interpreted as the need for science to purify itself of the unscientific nature of 
superstitious religious belief. The continued existence of this tendency can be seen 
clearly in A. Rupert Hall's 1990 work on Henry More's relationship to dle scientific 
revolution. In this work Hall argues that there is some value to be gained from 
examining those parts of the histoq of science that are not simply the 'positive 
7-l John Henry, Tbe ScieJlt[jic RelJo/ltfioll alld tbe O/7gill.r ~liVIodem Sciellce (palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002). 
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achievements.'75 Jvlore, therefore, is of interest not because of any particular 
scientific excellence, but because he exemplified those things that 'good' positive 
science reacted against. By treating More's theology as antagonistic towards true 
science Hall is able to portray the Cambridge Platonists as bit-part players, an 
analysis that shares much with the analyses adopted by teleological historians of 
philosophy. Hall's conclusion, that 'More's blatant spiritualism and his credulity with 
respects to ghosts and witches tainted his later metaphysical writings and put him 
outside the scientific pale,' is characteristic,76 Hall's approach therefore relies on an 
assumption that 'good' scientific thinking is opposition to the 'mystical' conclusions 
that necessarily come from a theological world view such as that advocated by 
More.77 
There has in recent years been a reaction against this Whiggish approach to 
the history of science. John Henry has argued against seeing science as a thing in 
opposition to, and naturally antagonistic to religion. Instead, he argues, we should 
take a much more inclusive approach to the understanding of the way in which 
religious belief influenced scientific enquiry. In this way the nature of a particular 
thinker's religious belief is not seen as in conflict with that part of his work which 
we can now recognise as 'scientific'. Rather, religious belief becomes an active 
75 A. Rupert Hall, HeJlC), iVlore (Cambridge, CUP, 1990), p.243; see also Hall's 'Henry :More and the 
Scientific Revolution' in Hency j\1ore, ed. Hutton, pp.3 7 -54. 
76 Hall, HelllJllvlore, p.262. 
77 Ibid. p.54. Something of this 'Whiggish' approach to the History of Science can be found in Brian 
Vickers' attacks on Frances Yates' work on the magical traditions of the Renaissance. Yates, most 
famously in her book Giordollo Bl7l1lo alld the Hem/eti" Traditioll (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
1964), argues that modern ideas of science grew in part out of Renaissance interests in the occult and 
magic. Vickers, particularly in his introduction to his edited collection O""l/It alld Sdmtlft" lvlentalities ill 
the Rellaissallce (CUP, Cambridge, 1984), attacks Yates for confusing tlle occult and non-occult 
traditions. Vickers, like Hall in his criticisms of Henry ]\lore, attempts to argue that there are two 
discernible traditions in tlle history of science. The interest of the occult is tllerefore tllat it highlights 
the correct 'mentalities' of the non-occult tradition, which Vickers argues more accurately 
foreshadowed modern science, see pp.6-17 especially. 
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influence on the intellectual process that historians seek to understand.78 In Heru'y's 
approach there is not simply a broader acceptance of religious belief as an influence 
- this can be found in 'Whiggish' historians of science such as Hall- rather, there is 
in Henry's work an acceptance of the need to judge and reconstruct not only the 
arguments but also the central terms of enquiry. This inclusive approach means that 
the intellectual historian must reconstruct not only the scientific arguments of a 
thinker, but also what the notion of 'science' meant to that thinker in the first place. 
Therefore dle history of science should not impose onto the past its own 
understanding of what 'science' is and then only consider those thinkers that 
conform to that form. The scientific revolution, Henry argues, is not a revolution in 
employing a pre-existing form of a science, but a broad intellectual movement from 
which our modern idea of science first appeared.79 To examine scientific 
exploration during this period involves with it an acceptance of how thinkers of that 
time related dleir scientific enquiry to other intellectual interests, such as religious 
belief. 
A good example of this approach is Henry's paper on More's disagreement 
with Robert Boyle.so In dus controversy Boyle criticises More's use of some of Ius 
scientific fmdings to justify the existence of Spirit, a claim that, as we shall see later, 
was important to More's own political beliefs. Traditionally this disagreement has 
been viewed as a strange anomaly between two friends. Henry, however, by arguing 
from the theological uses being made of these fmdings by More and Boyle, argues 
persuasively that this disagreement is not simply a scientific disagreement. Instead it 
78 John Henry, SdeJltt/ic Revoilitioll, p.86. 
79 Ibid., p.5. 
80 John Henry, 'Henry More versus Robert Boyle: The Spirit of Nature and the Nature of 
Providence,' in Hen!)! More, ed. Hutton, pp.56-67. 
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highlights the fundamental differences between More's intellectualist and Boyle's 
voluntarist understandings of God. Hemy, therefore, is able to show that this 
dispute was not simply a professional one as previously thought, but a broader 
intellectual debate in which science is used to describe and defme God's ordering of 
creation. 
I.3.ii. The History of Political Thought 
This concentration on the value of contextual analysis in the understanding of 
philosophy within history is central to the approach of J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin 
Skinner. Pocock and Skinner are now recognised as founding and formulating the 
key methodological arguments of the Cambridge school of history. The central 
philosophical claim of this approach is that all words, all utterances, are implicidy 
actions. Therefore the role of the historian is to understand the nature of the 
languages which these utterances were acting in, through and against. In Pocock's 
case, this insight comes from the reflection on historical practice;81 in the case of 
Skinner this methodology is presented more as a manifesto of intent. The central 
philosophical claim of Skinner's methodology is that philosophy is in essence and 
should be understood as 'linguistic performance.' Skinner, in particular, draws 
explicidy on J.L. Austin's speech-act theory to claim that someone in performing 
these words is also performing a political action. Using this linguistic framework, he 
argues that authorial intention can be understood by examining the relationship of a 
81 lain Hampsher-Monk, 'The history of political thought and the political history of thought,' in The 
Histo!)! if Political Thought ill Natiollal COlltext, ed. Dario Castiglione and lain Hampsher-Monk (CUP, 
Cambridge, 2001), pp.159-74, p.163. The best example of this is ].G.A. Pocock, The AllcieJIt 
COllstittltioll alld Fmdal La}/!: A stlldj' ~rEl1glish HistOliMI thought ill the SevellteeJIth Celltll!)!, (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1957). 
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philosophical text to the various languages available in a given context. The specific 
task of the historian is then to understand how the 'abstracted' ideas of the thinker 
related to and p/qy against the linguistic context within which he is writing.82 
Intention, therefore, is not a private internal thing, but exists within the 
'conventional repertoire of meaning within which meaning could be framed.'83 The 
first and best example of this method is Pocock's The Allcient COllstitutioll al1d the 
PeJlda/ Law. In this work, Pocock analyses the way in which legal and political 
change came about in early modern England through the conflict of the languages 
employed by different legal traditions.84 By limiting the task of the historian to the 
understanding of the linguistic relationship of ideas to the context, Pocock attempts 
to avoid the 'constant tendency' in the histoq of ideas to come to philosophical 
rather than historical conclusions. 
Pocock and Skinner's linguistic and contextual methodology has proven 
particularly effective in the realm of political thought. Their work has dramatically 
broadened the horizons of the histoq of political thought. They have successfully 
shown how political debates and arguments were articulated within linguistic and 
historical contexts, not grand historical dialogues where major figures debated with 
their eminent predecessors. In this way Pocock and Skinner have successfully 
removed the discipline of political thought from the realm of the 'great ideas' 
argued over by the 'great thinkers.' Instead, they have placed historical political 
82 J .G."\. Pocock, 'The History of Political Thought: "\ 1Iethodological Enquiry,' in Phi/osop!!)', Po/ilits 
Cllld Sotie!)', Second Series, ed. Peter Laslett and \\f.G. Runcimann (Blackwell, Oxford, 1967), pp.1S3-
202, p.1S7, also Hampsher-Monk, 'History of political thought' pp.161-3. 
83 Ibid., p.164. On the use of Austin by dle Cambridge School of historians, see: Quentin Skinner, 
'1Ieaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,' in Histo!)' Cllld Theo!)!, VII - No.1 (1969), pp.3-
53, p.46, and John Dunn, 'The Identity of dle History of Ideas,' in Phi/osop!!)', Po/itits Cllld S otie!)!, 
Fourth Series, ed. Peter Laslett, \\T.G.Runcimann, Quentin Skinner, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1972), 
pp.15S-73, p.167. 
8-l Pocock, Allcie!ll COlisliflilioll, p.15. 
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thought f:u:mly in the context within which they were written. The practical 
implication of this approach is that the remit of the historian of ideas is thrown 
wider than the traditional canon of philosophical texts. Now the task is to examine a 
much broader collection of contemporary texts to recreate successfully the linguistic 
context of the day.85 
Despite the obvious advances made by the Cambridge school of historians, 
doubts must remain over whether this method can do justice to all kinds of 
intellectual arguments from the past, particularly those that discuss and rely upon 
religious beliefs to be coherent. Something of their approach can be gleaned from 
Skinner's 'Reply to my critics.' In the first section of this extended essay Skinner 
deals explicitly with what he terms 'rational and irrational beliefs.' The question he 
wishes to answer is: how do we deal with beliefs tl1at seem irrational to us? He 
begins this analysis by arguing that in no way should the historian seek to make 
claims about the ideas he is studying. Rather the question should be firstly, is the 
belief system being encountered rational within context? Secondly (if it is not 
rational within that context) why is that 'irrational belief' being claimed and for what 
reason?86 The key then is not to understand what the beliefs are but what they do 
85 Hampsher-;"Ionk, '.History of political thought,' p.166. The classic example of how this new 
methodology brought about a complete change in the understanding of the historical nature of a 
thinker was Peter Laslett's introduction to his edition of Locke's TIJJO TreatiseJ" 011 GovemJJJe!lt. In this he 
successfully argues that Locke's intention was not to write a treatise defending and promoting ideals 
of Libel1)' attacked by Thomas Hobbes, as the traditional 'great books' reading of the history would 
have it. Rather Locke's work was a specific justification for revolutionary actions against the 
possibility of absolutism threatened by the reign of the Catholic James II and justified by Robert 
Filmer's Patrianva. Peter Laslett, 'Introduction' in John Locke, Two Treatises of GovenlJJJent (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1960) pp.67-79. 
86 Quentin Skinner, 'A Reply to my Critics,' in M~eallillg alld COlltext: QlIelltill S killlJer alld his elitits, ed. 
James Tully (polity, Cambridge, 1988), pp.231-88, p.242. The antipathy of the Cambridge school of 
historians to religious arguments in the history of philosophy has recently been noted by David 
\\lootton in his review of Quentin Skinner's new collection Visioll ofPolitli;s, 3 vols (CUP, Cambridge, 
2002) in The Time Litera!)' Supplemellt, March 14, 2003, p.8. The obvious exception to this antipatllY is 
Pocock's work on Hobbes' religion, in particular his essay 'Time, .History and Eschatology in the 
Thought of Thomas Hobbes,' in Politits, lallgl/age alld time: essa),s Oil poldiml thollght alld histo!)' (London, 
;"Ietlmen, 1972), pp.148-201. 
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within the argument of the philosopher being studied. Skinner claims that 'the 
golden rule is that, however bizarre dle beliefs we are studying may seem to be, we 
must try to make the agents who accepted them appear ... to be as rational as 
possible.'87 This being said, dle strictures that exist within this medl0d mean that 
Skinner's approach also requires a leap of historical imagination as to dle level and 
profundity of such belief, which many applications of this method have lacked. 
When dealing with seventeenth century thought, a period when, as Justin 
Champion has argued, '[i]ssues of theological belief and religious duty permeated 
almost every facet of. .. life,'88 an understanding of religious issues and their 
implications is essential, but for all its claims towards context and intentionality, the 
methodology of the Cambridge school of historians remains an exclusively 'secular 
idiom.'89 The secular nature of almost all their work has led to two results. Firsdy, 
they have tended to study only those d1inkers whose concerns have been most 
clearly political in this modern linguistic sense. The obvious example of this is the 
concentration of much of the literature of the Cambridge historians, and Skinner in 
particular, on Thomas Hobbes and those thinkers that have had the 'good taste of 
... allegiance to dle way of the future.'90 Secondly they have been unable, or 
unwilling, to engage with those thinkers whose implicidy theological systems have 
fallen outside the scope of their medl0d. This is highlighted when we examine dle 
extent to which the Cambridge Platorusts have been studied by Cambridge school 
87 Skinner, 'Reply,' p.246. 
88] .A.I. Champion, The Pillars of Pliestcrajl Shake!!: The Chlfrch qlEIIglal1d alld its Ellemies - 1660-1740 
(CUP, Cambridge, 1992), p.6. 
89 Ibid., p.5. 
90 Dunn, The political thought of Johll Locke: A HistO/ical Accoullt ql the ArglflJle!lt ql the 'T1I!O Treatises ql 
GoVel'lllJlllllt (CUP, Cambridge, 1969), p.259. CD. Tarleton has recently pointed to the implicitly 
modern reading of Hobbes created by Skinner in particular. 'The weakness of the Cambridge style of 
intellectual history has always been, of course, that the meaning it could allow us to give to a text 
within its historical setting utterly depended on how we first characterized the prominent and 
therefore determining features of tllat context.' CD. Tarlton, 'The Despotical Doctrine of Hobbes, 
Part I: The Liberalization of Leviathall,' HistolJl qlPoliticalThollght X,'UI:4 (2001), pp.587-615, p.612. 
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historians, which is litde if at all. For a methodology so consciously focused on 
context, this would appear to be strange for two reasons. Firsdy, it is odd that 
Hobbes' first, most consistent and fiercest critics, the Cambridge Platonists, have 
not been given more attention. Secondly, for a group so consciously aware of the 
need to understand the use of language in philosophy, it seems strange that they 
have not studied the Cambridge Platonists as the first philosophers consistendy to 
write philosophy in the English language. These examples indicate the limitations of 
the Cambridge approach. The Cambridge school of historian have, in many ways, 
revolutionised the study of intellectual history, but this method has only been 
applied in a limited way. Those limits have been defined by a modern understanding 
of the political, one which has more to do widl the belief systems of the twentieth 
rather than the seventeenth century. 
1.4. Conclusion 
For all the advances made by the Cambridge school of historians, it seems clear dlat 
if one is to come to an understanding of the political nature of the Cambridge 
Platonists a broader understanding of what the political meant to them is required. 
In the words of Charles Taylor, we need to 'confront our language of explanation 
with the self-understanding of our subjects.'91 There would, it seems to me, be 
much more to offer the intellectual historian in the recent approaches of some 
histories of science than is offered by the linguistic model suggested by Skinner and 
Pocock. In the methodology employed by John Henry, 'science' is interpreted as 
developing out of the broader concerns of natural theology and metaphysics. 
91 Charles Taylor, 'The hermeneutics of conflict,' in kIeallillg alld COlltext, ed. Tully, pp.218-30, p.228. 
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Scientific understanding for the seventeenth century intellectuals became another 
way of appreciating the work of the divine in creation.92 We can bring something of 
this approach to the understanding of the political in the thought of the Cambridge 
Platorusts. We need to understand the political in the seventeenth century 
understanding of the practical workings of the divine in creation. Using this 
approach it is possible to understand the political statements made by the 
Cambridge Platorusts in two ways. Firstly, we can decipher their explicit political 
statements as not simply utterances, but as arguments relating to every part of their 
philosophy. We can therefore understand Henry More's assertion 'they say nothing 
so true in Politicks, "No Bishop, no King;" as this in Metaphysicks, No Spirit, 110 
God,'93 in two ways. In the first instance, it can be viewed as an utterance that 
proclaims More's Royalist sympathies; it also shows tlle way that More, and the 
other Cambridge Platorusts, view the political as implicitly related to their broader 
metaphysical concerns. Political distinctions, as part of creation, implicitly hold 
theological corollaries. The reverse of this argument leads us to the second mode of 
understanding. This is tllat what we see as the explicitly theological concerns of the 
Cambridge Platorusts relate directly to the political arguments of the day. For 
instance, the Cambridge Platorusts do not simply reject arguments of Thomas 
Hobbes for his heretical materialism alone. They also reject them for the political 
errors that his tlleological heresy entails. The theological arguments of the 
Cambridge Platorusts are driven by a desire to protect and assert what they believe 
to be the correct way in which man participates with the divine in all parts of 
creation. Therefore they reject those politicians who used religion as a means to an 
92 Henry, Scimt[fic Rellolitioll, p.96. 
93 Henry J\Iore, All Alltidote agaillst Atbeism O/~ All Appeal to tbe Natllrall Famlties ~f tbe Millde ~lMa!I, 
Wbetber tbere be 1I0t a God, in A Collectioll ~f Pbilosopbiml Jr7,itillgS (London, 1662), p.142. 
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end (seemingly the only use for religion in political arguments if one follows the 
Cambridge School of historians). As Benjamin Whichcote pithily complains, 
'[a]mong Politicial1s, the Esteem of Religion is profitable: the Principles of it are 
troublesome.'94 Theological concerns necessarily lead to practical political 
arguments. For Cudworth, it was not only theologically ridiculous for Hobbes and 
others to create 'Religion [as a] Figmellt rifPoliticiallJ,' it was also politically untenable to 
create a political system where the ultimate arbiter of all human actions, God, is not 
'the very foundation of all Civil Sociery.'95 
U sing this method it is possible to come to a broader and fuller 
understanding of the Cambridge Platonists as thinkers that were interested and 
actively involved in the political controversies of their day. They may not have 
created an explicit political manifesto in the forms of Hobbes or Locke; they did, 
however, consistendy defend a conception of man's freewill that carries with it both 
an obligation to the divine and also ethical and political obligations towards their 
fellow men. For this reason dley form an important bridge between the theological 
and the political, creating from dleir deeply held theological convictions political 
arguments for toleration and liberalism, which I will argue were of central 
importance to the political debates at the end of the seventeenth century, in 
particular through the Cambridge Platonists relationship to, and influence on, the 
Latitudinarians. It is only possible to unlock and recreate this political element 
within the philosophy of the Cambridge Platonists if the profundity of the 
theological arguments dley employ are understood and respected. Within 
intellectual history theological belief, more than any odler factor, seems to be a 
9~ \\lhichcote, Apholis1JIs, no.l081. 
95 TISU, p.697. 
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stumbling block in the recreation of the philosophies of the past. But some thinkers 
in the past, whether we like it or not, believed in God. If, therefore, intellectual 
history is going to recreate successfully these pasts, then only by respecting and 
understanding the theological beliefs of thinkers such as the Cambridge Platorusts 
can this ambitious aim ever be achieved. 
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Chapter II - The Making of the Cambridge Platonists 
11.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the theological, philosophical, historical 
and political contexts that influenced the intellectual development of Cambridge 
Platonism. This survey will be broken into two sections. The first will concentrate 
on the theological and philosophical contexts from which the Cambridge Platonists 
ftrst developed. In particular I will examine the differing voitl11tmiJt and intelleettlaliJt 
understandings of the divine that existed within seventeenth century theological 
debate. This framework allows us to explain and understand the philosophical basis 
of determinism and the theories of predestination that informed the theology of 
Calvin and, more importantly, his followers. Of Calvin's followers I will concentrate 
on the thinking of Theodore Beza in particular, as it was his influence that turned 
the implicit voluntarism of Calvin's thought into the dogmatic Calvillist system that 
profoundly influenced the theological make-up of early-seventeenth century 
England. The thought of Beza is of particular importance for two reasons. Firstly, 
Beza codifted a system of theology that placed the predestined will of the divine at 
its heart, and therefore made, what Cudwortll terms, divine determinism the basic 
theological assumption of orthodox Calvinist theology. Secondly, he did this by the 
use of scholastic theology, to create what has come to be known as Protestant 
Scholasticism. Included in this section will be a discussion of the thought of 
Thomas Hobbes. This may seem an undue diversion at this point; however, the 
Cambridge Platonists, as some of Hobbes' earliest and most vehement critics, 
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attacked Hobbes' thought for being dle logical extreme of the voluntarism that they 
first encountered in Calvinism. Some commentators have argued that the attacks on 
Hobbes' voluntarism were a mask for their attacks on Calvinism. As we shall see 
later, particularly in Chapter Five, dlls was not dle case. It is, however, correct to see 
the Cambridge Platorusts as recognising in Hobbes the philosophical errors they 
initially encountered in Calvinism writ large. These theological and philosophical 
influences are of especial importance when trying to understand the political ideas 
within the thought of Cudworth in particular. These contexts allow us to 
understand the nature, but also the strength, of the theories of determinism against 
which the Cambridge Platorusts reacted when formulating their theories of freewill. 
By contrasting dle dlOught of the Cambridge Platorusts with the strict ethical 
legalism of voluntarism, we will be able to understand with more clarity dle 
assertion, implicit within the thought of the Cambridge Platorusts, that Christian 
faith was a necessarily creative, active principle. As John Smith argued in his Se!eded 
Discourses: 
[t]o seek our divinity merely in books and writing, is to seeke the living 
among the dead: we do but in vain seek God many times in these, where his 
truth too often is not so much enshrined as entombed: no; intra te qllaere 
DeulJJ, seek for God within thine own soul;! 
Following dlls more abstract theological survey, the second section of dlls 
chapter will examine the ways in which these conflicting theological traditions were 
employed within seventeenth century Cambridge. Firsdy, this will be done through a 
1 John Smith, Se/eded Dist'Ol(rses (London, 1821), p.5. 
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survey of the theological and educational forms found in seventeenth century 
Cambridge. Secondly this section will examine the differing theological and political 
controversies that dominated Cambridge during this period, from the Arminian 
debates of the 1590s, through the Laudian reforms of the 1620s and 1630s to the 
influence of the Westminster Assembly and the Purge of the Earl of Manchester in 
1644. In this SU1yey I will clarify the differences that existed between the 
overlapping but individually recognisable concerns of Puritanism, Calvinism and 
anti-Laudianism on the one hand, and anti-Calvinism, Arminianism and Laudianism 
on the other. Through this survey I will be able to achieve two things. Firstly, I will 
show the way in which the theological and philosophical arguments outlined in the 
fIrst section of the chapter were deployed within the historical and political context. 
Secondly, I will clarify the peculiar position that the Cambridge Platonists held 
within this context as Puritan adversaries of William Laud's reforms whilst at the 
same time maintaining an intellectual opposition to the Calvinism implicit within 
much contemporary Puritanism. The puritan anti-Calvinism that we fInd in the 
Cambridge Platonists is, I will argue, of central importance when, in the fInal 
chapters of this thesis, we come to understand the Cambridge Platonists 
relationship to, and influence on, the political debates of the later seventeenth 
centuq. 
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11.2. Theological and Philosophical Context 
1I.2.i. Voluntarism and Calvinism 
The simplest way to describe the reaction of the Cambridge Platonists to orthodox 
Calvinism is as an intellectualist response to the voluntarism implicit in Calvin's 
thought. One should define these terms at the outset. This debate is best described 
through reference to Plato's dialogue The Etttl?Jphro. In this dialogue, Socrates asks 
what the nature of holiness is: 'Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or 
do they approve it because it is holy?' Socrates decides on the latter position over 
dle former, arguing that we always choose things because of their intrinsic worth, 
rather than through some arbitrary choice.2 Plato was, of course, not engaged in the 
later debate over intellectualism and voluntarism, however his distinction helps one 
deflne the difference between dlese two theological and philosophical positions. 
Voluntarism follows the flrst deflnition, that worth (holiness in Plato's example), is 
solely defmed by the power and will of the divine. Intellectualism, by contrast, 
stresses the constancy of the divine by dle correspondence of the divine will at all 
times to the eternal exemplars of tmth and holiness. 
At its heart Calvin's theology relies on a voluntarist understanding of the 
divine. Understood on these terms, Calvin's thought merely continues the debates 
over voluntarism and intellectualism that dominated mediaeval theology.3 The most 
important influence on the voluntarism of Calvin's theology comes from his use of 
2 Plato, Ellti!yphro, trans Lane Cooper, in The Collected Dialog/les of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (princeton University Press, Princeton, 1961), ge-10e. 
3 Alister E. i\IcGrath, The Illtellectllal OligillS of the Europeall Reformatioll (Blackwell, Oxford, 1987), 
pp.84-86. 
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the thought of William of Ockham.4 Ockham's thought is driven by his desire to 
stress at all times the omnipotence and overriding liberty of the God in all things. 
Ockham sets about this task through a discussion of epistemology. Ockham rejects 
the belief that objects can be understood by their correspondence to an individual 
essence or form. To do this, Ockham argues, is to reduce God to a metaphor for 
reason and denies that God could, if he so chooses, act outside the logical 
parameters of the human intellect; in short, God makes the sky blue not because of 
a pre-existing notion of 'blueness' but because he chose for the sky to be blue. 
Consequently, for voluntarists such as Ockham, so powerful was the will of the 
divine tllat it would be perfectly possible for God to make the sky green if he so 
chose. Objects tllerefore cannot be understood by their correspondence to universal 
truths or forms. The consequence of tlns is that God becomes known primarily 
though tlle power and revelation of his acts, and not wough the logical deduction 
of his nature. Voluntarist theology, therefore, limits man's knowledge to those 
things tllat could only be understood by their in1mediate appearance, and not in 
comparison with intellectualist thought, through their correspondence to real 
entities or forms. Consequently, any belief that objects could be understood by their 
relationship to {/ P'1OJ1 principles is rejected by voluntarists because such an assertion 
would deny that the world is entirely contingent on the will and liberty of the divine. 
The ethical implications of these distinctions are very important. In 
intellectualist theology it is possible for man to deduce moral and ethical worth by 
tlleir correspondence to pre-existing, and rationally discoverable, moral norms. This 
4 The best survey of the mediaeval influences on the development of Calvin's thought is McGrath, 
IllteilectllalOligills, see chapter three especially. For accounts of Calvin's intellectual development and 
thought see, Alister E. l\IcGrath, A Life ~fJohll Calvill: A StmD,ill the Shapillg ~rlf7estem Cllltllre 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1990); l\fichaelMullet, Calvill (Routledge, London, 1989); Fran<;ois Wendel, 
Calvill: The Oligills alld DevelopJJle!lt ~rhis Rtligiolls Thollght (Collins, London, 1963). 
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means that man, through his own actions, can earn merit from God for moral 
action. The classic version of this intellectualist ethics comes in Aquinas. In the 
Stl1J1ma Theologica Aquinas argues, with the help of Aristotle, that there exists a pre-
existent principle of justice to which men can aspire. Merit can therefore be judged, 
and consequently reward apportioned, by man's success in achieving justice and 
virtue. This relies on two assumptions: firstly, that man has freewill and 
consequently is able to act in a manner tllat conforms to the eternal divine principle 
of justice; and secondly, that the principles of justice remain constant within the 
intellect of the divine.s 
Voluntarist theology rejects this intellectualist position because it diminishes 
the omnipotence of God's power and freedom. For his voluntarist critics, Aquinas' 
intellectualist ethics simply reduce the divine to the status of the judge in a 
supernatural virtue-contest. By contrast, the overriding desire of voluntarist 
theology is to stress the omnipotence and liberty of the divine. In the field of ethics, 
this can only be achieved if one de-couples the notion of divine merit from a 
knowable principle of justice. Consequently, merit cannot be defined by its 
correspondence to justice, like a voluntarist understanding of justice, rather it is 
entirely dependent on the will of God.6 This etlucal argument found a powerful 
theological ally in the anti-Pelagian writings of Augustine. The combination of anti-
Pelagianism and voluntarism went to make up the via 1JJoderlla AtlgtlJtinialla, which 
became a powerful theoretical influence on Calvin's thought. Augustine argues that 
at 'the Fall,' man, who had originally been under the control of God, came under 
the control of the Devil. Since man's fall had been brought about by man's original 
5 ~-\quinas, SN!llma Theologica. I-II.114.Art.1. 
6 :McGrath, Illtellecttlal OligillS, p.84. 
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sinful act, man could only be redeemed through an equally sinful act being carried 
out on God. The trial and death of Christ was that injustice, and it was only through 
the extraordinary sacrifice of God on behalf of man that man's salvation is brought 
about.7 Therefore man's redemption is entirely reliant on the power, freedom and 
extraordinary grace of the divine. Consequently man is completely incapable of 
bringing about anything of his own salvation. For voluntarist theology, because all 
action witllin the world must be governed and directed by the extraordinary power 
of divine grace, the means of man's salvation is in the power and arbitrary gift of the 
divine alone. However, if this is the case then logically all actions, even those that 
are sinful and evil, must also find their source in the will of the divine. Because of 
the stress on the will of the divine within voluntarist ethics, all things within the 
world, including evil, can only be explained as part of the extraordinary will of tlle 
divine. It is the supposed arbitrary nature of tlle divine suggested by voluntarism, 
and highlighted by the issue of theodicy, that forms the main means of attack on 
voluntarism by its intellectualist opponents such as Cambridge Platonists. 
When we look at the thought of John Calvin, these voluntarist themes are 
best understood through the epistemological discussion of man's knowledge of tlle 
divine, which opens the first book of his Illstittltes qfthe Christian Religion. Calvin does 
recognise that man can, to a limited extent, have knowledge of the divine though his 
own mind. When man through his reason comprehends the divine Calvin argues 
that he can only contemplate his utter insignificance in comparison to the divine. 
Man's reason therefore implicitly leads him to the 'terror and the fear of death.'8 
Consequently, although there is a limited negative understanding of God by man, 
7 A.P. Marthinich, The Two Gods qfLeviathan: Thomas Hobbes 011 Rtligioll and Politics (CUP, Cambridge, 
1992), p.267. 
8 Illstitlltes, I.i.l, Li.3. 
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man's fallen nature will always bring him to pride and evil in the face of God. As 
Calvin so graphically puts it: 
Let it stand, dlerefore, as an indubitable truth, which no engines can shake, 
that the mind of man is so entirely alienated from dle righteousness of God 
that he cannot conceive, desire, or design anything but what is wicked, 
distorted, foul, impure, and iniquitous; that his heart is so dlOroughly 
envenomed by sin, that it can breathe out nothing but cormption and 
rottedness; that if some men occasionally make show of goodness, their 
mind is ever intelwoven with hypocrisy and deceit, their soul inwardly 
bound with dle fetters of wickedness.9 
God remains the sole and only source of righteousness. Calvin stresses the implicit 
sinfulness of man by adopting Augustine's dictum that 'in Adam all died;' dlat the 
guilt of 'the Fall,' the rejection of the righteousness of God, is carried hereditarily 
and federally by all men. The fact that time passes does not diminish the fact that 
that the original sin of Adam is something that all are liable for and live with the 
consequences of.w In dlls way Calvin mirrors the voluntarist edllcs of the via 
modema A7Ig7lstillialla by removing from man any possibility of earning merit from 
God through freely willed human action. The source of merit is in the divine alone. 
The clearest example of dlls in Calvin's theology is in his interpretation of the merit 
gained by Christ's sacrifice. Calvin argues that man can in no way gain any merit 
from God because there is nothing that man possesses that God could possibly be 
9 Ibid., IL".19. 
10 Ibid., IIi 
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indebted to. Instead, in the example of Christ we have the clearest example of the 
predestined and unmetered nature of God's grace. The source of redemption 
through Christ is not through aspirations towards the actions of Christ, but by the 
extraordinaty power of God's grace alone: 
The free favour of God is as fidy opposed to our works as is dle obedience 
of Christ, bodl in their order: for Christ could not merit anything save by 
the good pleasure of God ... the merit of Christ depends entirely on the 
grace of God. 11 
Within the context of this study, two important consequences come from 
Calvin's voluntarist system. First is dle emphasis Calvin places on scripture. As we 
have already seen, Calvin following a voluntarist line refuses to believe that there is 
anything in the mind of man that can comprehend anything but the awesome 
presence of God; anything more than that becomes perverted by the fallen nature of 
the human mind. Knowledge of God cannot come by the application of the human 
mind to the form of God's creation in the world. Such is dle nature of the human 
mind that dus understanding would be fatally limited and inevitably perverted: 
For no sooner do we, from a survey of the world, obtain some slight 
knowledge of Deity, than we pass by the true God, and set up in ills stead 
the dream and phantom of our own brain, drawing away the praise of 
11 Ibid., ILxvu.1. 
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justice, wisdom, and goodness from the fountain-head, and transferring out 
th !2 to some 0 er quarter. 
For Calvin, man can only come to knowledge of dle divine when God has chosen 
to make hinlself comprehensible to the minds of men. The chief means of this is 
through the words of scripture. In scripture God reduces himself and 
'accommodates' to a form dlat is comprehensible to the human mind. Revelation 
therefore comes in a form understandable and digestible by dle human mind. An 
example of this, Calvin argues, is Christ's use of parables, reducing God's message 
to dle medium of human metaphors. Revelation is, for Calvin, in the words of 
Alister McGrath, the ultimate 'act of divine condescension.'!3 The words of 
scripture are then beyond human interpretation or criticism because they have been 
preserved in their present form through the power of divine providence rather than 
human care. 
The second consequence of Calvin's voluntarism is the selective and 
unknown nature of God's grace. Calvin's the017 of predestination, which again 
owes much to Augustine, was to become the most controversial aspect of Calvin's 
theology. Calvin argues that scripture has taught us that God's covenant was not 
preached equally to all men. The consequence of this is that salvation only comes to 
those whom God has elected to save. Therefore whether or not man will be saved 
or damned is already known to God's mind. There is nothing man can actively do to 
change the decision of God, consequendy the fate of man is, for Calvin, 
preordained by the will of God.14 In Calvin's theology, predestination is simply the 
!2 Ibid., 1.v.5. 
131IcGrath, Life, pp.130-2. 
!~ Illstitt/tes, II1.xxi. 
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logical consequence of his voluntarist doctrine of God. However, as we shall go on 
to see, the doctrine of predestination became the central building block of the 
Calvinist orthodoxy of thinkers that succeeded Calvin's thought after his death. 
II.2.ii. Protestant Scholasticism and Arminianism 
The nature of grace and predestination within Calvin's thought became the most 
contentious issue when Calvin's thought came to be developed into a unified system 
by his followers after his death. Chief in this development was Theodore Beza 
whose thought had a more profound effect than Calvin's on the development of the 
English Calvinism that the Cambridge Platonists were ultimately going to react 
against. Thomas Jackson, a precursor of the Cambridge Platonists, commented that 
Calvin's thought and that of his followers had been put 'into a worse and more 
dangerous sense than they themselves meant them in, or their followers in the 
Churches wherein they lived did interpret them.'!5 Although Jackson sees dus 
perversion to have affected the thought of both Calvin and Beza, it is possible to 
recognize witl1in Beza's thought a fundamental shift in the theological emphasis of 
orthodox Calvinism from that espoused by Calvin in the Institlltes. In particular, 
Beza introduces into Calvinist thought the strict logical form of Scholasticism. It is 
the combination of Scholastic logic with theological voluntarism that underpins the 
strict nature of the Calvinism that the Cambridge Platonists encountered in 
Cambridge in the seventeenth century. 
The use of scholastic thought within the Protestant tradition would seem, 
on first examination, to be strange. Both Luther and Calvin are highly critical of the 
15 Thomas Jackson, Tbe If/orks ~rTbo!J/as fadesoll, D.D. 12 vo1s (OUP, Oxford, 1844), IX:24. 
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manner in which scholastic thought had perverted and cortupted Christianity within 
Roman Catholicism.16 However what we encounter in Beza's thought is the 
conversion of the analytical and inductive reasoning of Calvin's Biblical theology to 
the synthetic and deductive theology advocated by Beza. In Calvin's thought, the 
starting point of theology is always the religious experience of man. Beza turns the 
basic premise of Calvinism on its head by making the starting point of Calvinist 
thought the doctrine of God. Beza's doctrine of God still maintains the extreme 
voluntarism that one finds in Calvin. However, where in Calvin this apophaticism 
develops from man's acceptance, through experience, of his fallibility and fallen 
nature in the face of the magnificence of the divine, within Beza's thought the 
voluntarist understanding is taken to be an a priori assumption. 17 In this way one can 
detect a clear movement from the Christocentric theology Calvin to the stricter 
Theocentric thought of Beza.18 Beza places his doctrine of God at the heart of his 
theological system. This change in emphasis is also marked by a change in 
theological method. Beza, in contrast to Calvin, bases his a pliori assertion of the 
nature and form of the divine on the dictates of scholastic logic, rather than on 
Calvin's use of Biblical proof. 19 As a consequence, dle Theocentric system 
developed by Beza has come to be known as Protestant Scholasticism. Brian 
Armstrong has identified four major tendencies within Protestant Scholasticism. 
The first of these is recognition of religious truth through the deductive, syllogistic 
reasoning. Second, because God is the source of this deductive reasoning, such 
16 John Patrick Donnelly, Calvillism alld Scbolasticism ill VeJ7Jligli's dodline of iIi an alld Grace, (Brill, Leiden, 
1976), p.6. 
17 Brian G. Armstrong, Calvillism alld tbe AtJJ)'rallt Here.!)': Protestallt SdJOlasticislJI alld Humallism ill 
S eVel/temtb amtlll]l Frallce (University of\\1isconisn Press, :Madison, 1969), p.136; John S. Bray, Tbeodore 
Beza's Docfli!le of Pre de stillati 011 (B. De Graaf, Nieuwkoop, 1975), p.119. 
18 j\fcGrath, IntelledNalOrigills, p.192. 
19 Bray, Beza's Doctlille ~lPredestillatioll, pp.121-2; Peter \V'hite, Predestillatioll, polic), a!ld polemit:' COI!llid 
and COIISel/SIiS in tbe Ellglisb Cblll'(;bji'OlJ1 tbe RefiJl7lJatioll to tbe CivilIT7ar (CUP, Cambridge, 1992), p.25. 
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reasoning carries with it the power and validity of revelation. Thirdly, as scripture is 
the unified account of divine truth, man can gain access to the truth of religion and 
measure orthodoxy by the use of syllogistic reasoning within the scriptures. 
Fourthly, Protestant Scholasticism relies upon a powerful abstract and metaphysical 
understanding of the doctrine of God, especially over the formation of the will of 
God.20 
This final point is crucial in understanding the development of both the 
theological and ethical implications of Protestant Scholasticism, in particular its 
understanding of the doctrine of predestination. Beza's starting point is the doctrine 
of God, not, as in Calvin, the experience of man. Therefore within Beza's system all 
theological explanations have to begin with the doctrine of God, and implicidy the 
manifestation of the will of God, the doctrine of predestination. Predestination is 
therefore promoted by Beza to the central means by which God's nature was 
manifested to men. Predestination is no longer a logical consequence of the divine 
grace, as in Calvin, but central to the doctrine of God. By making predestination 
central to his doctrine of God, Beza mirrors the theological structure of Aquinas 
rather than Calvin.21 In Beza's theocentric theological system, predestination 
becomes the logical starting point of all dleological discussion. The ethical 
consequence of this is that the judgment of man through the predestined will of 
God is ordered more by the dictates of scholastic reasoning than by Biblical 
evidence. The clearest example of this is the clear distinction made by Beza, and 
odler Protestant Scholastics, between the supra-lapsarian and infra-lapsarian nature 
of salvation, whether salvation is preordained before or after 'the Fall' of Adam. 
20 "-1.rmstrong, Am)'lYlllt Here-D', p.32. 
21 Ibid., ppAO-1. Compare Illstitutes, IIL21, with Aquinas, SlImma Tbeologica, 1 a.19. 
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Starting from dle assumption iliat Christ died to save only ilie elect, Beza argues 
iliat logically it is contradictory to his doctrine of God to say iliat God would make 
a decision on ilie membership of ilie elect which was contingent on the temporal 
act of 'ilie Fall.' For Beza it is a matter of logic, not Biblical proof, iliat God elected 
ilie saved from eternity railier ilian making dlls decision as a consequence of'ilie 
Fall.,22 Beza's argument, in dlls crucial area of Calvinist doctrine, is asserted not 
because of Biblical exegesis, but because it nllirors more accurately ilie logic of ilie 
scholasticism iliat underpins all his ilieology. 
A second, edllcal, implication of Protestant Scholasticism was the 
development of what R.T.Kendall has termed 'experimental predestination.' This 
ilieory argues iliat, because ilie elect are known from eternity, ilie use of ilie correct 
form of deductive, syllogistic, reasoning can confltm or deny man's membership of 
ilie elect. Kendall argues iliat Beza's iliought seeks to use ilie moral law as a means 
of giving man knowledge iliat he is one of God's elect. Beza argues iliat if man's 
election has been preordained, ilien even in his fallen state ilie saved individual, 
through his ability to act in a moral and pious way, can gain knowledge of his 
membership of the elect. This practical knowledge of membership of ilie saved is 
based on a use of 2 Pt.1: 1 0: 'ilierefore, bredtten, be ilie more zealous to confltm 
your call and election, for if you do dlls you will never fail.' This form of reasoning 
relies on a syllogistic proof to confirm man's memberslllp of the elect. This so-
called practical syllogism argues iliat sanctification can be verified using ilie 
following reasoning: everyone who believes is a child of God; I believe, therefore I 
am a child of God and as a consequence a member of ilie elect.23 What we find, 
22 Armstrong, A"rylYllit Here!)', pp.13 7 -S. 
23 Kendall, Calvill alld Ellglish Calvillism (OUF, Oxford, 1979), pp.S, 71. 
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therefore, in the ethical arguments of the Protestant Scholastics is a reversal of the 
roles of justification and sanctification from what we find in Calvin's writings. 
Where Calvin argues that man cannot truly repent until he is assured of God's grace, 
in Beza's thought that assurance can be delayed until knowledge of the effects are 
known and so the actions of this life can have an effect on man's knowledge that he 
h . 1: ·th 24 as a true savmg lal . 
The main opposition to the Protestant Scholasticism of orthodox Calvinism 
came from the thought of one of Beza's pupils, Jacobus Arminius. Arminius 
undermined the central tenet of Protestant scholasticism by asserting that it is not 
possible to argue that Christ died solely for the elect. In doing this he undermines 
the implicit voluntarism of Beza's thought.25 Arminius does not reject the doctrine 
of predestination, in fact his thought carries with it a very strong doctrine of 
predestination. However, in contrast to Beza, Arminius makes predestination 
subordinate to creation and 'the Fall.'26 Consequently, Arminius argues that Christ 
died for all, but God saves only those who have the moral fortitude to believe. 
Christ tllerefore acts as mediator not for the preordained with no regard for their 
action, but for the elect because they chose to 'repent and believe.' Although 
Arminius' thought is consistent with the belief that salvation is only open to those 
who have been preordained to be saved, it also implies that the power of grace can 
be resisted or accepted by volition. Human action, for Arminius, becomes integral 
to the process of salvation.27 Arminius' thought rejects the purity of Calvinist 
justification by faith alone in favour of a two-fold justification of grace and human 
2~ Ibid., p.35. 
25 Ibid., p.149. 
26 \\lhite, Predestillatioll, Poli!), alld Polemil', p.31. 
27 Kendall, Calvill, p.142. 
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action. The difference between the thought of Arminius and the orthodox 
Calvinism of Beza is that, whereas orthodox Calvinists argue that believers 
persevere in moral piety because they are elect, Arminius argues that God elects 
only those whom he foresees will remain in the life of moral piety.28 To the modern 
reader, these differences may only seem to be based on subde semantic differences. 
However within Calvinist theology of the early-seventeenth century Arminius' claim 
that man through his own action could choose to resist or accept the power of grace 
was a heretical claim, which would come to dominate seventeenth century 
theological debate. 
II.2.iii. Voluntarist Theology and Thomas Hobbes 
A discussion of Thomas Hobbes at this point might appear to be a digression from 
the central theme of this chapter. I believe, however, that in relation to the 
Cambridge Platonists it is important to understand the thought of Thomas Hobbes 
as essentially growing out of the voluntarism implicit within the ordlodox Calvinism 
of the early-seventeenth century. This voluntarism is not the only influence on the 
development of Hobbes' work, although it is an influence on Hobbes' work that has 
been overlooked by many. The Cambridge Platonists, and Cudworth in particular, 
approach Hobbes in dle ftrst instance as an extreme proponent of dle voluntarism 
that they encountered and opposed in orthodox Calvinism. As A.P.Martnich has 
pointed out, Hobbes' ftrst critics all came from Arminian, or at least anti-Calvinist 
dlinkers, most notably Clarendon, Bramhall and, of course, the Cambridge 
Platonists. Many of the early critiques of Hobbes were explicit in their equating of 
28 Ibid., p.145. 
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Hobbes to Calvinism. Thomas Pierce, who would later become Dean of Salisbury, 
claimed in 1658 that 'Mr Hobbs .. .is as able a Calvillist (as to these points) as their 
party hadllately had.'29 The voluntarist element in Hobbes' thought remained 
central to criticisms of his thought into the early eighteenth century. Leibniz, for 
instance, utilised the dilemma of The Etttl?JPhro in his criticism of Hobbes' educal 
h 30 t eory. 
The source of the voluntarism in Hobbes' thought comes from his use and, 
to an extent, secularisation of the salvific structure of Calvinist thought. Hobbes 
certainly grew up within the strict Calvinist orthodoxy. His father, although not the 
most pious of men, was an ordained minister who followed the Calvinist orthodoxy 
of the Elizabedlan and Jacobean Church. Hobbes also received an orthodox 
Calvinist education as an undergraduate at Magdalen Hall, Oxford.3! Hobbes in his 
own writings expressed an adnliration for Calvin and other Calvinist writers, most 
notably William Perkins.32 Despite these biographical influences, the nature and 
extent of Hobbes' religious belief remains an extremely contentious issue. The 
problem in interpreting Hobbes' religious belief comes, I believe, as a consequence 
of the extreme negative theology that runs ilirough all of Hobbes' dlOUght. This 
position is, I would argue, direcdy comparable to the voluntarism we have already 
encountered in Calvinism. Much of dUs ambiguity comes from Hobbes' professed 
belief that philosophy should not seek to discuss the nature of God, as Hobbes 
clearly states: 'We ought not to dispute of God's nature, he is no fit subject of our 
29 Thomas Pierce, Auroxamxp1iJls, or S e!lColldellJllatioll, (London, 1658) p.138. 
30 See Goldie, Mark, 'The Reception of Hobbes,' in The CalJlb'idge HistolJl ofPolitiml Thoflght, 1450-
1700, ed. ] .H.Bums, with the assistance of l'vIark Goldie (CUP, Cambridge, 1991), pp.589-615.The 
fullest discussion of Hobbes' relationship to voluntarist theology is N oelMalcolm, 'Thomas Hobbes 
and Voluntarist Theology' (ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1982). 
3! Martinich, T]/fo Gods, p.64; l\fartinich, Hobbes: A BiograplJ)1 (CUP, Cambridge, 1999), pp.1-18. 
32 Thomas Hobbes, 'Of Liberty and Necessity,' in Hobbes alld Bramhall 011 LIberl)' alld Necessil)', ed. Vere 
Chappell (CUP, Cambridge, 1999), pp.70, 80. Also see l\Iartinich, TJ/fo Gods, p.3. 
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philosophy.,33 Much time and effort has been spent discussing the sincerity of 
Hobbes' religious faith, this quote being often used by those who wish to deny 
Hobbes a sincere religious belief. However, it could just as well, in the light of the 
Calvinist orthodoA'T of the day, be read as following the extreme negative theology 
that we have already encountered in Calvinism. In a similar vein to Calvin, Hobbes 
argues that all the human mind can know of God is that he exists, '[±Jor there is but 
one Name to signifie our Conception of his Nature, and that is, I AM: and but one 
Name of his relation to us, and that is God.'34 Hobbes argues tint it is not for 
humans to conceive of God, only to honour him.35 As J.G.A. Pocock has argued, 
'Hobbes's God is one of whom we can know by reason only that he must exist and 
must be all-powerful. His nature is incomprehensible, and anything we say about it 
is no more than language designed to honour his power. ,36 The ethical consequence 
of a system built on such an extreme apophatic premise is that man is, in 
comparison to the divine, totally helpless and corrupt. Hobbes' extremely 
pessimistic view of human nature is therefore not simply a useful rhetorical tool to 
justify absolutism and the rule of the Leviathan, it is also the political working out of 
the fallen state of man that we have already encountered in Calvinist voluntarism. 
Hobbes also follows Calvin in arguing that redemption and salvation is 
found exclusively through the will of God.37 The means by which this is achieved is 
where Hobbes primarily differs from Calvin. Where Calvin argues that the will of 
God can only be known by man through his accommodation to mankind in 
scripture, Hobbes argues that God's will is mediated to man through the correct 
33 Hobbes 'Of Liberty and Necessity', p.42. 
3~ Leviathall, pA03. 
35 Ibid., p.99. 
36 Pocock, 'Time, History, and Eschatology,' p.185. 
37 j\Tartinich, TJVO Gods, p.67. 
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form of civil sovereign.38 Despite this difference in form, both Calvin and Hobbes 
maintain the voluntarist ethical structure that justice is formed by dle action of will, 
not by its correspondence to a pre-existing notion of justice. Consequendy justice is, 
for Hobbes, created exclusively by the will of the sovereign. This claim is dlen given 
theological credence, Hobbes believes, by his argument that the sovereign is dle true 
heir of the kingship of Christ. The Leviadlan therefore becomes for Hobbes the 
image and mirror of the kingship of Christ. Although Hobbes' argument in this 
respect differs from that of Calvin, his interpretation of the person of Christ still 
remains loyal to Calvinism. Hobbes interprets the office of Christ as three-fold: 
Redeemer, Pastor and Eternal King. This three-fold distinction follows Calvin's 
interpretation of Christ as Prophet, King and Priest.39 For Hobbes, the most 
important of these was the office of 'Eternal King.' Hobbes argues that the only 
source of God's law can be through one sovereign, '[o]ut of which we may 
conclude, that whosoever in a Christian Common-wealth holdeth the place of 
Moses, is the sale Messenger of God, and Interpreter of his Commandments.,4(1 
Once this relationship is established, the voluntarist nature of Hobbes' ethical 
theory becomes clear. Salvation is only available to those who adhere to the will of 
the sovereign, who is, for Hobbes, the only arbiter of God's will: 'All that is 
NECESSARY to Salvation, is contained in two Vertues, Faith in Christ, and ObedieJlce 
to LawS.'41 Sin is therefore synonymous in Hobbes' eyes with the breaking of the 
laws ordained by the civil sovereign, which is 'not only showing contempt of the 
legislator, but also the will of God.'42 Consequendy law is, for Hobbes, not 
38 Leviathall, p.41S. 
39 Ibid., p.5l2; Illstitlltes, II.xv, also see :Martinich, TJJlO Gods, p.294. 
-10 Leviathall, p.504. 
-11 Ibid., p.6l0. 
-12 Ibid., p.33S. 
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dependent on a pre-existent notion of justice. Rather, Hobbes' voluntarism is 
clearest when he argues that justice is created by the will and power of the sovereign 
alone, as the conduit for the will of God. 
II.3. Historical and Political Context 
II.3.i. Calvinism and anti-Calvinism in seventeenth century Cambridge 
The purpose of this second section is to show the way in which the theological and 
philosophical theories outlined above came to influence and drive the theological, 
social and political context within which the Cambridge Platonists developed. In 
particular I will examine the manner in which these debates manifested themselves 
in Cambridge University during the first half of the seventeenth century. I will argue 
that, although the Calvinist orthodo:lo..7 of Protestant Scholasticism was always a 
strong influence, it was not so dominant that we have to see Cambridge Platonism 
as developing out of Calvinist hegemony. It is true to say that Calvinism was the 
dominant theological fOlID of the English Church in the late-sL'{teenth and early-
seventeenth centuries. Peter White has argued that the doctrine of predestination, 
often used as the litmus test of Calvinist orthodo:lo..7, was uniformly accepted in the 
parishes of early-seventeenth century England. White, however, does admit that 
debates over predestination remained highly contentious within the Universities of 
Oxford and Cambridge.43 It is within this Calvinist/ anti-Calvinist debate, which 
existed within the confines of the Universities if not in the countty at large, that 
43 \\1hite, Predestillatioll, Poli0' alld Polemic, p.309. 
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Cambridge Platonism ftrst became defined as a characteristic theological and 
philosophical position. 
The power of the Calvinist orthodm.J of the late Elizabethan and Jacobean 
Church is perhaps best shown through the success and popularity of the writings of 
the Cambridge theologian William Perkins. Perkins, a fellow of Christ's College, was 
not the most original of thinkers. His major strength was as a conduit for the 
transmission of the ideas of Protestant scholasticism, and particularly Beza's 
thought, into England.44 Perkins was able to introduce to England, through works 
like A Golden Chaine, Beza's theories of supra-Iapsarian predestination and assurance 
for the faithful through the reasoning of the practical syllogism.45 It is in Perkins' 
thought that we find the most explicit uses of syllogistic reasoning to conftrm the 
membership to the elect. Through the practical syllogism Perkins argues that man is 
able to both give witness to the spirit and, by inference, attain knowledge of 
sanctiftcation. This second claim, which mirrors vety closely that which we have 
already encountered in Beza, is based on the assumption that man can never know 
the 'ftrst cause' of election, but, through the correct form of reasoning, could 
appreciate himself as one of the elect.46 
It is no surprise to see Perkins as the most vociferous defender of Calvinism 
during this period. In particular he vigorously attacked both Arminius and any 
suggestions of Arminiarusm within the English Church. The most famous example 
of this opposition came in Cambridge in the 1590s, a debate which started the 
Calvinist/ anti-Calvinist debate from which Cambridge Platonism ftrst emerged ftfty 
441. Breward, 'The Importance of Perkins,' in The JOlll7lal ojReligiolls History, 4:2 (1966), pp.113-28, 
p.llS. 
45 Dewey D. Wallace, Ptllitalls alld Predestillatioll: Grace ill Ellglish Protestallt Theology, 1525-1695 
(University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1982), p.60; Kendall, Calvill alld Ellglish Calvillism, 
pp.S4-S. 
46 Kendall, Calvill, p.71. 
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years later.47 In a University sermon preached in 1595, William Barrat, the then 
chaplain of Gonville and Caius College, vehemently attacked the strict Calvinism 
being taught by some in Cambridge at the time and, by association, Perkins as its 
chief advocate. The chief influence on the sermon was probably the French 
Protestant Peter Baro who was then tlle Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity. 
Although publicly professing to tlle Calvinist orthodoxy Baro is thought to have 
held Arminian views in private. Baro also opposed the scholastic philosophy upon 
which the strict Calvinism of the time rested.48 The opposition to Barrat's sermon 
was led by Perkins.49 So fierce was this opposition that Barrat was forced to recant 
his sermon. However, the controversy did not end within the confine of the 
University. The profession of anti-Calvinist sentiment within Cambridge led the 
then Archbishop of Canterbury, John Whitgift, to intervene to settle the doctrinal 
problems aroused by this controversy. The subsequent 'Lambeth Articles', 
published in November 1595, are the clearest statement of English Calvinist 
orthodoxy.SO These state clearly that 'God has predestined some men to life, and 
reprobated some to death.' The moving force of this election is not the 
'perseverance ... of good works, or of anything innate in the person of the 
predestined, but only the will and pleasure of God.' Crucially for this survey, the 
Lambeth Articles conclude with the statement that '[i]t is not in the will or the 
power of each and every man to be saved.,sl The inlmediate effect of these articles 
47 TIllS point is made most clearly by H.C. Porter in his book Reformatioll alld Reactioll ill Tudor 
CaJ1JbJidge (CUP, Cambridge, 1958), where he concludes his work on the debates of the 1590s with a 
discussion of the \\lhichcote/Tuckney debate under the chapter title of 'The Candle of the Lord,' 
pp.416-29. 
48 \\1allace, Pmitalls alld Predestillatioll, p.67. 
49 Breward, 'The importance of Perkins,' p.120. 
50 Nicholas Tyacke, Allti-Calvillists: The Rise ojAmlliliallislJl, (.1590-1640 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1987). p.5 
51 The best full-length discussion of this controversy is Porter, RefoJ7J1atioll and Rem·tioll. It is from tllls 
work, pp.365-6, that the translations of the Lambeth Articles are taken. Also see, Tyacke, Allti-
Calvillists, p.29-31. 
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was simply to fire a warning shot across the bows of thinkers such as Barrat and 
Baro who tried to deny the Calvinist orthodoA)' of the day. The long term effect of 
the articles was to codify and maintain a strong anti-Arminian theme within the 
English Church that remained largely undisturbed till the 1620s. 
In this way the Lambeth Articles can be seen as a precursor to the most 
systematic attack on dle Arminian threat to Calvinist orthodoA1T at dle Synod of 
Dort (1618-19). Called flnally to setde the divisions in the Reformed Church in the 
Low Countries, the conclusions of the Synod follow very closely the theological 
position advocated by the Lambeth Articles. The presence of an offlcial English 
delegation to the Synod only went to confIrm the opposition there was within the 
established English Church to anti-Calvinist and, in particular, Arminian thought. 
The conclusions of dle Synod were summed up in the now famous TULIP 
mnemonic. This summarised Calvinist teaching in flve central points: total depravity 
of human nature, unconditional election of the individual, limited atonement of 
Christ's passion, irresistible grace of God, and perseverance of the elect.52 The 
conclusions of the Synod were not ever adopted as canon law within England. It is, 
however, fair to see the conclusions of dle Synod as mirroring the Calvinist 
orthodoxy of the English Church at the time. That being said, it did not silence 
Arminianism and anti-Calvinism either on the continent or in England.51 
52 McGrath, Life, p.217; Kendall, Calvill, p.150. 
5.1 Tyacke, Allti-Calvillists, pp.l 04-5. 
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University as a whole, as analogous with Calvinism. As already stated, the religious 
orthodoxy of Cambridge at the time was broadly Calvinist, but to equate that with 
the extreme Calvinism of later figures, such as Anthony Tuckney, is to misread the 
nature of Puritan belief within Cambridge at the time. Puritanism has become one 
of the great 'catch-all' definitions of religious histoq and, as a consequence, exact 
defmition is vety difficult. Puritanism was, at least until the 1620s, a term used to 
describe members of the Church of England (which was broadly although not 
dogmatically Calvinist) that wished to see greater Protestant reforms of liturgy and 
organisation. In this sense the debates of the 1590s may have been anti-Calvinist, 
but they did not seek to undermine the Puritan orthodoxy of the day. It was mainly 
with the growing ascendancy of Laudianism through tile 1620s and 1630s that the 
term became used as a term of abuse, when it was used to define those who 
opposed Laud's reforms generally, and those who followed Calvinist doctrine in 
particular. 57 Emmanuel was therefore a great home to Puritanism understood in a 
more general sense. In this sense it is possible to see the Cambridge Platonists 
within Puritan Emmanuel. In fact two of the college's great masters from this 
period, Lawrence Chaderton and Richard Holdsworth, can be understood as 
Puritans who sought to distance themselves from the deterministic excesses of the 
Calvinism of their time.58 Holdsworth as master actively discouraged his 
undergraduates from using Calvin as their sole and certainly first source of Biblical 
interpretation.59 That is not to say that some of those educated in Emmanuel at the 
time did not follow this extreme Calvinism. It is however incorrect to view the 
57 Tyacke,Allti-Calviliists, pp.7-8. 
58 Sarah Bendell, Christopher Brooke & Patrick Collinson, A Histol), ~lEIl1JJJali/ie1 College, Cambridge, 
(Boydell, Woodbridge, 1999), pp.177, 224. 
59 Emmanuel College 1lS 48, fo1.40. 
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Cambridge Platonists as developing their position in complete opposition to the 
prevailing theology of their college. 
What is certain is that Emmanuel was the Puritan heart of Cambridge 
University at the time. This Puritanism was best seen in the non-conformity of 
religious observance within dle college. During the reign of James I, Emmanuel was 
criticised for failure to have surplices worn in Chapel and to use the Book of 
Common Prayer. Most importandy, looking forward to Laud's reforms in the 
University, communion was taken sitting around a table, passing the sacraments 
from man to man. The Chapel, which is now the Old Library in the college, was 
orientated nordl/ south and remained unconsecrated. The statutes of dle college 
also had within them the missionaty zeal characteristic of the Puritanism of 
Cambridge at the time. These statutes said that no fellow could serve more that 10 
years before taking a parish. The ruling theology of Emmanuel was, one can say, 
Puritan in form, broadly but not exclusively Calvinist in theology, and imbued with 
a missionary zeal.60 The main beneficiaries of this zeal were the Eastern counties 
and Essex, which by the early-seventeendl century had become, theologically, 
satellites of Emmanue1.61 
The form that education took in Emmanuel at the time followed the 
traditions of the scholastic curriculum dating back to the mediaeval foundation of 
the college and University. The importance of the scholastic form of this education 
was given extra weight because of the importance Scholastic philosophy played in 
underpinning the Calvinist orthodoxy of the day. The overriding impression one 
gets from the nature of the Scholastic curriculum was the st11.ct and rigid form it 
60 Bendell et aI., Emmall/fe! College p.16. 
61 Ibid., p.189. 
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took not only in style but also in content. In Cambridge the form of education was 
governed by the student's tutor. Each student was allotted a tutor by the master of 
the college on entry, and that tutor watched every part of that student's education, 
from teaching to accommodation and the managing of finances. 62 The relationship 
was much more that of school-master and pupil. Milton complained later of having 
been whipped by his tutor as an undergraduate in Cambridge.63 The ages of student 
at matriculation could vary wildly. Tuckney for instance matriculated when he was 
fourteen, John Locke, at Christ Church Oxford, when he was twenty-one.64 
Lectures were held in the Old Schools, between the Senate House and Clare 
College, often very early in the morning. The rest of the day was then spent 
covering the rigorous scholastic education. 
One of the best sources for the nature and form of this education is Richard 
Holdswordl's DirectiollJfor a Stt/dellt Of the UlliverJiry. It is not possible to see this as a 
direct transcript of a student education at the time. Fitsdy, by splitting the day in 
two and having parallel classes in philosophy in the mornings and history and 
language in dle afternoons, the Directiom suggest a form that differed from the 
traditional style of organising the curriculum.65 Added to dus is the confusion that 
has arisen over the precise date of the authorship of the DirectionJ. In the Emmanuel 
College version, which was presented as a public book written out by a professional 
scribe, the audlor recommends books dlat were published after Holdsworth was 
ejected from the Mastership of Emmanuel in 1644. It is, however, known that even 
whilst he was exiled in London Holdsworth continued to take an active interest in 
62 For a full account of the role of the tutor see H.F.Fletcher, The Illtelledllal Developme/lt ojJolJll jl;1iltoll, 
2 vols. (University ofIllinois Press, Urbana, 1961), volume II. 
63 1Iamice Cranston, Johll Locke: A Biograpl!J! (OUP, Oxford, 1985), p.30. 
6~ Letters, p.i; Cranston, Johll Locke, p. 29. 
65 Emmanuel College MS 48, fols.7-13; Bendell et al., EtlltJIallllel College, p.74. 
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college and University affairs through the 1640s.66 It is therefore possible to 
interpret the Directions not as an authentic account of the nature of an undergraduate 
education, as H.F.Fletcher has done, but as an idealised account of the form that 
that education might take. 
Viewing the Directiolls with dus caveat in mind, it is of interest to see the 
dominance that Aristode played in dUs education. It is possible to interpret the 
philosophlcal education that Holdsworth suggests for the four years of study as a 
preparation for the study of Aristode's Logic at the end of it. All dUs strict education 
was based around dle scholastic belief in the deductive nature of knowledge. The 
truth could be found by placing reality against several prescribed forms of syllogistic 
reasoning.67 The final form that dus education took was in the disputations. These 
were public examinations in whlch students had to defend or attack a set position 
using the forms of Aristotelian/Scholastic reasoning taught to them in the previous 
four years. Holdsworth was very keen to stress the importance of these disputations. 
They were not only needed to gain the degree, but would show publicly later the 
worth of the University after these students entered public life: 
Without those you will be bafeled in your disputes, digraced & vilified in 
Public examinations, laughed at in speeches & Declamations you will never 
dare so appear in any act of credit in the University.68 
66 John A. Trentmann, 'The Authorship of Dli'lldioJlsjor a Stude"t of the UJliversdie'in TrclllsmtioJls of the 
Camblidge Bibliographical S ode(y, V11:2 (1978) pp.170-83. p.180. 
67 William T. Costello, The Scholastic Clirricllilim at Ear!J! Seve/ltee/lth centll!]! Camblidge (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge J'dA, 1958), pp.14-5. 
68 Emmanuel College, MS.48, fo1.22. 
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II.3.iii. Laudianism and Arminianism in Cambridge in the 1620s and 1630s 
As has already been mentioned, despite the various Arminian controversies of the 
late-sL'{teenth century, the English Church remained in a broadly Calvinist form 
until the 1620s; any residual Arminianism was limited, particularly in Cambridge, 
with the Royal approval of, although not official acceptance of, the final ruling of 
the Synod of Dort.69 Despite this political move there remained, as we have seen, a 
clear anti-Calvinist seam in English theological thought, particularly within the 
Universities, through the early-seventeenth century. This opposition manifested 
itself in two different, but often confused camps. The first was in the theological 
Arminianism which first found a voice in Barrat and Baro in the 1590s. The second 
is the anti-Calvinist reforms to Church practice driven by William Laud. These 
Laudian reforms are often termed 'Arminian' because they were anti-Calvinist in 
form. However, it is wrong to make the two terms synonymous. Particularly in 
reference to the Cambridge Platonists, it is important to stress how in Cambridge at 
the time they opposed Laud's reforms, keeping true to their Puritan heritage but, at 
the same time, distancing themselves from the theological excesses of many of the 
P . . 70 untan contemporanes. 
Laud is often referred to as an Arminian. It is, however, wrong to see Laud's 
Arminianism as growing directly from the Dutch Arminianism which was defeated 
and subsequently persecuted following the ruling of the Synod of Dort. As we have 
already seen sympathy was shown to the theology of the Arminians in England in 
the 1590s. Although James 1's sympathy to Calvinism did place Calvinism in the 
69 Tyacke, Allti-Calvillists, p.4S. 
70 Christopher Hill, Miltoll alld tbe Ellglisb Ri;VOllltioll (Yiking Press, New York, 1977), pp.268-77. 
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ascendancy in the early years of the seventeenth century, particularly in positions of 
Church government, a residual English anti-Calvinism remained. T.M. Parker has 
argued that in English thought one can fInd a tradition of anti-Calvinism which is 
allied to, but not based entirely on, Arminian theology. Parker sees this tradition 
growing from an increase in patristic scholarship in English Universities in dle late-
sixteendl and early-seventeenth centuries. The earliest exponent of this was 
Lancelot Anruewes who, on his death in 1626, Laud described as 'the great light of 
the Christian world.'71 This interest in patristics can also be found in other anti-
Calvinist thinkers of the time such as Thomas Jackson and William Buckeridge, 
both of whom found favour under the patronage of Laud.72 There was some cross 
fertilisation of ideas between the Dutch and the English Calvinists. John Hales, later 
of the Great Tew circle, is said to have 'bade John Calvin goodnight' whilst 
observing the debates at the Synod of Dort. However, it is possible to see dlat, in 
Parker's words, 'English Arminianism was parallel to Armianism proper, not its 
product; it was not created by Arminius, nor did it follow him in detail.'73 
Even though Laud's own anti-Calvinism did not follow exacdy the Arminian 
teachings of which he was accused, dlat does not mean that there was no 
theological sincerity within his thought. In dle past it has been popular to suggest 
that Laud's piety was a front for his political ambition. For instance, Hugh Trevor-
Roper's influential account of Laud's life sees Laud's reforms as politically 
motivated by the wishes of Charles I and not by doctrinal conflicts with the 
71 Quoted in Nicholas Tyacke, 'Archbishop Laud,' in The Earb' Stllat1 Ch,m;h, 1603-1642, ed. Kenneth 
Finchman (?\Iac1Iillan, Basingstoke, 1993), pp.51-69, p.62. 
72 For Thomas Jackson see Sarah Hutton, 'Thomas Jackson, Oxford Platonist, and \\1illiam Twisse, 
Aristotelian,' in JOlll1lal ?lthe HiJtol)' o/IdeaJ, 39 (1978) pp.635-52, pp.638, 641. For William Buckeridge 
see Tyacke, 'Archbishop Laud,' p.56. 
73 T.Parker, 'Arminiarusm & Laudiarusm in seventeenth century England,' in StlldieJ ill ChllrdJ HiJtol)' 
Vo!.l, ed. CW. Dugmore & Charles Duggan (Nelson, London, 1964), pp.20-34, pp.29-30. 
77 
Calvinist orthodoxy.74 However, it is possible to find in Laud's early career a clear 
opposition to the determinism of Calvinism. Whilst at Oxford Laud had developed 
a clear defence of freewill, the interior nature of righteousness and the certainty of 
salvation.75 In his doctoral thesis of 1608 Laud argues that only a bishop can confer 
holy orders. Laud was supported in Oxford by the Platonic philosopher Thomas 
Jackson. Jackson was an anti-Calvinist who believed that Christ died sufficiently for 
all Witllout limitation. The clear anti-Calvinism of both men led them to be branded 
Pelagian and brought them into conflict with the University authorities. It does 
seem that both men were aware of, and prepared to take, the risks that their 
theological views brought.76 
Where Laud's anti-Calvinism differs ftom the Dutch Arminians is his 
concentration on the sacraments as the means by which grace is transferred. This 
sacramental argument had been used against Calvinism by early Arminians. An 
English example of this argument was by Richard 'Dutch' Thompson who argued in 
the 1590s tlnt the universal nature of baptism, which was a central sacrament within 
the Church of England, invalidated tlle Calvinist defence of predestination.77 Laud 
concentrated on the sacrament of the Eucharist. This emphasis on tlle sacramental 
was peculiar to the English anti-Calvinism of Laud. Many of his later hated reforms 
- altars moved to the east-end, use of communion rails etc. - had to do with the 
veneration and sacerdotal nature of communion within Laud's anti-Calvinistic 
theological system. As Nicholas Tyacke argues, 'It was no accident that during the 
Arminian ascendancy altars and fonts came to dominate Church interiors, for the 
H For a critique or Trevor-Roper's biography of Laud see, Tyacke, 'Archbishop Laud,' pp.51-3. 
75 Tyacke, 'Arminisim and English Culture', in B,itaill alld the Netherlallds, Vol. 7 - Ch!llvh & State sim'e 
the Refol7Jlatioll. ed. A.C.Duke & C.A.Tamse, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1981) pp.94-117, p.96. 
76 Tyacke, 'Arminisim,' pp.97, 104; Tyacke,Allti-Ca//Jilists, p.71. 
77 Tyacke, Allti-Calvillists, p.36. 
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two were logically connected, sacramental grace replacing the grace of 
predestination.78 What is clear, therefore, is that Laud's anti-Calvinism was sincere 
as, but different in its form from, the anti-Calvinism of the Dutch Arminians. The 
difference between the two is shown by a comment made by the Calvinist Robert 
Bailie in the 1640s. Bailie criticises the English form of Arminianism for a tendency 
to Popery, whereas the Dutch form tended to the Socinian. Bailie criticises, on one 
hand, the sacramental nature of Laudianism and, on the other, the theoretical and 
intellectual theology that one finds in the Remonstrants. Such a distinction naturally 
places the Cambridge Platonists closer, in anti-Calvinist sentiments, to the latter 
than the former. 79 
During the 1620s and 1630s there was a gradual and then systematic attack 
on the Puritan and, therefore, Calvinist traditions of Cambridge. Although there 
was, as we have seen, a heated debate between Calvinists and anti-Calvinists from 
the end of the sL'(teenth century, this was the fIrst time one of the camps had tried 
to remove dle other completely from the fIeld of conflict. With the ascendancy of 
Laud a systematic attack on those theologically opposed to hin1 began. Laud was 
not able to exert direct influence over Cambridge, as he was in Oxford. As 
Chancellor from 1630, Laud wielded considerable influence over the theological 
fOlm of Oxford University, and his tenure as Chancellor led to a considerable rise in 
Laudian anti-Calvinism from 1630. Laud's influence within Cambridge was, 
however, limited because he had no direct influence over the running of the 
University as he had in Oxford. Laud's influence in Cambridge was primarily 
exercised through intermediaries. The fIrst of dlese intermediaries came in 1626 
78 Ibid., p.176. 
79 \V'allace, Plilitalls alld Predestillatioll, p.224. 
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widl ilie contentious election of dle Duke of Buckingham, ilie King's favourite and 
Laud's close ally in Court, as Chancellor. This led to a systematic muzzling of 
Puritan interests wiiliin ilie University. Cambridge effectively fell under direct Royal 
control. Aliliough iliese attacks abated wiili ilie murder of Buckingham, oilier 
factors added to the indirect Laudian attacks on Puritanism within Cambridge. The 
first of these came wiili the dissolution and extended absence of Parliaments from 
1629. Wiiliout Parliament, which had traditionally been supportive of Puritanism, 
iliere was no effective political check on ilie reforming zeal of Charles I and Laud. so 
The second influence came from Laud's powers as Bishop of London. This 
position gave him an effective veto on ilie nature and content of books published in 
London. As a consequence, iliere was an enormous growth in pro-Laud literature. 
This was also helped by ilie Laudian influence on ilie production of books ilirough 
ilie University presses in Oxford and Cambridge.S! This influence was also 
maintained by ilie active Royal influence on ilie election of college heads. The most 
obvious, and historically ironic, case of dlls Royal influence was ilie failed attempt 
to have Richard Holdsworili elected Master of St John's College in 1633. 
Holdsworili's election, which had been overwhelming amongst the fellowship of ilie 
college, was opposed and overturned by Royal command; the reason was 
Holdsworili's Puritan, and consequendy anti-Laudian sympadlles. The irony is iliat 
in ilie early 1640s Holdsworili was to become, as Vice-Chancellor and Master of 
Emmanuel, one of ilie King's most vociferous defenders against ilie claims of 
Parliament. Holdsworili was eventually stripped of his status, imprisoned and 
eventually exiled from Cambridge because of his desire to see a limited Episcopal 
80 Tyacke,Allti-Ca/villists, pp.49-51; Twigg, UlliversifJl qlCambiidge, pp.20-26. 
SI Ibid., p.31. 
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setdement and continued loyalty to the King.82 Despite this influence, some colleges 
and churches within Cambridge were able to resist Laud's reforms, most notably 
Emmanuel and Sidney Sussex Colleges, both of which were accused by Laud of 
b ·, . fP' . ,83 eillg nursenes 0 untan1sm. 
What is of interest in all these reforms is that the Cambridge Platonists seem 
to have always remained connected to institutions that opposed, or at least resisted, 
Laud's reforms, most notably as students and fellows of Emmanuel but also by their 
connection with Holy Trinity Church. Holy Trinity was a centre of Puritanism in the 
City of Cambridge and often brought the displeasure of Laud.84 Whichcote was 
appointed to the Sunday lectureship at Holy Trinity in 1636 at the height of Laud's 
influence in Cambridge. It is impossible to verify whether Whichcote's appointment 
was made with or without the blessing of the Laudians within Cambridge. It is 
possible to surmise, however, that Whichcote's conciliatory style may have been a 
nod to the dominance of the Laudians in Cambridge at the time. It may not be 
possible to go as far as Nicholas Tyacke in arguing that 'Calvinism had been 
silenced'in Cambridge by 1632.85 It is, however, possible to see the Puritans, who 
included strict Calvinists, as very much on the defensive during this period. 
Although the Cambridge Platonists were not doctrinally Calvinist, their Puritan 
sympathies, especially in the face of Laud's reforms, placed them together with the 
strict Calvinists in opposing Laud during this period. 
82 Ibid., pp.26-7. 
83 Ibid., p.38. 
8+ Ibid., p.30. 
85 Tyacke, 'Archbishop Laud' p.69. For a direct rejection ofTyacke's assertion see \\lhite, 
Predestillatioll, po/il)' alld polemic, p.306. 
81 
1I.3.iv. Cambridge in the 1640s: The Westminster Assembly and the Earl of 
Manchester's Purge 
Any hope of Laud continuing his reforms within Cambridge was greatly climinished 
by the King calling Parliament for the fIrst time in 12 years. The calling of the Short 
and then the Long Parliaments hastened the growing political crisis in England, 
which eventually drew the country into civil war. What is of interest to this survey is 
not the nature of that political crisis, but the theological form that Parliament's 
opposition to the King took. In particular, I will examine the manner in which the 
opposition of Parliament, to the King, and consequently Laud, profoundly affected 
the theological make-up of Cambridge during this period. Because the opposition to 
Laud was driven by the wishes of Parliament, its theological form was more 
explicitly Calvinist, matching the Calvinism of tlle country at large, rather than 
matching the greater theological diversity that was peculiar to the Puritanism of the 
Universities. Therefore we fmd in the reforms of the 1640s a Calvinist zeal that, 
although existent within Cambridge at the time, was certainly not found in the same 
concentration as it was in the Long Parliament. 
Within both the Short and Long Parliaments there was not a great desire to 
bring about, to borrow a phrase of the time, root and branch reforms of the 
Universities. Over half the MPs in the new Parliament had been educated in the two 
Universities, compared to only about a quarter of MPs from Parliaments earlier in 
the seventeenth century. Among this new group of University educated MPs was 
the new MP for Cambridge, and former land agent of Emmanuel College, Oliver 
Cromwell. There was, however, a desire within Parliament to remove from the 
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Universities the excesses of Royal control within the University.86 This was brought 
about in two ways. The flrst was to attack Royal demands placed on the 
Universities, the clearest example of this being the repeal of James 1's proclamation 
of 1616. The proclamation was in itself not highly contentious, demanding that all 
graduates afftrm Royal supremacy over the Church, support the Book of Common 
Prayer and uphold the thirty-nine articles. The complaint was rather that the 
proclamation had been imposed without the consent of Parliament and was 
therefore 'against the law and libertie of the subject, and ought not to be pressed 
upon any students or graduates whatsoever.,87 The second form of attack was the 
systematic dismantling, sometimes literally, of the Laudian reforms forced on the 
University during the 1630s. This process was driven by a report commissioned by 
Parliament and given by William Dowsing on dle state of religious practice in the 
University. In this report Dowsing criticised the extent of Laudian reforms, 
ceremony and decoration within the University. He did, however, single out the 
Puritan credentials of C01'pUS Christi, St Catharine's, and Emmanuel Colleges as 
well as Holy Trinity Church.88 
The beginning of dle Civil War in 1642 naturally had a profound effect on 
not only dle nature of the University but also the religious oudook and form of the 
University. War naturally brought about a drop in student numbers, the main source 
of income f01' many of the colleges. In addition the strategic imp01'tance of 
Cambridge led to a constant military presence within the city, widl many soldiers 
being billeted on the colleges. Some colleges were even used to house prisoners 
from the Royalist army. Added to this was a general town and gown split in support 
86 Twigg, Ulliversity ~rCtllJlblidge, p.42; Bendell et aI, Emmtllluel College, pp.240-2. 
87 Twigg, Ulliversity ~rCtlJJJblidge, p.47. 
88 Ibid., p.49; Bendell et aI, A HistolJl ~rE1JJ"'tlIlIIel College, p.207. 
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for Parliament and tile King respecthTely. The army of the Eastern Association, 
under the leadership of the Earl of Manchester and Oliver Cromwell came to 
dominate the city and university. Cromwell was instrumental in foiling the attempts 
of several colleges to support the King by intercepting consignments of college 
plate being sent to help fund the King's war effort in Oxford. The growing 
influence of the Army on the running of the university was highlighted by the 
hostility shown by certain members of the army to the Lady Margaret Professor of 
Divinity presenting his termly Latin lecture as set down in statute. The cause of this 
opposition was not the content of the lecture, but that the lecture was to be given in 
the language of Roman Catholicism. 89 
The main influence on the theological form of Cambridge came with the 
formation of the Westminster Assembly in 1643. The Assembly was called by 
Parliament 'for the vindicating and clearing of the Doctrine of the Church of 
England from all false Calumities and Aspersions.,911 It met for tile fIrst time on 1 
July, 1643. The divines chosen to sit in the Assembly were all chosen to defend and 
support the strict Calvinist interests of Parliament. Chastened by 12 years of 
personal rule and imposed religious reform, Parliament was determined not simply 
to root out, but to crush all Laudian sentiment within the country. Its two explicit 
aims were to root out all vestiges of Laud's ref01ms and to bring about a new 
reformed Presbyterian settlement within the English Church. The Westminster 
Assembly, by representing those in Parliament and the country who had been most 
clearly targeted by Laud's reforms, presented in opposition to Laud the most unifIed 
statement on Calvinist doctrine put f01ward in England during the seventeenth 
89 Twigg, Ulliversity ~rCa!J/blidge, pp.66-83. 
90 Quoted in Kendall, Calvill, p.167. 
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century. The Assembly was, therefore, explicitly chosen from divines who could be 
trusted by Parliament to follow a strict Calvinist unity. In tlus way they followed 
very closely the Protestant Scholasticism that lay behind tlUs Calvinist orthodoxy. 
Any suggestions of anti-Calvinism were avoided by the simple tactic of onlitting any 
divines from the Assembly who did not share the strict Calvinist sympatlues of 
Parliament. It is in tlUs complicated and convoluted political and theological context 
that the ortllOdox Calvinism, against wlUch the Cambridge Platonists are 
traditionally seen to have developed, emerges. As we. have seen, strict Calvinism did 
not dominate the education of the Cambridge Platonists. There had always existed 
since the 1590s a level of debate within Cambridge over theological issues, in 
particular predestination. The strength of the Calvinism that we will encounter in 
Tuckney's letters to WlUchcote betrays not so much tlle Calvinist unity of 
Cambridge during the early seventeenth century, but is rather a symptom of the 
strength of the Calvinist reaction to the Laudian reforms of the 1630s.91 
The strength of tlUs reaction was shown in the ruthless purge of the 
University by the Parliamentary visitation of the Earl of Manchester in February 
1644. Manchester's Purge, as it has come to be known, fundamentally changed the 
theological make-up of Cambridge University. The Earl of Manchester, by the 
imposition of the Scottish inspired 'Solemn League and Covenant', ruthlessly 
targeted those acadenlics who opposed the Parliamentary cause of the time, either in 
religious form or political conviction. TlUs oath bound those who took it to the 
establishment of a Presbyterian Church settlement in England in the form 
advocated by the WestnUnster Divines. The severity of Manchester's Purge is 
91 For an interpretation that places the Cambridge Platonists within an exclusively Calvinist world see 
Tulloch, RatiollaITheolo!!Jl, II:ll-13. 
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summed up in a letter by William Sancroft the younger to the then imprisoned 
Master of Emmanuel, Richard Holdsworth. Describing the purge, Sancroft wrote 
that the Earl of Manchester had 'beheaded whole colleges at a blow; nay, whole 
Universities and whole Churches too.>92 The severity of Manchester's Purge can be 
explained by two factors. Firstly, on a practical level, Manchester needed to carry 
out his purge before the beginning of tlle spring campaigning season. For this 
reason Manchester concentrated mainly on the heads of houses rather than the 
general fellowship of the colleges. The appointment of the latter he left to the 
discretion of the Westminster Assembly. The second reason was political. As the 
King's capital was Oxford, Parliament needed to enforce its will on tlle Cambridge 
in a symbolic way. The Parliamentary purge of Oxford three years later, although as 
severe, was not nearly as swift and bmtal as that carried out in Cambridge in 1644. 
Manchester's main tactic was not to attack the University as a single entity 
but to single out individuals within colleges, especially the heads. This was designed 
to break whatever unified resolve and resistance to the claims of Parliament that 
tllere might have been in the University. Manchester was therefore able to assert his 
authority in the most visible manner possible. The only limit on Manchester's power 
was that those whom he chose to replace various heads of houses had to be 
approved by the Westminster Divines. Manchester's Purge was in the final 
reckoning just as brutal as Sancroft describes above. Somewhere in the region of 
212 fellows were ejected; 180 of them had taken their degrees between 1629-40, 
during the height of Laud's influence of the University.93 By the end of 1644 ten 
new heads of colleges were imposed by Manchester. Seven of these replacements 
92 Quoted in Twigg, Ulliversit)' ~lCa/J/bridge, p.97. 
93 Ibid., pp.88-97. 
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came from Emmanuel, and of the ten, nine were already members of the 
Westminster Assembly. All of these replacements were given their positions directly 
by the Westminster Assembly and tlle majority followed the moderate Presbyterian 
and orthodox Calvinist credentials of tl1e Assembly and the Commons.94 The 
exceptions to this were the appointment in 1645 of Cudworth to Clare Hall and 
Whichcote to King's. These appointments were not, as is commonly attributed in 
biographies, in the main sweep of Manchester's Purge. Neither Cudworth nor 
Whichcote were the first choices for tl1eir positions. Neither did they share any 
obvious affmity with the Calvinist orthodoxy of their Westminster Divine colleagues 
appointed to the headships of colleges before them. Perhaps they were, as second 
choices, last minute appointments needed to fill positions, as the religious and 
political tide was moving away from tl1e Westminster Assembly in 1645_6.95 Perhaps 
their puritan inclinations outshone a hidden anti-Calvinism which did not emerge 
until later. This second point seems unlikely considering that Cudworth is known to 
have shown anti-Calvinist sentiments in his B.D. examination only a year before.96 
What is clear however is that neither Whichcote nor Cudworth seem to have been 
particularly happy with the nature of their appointments. Whichcote shared half his 
salaty with his predecessor at King's, Samuel Collins, and went to great lengths to 
ensure that Collins' children were provided f01' on Collins' death. 97 Cudworth did 
not take an active role in matters at Clare Hall and did not take up residence there.98 
94 Ibid., p.l 03. 
95 Ibid., p.l04. 
96 'j'vIemoirs of Ralph Cudworth D.D., Author of The Intellectual System', Tbe PreseJlt State ~rtbe 
Repllblic if Letters jorJallllalJ1 1736, "A,\'1I (London, 1736), pp.24-38, p.27; John Passmore, Ralpb 
ClldJlJol1b:AIl Illte!pretatioll, (CUP, Cambridge, 1951) p.ll. 
97 Letters, pp.A·vii-XL'(; Bendell et aI, EmmallIlel College, p.247. 
98 John Pierce, Biograpbiml Register ~r Cbrist's College 1505-1905 alld oftbe earlierfii!llldatioll, God's HOltse, 
1448-1505, 2 vols (CUP, Cambridge, 1913), 1:466. 
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The Cambridge Platorusts can dlerefore be seen to be placed in a peculiar 
position wiiliin Cambridge during this period. Through the promotion of 
Whichcote and Cudworth and the continued presence of other Cambridge 
Platorusts in college fellowships during this period, it would seem dlat the 
Cambridge Platorusts were at least in step with, if not in league with, the theological 
zeitgeist. However, through this period the Cambridge Platorusts became the 
leading critics of the strict 'Protestant Scholastic' Calvinism dlat lay at the heart of 
the reforms of the Westminster Assembly. It is in this context, as Puritan anti-
Calvinists, that we fIrst encounter the moderate theology of the Cambridge 
Platorusts most famously in Cudworth's Sermon Preached before the Hot/se if CO"JJJ10IlS of 
1647 and Whichcote's correspondence with Anthony Tuckney from 1651. The next 
chapter will therefore trace the beginnings of Cudworth's and Whichcote's 
dleological and philosophical systems in light of the contexts which have been 
oudined in this chapter. 
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Chapter III - The beginnings of Cambridge Platonism - the 
Whichcote/Tuckney debate and Cudworth's early writings 
lILt. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to show, through an examination of the thought of 
Benjamin Whichcote and Ralph Cudworth, the manner in which Cambridge 
Platonism initially developed against the theological, philosophical and political 
contexts outlined in the previous chapter. As we have seen, there were many 
conflicting theological influences in Cambridge in the early- to mid- seventeenth 
centuq. However, by the mid 1640s, as a consequence of the Earl of Manchester's 
purge, the most important of these contexts was the orthodox Calvinism of the 
Westminster Assembly. This chapter will examine in detail the famous 
correspondence between Benjamin Whichcote and his former tutor, Anthony 
Tuckney. Although the main task of this thesis is an examination of the thought of 
Ralph Cudworth, I believe that an examination of Whichcote's thought is important 
here for two reasons. Firstly, as the debate between Whichcote and Tuckney is both 
one of the earliest and fullest defences of Cambridge Platonism, it allows us to see 
how Whichcote, as the founder of Cambridge Platonism, reacted explicitly against 
the voluntarist form of orthodox Calvinism. Although, as we shall see, we can fInd 
this reaction in Cudworth's work, particularly his early writings, the initial reaction 
against Calvinism is never as explicit as it is in Whichcote's letters. Consequently this 
chapter will begin by outlining Tuckney's response, stressing in particular its 
correspondence to the Calvinist orthodoxy of the day. This will also show how 
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Tuckney's criticism of Which cote centred on his use of reason within the realm of 
religion. Tuckney believes this to be dangerous for two reasons. Firstly, by the use 
of Platonism, Tuckney believes Whichcote is introducing foreign, pagan influences 
into and watering down Christianity. Secondly, Tuckney argues that Whichcote's use 
of reason, which grew from his Platonism, opens the door to the anti-Calvinism of 
Arminianism and the anti-Trinitarianism of Arianism and Socinianism. The second 
reason for examining Whichcote's responses to Tuckney is that they show clearly 
the manner in which Platonic, and particularly Plotinian themes were deployed to 
mount an intellectualist response to the voluntarism of Calvinism. Before examining 
Whichcote's specific answers to Tuckney, this chapter will therefore examine the 
sources of Which cote's Platonic philosophy. With this Platonic influence in mind it 
will then be possible to show how Whichcote links tlle principle of God's wisdom 
and justice with the overflowing rationality of an intellectualist, Platonic God. 
Reason, because it is the defining principle of God in creation, becomes, Which cote 
argues, tlle recognisable form of God's grace and goodness. Reason becomes the 
means by which man can draw himself to the justice and goodness of the divine. 
Whichcote argues that this is possible if reason is understood as the defining 
principle of not only God but, more specifically, the mediating principle of Christ. 
The grace by which man is saved therefore changes in Whichcote's thinking from 
the extraordinal-Y, inexplicable, and arguably arbitral)' grace of Calvinist 
predestination, to the rationally disce111ible saving grace of Platonically understood 
Christianity. 
It is with these themes in mind that we can then turn our attention to 
Cudworth's early writings. These writings not only follow the thought of Which cote 
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in form and style, but also take the central dlemes of reason and grace mediated 
dlrough the person of Christ to set up in these writings the central themes that 
continue into Cudworth's mature and more philosophically minded writings. 
Cudworth uses the theological and philosophical principles we find in Whichcote to 
show how man can, through his reason, come to God through his actions in the 
created world. It is, I will argue, Cudworth's desire to come to an understanding of 
how man can most effectively live in the light of Christ within creation that drives 
all his thought. This desire becomes most clearly manifested in Cudwordl's wish to 
form within the created world, what I will term, an ethical t:01J1JJJtflliOI. That is not 
simply the moral life, but a society through which man can achieve his Christ-like 
potential within the created world. 
The task of theology for both Whichcote and Cudworth is to explain and 
establish the Christian life in reality. Calvinism fails, they argue, because its 
voluntarism and doctrine of supra-Iapsarian predestination rendered the created 
world redundant and therefore the creation of a viable edlical community 
impossible. To create the ethical community on eardl both Wllichcote and 
Cudworth argue that man must understand not only his relationship to the divine, 
but also how man can come to appreciate this relationship through the divine 
principle of reason that exists in all reality. The constant stress on reason as the 
means of man's participation with God becomes the leitmoti/of Cambridge Platonic 
thought; the means by which man can fulfil his obligation to both love God and his 
neighbour. It is through this Christocentric theological system that we fInd in the 
writings ofWlllchcote and Cudworth dlat we also fIrst encounter the Trinitarian 
principles that dominate Cudworth's later writings. 
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111.2. The Whichcote/Tuckney debate 
III.2.i. Tuckney's attack 
Anthony Tuckney was Whichcote's former tutor at Emmanuel and at the time of 
the correspondence, in 1651, was Master of Emmanuel. It has been common to 
view this correspondence as showing the form of the Calvinist orthodoxy that the 
Cambridge Platonists experienced at Emmanuel, particularly from their initial 
tutors. As we saw in the previous chapter, it is not, however, possible to assume a 
blanket of Calvinist orthodo:A'Y in Emmanuel or in Cambridge as a whole during the 
early decades of the seventeenth century. Tuckney was certainly a central figure of 
the Westminster Assembly and of dle Calvinist orthodoxy of the Westminster 
Assembly dlat dominated the theological clin1ate of Cambridge after 1644. For dlls 
reason, Tuckney's criticisms are indicative of the voluntarist nature of Calvinism 
that the Cambridge Platorusts attack. 
Tuckney's own life is representative of the changing fortunes of orthodox 
Calvinism in Cambridge during the early- to mid- seventeenth century that were 
examined in the previous chapter. Tuckney matriculated at the age of fourteen in 
1613. On ms graduation from ms M.A. he left Cambridge to serve dle Earl of 
Lincoln. Tuckney later returned as a fellow of Emmanuel. In 1626 he took 
Wmchcote as a student but left the following year to take up the appointment of 
vicar of Boston, Lincolnshire. Tuckney's direct influence on Wmchcote may have 
been important, as Tuckney often suggests in rus letters, but it was nonetheless 
limited to one year. Tuckney was then absent from Cambridge during the 1630s and 
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the Laudian attacks on Puritanism in Cambridge. Tuckney only returned to the 
University when the Earl of Manchester's purge placed him in the Mastership of 
Emmanuel in 1644.1 Even then his effective return was delayed by the ongoing 
debates of the Westminster Assembly. His appointment to Emmanuel was made 
with some reluctance by the Westminster Assembly. As a leading member of the 
Assembly - Tuckney headed one of the main doctrinal committees of the Assembly 
- the other members of the Assembly were reluctant to lose his expertise.2 The 
Assembly only consented to his appointment on the understanding that his role in 
the Assembly would take precedence. Consequendy, Tuckney only took up 
residence in Cambridge, and took an active role in Cambridge events, at the 
effective end of the Westminster Assembly in early 1648. Despite these absences 
Tuckney's arguments are, nevertheless, indicative of the Calvinist nature of 
Cambridge during the 1640s and 1650s.3 
Central to Tuckney's attack is his continual stress on the infinite distance he 
believes exists between the extraordinary grace of God and d1e faculties of fallen 
man. It is unsmprising to see Tuckney's criticisms of Which cote centre on 
Whichcote's characteristic defence of the faculty of reason, taken from Proverbs 
20:27 'the Spirit of man is d1e candle of the Lord.' Staying hue to his orthodox 
Calvinism, Tuckney believes that the human mind is capable of coming to a very 
basic appreciation of God. However, as we have already seen in Calvin, this can 
only ever be negative in form. Using the guise of a wise and caring friend, Tuckney 
suggests to Whichcote that he would be wiser basing his theology on questions of 
1 LetterJ, ppj-iv. 
2 Bendell et aI, EmlJlalillel College, pp.245. 
3 Ibid., pp.245-6; Twigg, Ulliversity qlCambridge, p.112. 
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faith rather dlan reason. Tuckney argues, as a good Calvinist, that human reason can 
never come anywhere near an appreciation of the divine: 
Where Faith is, there is a renewall of God's image; in knowledge, as well as 
holiness and righteousness and there a liberJIJJl arbitriJI1JJ ad bonJlJJl spititllale is 
in parte renewed, as well as a reda ratio; and a beleefe of that, to which 
reason cannot reach.4 
Religious belief must come in the uncorrupted forms of faith and scripture. 
Although in acting by faith, Tuckney argues, man's reason also acted, this was recta 
ratio - right reason. Right reason does not subvert faith into corrupt human faculty, 
Tuckney argues, but deduces the supremacy of faidl over human reason.s Right 
reason therefore teaches man to suspend his own human, rational faculties and 
allows man to experience the divine through scripture in an uncorrupted form 
without secondaty interpretation. Tuckney acknowledges that scripture has been 
used by heretical sects, but this is through their over-interpretation of those texts. 
Only by extracting the unnecessaty mediation of human reason from religion is it 
possible for man to come to dle full truth of God's message. Teachings of'tmth 
and love' such as the Sermon on the Mount, Tuckney argues, cannot simply be 
learnt as ethical formulas recoverable by reason, they are only coherent as dle 
teaching of grace mediated to man through the words of scripture.6 The vital role 
that scripture plays in accommodating God's word to man is fatally limited by the 
use of reason. Reason can never explain dle mysteries of Christianity, such as the 
~ Leffers, p.94. 
5 Ibid., pp.21, 66. 
6 Ibid., pp.80-93. 
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Incarnation or the Trinity. Consequently those thinkers who use reason as a 
theological tool are drawn witl-l increasing inevitability into heresy. This is shown by 
the desire of heretical groups such as Arminians, Socinians and Catholics who, in 
Tuckney's view, seek to diminish the divine to the role of a secondary principle 
behind tlleir primary aim of justifying human freewill.7 At the final reckoning 
Tuckney prefers to hold to his extreme fideism, and the criticism that that might 
have brought him, rather tllan diminish the form and nature of the divine: 
I had rather, by reason of my adaering to the truth, that CAL VINE 
maintained; men shoulde call mee a Calvinist: than by reason of eyther and 
indifference, or by prop ending to somthing tllat Socinians, or Arminians 
hold; men, tllough unjustlie and in sinfullie should besmeare mee with their 
appella tion. 8 
Tuckney's vehement attack on the power and virtues of human reason 
provides us with interesting insights, not only into Tuckney's thought but also the 
wider theological context in which this debate was written. In Tuckney's account of 
human reason we can clearly see the influence of the Protestant Scholasticism 
implicit in his orthodox Calvinism. Tuckney's letters do not contain any of the clear 
syllogistic logic that we earlier encountered in Beza and Perkins. Tuckney's account, 
however, does rely on the distinctions between the knowledge of the actions of 
God's mind and the execution of those actions. The former, for Protestant 
Scholasticism, can never be known by the mind of man; the latter however, can be 
7 Ibid., pp.2,89. 
8 Ibid., p.79. 
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known if the correct form of reasoning is applied. It is this philosophical distinction 
that allows Protestant Scholasticism to reconcile its strict supra-laps arianism with 
the ethical theories of e)..']Jerimental predestination.9 Tuckney's criticisms of 
Whichcote centre on Tuckney's belief that Whichcote's continual stress on reason 
means that Whichcote is attempting the impossible task of knowing the mind of 
God. For Tuckney the voluntaristic account of the greatness of the will and wisdom 
of God can never be penetrated by the mind of man. The only reasonable action is 
for the mind to be led, by faith, to know the grace of God. Citing 1 Cor. 1:20, 
Tuckney argues that at the final analysis all human attempts to know the mind of 
God are essentially folly: 'Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the 
debater of the age? Has God not made foolish the wisdom of the world?' 
Tuckney is sure that Whichcote's errors have their source in Whichcote's 
over-reliance on both anti-Calvinist and pagan texts. Whichcote, Tuckney believes, 
has been exposed to these at Emmanuel after he had left Tuckney's tutelage. These 
errors, Tuckney argues, are at the base of Which cote's heterodoxy and their sources 
were clear: 
Some are readie to think; that your great authors, you steere your course by, 
are DR FIELD, DR. JACKSON, DR. HAMMOND; all three very learned 
men; the middle sufficiently obscure; and both hee and the last, I must 
d think III nee s , too corrttpt. 
9 Bray, Beza's Dot/line of Pre de stillati 011, p.129 
1U Lettm, p.38. 
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All three authors cited by Tuckney were leading figures in the established Church, 
that had been so comprehensively defeated by the time of Tuckney's letters in 1651. 
Tuckney in this quote, therefore, criticises Whichcote's reliance on, in Tuckney's 
eyes, the discredited thinking of the established Church of England. Richard Field 
was the closest to the Calvinism of Tuckney, but he had retreated from the extremes 
of Calvinist doctrine in the early-seventeenth century. II Henry Hammond acted as a 
chaplain to Charles I and was extremely critical of the liturgical reforms made by the 
Westminster Assembly of which Tuckney was such a central figure. Hammond has 
also been described as the 'intellectual heir' to the moderate theology of the Great 
Tew circle, and Falkland and Chillingworth in particular.12 Thomas Jackson is, as we 
shall go on to see, the most interesting of the three divines cited by Tuckney. 
Jackson followed the moderate religious beliefs of Field and Hammond. He was 
also, with Hammond and Field, an Oxford based thinker and, in Tuckney's view, a 
dangerous influence because of his Arminianism. Jackson, however, stands apart 
from Hammond and Field because of his use of Platonic thought in his ·writings. 
Tuckney believes that these corrupting influences had allowed the introduction of 
non-Christian sources into Whichcote's theology. Some of these were learnt from 
Jackson, but others, Tuckney feared, learnt from his contemporaries. As Tuckney 
continues to Whichcote: 
Whilest you were fellow here [Emmanual], you were cast into the companie 
of very learned and ingenious men; who, I fear, at least some of them, 
II Tyacke, Allti-Calvillists, pp.13-14, 60-1. 
12 Horton Davis, 1f70rship alld Theolo!!J' ill Ellglalld: From AlldreJves to Baxter alld Fox, 1603-1690 
(princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975), pp.344-5; Hugh Trevor-Roper, Catholits, Allglicalls alld 
Plllitalls (Seeker & Warburg, London, 1987), pp.215-27. 
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studyed other authors, more than scriptures; and PLATO and his schollars, 
above others:13 
Tuckney believes that it is through Whichcote's use and respect of Pagan and 
mosdy Platonic sources that heretical principles entered his dleology. In particular 
the use of these theories dinlinishes the exclusive nature of Christ's saving grace. By 
placing so much respect in ancient, pagan, philosophers Tuckney argues that 
Whichcote is fatally down playing the exclusive Ullth of the Gospel: 
Those ... Philosophers, and odler Heathens, made fairer candidates for 
Heaven; than dle scriptures seeme to allowe of: and They, in their virtues, 
preferred before Christians, overtaken with weaknesses - A kinde of a 
Moral Divinitie minted; onlie with a litde tincture of Christ added: nay, a 
Platonique faith united to God. 14 
Tuckney sees in Whichcote's 'Platonique faith' something incompatible with 
his own understanding of God. He complains that Whichcote's undue respect for 
dle ability and faculties of men are too easily being used as a screen for heresy. Chief 
of these heresies in Tuckney's mind was the heresy of anti-Trinitarianism. His 
accusations of heresy centre on two linked factors in Whichcote writings: [ttst his 
Platonism, which can lead to Arianism, and second his use of reason, which opens 
the door to Socinianism. In Tuckney's attacks we encounter for the [ttst time the 
accusations of anti-Trinitarian heresy which were laid at the door of the Cambridge 
13 Letters, p.38. 
14 Ibid., p.39. 
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Platonists with increasing regularity through the remaining decades of the 
seventeenth century. 
The fear that Platonism necessarily leads to anti-Trinitarianism is most 
clearly highlighted by Calvin's dispute with Michael Servetus. Servetus was born in 
Aragorn in 1511 and now is best remembered for his observations concerning the 
operation of cile heart. 15 It was, however, his theological writings that brought him 
into direct conflict with Calvin and, at the behest of Calvin, saw him executed as a 
heretic. 16 Servetus, in several treatises on Christian doctrine, argues that the teaching 
of Christ had been falsified by cile Church fathers, the Roman Church and latterly 
the reformers. Of these many falsifications the greatest was the Trinity. In place of 
the metaphysical complications of the doctrine of the Trinity, Servetus argues that 
God is a single principle who had revealed himself to man through a gradual 
revelation.17 This gradual revelation of the one true God had, Servetus argues, come 
to be confused within Christian theology as the Trinity. Rather than be confused 
with complicated metaphysics Servetus argues that God should be understood as 
the ideal of reason which, in cile words of Franc;:ois Wendel, is 'the primordial idea 
which comprehends and sums up the essence of all things.'18 The philosophical 
source of these theories is Neoplatonic philosophy. Through the use of 
Neoplatonism Servetus is able to doubt the Trinity on philosophical as well as 
theological grounds. The most obvious form of this is Servetus' use of Neoplatonic 
emanation to explain his theory of the progressive revelation of God. The revelation 
of Christ is therefore not as part of the unified form of the divine, but as the most 
15 Wendel, Calvill, pp.93-4. 
16 For a full discussion of Calvin's dispute with Servetus see Ibid., pp.93-9. 
17 Jerome Friedman, iVlithael Servetlfs: A Case stl/{!)' ill Total HereJ)' (Librairie Droz S.A., Geneva, 1978), 
p.46. 
18 Wendel, Calvill, pp.93-4. 
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important of these divine emanations. Servetus uses Neoplatonism to assert Christ 
as a created being, not as part of the Trinity. Calvin violently attacked Servetus' anti-
Trinitarianism. It is not clear whether Calvin believed that Setvetus' heresy was 
direct consequence of his Neoplatonism; however, the existence of a Neoplatonic 
influence on his theories shows how Neoplatonism could be used to pervert 
accepted Christian doctrines. This interpretation of the relationship between 
Platonism and Christianity was used in the 1680s by Theophilus Gale who argues 
that it was the mixture of Platonic philosophy with Christianity that lead inevitably 
to the anti-Trinitarian heresy of Arianism. 19 Accusations of the heretical nature of 
Platonic philosophy on the doctrine of tlle Trinity also help explain the lengths, 
which we shall see in the next chapter, to which Cudworth went, in his True 
Illtellectllal System if the Universe, to defend a Platonised doctrine of the Trinity. 
Although attacking Whichcote's Platonism, Tuckney's major accusation of 
heresy centres more generally on Whichcote's use of the faculty of reason. Central 
to Tuckney's criticism is the belief that Whichcote's use of reason would lead him 
into the other great seventeenth century anti-Trinitarian heresy, Socinianism. The 
founder of Socinianism was the Italian theologian Faustus Socinius. Reacting to the 
strictures of high Calvinism in the late-sL'l:teenth century Socinius had sought to 
examine the Bible with the rigorous rationality of the humanist renaissance?) This 
method caused Socinius to doubt and refute many of tlle great mysteries of the 
Church, most importantly the doctrine of the Trinity. What was revolutionary about 
Socinius' anti-Trinitarianism is his rejection of not only the Trinity, but also the pre-
19 Sarah Hutton, 'The Neoplatonic Roots of 1-\rianism - Ralph Cudworth and Theophilus Gale,' in 
SomiallisJJJ alld its Role ill the Cllltlfre ~rXVI-th to XVlII-th Centllries, ed. L.Szczucki (P\XIN-Polish 
Scientific Publishers, Warsaw, 1983), pp.139-45; D.WDockrill, 'The Authority of the Fathers in the 
Great Trinitarian Debates of the SLxteen-Nineties,' in Stlfdia Patlistim, XYIII.4, (peeters Press, 
Leuven, 1990), pp.335-47. 
211 H. J oh11 l\kLachlan, S ocilliallislJl ill S evente8llth-CentlllJ' Ellglalld (Oxford, OUP, 1951), pA 
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existent divinity of Christ. Christ, in Socinius' eyes, is a human who was ordained 
with divine powers (divillitas). This did not make him equal with, or part of God 
(deitas).21 In this way the Socinian heresy differs from other anti-Trinitarian heresies 
as it made Christ a creation in time, not the ftrst creation of eternity as in the Arian 
heresy. Even in the theological melting pot of the Interregnum anti-Trinitarianism, 
in whatever form it took, was punishable by death.22 Such was the reliance of 
'reason'in Socinian thought that for the Calvinist orthodoxy any theological method 
that advocated and championed the use of reason opened itself up to the dangers of 
Socinian heresy. John Edwards, during this period, states, in a manner reminiscent 
of Tuckney's criticisms of Whichcote, that if 'right reason is [taken to be] the rule of 
faith ... We are to believe the Scriptures, and the doctrine of the Trinity ... so far as 
we see them agreeable to reason, and no further. m The implicit association of 
reason and rationality with the Socinian heresy helps explain Tuckney's continual 
accusations of heresy against Whichcote. At one point in the correspondence 
Tuckney accuses Whichcote, because of his use of reason, of walking in Socinian 
'footsteppes.' At another point Tuckney goes even further by attacking Whichcote's 
claim that 'Truth is Truth, whatsoever speaks itt: and will readily agree with Papists, 
Socinian, or anie; so farre as he asserts itt: because it is not His, but God's.' This, 
Tuckney claims, must be false because the truth gained through reason by the 
Socinian must be bogus because truth cannot exist when the divinity of Christ is 
doubted.24 
21 Ibid., p.13. 
22 In lv[ay 1643 the Blasphemy Ordinance made the denial of the Trinity or that Scripture was the 
word of God an offence punishable by death. "\lthough passed, tllls law proved impossible to 
enforce. See Christopher Hill, The Tf70rld T"med Upside DOJJ!Jl: Radiml Ideas durillg the Ellglish Revoilitioll 
(penguin, Harmondsworth, 1991), p.137. 
23 Ibid. 
2,\ The quote from \V'hichcote is Tuckney quoting \\1hichcote's second letter back at llimself. The 
quote does not appear in the published version of\\1hichcote's second letter. ~\s no manuscripts of 
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It is, Tuckney argues, always the Arminans and Socinians who call for liberty 
of conscience to hide their 'wildest and foulest extravagances.,25 For Tuckney the 
human mind can never gain access to the mysteries of the divine. Those who seek 
to include an element of reason into theology are heretical, because their use of 
reason implicitly suggests that man can know something of the will and power of 
God and mysteries, such as the Trinity, that only God can know. In this sense 
Tuckney's criticisms of Which cote are completely in keeping with the voluntarism 
of the Calvinist orthodoxy of the day. Whichcote's reply to Tuckney's criticisms 
employs a Platonic intellectualism which is philosophically irreconcilable with 
Tuckney's Calvinist voluntarism. It is in this break from the Calvinist orthodoxy that 
we ftrst encounter the intellectualism at the heart of the Cambridge Platonic system 
which Whichcote founded. 
III.2.ii. Benjamin Whichcote and Platonism in the seventeenth century 
Benjamin Whichcote was born in Stoke, Shropshire in 1609 and matriculated as a 
student at Emmanuel in 1626 where he was initially tutored by Anthony Tuckney. 
He was elected to a fellowship in 1633 and appointed to the Sunday afternoon 
lectureship at Holy Trinity Church in 1636. Following his appointment as the 
Provost of King's by the Earl of Manchester, Whichcote acted as Vice-Chancellor 
in 1650-51, the year that his debate with Tuckney took place. He was removed from 
the Provostship of King's in 1660 by Royal order but, by accepting tlle Act of 
Uniformity, was appointed to St Anne's, Blackfriars. Later he was presented the 
the letters are available it is difficult to know whether this is a direct quotation or an embellishment 
on Tuckney's part, see Letters, p.SS. 
25 Ibid., p.31. 
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parish of St Lawrence Jewry in 1668. Despite his physical separation from 
Cambridge, Which cote always maintained a close affinity to Cambridge and in 
particular a close personal friendship with Ralph Cudworth, at whose house 
Whichcote died during a visit to Cambridge in 1683.26 
Perhaps because of Whichcote's geographical separation from Cambridge 
after 1660 it has become increasingly common for commentators to downplay and 
even deny a (Cambridge) Platonic element in his writings. Within Whichcote's 
surviving work, posthumously collected sermons and aphorisms, one does not find 
the vast Platonic erudition that we find in Cudworth or More. Jon Parkin, in his 
recent work on Richard Cumberland, has argued that Whichcote was more a 
practical rational divine in the mould of the Latitudinarians than a 'cloistered' and 
esoteric thinker like Cudworth or More. Parkin argues that this is typified by his 
more common use of Aristotle than Plato in his sermons. This interpretation would 
seem strange for two reasons. Firstly, contemporary accounts never doubted 
Whichcote's use of Platonic theology. Confirming the assumptions of Tuckney's 
attack, Gilbert Burnet, in his History if JJ()! OWl! time, comments that it was Whichcote 
who had first encouraged tlle study of Plato and Plotinus in Cambridge,z7 Secondly, 
the anti-Platonic reading of Which cote relies too heavily on the surface, linguistic 
form of Which cote's thought, examining whom he quotes, not how he uses them. It 
is true that Aristotle and many otller non-Platonic philosophers are quoted by the 
Cambridge Platonists. The Cambridge Platonists' use of these philosophers, 
however, has to be understood within the assumption of a broader Platonic 
26 C.A.Patrides, ed. The CalJlbridge Platollists, p.xxi.x. The closeness of\\1hichcote and Cudworth's 
friendship is shown by \V'hichcote acting as security for Ralph Cudworth's youngest son Charles 
Cudworth's transit to work in India. Ch,ist's College 1V1S.77, 'Letter of John C. \\1hitebrook to John 
Peile, :May 26th 1902.' 
27 Gilburt Burnet, Histof)' ~flv1y 01/1/1 time, 2 vols, ed. Osmund Airy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1897-
1900), 1.331. 
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framework. 28 Therefore to call Whichcote an Aristotelian first, as Parkin does, is to 
completely miss the profound Platonic form of his intellectualist theology, which is 
seen so clearly in his responses to Tuckney. This form of interpretation also fails 
because it too readily accepts the belief, outlined in Chapter One, that 
Aristotelianism and Platonism are implicitly opposed philosophies. This form of 
thinking has been used by those interpreters who saw the Platonic renaissance in 
England as springing out of a vacuum of Aristotelian scholasticism.29 Therefore, 
before we can examine in detail the Platonic nature of Which cote's response to 
Tuckney we must f1rst examine the sources of Which cote's Platonism within the 
context of seventeenth century thought. 
Although Aristotelian Scholasticism was the dominant philosophical and 
pedagogical system of the seventeenth century, it is incorrect to think of Plato as 
alien to the seventeenth centuty. It is true that Platonic sources were far less 
common in England than in other countries on the continent. Only two Platonic 
texts, a Greek edition of the MeJlexemls and the pseudo-Platonic A:x.iociJus, had been 
published in England by the beginning of the seventeenth century.30 There had 
always been, however, since the sixteentll century writings of Erasmus, Jean Colet 
and Thomas More, a tradition of Platonic humanism within England. This was 
evident in the humanist foundations of St John's and Christ's Colleges in 
Cambridge, and Corpus Christi College, Oxford. However, even in these 
foundations Plato remained an optional, not compulsory element of the 
28 Jon Parkin, SdeJlo'e, Religioll al1d Politio's ill Restoratioll El1glalld: Ridlard Cllmber/alld's 'De Legiblls Natllrae' 
(Boydell, Woodbridge, 1999) pp.76-7. Something of Parkin's linguistic interpretation of\V'hichcote 
can be explained, I would venture, by Parkin's use of the method of the Cambridge school of 
historians, and Skinner in particular, within his work. 
29 See for instance Cassirier, Platollio' Rellaissallce, p.44. 
30 Sarah Hutton, 'Plato in the Tudor Academies' in Sir Thomas Gresham alld Gresham College: Stlldies ill 
the Illte/ledlla/ histoIJI Of Loll dOll ill the sixteellth alld sevellteeJIth o'lJIltmies, ed. Francis "-\mes-Lewis (Ashgate, 
Aldershot, 1999), pp.106-124, p.107. 
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curriculum? The prevalence of the study of Aristotle did not mean that there was 
necessarily no place for the study of Plato. As was shown in Chapter One there has, 
since the nineteentll centuty, been a clear distinction made between the practical 
virtues of Aristotle next to the esoteric learning of Plato. However in the 
seventeentll centuty botll thinkers were not seen as polar opposites, but as part of 
the same tradition of wisdom and learning. Just because Aristotelian thought held 
the ascendancy does not mean that there was no place for Platonic philosophy.32 It 
is possible to fInd in some thinkers who are traditionally seen to be part of a 
scholastic academic orthodoxy of the time a healthy respect for Plato's thought. 
One of tlle best examples of this is Richard Holdsworth's PraelectiolleJ Theologicae. 
Holdsworth, whom we have previously encountered advocating the importance of 
Aristotle in his DirectiollJ for a StNdellt of the UniverJiry, was a product of the humanism 
of St John's College, Cambridge. He fIrst gave the Praelectiol1eJ Theologicae as lectures 
while he was Professor of Divinit:y at Gresham College in the 1630s. The PraeiectioJleJ 
Theologicae were published posthumously in 1661 by Holdsworth's nephew Richard 
Pearson, as an attempt to resurrect Holdsworth's reputation after the Civil War. In 
these lectures references to Plato are frequent, using the common Neoplatonic 
epithet of 'divillilliJJiJJlIlJ Plato.'33 There are also other sources of Platonism within 
seventeenth centuty scholarship. There are over thirty instances of holdings of Plato 
in college libraries and private book collections in seventeentll centuty Cambridge. 
There were also other Neoplatonic sources in Cambridge collections in the 
31 Ibid., pp.109-110. 
32 Charles B. Schmitt, A,iJtot/e alld tbe R£IlaiJJallt'e (Harvard University Press, Cambridge j\L\. 1983), 
pp. 91-3, 103; Hutton, 'Plato in the Tudor Academies,' p.109. 
33 Richard Holdsworth, Prae/ediolleJ Tbe%gil'Cle, ed. Richard Pearson (London, 1661) p.359. See also 
pp.57, 107, 203; also Hutton, 'Plato in the Tudor Academies,' p.123 
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seventeenth centuq, including an edition of Plotinus in Andrew Perne's vast book 
collection that found its way into Peterhouse library after his death in 1589.34 
Far from being anathema to seventeenth centuq thought, there are also 
examples of the explicit use of Platonic thought in the writings of philosophers and 
theologians in the early-seventeenth centuq. Both Thomas Hobbes and Francis 
Bacon made references to Plato in their writings. These references are not 
necessarily complementaq, however, they are in a form that assumes the reader 
already has knowledge of Plato's work.35 A more positive use of Platonic philosophy 
can be found in the writings of scholars educated in the humanist foundations 
mentioned above. At Stjohn's in Cambridge Everard Digby used a wide range of 
sources from both the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions. Crucially he had not only 
a knowledge of Plato, but also the Neoplatonic thought of, amongst others, 
Plotinus, Proclus and Iamblichus. His thought was consciously indebted to the 
Florentine Platonism of Ficino and Pico.36 
Perhaps the most important advocate of Platonism in the early-seventeenth 
centuq was Thomas Jackson, whom we have already encountered as an ally of 
William Laud and in Tuckney as an alleged source of Which cote's errors. Jackson, 
born in 1579, was a student and later fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. 
After a period as Vicar in Newcastle-upon-Tyne he was elected, under the 
sponsorship of Laud, as President of C01pUS Christi, a position he held from 1630 
till his death in 1640. In the early-seventeenth century the originality of Jackson's 
mind was marked by the manner in which he almost completely rejected the 
3-1 E.S.Leedham-Green, Books ill Cambridge IlItJeJltories, 2 vols (Cambridge, CUP, 1986) 1:448, 625-6, 
629, II:419. 
35 See in particular Hobbes' references to Plato's Republic at the conclusion to book two of Leviathall, 
p.407 
36 Hutton, 'Plato in the Tudor Academies,' p.113 
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dominant Protestant scholasticism that dominated early-seventeenth century 
theology.37 His liberal approach to the predestination debates already mentioned 
also placed him firmly in opposition to orthodox Calvinism. Jackson argues that 
Calvinist determinism, far from stressing the limitlessness nature of the will of God, 
actually limits the nature of the divine. To say that God is limited to a preordained 
chain of events is to deny that God can also know not only the necessary 
consequences but also the contingent consequences of all actions. Human agency 
therefore, far from limiting divine power, actually feeds into the infInite power of 
the divine by accounting for the infInite capacity of the will of God: 
So far is freedom of choice or contingency from being incompatible with 
the immutability of God's will, that without this infmite variety of choice or 
freedom of thought in man and angels, we cannot rightly conceive him to be 
as infInitely wise as his decree is immutable.38 
Such is the infmite nature of the divine that all creatures, even 'the worm or gnat,' 
participate in God's infmite wisdom and goodness. At tlle source of creation lies the 
goodness of God that continually replenishes the created realm with this goodness 
like a fountain. 39 Jackson's theology therefore relies on Platonic imagery and 
distinctions. He also believes that there is an almost providential closeness between 
Christianity and Platonism. In his voluminous writings Jackson often sites the 
'Divine' philosophy of Plato and Plotinus. Jackson also cites the myth of the 'Attic 
37 White, Predestillatioll, PoliC')! alld PoletJJi.~ pp.256-9. On Jackson's rejection of Scholasticism see 
Jackson, Works, V:99. 
38 Ibid., V:90. 
39 Ibid., IV:404, V:60-2. 
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Moses' and the dissemination of revealed tmth through ancient theology - the priJca 
the%gia - as possible sources for the seeming closeness of Christianity and 
Platonism.40 Jackson even goes so far as to argue that pagan Platonism written after 
the birth of Christ, in particular the thought of Plotinus, might have been influenced 
by the revealed truth of Christianity. In the case of Plotinus, Jackson argues that 
Plotinus, perhaps through contact with the works of Origen, had 'set forth stolen 
fragments of the food of life with the Platonical sauce.'41 On theological issues 
Jackson particularly stresses that both Platonism and Christianity believe in the 
immortality of the soul and also that this immortality is contingent on actions in life. 
This final point naturally put Jackson in stark opposition to his Calvinist 
contemporaries and he seems to have been happy to accept the Arminian 
implications of his thought.42 
There are clear biographical links between Jackson and the Cambridge 
Platonists. Jackson was friendly with Henry More's tutor Joseph Mede, who is often 
placed on the edge of the Cambridge Platonists, and Jackson later published his 
correspondence with Henry More. Jackson's Platonism does differ from that of the 
Cambridge Platonists. In particular, his thought is based much more explicitly in the 
doctrines of the Church. This is shown by the fact that his works, although 
containing great Platonic learning, were primarily concerned with doctrinal Christian 
issues, rather than the more wide ranging philosophical questions dealt with by 
More and Cudworth. Jackson also cautions against the dangers of too heavy a 
reliance on ancient wisdom, favouring primarily the revealed truth of Christianity. 
Jackson does, however, share many affmities, both philologically and philosophically 
40 Ibid., 1:115, IV:404, V:27, \'11:243. 
41 Ibid., IV:404. 
42 \V'hite, Predestillatioll, Polio' alld PolelJli,~ p.256. 
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with the Cambridge Platonists. As we shall see in Chapter Five his defence of 
freewill in particular foreshadowed many of the arguments that we will encounter in 
Cudworth's freewill manuscripts. Jackson's theology, therefore, along with the 
thought of lesser figures such as Everard Digby, shows that there existed in the 
early-seventeenth centuq a small, yet significant tradition of Platonic thought in 
England from which the Cambridge Platonists would later flower. 43 
III.2.iii. Whichcote's response to Tuckney 
As has been shown above, by reacting to the voluntarist determinism represented by 
Tuckney and the theology of the Westminster Divines, the Cambridge Platonists 
can be understood as a continuation of the Calvinist/ anti-Calvinist debates which 
had occurred in Cambridge since the 1590s. What makes Whichcote's duel with 
Tuckney stand out from these previous anti-Calvinist controversies is his 
unflinching advocacy for the dignity of man's rationality. Even Thomas Jackson was 
guarded in his respect for the faculty of reason. Jackson does stress that reason is 
given, by God, to help man in the interpretation of scripture. However, reason is 
not the only guide and is certainly inferior to faith as the surest guide to religion. As 
Jackson argues, ~c:d(l ratio be not the mle of faith, nor any competent judge of divine 
mysteries.'44 Whichcote's continual stress on dle rationality of bodl man and God 
sought to reform the common understanding of man's relationship to the divine by 
placing man within an intellectualist conception of the divine. This central claim, 
which comes direcdy from Whichcote's appeals to, and use of, the Platonic 
43 Sarah Hutton, 'Thomas Jackson,' pp.636-646. 
44 See Jackson, IWorks, IX:18,44,146. 
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tradition, allows him to consistently and coherently attack the voluntarist basis of 
the Calvinist ortllodoxy.45 
Whichcote in his replies to Tuckney continually stresses that his main aim 
has always been to defend the dignity of the Christian religion. In this way he wishes 
to defend Christianity from the extreme positions that it was driven to by the 
determinism of Calvinist orthodoxy. In particular Whichcote wishes to distance 
Christianity from accusations of the arbitrariness of God. Whichcote, therefore, 
always seeks to understand God in intellectualist terms, as the principle and 
exemplar of justice. As Whichcote stated to Tuckney in his second letter: 
I do without scmple beleeve what God hath reveled, and as he hath reveled; 
because God is infinite in knowledge, infallible in truth, and necessarily 
good: whence He cannot deficere, or declare contra veJ1iteJJ} facto, rationem rei; or, 
in matters of his own voluntary determination, otherwise than as He hath 
resolved them:46 
If God cannot act other than by his revealed goodness then man can by his actions 
become reconciled to the known and inlmutable principles of tlle divine. Whichcote 
argues that this reconciliation is possible through the faculty of reason. That is not, 
Whichcote argues, because reason is a human faculty, but because it is the principle 
that links man to God. Whichcote, at the end of his final reply to Tuckney, wearily 
complains that Tuckney's continual attack on his use of the faculty of reason 
45 Cassirer directly attributes the success of the Florentine and Cambridge Platonists' theological 
system in breaking the 1\.ugustine 'strangle-hold' over arguments for freewill and determinism, which 
he believes even Aquinas failed to break, to their use and respect for the Platonic tradition. See 
Cassirer, Platollie RfJJlaissalU'e, p.l 04. 
46 Letters, p.43. 
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misunderstands the manner within which he is using reason. Whichcote argues that 
'[t]hose who mistake the Means for the End, may be reproved; without prejudice to 
the Means.,47 What this comment shows is that Whichcote does not see reason as 
the end of religion, as Tuckney continually accuses him, but merely the means given 
by God for man to begin to understand religion. In this way reason is a divinely 
given faculty, closely related to the idea of grace in the mind of Whichcote, that 
exists withill an understanding of the divine: 
the work of grace and favour towards us and upon us; our being restored to 
righteousness, goodness and uuth; and our being reconciled to God, so as 
we may truly fmd the kingdom God within US.48 
Tuckney's response therefore fails for Whichcote because, by disposing of reason as 
an end in itself, it also disposed of reason as a means to the appreciation of a higher 
goal. This positive understanding of the human faculty of reason was central to 
Whichcote's intellectualist position. 
To understand dle way in which Whichcote believes one can equate reason 
with an understanding of the divine one must turn to the Neoplatonic tradition 
Whichcote draws from, in particular the thought of Plotinus. When descl1bing the 
nature of the divine in Ennead 6.8 Plotinus suggests that, 
47 Ibid., p.129. 
48 Ibid., p.16. 
111 
[the One] is then without dimensions, one rational principle for all things, 
one number and one that is greater and more powerful that what has come 
into being, and there is nothing greater or better than him.49 
The divine is therefore the ultimate principle in the universe. As the ultimate 
principle in the universe Plotinus argues that the divine can only be understood 
through reason, as the divine is the sole soutce of the rationality that pervades and 
orders all creation. The imprint of the divine is therefore found, through reason, in 
all creation. This ordering was not by the arbitrary will of the divine, instead creation 
is in a reasoned manner because of the implicit rationality of the divine intellect. As 
Plotinus put it, '[t]he ordering of the universe, then, corresponds with Intellect in 
such a way that it exists without rational planning.'511 Creation, therefore, is a unified 
rational principle emanating from the intellect of the divine. As all parts of creation 
are inextricably linked to the intellect of the divine, all parts of creation can, to a 
limited extent, seek a participation in the divine.51 All actions in creation are then, 
implicidy, a participation in the divine. As Plotinus put it: 
The first part of soul, then, dlat which is above and always filled and 
illuminated by the reality of above, remains There; but another part, 
participating by the first participation of the participant goes forth, for soul 
goes forth always, life from life; for actuality reaches everywhere, and there 
is not point where it fails. 52 
~9 Elllleads, 6.8.17. 
5U Ibid., 3.2.14. 
51 Ibid., 3.2.3. 
52 Ibid., 3.8.5. 
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Although this participation is not consistently strong in all parts of creation, it is 
present in all parts of the created realm. Man, as part of this created realm, is not 
only part of the divine intellect but man also has, through his reason, tlle means to 
appreciate, or participate, in this divine creation. This places man in a unique 
position within creation because he can, by his own volition and through tlle use of 
his reason, bring himself closer to the divine. He could choose not to use his reason 
to bring himself into participation within the divine. The implications of the 
assumed power of human agency in tlus system and Whichcote's acceptance of this 
Plotinian schema clearly placed him at odds with the determinism of orthodox 
Calvinism. The implications of this argument for freewill will be discussed in 
Chapter Five. At this stage it is enough to show the way in which Wluchcote 
believes man can, through his own volition, come to know and participate in the 
divine. The principle of reason links man directly to the intellect of the divine. 
This Plotinian step is found implicitly in all Whichcote's writings. Reason is, 
for Whichcote, the means by which man not only raises himself to the divine, but 
also the divine principles in the world. In this way reason acts as a reflection of 
Christ in the world. Through reason, Whichcote states to Tuckney, 'Christ is able to 
be acknowledged, as the principle of grace til us.' Christ, Whichcote argues, acts in 
two ways for man. Firstly, he allows man to distinguish the 'new man from the old.' 
Secondly, he is the advocate and means of reconciliation between God and man.53 
By making this explicit link between the faculty of reason and the divine person of 
Christ, a claim that relies entirely on his Platonism to be coherent, Whichcote 
believes he is able to overcome any claims tllat his use of reason led him to 
53 Letters, pp.13-4. 
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Sociniarusm. In fact so preposterous does Whichcote believe this claim to be that he 
believes that it would be as well to call him a 'Papist, or Mahometan; Pagan, or 
Atheist' as a Socinian.54 
Reason becomes the principle in all men that brings man towards God. As 
Whichcote concludes his correspondence widl Tuckney: 
Now that Christ is more known and freelie professed, let him also be 
inwardlie felt, and secretlie understood; as a principle of divine life within us, 
as well as a saviour without US.55 
Through this rationality Whichcote argues that man can develop the Christ-like 
potential that he believes exists in all men. This is described by Whichcote by the 
metaphor of 'the Candle of the Lord.' When understood in its Plotinian context 'the 
Candle of the Lord' helps to clarify Whichcote's response to Tuckney's criticisms. If 
God's justice was defined by his will, as Tuckney argues, then there is no way of 
understanding or appreciating the nature of this justice, except through the dictates 
of divine fiat. However, if the divine is seen as the principle of justice then man can 
gain access to the implicit notion of this justice in the world. If dlat notion of justice 
can also be linked to a principle of reason, as in the Plotinian schema oudined 
above, then, Whichcote argues, reason can be seen as part of the intellectual 
revelation of the divine. So in answer to Tuckney's criticism, Whichcote is sure to 
show that 'the Candle of the Lord' is not a shallow principle, but a profound symbol 
that speaks of the divine in the world. 56 Reason, therefore, can show man the nature 
54 Ibid., p.53. 
55 Ibid., p.126. 
56 Ibid., p.112. 
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of the divine in all parts of creation and teach man to recognise the wisdom, justice 
and love of God through creation. Knowledge of the source of man's rationality can 
allow man to appreciate that the religious inclination within man is not something 
that has to be proven by exterior actions but is the thing which, through reason, 
defInes man's very being. As Whichcote states in his sermon on The Use rifReasoll ill 
lliIatters rifRe/igioll, '[i]fReason did not apprehend God; Religion could not be 
learn' d. ,57 
It is, however, important at this point to qualify the nature of this argument 
for reason in Whichcote's thought. Reason, as already stated, is promoted to a 
higher position in Whichcote's thought than by any of his close contemporaries or 
predecessors. To do this Whichcote equates reason with the revelation and 
covenant of the divine. That is not to say that reason is superior in Whichcote's eye 
to the traditional forms of biblical revelation, whatever implications Tuckney draws 
from Whichcote's use of reason. 58 Reason is, for Whichcote, always placed within the 
revelation of the divine, placing reason on an equal plane with biblical revelation. 
Whichcote argues that reason is never opposed by revelation, but only further 
reinforced by the evidence of biblical revelation, because revelation and reason have 
the same source in the intellect of the divine. Reason can therefore, Whichcote 
argues, never oppose faith. Consequently, as Whichcote pithily commented, he is 
able to dismiss all things that are contrary to reason, as an act of faith. 59 
57 Benjamin \V'hichcote, 'The Use of Reason in Matters of Religion,' in C.A.Patrides ed. The Camblidge 
Platollists, p.47; also see Letters, p.44. It is interesting to compare the different uses of the metaphor of 
light within \V'hichcote's thought and that of Calvinism. \V'here \V'hichcote always equates light, the 
Candle of the Lord, with the intellectual principle of the divine, Calvinism always equates it with the 
word of God, the divine principle accommodated for the mind of man. See Robert A. Greene, 
,\V'hichcote, the Candle of the Lord, and Syderesis,' in The jOllrllal ~f the HistolJl (([Ideas, 52:4 (1991), 
pp.617-44, p.621. 
58 Letters, p.70. 
59 Ibid., pp.l 02-3, 44. 
115 
This fmal claim brings the second qualification one must put on the 
principle of reason within Whichcote's thought. Reason is not for Whichcote a pure 
principle of deductive proof, radler it is the practical means by which man can come 
closer to the divine.60 To see reason without this practical aspect is, for Whichcote, 
to confuse it, as Tuckney had done, for an end in itself. Reason can only be effective 
in bringing man closer to the divine if it is used actively in creation. In this way the 
comparison in Whichcote's thought between the active principle of reason and 
Christ as the active principle within the divine is instructive. It is, Whichcote argues, 
a conceit in men to believe that they could be reconciled to God without themselves 
becoming more God-like. It is only through the practical use of this rational faculty 
that man can, in Whichcote's eyes, come closer to the divine.6 ! This practical 
understanding also has a consequent implication in that it creates a surer and firmer 
faidl in man. If man is able to come to the divine through his own actions he is able 
to be satisfied about the truth of God in his own mind. G2 Consequendy Whichcote 
argues that, although 'the Candle of the Lord' remains the 'talismanic endorsement 
of the dignity of man,' 63 man still remains in a fallen state. Therefore this candle-
light can never be equal to dle bright, burning intellect of the deity, but only a dim 
reflection of it. It is, however, this faculty that Whichcote believes God has placed 
in man to discover the truth of the divine. If its light is sometimes dimmed or only 
perceived 'through a glass darldy,' it still remains as a reflection of the light of Christ 
and consequendy the means by which man can reconcile himself to the divine. 
Human reason is, Whichcote argues, not identical to dle active divine principle, but 
GO On this point it is interesting to note the contrast that existed between the inductive reasoning 
which typified Calvin's theological style and the deductive reasoning or Beza and his Protestant 
Scholastic followers. See .l\rmstrong, A1JJ)'I"clIlt Here!)', p.136. 
61 Lefte!)', p.14. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Greene, '\Xlluchcote,' p.618. 
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is drawn directly from it. It is this Christocentric aspect in Whichcote's defence of 
reason which, as we shall come on to see, prepares the ground for the more 
explicitly Logocentric Trinitarianism of Cudworth's later thought. 
111.3. Cudworth's early writings 
Ralph Cudworth was born in Aller, Somerset in 1617, son of Ralph Cudworth the 
elder, who was a graduate of Emmanuel College.64 The elder Ralph Cudworth, 
before taking the post of vicar of Aller in 1616, had been vicar of St Andrew's 
Church, Cambridge and was at some point a chaplain to James 1. He also achieved 
limited recognition as the author of a supplement to William Perkin's commentary 
of the Epistle to tlle Galatians.65 The author of the 'Memoirs rifRalph Cudworth 
D.D. Author rifThe Intellectual System,' written in 1736, comments that Cudworth's 
father 'wanted neither for Genius or Learning [but] he had not Ambition of 
appearing in Public as a Writer.' Cudworth's father died in 1624 and therefore 
would only have had a limited influence on Cudworth's early development. 
Cudworth's mother, who remains unnamed in all accounts of Cudworth's life, 
remarried a Dr Stoughton. Stoughton, like the elder Cudworth, was a fellow of 
Emmanuel and is credited with encouraging Cudworth's early potential and his 
6~ The most often quoted source for the life of Ralph Cudworth is Thomas Birch's 'An account of 
the Life and writings ofR. Cudworth D.o.' which prefaced the 1743 edition of the TISU. However 
this source, which has been assumed to be the earliest account of Cudworth's life, is itself based in 
large part on an anonymous account of Cudworth's life published in 1736. The 'i\lemoirs qlRalph 
Cudworrll D.D. AlIthorl!lThe Intellectual System,' appeared in the January 1736 edition of ilie 
journal The Presellt State qlthe Repllblic o/utters. TIllS appears to be the source of many of the claims, 
some of which are erroneous, which appear in Birch's account. It is, however, factually correct on 
the majority of the details of Cudworth's life. 
65 Ralph Cudworth, the elder, A COlntJJeJltatie or Expositioll, "POll the first Chapters if the Epistle to the 
Galatialls: penned 0' ... kI!: W Perkills. NOiV pllblished for the benefit I!l the Chlll'l:h, alld cOlltillued Ivith a 
slIpplemellt IIPOIl the sixt chaptn: 0' Raft C"dlvof1h. (Cambridge, 1604). 
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eventual matriculation to Emmanuel in 1632.66 Cudworth's progress once in 
Cambridge was rapid. As a pupil of Which cote he took his B.A. in 1635 and his 
M.A. in 1639, 'with unusual Applause.'67 Following Cudworth's M.A. he followed 
his father and step-father into a fellowship at Emmanuel. At Emmanuel Cudworth 
stood out as an unusually successful and popular tutor, having at one point 28 
pupils, which was, so the author of the '1VIemoir' comments, so rare as not to have 
been remembered in living memory at Emmanuel. 
Cudworth was appointed to the Mastership of Clare Hall in 1645. In the 
same year Cudworth was also elected to the Regius Professorship of Hebrew, and in 
1651 Cudworth was made a D.D. 'without the least difficulty and with a dese1ved 
Approbation.'68 During this period Cudworth appears to have begun to drift from 
the University. In his capacity as Regius Professor of Hebrew he lectured on the 
plan and structure of dle Temple of Jerusalem. He did not, however, setde into his 
position at Clare and never became actively involved in the running of the college. 
The author of the 'Memoir' suggests that a shortage of funds nearly forced 
Cudworth to resign from the University in the early 1650s. His financial situation 
may have been helped by his appointment, in succession to Whichcote, to dle living 
of Nordl Cadbury in 1650, that carried with it the not inconsiderable income of 
£300 per annum. 69 What ahnost certainly brought Cudworth financial security was 
his marriage in 1654 to Damaris Andrews, the widow of one Thomas Andrews. 
This marriage brought with it not only fmancial security but also three step-children. 
66 The Author of the '.Memoir' does, however, state that Cudworth's mother had at one point been a 
Nurse to Prince Henry, the eldest son of James 1. 'i\Iemoirs' p.24. 
67 Ibid., pp.24-S. 
68 Ibid., p.2S. 
69 Ibid., pp.27, 29. 
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Cudworth's wife then had three more chilciren, John, Damaris and Charles. 70 
Although Charles Cudworth died in 1683 in India, contrary to the claim made in 
both the 'Memoir' and Birch's 'Life,' Cudworth's eldest son John survived 
Cudworth, as did his daughter Damaris.71 In the same year as his marriage 
Cudworth was able to consolidate his position in the University by his election to 
the Mastership of Christ's College.72 The appointment protected Cudworth's career 
in two ways. Firsdy, as Cudworth was elected to this position by the Mastership of 
the college he immediately held more legitimacy in dle University than he had as dle 
Earl of Manchester's appointee at Clare Hall. Secondly, at Christ's he came under 
dle influence and patronage of Heneage Finch, who later, as Lord Chancellor, was 
the Dedicatee of the Trite Intellectual System of the UllilJeJ'Je. These two factors almost 
certainly helped Cudworth remain in his position at Christ's when many of his 
fellow heads of houses, most notably Whichcote at I<ings, Worthington at Jesus and 
Tuckney at Emmanuel, were ejected at dle Restoration. 
Late in life Cudworth, in a letter to the Dutch Remonstrant Peter van 
Limborch, stated that he had been brought up on a diet of Calvinism from an early 
age. He does, however, not say when he began to depart from this strict Calvinist 
position.73 If this movement away from Calvinism did begin prior to his 
matriculation, it would certainly have been hastened by the teaching and influence 
of Which cote. In fact Whichcote's liberal theological position and also his respect 
711 Cudworth's wealth from his marriage is shown by the extensive properties, mostly in Suffolk, 
outlined in his will which he left to his wife and subsequently his eldest son John. Christ's College 
.MS.77, Will ~lRalph ClldJIJOl1h D.D., M.aster ~lChrist's and if/til ~lDalJlaris ClldJ/JoI1h. In addition to his 
own children Cudworth cared for his three step-children, namely Thomas and Richard Andrews and 
Damaris 1\bney (nee 1\ndrews). For a rough Cudworth family tree see Christ's College MS.77. 
71 ';,Iemoirs,' p.29; Birch, 'Life,' p.9. 
72 John \\1orthington, The Diar), alld ComspolldelhY! ofDrJolJll WOl1hillgtOIl, 3 vols, ed. James Crossley & 
Richard Copley Christie, The ChethalJl Societ.y, vols. 13,43, 114, (1847-1886), 1:52; CUL.:~dS, Mm.5.45, 
Notes 011 the Masters ~lGod's HOllse & Ch,7St's College, fo1.59. 
73 Powicke, Cambl7dge Platollists, p.lll. 
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for classical and, in particular, Platonic thought are identifiable in Cudworth's 
earliest writings. In these early publications Cudworth can be seen adopting an 
intellectualist opposition to the voluntarism of Calvinism very similar to that we 
have already encountered in Whichcote. Although Cudworth's early writings lack 
the heavy erudition of his later work, his earliest publications - A Discourse cOllcerning 
the trm !lotion oj the Lord's st/pper and The Ullioll oj Chtist alld the Church ill a shadow, both 
published in 1642 - both deal with theological issues with the mL'{ of historical and 
philosophical analysis which is central to the style and argument of the TISU. Even 
before these works were published Cudworth, in his B.D. disputations, put forward 
principles of eternal and immutable morality that were to become one of the 
recurring themes of his writings.74 With these writings Cudworth also published two 
sermons. The first and most famous being his S ermoll Preathed before the Hottse of 
ComJJlolls of 1647, (described as the First S ermoll) the second, his S ermoll Preached to the 
HOllourable Society ojLillco!lles-IllIle from 1664 (described as the Secolld Sermoll). These 
published writings are interesting for two reasons. Firstly, they are Cudworth's only 
published works until the publication of his monumental TISU in 1678 when 
Cudworth was 61. Secondly, we can find in them the beginnings of the ideas that 
fmd their intellectual maturity in Cudworth's later published and unpublished 
writings. 
74 The subject of Cudworth's B.D. disputations, mentioned in a previous chapter, were: firstly, 'The 
Nature and Reason of Things are eternal and indivisible and that there is an immutable Difference 
between Good and Evil,' and secondly, 'That there exist incorporeal substance that are naturally 
immortal.' These disputations were printed in the 1670 edition of Cudworth's Discollrse 011 the Tl7le 
Natllre ~(the Lord's Slipper. The author of the ':Memoir' comments of Cudworth's B.D. disputations 
that, '[fJrom whence it also appears, that this profound Metaphysician was tllen revolving in his 
spacious lIind, and carefully examining those different and important Questions, which he discussed 
with such Copiousness and Subtlety in his Illteflectual System and other of this invaluable works are yet 
(unhappily) in Manuscript.' Cudworth's early use of the intellectualist arguments for an eternal and 
immutable basis to morality are also commented on by Tulloch, Ratiollal Theolo!!)', II:29, 202-3; and by 
Passmore, Ralph CtfdlJlol1h, p.ll. 
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In these early writings we find Cudworth beginning to examine the themes 
that dominate his mature thought. In all these publications Cudworth continually 
returns to the central Christian theme of how can men live in the image of Christ. 
In all of Cudworth's writings this theme is dealt with in two linked ways. Firsdy, 
beginning with the principle of the divine, Cudworth continually seeks to explain 
how man fits into the overarching principle of divine creation. In particular he asks 
how man can be defined in relation to God as Trinity. Secondly, taking the life of 
man as his starting point, Cudworth seeks to understand how man's humanity and 
relationships to other men can be defined within this overarching Trinitarian 
metaphysical system. In particular Cudworth, like Whichcote, seeks to link the duty 
of man to live dle life and image of Christ with dle obligation of man to achieve this 
within a viable human and, what I have termed, ethical community. 
In his early writings Cudworth follows Whichcote's Christocentric criticisms 
of the prevailing theological orthodoxy of mid-seventeenth century England. We 
can see these criticisms most clearly in Cudworth's First Sermoll. In style this sermon 
follows Whichcote in the moderate dleological position it takes. Cudworth attacks 
Calvinism and Scholasticism, which are those areas of thought that are central to 
Whichcote's letters to Tuckney. It is therefore interesting at this point to compare 
Cudworth's First Set71101l to Whichcote's Letters to show the unity of their theological 
position and, in particular, dle intellectualist philosophical position that both men 
shared. Cudworth's First Sermoll was a remarkably brave piece of public oratory. 
Cudworth was, at the time, the 29 year old Master of Clare Hall. In his sermon he 
not only attacks the prevailing dleological mood of the day, which he identifies as 
the voluntarist theology of the Westminster Assembly, but also the divisive use to 
121 
which religion had been put to tear the country apart through the extraordinary 
middle years of the 1640s. Cudworth links these two issues with a general attack on 
the dangers of what he terms 'self-love.' Although this is never clearly defined by 
Cudworth in the First Sermon it is clear that, by implication, Cudworth understands 
self-love in two ways. Firsdy, it is the selfish, egotistical acts of man following his 
base emotions over the higher principles of morality. Secondly, and more 
importandy for the context of Cudworth's Fint Sermoll, he uses self-love to attack 
the stale, legalistic intelpretations of religion that made religion not something 
which reformed man, but something that merely confumed man's own self-image 
and prejudices. Such a self-serving understanding of religion, Cudworth argues, fails 
to understand that man is, by his very creation, actively involved in the nature and 
reality of dle divine. The most influential of this religious legalism is for Cudworth, 
like Whichcote, the limited form of Scholastic reasoning. At dle very beginning of 
dle Fint Sermon Cudworth attacks those who write about religion as 'but a litde 
Book-craft, a mere paper-ski/!.,75 Cudworth argues that such thinkers fail because their 
bookish approach to theology can never bring man into a true participatory 
relationship with the divine. This scholasticism which was central to ordlodox 
Calvinism, creates in Cudworth's view, a prescriptive and legalistic ethical system 
that implicidy fails to appreciate the living, active nature of the divine's presence in 
the world. As Cudworth states, '[i]nke and paper can never make us Christians, can 
never beget a new nature, a living principle within us: can never form Christ, or any 
true notions of spirituall things in our hearts.,76 Cudworth is dismissive of those who 
believe that knowledge or experience of salvation could ever be achieved by such 
75 First Sem/oll. p.91. 
76 Ibid., p.92. 
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means. It is, Cudworth argues, ridiculous 'to perswade our selves that we are 
certainly elected to everlasting happiness: before we see the image of God, in 
rightousnesse and true holinesse, shaped in our hearts.,77 
The final clause of this quotation shows the implicit intellectualism that runs 
through Cudworth's argument. The arguments of Scholasticism and Calvinism fail 
in Cudworth's mind because they fail to understand that man is, by nature, shaped 
by the righteousness, holiness, and intellect of the divine. Man's relationship to God 
cannot be defined by the complications of Scholastic logic but through the 
recognition of the divine principle in all men: 'Surely, the way to heaven that Christ 
hath taught us, is plain and easie, if we have but honest hearts: we need not many 
Criticismes, many School-distinctions, to come to a right understanding of it. ,78 As 
in Whichcote's writings, Cudworth equates this interior principle with the principle 
of Christ known through the rationality implicit within men. This intellectualism is 
brought out explicidy by Cudworth later in the First Sermon. Here, citing Plato's 
argument from the EJit/?ypbro, Cudworth links God's love not to arbitrary action, but 
to God's recognition of his goodness in the essential nature of man.79 Comparing 
Plato's argument with the 1 In. 4:10,80 Cudworth links the nature of man, the 
incarnation and dle salvation of man to this central, intellectually understood, 
principle of divine love. For this reason Cudworth argues the principles of true 
dleology are found, as the example of Christ taught man, in actions rather than in 
mere words. So Cudworth argues: 
77 Ibid., p.94. 
78 Ibid., p.96. 
79 Ibid., p.102. 
80 'In tins is love, not that we loved God but that he loved us and sent his son to be tile expiation of 
our sins.' 
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The Gospel, that new Law which Christ delivered to the world, it is not 
merely a Letterwithout us, but a qTlzdeenillg Spidtwithin us. Cold Theorems 
and Maximes, dty and jejune Disputes, lean syllogistical reasonings, could 
never yet of themselves beget the least glympse of true heavenly light, the 
least sap of saving knowledge in any heart.S! 
Distinctions learnt from philosophy are important, but only as a means to confirm 
the truth already revealed to man in the example of Christ. As Cudworth argues in 
his Second Sermoll, such philosophical distinctions are 'thin and subtile to vulgar 
apprehensions.'82 The example that man had to understand in the example of Christ 
was that he did not create a stale, legalistic example, but an inner principle for the 
transformation of man.83 
Cudworth's belief that Christ is a living and active principle comes out, if 
only in a subtle form, in Cudworth's Discourse 011 the tl7fe flattlre of the Lord's Stlppe!: In 
this short work Cudworth seeks to reject Roman Catholic teaching on the true 
nature of the Eucharist.84 Using examples from both pagan and Jewish thought 
Cudworth argues - against the Catholic belief in transubstantiation - that the 
Eucharist is not a sacrifice itself but a feast upon a sacrifice. Cudworth argues that in 
taking the Eucharist, the communicants are partaking in the Sacrifice made for man 
by Christ. This participatoty relationship with the sacrifice of Christ assumes two 
factors. Firstly it draws on Platonic distinctions of 'forms' for the nature of the 
Eucharist. Cudworth argues, that the Eucharist is not a sacrifice in itself, rejecting 
8! First Sermoll, p.92. 
82 S etolld S ermOIl, p.196. 
83 Ibid. p.222. 
84 It is interesting to note, with an eye on the tolerance implicit within all of Cudworth's writings, that 
in a time of vimlent anti-Catholicism tllls work is tlle most explicit attack we find in all of 
Cudworth's writings on the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. 
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the Catholic belief that the host truly becomes the body and blood of Christ in the 
Eucharist. Rather, Cudwordl argues, dle Eucharist is a reflection of the form of the 
sacrifice of Christ. This argument allows Cudworth to make a second point. Just as 
Platonic forms relate to an eternal archetype, so the Eucharist relates, Cudworth 
argues, to the eternal and ongoing sacrifice of Christ.85 The 'Federal rite' of the 
Eucharist not only confirms the eternal and active presence of Christ, but also, 
where 'God's meal, was a 'Federal Rite' between God and those that partake of 
them, and Signified that there was a Covenant of Friendship between him and 
them.'86 
Unlike the prevailing Calvinist belief that the sacrifice of Christ merely 
confirms the poverty and sinfulness of man and consequendy man's total reliance 
on the inlmeasurable, and essentially arbitrary, nature of God's grace, Cudworth 
argues that the sacrifice of Christ unites God and man in common cause.S7 Christ 
becomes not dle symbol of the vast divide that exists between God and man but the 
mediating principle between the lower state of man and the perfection of the divine. 
This principle of Christ as mediator comes out most clearly in Cudworth's Second 
Sermon: 
And this is an unspeakable Consolation that the Clu-istian Religion affords 
us, and a most gracious Condescension of the All-wise God; That 
forasmuch as we that dwell in these houses ... are so far removed from the 
pure and abstracted Deity, and so infinitely disproportioned unto it, that 
there should be such a contrivance as this set on foot, that we should have 
85 Ralph Cudworth, Discollrse 011 tbe Tl7le NatlllY! oftbe Lord's Slipper (London, 1670), p.75. 
86 Ibid., p.86. 
87 Illstitlltes, ILxvii.1. 
125 
one of our own Flesh and Bloud, that was in all things tempted like unto us, 
and had experience of all our difficulties, and calamities, who demonstrated 
his infinite love to us in laying down his life for us, and therefore we cannot 
doubt but have a most tender sympathy and fellow feeling with us in all our 
infirmities.88 
In tllls quote Cudworth opens up the problem of anti-Trintariarusm of which we 
have already seen Tuckney accuse Whichcote and which would continue to dog 
Cudworth's later writings. Cudworth's thought relies on Christ as the mediating and 
defming principle in all creation. Cudworth, however, in trying to establish the 
person of Christ as mediating and active principle comes close to suggesting that 
Christ is a created, not co-eternal, principle. The manner in wlllch Cudworth 
explains the principle of Christ as both an active principle which is co-eternal with 
the Father is a central theme of Cudworth's defence of the Trinity in the TISU. 
Taking into account tIlls theological issue, Cudworth is clear in how he views the 
place of Christ to man; in Christ man sees 'witb all open face ... as ill a Glass tbe Glory of 
tbe Lord nakedly represented to us, being cbanged into tbe Jame image jlr)JJl glolJ! to glory.'89 
The eternal principle of Christ becomes, for Cudworth, the spirit of a new life 
infused in the soul of man through faith?] 
In his early writings Cudworth removes himself from external questions of 
Church order and liturgical form that dominated theological debate in the early 
decades of the seventeenth century. Alluding to the religious and political upheavals 
of the 1640s, Cudworth argues in this Preface to his First Semlon, 
88 Suolld SeI7JJOIl, pp.200-1. 
89 Ibid., p.202. 
90 Ibid., p.224. 
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I fear many of us, that pull down idols in Churches, may set them up in our 
hearts: and whilst we quarrel with painted glass, make no scruple at all of 
entertaining many foul lusts in our souls, and committing continual idolatty 
with them.91 
Cudworth's inner reformation was not to turn men from the legalism of outward 
signs to the inner legalism of religious zealots and enthusiasm, but to emancipate 
man from both the external and internal dictates of arbitraty ethical legalism 
altogether. Implicit in Cudworth's argument is that in the recognition of the active 
principle in oneself, the individual comes to recognise that principle within others. It 
is the mutual self-recognition of the Christ-like potential in all men that draws men 
together. This process of mutual self-recognition provides the building blocks from 
which Cudworth creates the second of his recurring themes, the ethical community. 
In his Second Sermoll Cudworth goes some way to explaining how this 
community might be recognised and formed. In this sermon Cudworth, using 
suggestively political language, lists the three levels to describe how man can ascend 
to a hue participation in the divine. The flrst level, where Cudworth describes man 
as 'sin's freemen,' is the life driven and deflned by 'Como! Liberty, or 
Licentiousness.>92 This position, Cudworth claims, is taken by 'Epicureans, 
Antinomians and Enthusiasts.' The second level, that Cudworth terms as 'the 
bondsman to the law and sin,' is the position mistakenly taken by many who claim 
to live the religious life. Men in this position believe that the highest perfection of 
91 Cudworth, 'Preface' to A Se/7JJOII Preached before the HOllollrable The HOllse ~r COil/mOilS, OlllvIarch 31 st, 
1647: Beillg a dCl)! if Public HIIJJliliatioll (London, 1647), p.38. 
92 Suolld Sem/oll, pp.241, 239. 
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the Christian life is to exist within a legalistic relationship in the world, whether tlus 
be following the rulings of organised religion or tlle internal dictates of moral piety. 
Cudworth argues that in this second position men fail to appreciate the active and 
living principle of Christ, seeing the /OI7J1J' of religion as more important than the role 
of religion.93 The true religious life can be found, Cudworth argues, by turning away 
from both the external and internal dictates of arbitrary codes and laws, to a hue 
participation with the living principle of Christ. To become, what Cudworth terms, 
one of 'God's freemen' man has to accept the active principle of Christ over the 
passive acceptance of proscribed arbitrary codes.94 
By calling for an inner reformation Cudworth is not advocating the 
supremacy of personal faitll over the rules of organised religion. Such a position, 
Cudworth argues leads to dangers of antinomianism. The confidence of personal 
belief alone can never fulfil the obligation of man to live the full Christian life. As 
Cudworth argues, personal conviction cannot alone lead to Christ, 'no more than 
mere words can clothe a naked man's Back, or feed a hungry Man's Belly.'95 For 
Cudworth the life of 'God's freemen' implicitly assumes the active membership of 
an ethical community in the world. It is difficult to ascertain exactly what form 
Cudworth deemed this ethical community should take. At times he discusses the 
ethical community in terms of 'Church.' It would be incorrect to view Cudworth's 
use of 'Church' as advocacy for strict ecclesiastical structures. Cudworth appears 
instead to use the term 'Church' to describe a universal, catholic and corporate 
93 It is interesting to note here that in the Secolld Sermoll, dated 1664, Cudworth makes an explicit 
distinction between the failings of Epicureanism, which Cudworth equated with Hobbism, and the 
theistic determinism of Calvinism. "-\lthough, as has already been noted, Cudworth recognises in both 
the failings of voluntarism, he does make an explicit distinction between the two. TIllS distinction is 
of great importance when we come to consider Cudworth's view of freewill in more detail in Chapter 
Five. 
9-1 Ibid., pp.241-4, 217. 
95 Ibid., p.214. 
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body. In his S ecolld S ermOIl, preached in early 1664 when the level and extent of 
comprehension and toleration within the Church was a particularly live issue, 
Cudworth calls for the Church to be the union of all reformed beliefs, as otherwise 
the reformed Church would be 'pulled into complete confusion and min by infmite 
sects and divisions.'96 This view of the broad nature of the Church is backed up by a 
letter to the Dutch Remonstrant, Peter van Limborch, in 1674, in which he calls for 
the Church of England to be 'a Noah's ark' of comprehension, in which all 
reformed religious groups, Calvinists, Remonstrants and even Socinians could live 
together.97 For Cudworth the exact structure of the Church was of secondaty 
importance to the role it played within the Christian life. As Cudworth argues in 
FM.4983, 'I would understand t temple to be a type of the universal society of 
Christians, t true temple of God.'98 
It is this catholic notion of the comprehension of all free-thinking Christians 
which is at the heart of Cudworth's belief in ethical community. The Church, or 
ethical community, was both the structure through which man came to know God, 
as well as the eardl1y fulfillnent of man's participatoty relationship widl the divine. 
In his 1642 publication Tbe Ullioll rifCbrist alld tbe Cburcb ill a Sbado}JJ Cudworth, in a 
work examining the sacrament of marriage, defines marriage as a metaphor of the 
l'elationship between the Church and Christ. In mal'riage Cudworth al'gues that as 
women are wedded to men by marriage so the Church is wedded to Christ. As the 
woman submits herself totally to man in marriage, so the Church submits itself 
totally to Christ. Cl'ucially, however, Cudwol'th argues that this is not a one-way 
96 Ibid., p.255. 
97 Letter from Cudworth to Limborch, 16 March, 1674, quoted in Hutton, 'Liberty and Self-
determination,' pp.82-3. 
98 FM.4978, fo1.20. 
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relationship, for in marriage as man promised to honour his wife, so Christ honours 
his Church with his body, through his sacrifice.99 A Church created out of the 
membership of God's freemen is unified through its shared experience of the 
principle of Christ, understood fully as an active principle, playing within the hearts 
of all men. So as marriage can be broken by the licentious desire of adultery, so the 
Church - the human community - can be broken by the sinful lusts of men. The 
unity of the ethical community is therefore controlled by the inner reformation of 
man. The desire to live in the light of Christ, by the means of inner reformation, and 
the fulftltnent of this through the creation of an ethical community are inseparable 
in Cudworth's mind. The seeming paradox that an internal action can confirm an 
external community mns through all Cudworth's work and in part explains how this 
political aspect that mns through all Cudworth's work is so difficult to account for. 
The ethical community for Cudworth is a reflection of the divinity of Christ, 
consequendy man's individual appreciation of the divinity through his participation 
in the divine image leads to a collective, even democratic, recognition of this 
participation in other men. The unity of men through Christ by reason is, therefore, 
Cudworth argues, not only confirmed but solidified by the ethical actions of men in 
the world. As Cudworth argues in FM.4983, 'y" Love of God is too weak a principle 
. e d fXi' I . I G d d 1 ,100 Th . to conquer Sill y great uty 0 -< an aw 1S to ove 0 all tove mell.· e creation 
of the ethical community is the central purpose of life. Through it, Cudworth 
argues, men collectively create the means through which all men can fulfil their 
participatory relationship widl God. 
99 Ralph Cudworth, Tbe Ullioll ~lCbrist alld tbe Cb,m:b ill a Sbado]}J (London, 1642), pp.4-6. 
100 Fl\1.4978, fol.l00 - my emphasis. 
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Within his early writings we can already see d1e manner in which Cudworth 
implicidy links his Christocentric doctrine of God implicidy to d1e political 
principles of the ethical community. The linking principle between these two is 
reason, reason which emanates down to man through Christ, and reason which 
brings man into a participatory relationship with the divine. By the use of this active 
rational principle Cudworth makes d1e means through which man comes to know 
God in the world an implicidy ethical and political principle. For Cudworth all 
actions should be judged as part of man's participation within the Christ-like image 
of the divine. Therefore, in Cudworth's mind, the political is understood as an 
essential manifestation of the theological. In this fully participatory nature Cudworth 
argues, man emancipates himself from the dangers of self-love that typified the 
stale, legalistic relationship found in the ethical teachings of Calvinism. The breadth 
of the educal community is therefore not defined by doctrinal or liturgical 
principles, but by the collective acceptance that all men must individually participate 
with the divine. The breadth and latitude of Cudworth's ethical community is based 
entirely on his doctrine of God. Membership of the educal community assumes the 
acceptance of the intellectualist principle of God that we encountered in 
Whichcote's replies to Tuckney. The emancipation of man from strictures of 
legalism can only come, Cudworth argues, if man completely accepts that all 
creation is defmed by the overflowing love of the divine. The seeming paradoxical 
nature of this relationship is not lost on Cudworth. At one point in the First Sermoll 
he comments that 'Love is at once a Freedome from all Law, a State of purest 
Liberty, and yet a Law too, of the most constraining and indispensable Necessity.,1111 
101 First 5 ermoll. p.124. The importance of this paradox in Cudworth has been noted by C.A.Patrides, 
see Ibid. n.SS. 
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One can unlock the political nature of Cudworth's thought by understanding the 
way in which Cudworth asserts the social and political nature of man, in particular 
man's freewill and personal responsibility, as not being anathema to, but logically 
contingent on, the strict understanding of God's love. This principle of divine love 
is understood and mediated to man in these early writings in the Christocentric 
principle of reason. In this way Cudworth, in these writings, follows the theological 
path set by Whichcote. What we will encounter in the remaining chapters of this 
thesis is the manner in which Cudworth converts this Christo centric theological 
principle into a philosophically minded, Logocentric, system of moral responsibility, 
ethical self-determination and political obligation: a comprehensive understanding 
of the created realm which, at its heart, is defmed by the Trinity as The Trtle 
IllteilectNal System if the Ulliverse. 
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Chapter IV - Cudworth's Doctrine of the Trinity - the True 
Intellectual System of the Universe 
IV.t. Introduction 
Ralph Cudworth's incomplete Trtle Illte!ledllal System rif the Universe 1 dominates his 
intellectual reputation. Cudworth is remembered, and largely judged, by the style 
and form of the fIrst and only published volume of his Intellectllal System. Cudworth's 
seeming relish in continually attacking the many forms and guises of atheism means 
that Cudworth is praised for penetrating 'the very darkest reaches of Antiquity to 
strip Atheism of all its Disguises & and drag up the lurking Monster to conviction.'2 
Such was the power and quality of the learning in the TISU that John Locke, in his 
Some Thoughts concerning Edllcatioll, suggests that: 
He that would look further back, and acquaint himself with the several 
Opinions of the Ancients, may consult Dr. CtldwOIth's IlltelledNal System; 
wherein that very learned Author hath with such Accurateness and 
Judgement collected and explained the Opinions of the Greek Philosophers, 
that what Principles they built on, and what were the chief Ffypotheses, that 
divided them, is better to be seen in him, than any where else that I know.3 
1 To differentiate between the first and only published volume of the True Illte//ect/la/ S),stem ~r tbe 
Ulliverse, and the whole project which was never completed by Cudworth, I will term the published 
volume as TISU and the entire project as Cudworth's Illte//ectt/a/ System. 
2 British Library Add.MSS 2497, Misce//a!leolls Papers ~rTbo!JJas Bircb, fo1.93. 
3 John Locke, S olJle Tbollgbts COllcemillg Edllmtioll, ed. John \V & Jean S. Yolton (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989), p.248. 
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The weight of learning in the TISU has, however, also been grist to the mill for 
many of Cudworth's greatest critics. John Turner, one of Cudworth's fIrst critics, 
saw TISU as, 'instead of being, as it calls itself, an UniverJe, is a ChaoJ of crude and 
indigested NotionJ; and AbJJ of bottomless Vanity and OJtelltatiollJ.'4 This form of 
criticism was continued into the twentieth century where the formless and 
unsystematic nature of much of Cudworth's argument was judged to be 'intolerably 
verbose' and 'monstrously obese.'s 
Ernst Cassirer was correct in pointing out tha.t Cudworth's style did differ 
from the clarity offered by more modeI'll seventeenth century philosophers such as 
Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes and Montaigne. However the style and form of the TISU 
should not diminish its importance and impact as a philosophical work. Cudworth 
was remembered as much for being a philosopher, as he was for encyclopaedic 
style.6 If the TISU is placed in the context of Cudworth's other writings, especially 
his early writings mentioned in the previous chapter, the philosophical coherence of 
the TISU comes into sharper focus. If one works through the vast learning and 
often wearisome diversions that Cudworth takes into ancient and Pagan theology 
one fInds that the TISU is an extremely sophisticated defence of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. Linking this insight back to what we have already observed in Cudworth's 
early writings we can see the TISU as a long and detailed philosophical apology for 
the intellectual and metaphysical principle that underpins all creation. For Cudworth 
the Trinity, correctly understood, is The True Illtelleettial SYJtem of the Ulliver.re. It is on 
4 John Turner, A Discoltrse collcemillg the 111essias ... To }/INch is prefixed a large Pr~lace aSS811illg alld 
explaillillg the Docfline of the Blessed Tlillit)' agaillst the late miter ~l the Ilitellectl/al System (London, 1685), 
p.XXl. 
5 Quoted in Samuel :Mintz, The HI/Iltillg ~l Leviathall: S eVe/ltemth-ce/ltlll)' reactioll to the materialism alld moral 
phiiosopl?J ~lTboJJ1as Hobbes (CUP, Cambridge, 1962), p.96. 
6 For praise of Cudworth the philosopher see for instance David Burne, Ellqllireies cOllcemillg Hllmall 
Ullderstalldillg alld cOllccmillg the Plimiples Of Morals, ed. L.A.Selby-Bigge & P.H.Niddich (Clarendon 
Press, OUP, 1975), p.73. 1\lso see, Button 'Classicism and Baroque,' pp.211-2. 
134 
this often overlooked Trinitarian aspect of the TISU that this chapter will 
concentrate. 
As already stated, because the TISU dominates Cudworth's reputation, it is 
important fIrst to account for the genesis and writing of the TISU. This is 
particularly important because the TISU was published in 1678 many years after the 
early publications described in the previous chapter. That being said, I will argue 
that even though the style Cudwordl uses in the TISU changes markedly from the 
Whichcotian and Christo centric nature of his early writings, the central arguments 
Cudworth deploys remain the same. The TISU can be understood as the 
metaphysical preparation for the ethical and political implications of his later 
unpublished writings. In particular I will argue that the active power of the second 
person of the Trinity, the Logos, which is the characteristic theme of Cudworth's 
Trinitarianism, is the principle through which Cudworth's ethical principles must be 
understood. Because Cudworth's Logocentric defence of the Trinity is so important 
to all Cudworth's writings I will examine in detail how Cudworth philosophically 
justifIes the doctrine of the Trinity on these terms. In particular I will show the 
manner in which Cudworth accounts for the active nature of the Logos by an 
examination of his use of Plotinian distinctions in his critique of Descartes' 
ontological proof. By highlighting the Neoplatonic basis of Cudworth's account of 
the Trinity I will be able to explain not only the form of argument he employs in the 
TISU but also account for, through his 'Cabalistic' understanding of the Trinity, 
some of dle vast and often repetitive erudition that characterises the TISU. I will 
then show the way in which the philosophical arguments for the Trinity found in 
ancient theology, and Neoplatonism in particular, are understood by Cudworth to 
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be merely a preparation for, and confirmation of, the incarnation of Christ. The 
Trinity understood in its hue Christian form is, Cudworth argues, the defming 
principle of all creation. For this reason he believes all creation is explicable in light 
of this conception of Trinitarianism. To show how Cudworth argues this to be the 
case I will conclude dlls chapter by examining how he believes that by overcoming 
the errors of atheism - the putative task of the TISU - one cannot only conflrm the 
dleistic basis of reality, but also confirm the Trinitarian form of creation. 
IV.2. The form and conception of the TISU 
The interpretation of the TISU as a continuation of Cudworth's ongoing intellectual 
project is conftrmed if we examine the genesis of the project which was to become 
the TISU. In the preface to the TISU he states that the TISU began life as a work 
on liberty and necessity. He then states that he began to realise that before he could 
attempt this he needed to undermine and confute all those atheistic, or theologically 
incorrect arguments that made the idea of morality and distributive justice logically 
ridiculous.7 Cudworth's initial desire when beginning work on the TISU was to 
refute those arguments that he believes would undermine the possibility of a viable 
system of morality; in Cudworth's words, those arguments that make 'a Day of 
Judgement, tidicttlolts.' By his own admission, the TISU began life as a work that 
underpins his belief in the ethical community, a theme that we encounter in his early 
writings. 
It would, at flrst sight, appear to be strange to compare Cudworth's early 
writings with the TISU, flrsdy because of the differing styles of both sets of work 
7 TISU, p.lli. 
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-
and secondly because of the great gap that there was between Cudworth's early 
publications in the 1640s and the publication of the TISU in 1678. The only 
exception to this being the publication of his Second Sermoll in 1664, a work that 
Cudworth was himself not satisfied with. 8 Something of this gap can be explained 
by a combination of his idiosyncratic working habits and the external machinations 
which hampered his ability to produce work. Cudworth's Intellectual System probably 
began life in his stated desire to produce a work on ethics in the early 1660s. In fact 
Cudworth, in letters to Worthington, suggested that his work on ethics would be a 
deeper and fuller account of the ideas we encountered in the Secolld SemJoll. 
Cudworth, in beginning this project, was attempting to place into a more 
philosophical form the ideas of ethical community and the Christian life which 
appear in his earlier writings. It was this project which brought about his now 
famous dispute widl Henry More over the writing and publication of More's 
EIlChilidioll ethictl1J? in 1666. 
Cudworth claimed, in a letter dated January 1664/5, that he had begun work 
on what he termed his 'Metaphysical Ethics ... above a year ago,' and was 'struck 
into amaze' by the discovery that More, 'whom I have been entire friend to,' was 
also working on an intellectualist ethics. Cudworth claimed that More was perfecdy 
aware dlat he had been working on this project, which had begun as sermons he 
had preached in the college chapel. More, writing in his defence to Word1ington in 
May of the same year, claimed that he had intended to publish his work after 
Cudworth had published his.9 
8 Worthington, Diary, II:141. 
9 Ibid., 1:157 -60, 172. 
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The vehemence of Cudworth's reaction is, on the surface, surprising. It is, 
however, possible to argue that there was more involved in this reaction than an 
academic spat over claims to intellectual property. At the Restoration, although 
Cudworth was quickly confIrmed in his position as Master of Christ's by the King, 
there was still great opposition to his remaining at Christ's.lO In letters to John 
Worthington, who had not shared Cudworth's fortune in maintaining his position in 
Cambridge, Cudworth discusses at some length both his political problems at 
Christ's at the time and how to thank those who had supported his position. In 
particular, he was searching for some means of thanking Archbishop Sheldon, to 
whom he owed his 'living and station.' The problem, Cudworth claimed, was that he 
had little or notlling to publish; this was the reason why his Second Sermoll was 
published at this time, even though he was dissatisfIed with it.ll Following this initial 
discussion Cudworth again claims in late 1664 that there would be growth of 'a new 
mischief,' against him in the college, possibly orchestrated by Bishop Henchman of 
Salisbury.12 To counter this new threat he then suggests that he could publish a 
work on natural ethics, with a dedication to Sheldon. Such a work would, one 
imagines, have been of greater intellectual worth and political weight to Cudworth 
that the SecoJld Sermoll, also it would have been a more suitable means of 
acknowledging his debt to Sheldon. 13 It is in the context of his difflculties at Christ's 
10 Ibid., 1:203. 
11 Ibid., II:135. 
12 Cudworth's suspicion that opposition to his place at Cambridge was being orchestrated by Bishop 
Henchman is confirmed by a letter from Henchman to Richard Love dated 17 October, 1660 which 
is held in the Tanner manuscripts of the Bodleian Library. In tllls Henchman states that 'Dr 
Cudworth brought Clare-Hall into a ruinous condition, and tllen I have cause to feare that [he] may 
do that like at Christ College.' Henchman goes on to argue that tlle failures of a head of a college are 
based not on his econonllc management of a college willch, he argues, can be delegated to a bursar, 
but on the moralleadersillp tllat the ]\faster gives to the college. l1lerefore Henchman's criticisms of 
Cudworth are not for his inexperience during his time at Clare, but because Cudworth's 
Churchman ship was not in tune with the newly restored Anglican Church of willch Henchman was a 
leading member. See Tanner j'vIS.49, fo1.32. 
13 Worthington, Dim)" II:141-2. 
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in the mid 1660s that we should read his altercation with More. Cudworth's clear 
anger at More was not that he was publishing on a similar area - this had never been 
a problem, nor would it remain a problem for the Cambridge Platonists. Rather, I 
would argue, he feared that More, by publishing such a similar work, would destroy 
his initiative. The publication of More's work removed from Cudworth the chance 
to repay the debt to those on whose influence Cudworth relied. If this interpretation 
is correct one may cilen imagine Cudworth's increased anger when he discovered 
More's intention to dedicate his ethical work to Sheldon, especially as Cudworth had 
already informed Sheldon of his intention to publish a work dedicated to him.14 
These political machinations explain something of the slowness in 
Cudworth's working habits. However, the length and style of the TISU can also be 
explained by Cudworth's own idiosyncratic methods, methods that continually 
fmstrated Cudworth's friends and colleagues. He was, by all accounts, a very slow 
reluctant writer. Throughout cile 1660s many of Cudworth's friends and colleagues 
were encouraging llinl to publish his works, most notably his unpublished writings 
on the prophesies of the Book of Daniel. These had been publicly praised by Hemy 
More in the preface to his 1660 work, An E.-plallatioll of the Grand i\1JisteCY if 
Godliness. ls These writings, that are in part held in manuscript in the British Library, 
were also commented on favourably by Samuel Hartlib in a letter to John 
Worthington in 1661. As late as 1664 Worthington was still encouraging Cudworth 
to publish his work on Daniel and in 1668, in a letter to Heruy More, Worthington 
claims to have made an offer to Cudworth to help edit these writings on Daniel, to 
I~ Ibid., 11:162,166. 
15 Henry :More, All Explallatioll if tbe Gralld lV[)'steO' if Godliness, (London, 1660) p.xxxvi. 
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which he had not received a reply. 16At many points through their letters John 
Worthington attempts to persuade Cudworth to publish during the 1660s. In a letter 
to Heruy More in 1669 Worthington, almost wearily, hopes that recent works on 
prophetic scripture will finally 'draw out Dr Cudworth's [work] perhaps.,17 
Cudworth's inability to produce a work on ethics in the mid-1660s can, therefore, 
be accounted for as much by his procrastination, as by the political difficulties he 
was suffering or duplicity that Cudworth claimed to see in More. 
Cudworth, in the preface to the TISU, also gives his own explanation for the 
length it took to produce such a volume. Although the work had begun as a work 
on ethics, the aims of the work had changed through the process of composition. 
This change had come about, he claims, because he had come to realise that the 
arguments needed to create an ethical community - 'For Natural Justice alld 
Morality, Foullded ill the Deity; For Liberty from Necessity, and a Distributive Justice if 
Rewards alld Punishments ill the worid lS - relied on him first dealing with the 
metaphysical issues that underpinned his project. The need to create a coherent 
philosophical stmcture from which the ethical community could develop helps to 
explain the proposed structure of the entire Illtelledt/al System which he outlined in 
the preface to the TISU. The first task is, Cudworth argues, to refute all forms of 
determinism that 'Sel'lJe The Design of Atheism, alld Ulldermille Christianity, alld all 
Religion.,19 His work defending the virtue of the ethical community, which grew 
from his early writings, slowly developed into his planned three volume work, 
beginning with an attack on atheism, through an intellectualist ethics, defining the 
16 \\1orthington, ViaO', II:68, 140, \\1orthington in the same letter says that he offered to help 
Cudworth edit his writings on Hobbes which may have been an early draft of the TISU. 
17 Worthington, ViaO' II:303. 
18 TISU, p.v. 
19 Ibid., p.iii. 
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principles by which moral good and evil could be known, and concluding with a 
defence of Liberty against necessity, the central building block of the ethical 
community.20 
IV.3. Cudworth's doctrine of the Trinity 
IV.3.i. From 'The One' to the Trinity 
In Cudworth' thought God is the central term of reference. All parts of creation, all 
actions within the world are defined by and through the principle of the divine. 
What I will argue is that it is only if God is understood in the Trinitarian form that 
Cudworth defends in the TISU that all the implications of God's divinity, and man's 
relationship and obligation to that divinity can be fully understood. It was possible, 
Cudworth argues, to account for the existence of a divine principle in all parts of 
creation. However, he asserts, it is only through understanding the divine in terms 
of Trinity - as a relational unity of intellectual, comprehending, and creative 
principles - that the true fecundity of the divine presence can be appreciated. 
Through this understanding Cudworth argues that man is able to not only 
appreciate dle power of the divme more fruitfully, but also understand his place 
within this divinely ordained reality more profoundly. Consequendy the Trinity is, 
for him, the defining principle of the Universe. Not only does the Trinity explain 
the nature of dle divine, it also explains how the divine relates to and informs every 
facet of creation. In this sense Cudworth's Trinitarianism is important on two 
fronts. Firsdy, it allows him to account for the existence of an active divine principle 
20 Ibid., pp.v-V1. 
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in all parts of creation, bringing the mundane, physical world within the compass of 
the understanding of the divine. Secondly, it makes every part of man's existence 
reliant on his relationship to and appreciation of God in this Trinitarian form. In 
this way he believes that the divine, understood in his true Trinitarian form, informs 
every part of human existence. Therefore human agency, moral action and political 
obligation in his thought cannot be fully understood unless his Trinitarianism is first 
appreciated. 
Cudworth's Trinitarianism is entirely reliant on his intellectualist theological 
position. As stated at the end of the previous chapter, it is a seeming paradox in his 
thought that the latitude and tolerance it exhibits is reliant on the total acceptance of 
a very particular understanding of the divine. As Sarah Hutton has argued, 
'Cudworth's liberal theology entails a conception of God, the fIxity of which might 
appear to belie the latitude of his religious views.'21 This latitude relies on the active 
divine principle that develops out of his strict, intellectualist theological starting 
point. The intellectualism that we earlier detected in his sermons exists to an even 
greater extent in the TISU. As Cudworth argues at one point in the TISU, 'God's 
n:7ill is &t!ed by his Jt/stice, and not his Jt/stice &lled by his Will; and therefore God 
himself cannot c01J1malld, what is in its own nature U'!jtlst.'22 For Cudworth, God's 
will is not the arbitral), instrument of voluntarist theology, but a faculty in the 
divine, that is synonymous with the eternal principle of justice which defInes God. 
This claim is the central building block of Cudworth's intellectual theological 
system. The success of his system therefore relies entirely on his ability to 
coherently defend this strict intellectualist doctrine of God. 
21 Sarah Hutton, 'Ralph Cudworth: God, 1Iind, and Nature,' Religioll, Reasoll alld Natllre ill Earb' 
ivIodem Ellrope, ed, Robert Crocker (I<Juwer, Dordrecht, 2001), pp.61-76, p.62. 
22 TISU, p.897. 
142 
Traditional Calvinism, exemplified by Tuckney's criticisms of Which cote, 
always argued that intellectualism tended towards anti-Trinitarianism. Tuckney 
attacks Whichcote's intellectualism because Whichcote's suggestion that reason can 
allow man to know something of the divine always, in Tuckney's mind, denies the 
supremacy of the will and power of the divine. For Tuckney's voluntarism, the 
intellectualism of Whichcote and the other Cambridge Platonists implicitly seeks to 
deny the omnipotence of divine God's will and inevitably leads to heresy because it 
believes man can understand the inexplicable. The clearest example of this is 
Tuckney's constant allusions to Whichcote's anti-Trinitarianism. Tuckney believes 
that the Trinity can, in essence, only be understood as an inviolable mystety created 
by the will of God alone. Man can never understand the Trinity; he can only accept 
it as a matter of faith. Cudworth, and tlle other Cambridge Platonists, reacted 
against this position because they feared that the continual Calvinist stress on the 
Trinity as an inexplicable mystety would eventually lead to the destruction of the 
Trinity by the means of rational deduction. Cudwortll, in the TISU, therefore not 
only seeks to account for the triune nature of the divine, but to do this in such a 
manner that allows the Trinity to be rationally verifiable.23 He attempts to overcome 
the dangers of the Calvinist mystery of the Trinity by asserting his intellectualism 
from the outset. The problem that this approach creates is how to move from this 
appreciation of God as a single principle of wisdom and justice to an understanding 
of the divine as three separate, but co-eternal persons. 
23 D.W.Dockrill, 'The Fathers and the Theology of the Cambridge Platonists,' Stlldia Paflistica, 1>.TYII:1 
(1982), pp.427-439, p.428. 
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As already mentioned, Cudworth's starting point when describing God is 
always to stress divine omnipotence in terms of the intellectual principle of love. As 
he argues in the TISU: 
God is a Being Absolutefy Peifect, Unmade or S elfoligillateJ~ alld NecessOlify Existing, 
that hath all Illfil1ite FeC'tllldi!J1 in him, alld Viltualfy COllteills all thillgs; as also all 
Infinite Benigni!J1 or OVeJj70willg Love, UllillVidiollJ!Y displqyillg alld comtJJtlllicatillg it 
seff; together with all Impartial Rectitude, or Nature of]1IStice.l-+ 
For Cudworth the wisdom and love of God is the defining principle of all creation. 
From this belief he argues that is possible to move from the single, intellectual 
principle of the divine to an understanding of the Trinity. He believes it is possible 
to understand the implicit Trinitarianism of God if one examines and dissects how 
it is that we explain the existence of God in the first instance. In the TISU he 
approaches this problem by means of a critique of Descartes' proof of the existence 
of God from a p,io,i principles alone: Descartes' ontological proof. This proof is 
found most clearly in the fifth mediation of his Jvleditatiolls 011 First Philosopl?J.25 In his 
fifth meditation Descartes argues that one can, without recourse to other external 
stimuli, conceive of the existence of God. By recognising the divine by intellectual 
means alone Descartes argues forcefully not only that God could exist but that God 
necessarily exists. He defends this claim by asserting that if God exists he must, by 
definition, be perfect. The intellectual conception of a perfect principle cannot, 
2-1 TISU, p.207. 
25 The term 'the ontological proof was not one used by Descartes, or by Anselm of Canterbury the 
founder of this argument. It was coined by Kant, in his Cfitiq!le ifPllre Reasoll, to describe a proof of 
the existence of God from a priori principles alone. See John Cottingham, A Destat1es Didio/lalJ
' (Blackwell, Oxford, 1993), p.13 7. For an excellent overview of the ontological proof see, Jonathan 
Barnes, The Olltological Af;gllIJ/elit (i\IacMillan, London, 1972). 
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however, simply be created from nothing in the imperfect mind of man because it is 
impossible for the imperfect human mind to create something that is perfect, 
something which is superior to itself. Consequently the only source of this perfect 
idea must be a perfect being that has independent existence from the mind of man. 
As only God can be perfect it necessarily follows, Descartes argues, that God 
. 26 
eX1sts. 
Cudworth, in essence, accepts the starting premise of Descartes' proof, that 
the existence of God can be inferred from intellectual principle alone. What 
Cudworth rejects in Descartes' fifth meditation is not the argument used but the 
methodological assumptions Descartes makes to justify his conclusion. It is 
possible, Cudworth argues, to account for not only the existence of the divine but 
also the form tl1e divine takes as Trinity if Descartes' methodological failures can be 
overcome. Cudworth's criticism of Descartes initially follows the criticisms of 
Descartes' earliest critics, Gassendi and Arnauld, by pointing to the essential 
circularity of the argument that Descartes employs. For Cudworth tl1e circularity in 
Descartes' argument is a direct result of Descartes' use of sceptical reason in his 
proof. Such a sceptical method necessarily brings human faculties into doubt. 
However, the knowledge of the existence of God is, in ontological terms, founded 
exclusively on the supposition of his faculties, faculties which in Cartesian terms, 
because of our sceptical reason, can only thought to be reliable if the existence of 
God is assumed. As Cudworth puts it: 
26 Rene Descartes, The Philosophicallf7orks ofDesca/1es, 2 vols, trans Elizabeth S. Haldane and 
G.R.T.Ross (CUP, Cambridge, 1967),1:181-4. 
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For to say, that the Tmth of our Ullderstallding FaCtllties, is put out of all 
Doubt and Question, as soon as ever we are assures of the Existellce 0/ a God 
EsselltialIY Good, who therefore cannot deceive; whilst this Existence of 
God, is in the mean time it self no otherwise proved than by our 
Understanding FaCilities . .. this I say is plainly to move round in a Circle; and to 
thi 11 27 prove no ng at a . 
The weakness in Descartes' argument comes, Cudworth argues, from his reduction 
of reason into a sceptical form. By arguing that reason can doubt the existence of all 
things, Cudworth argues that Descartes can only effectively make claims with 
certainty if the divine is fIrst presupposed. As a consequence, the existence of God 
cannot be known with any certainty because this conclusion is based on a method 
which itself relies on God to create that certainty. Cudworth argues that Descartes' 
proof relies on the '[f/imJlless and Solidity, of such Thin and Subtle Cobwebs.,28 
. Cudworth's solution to this dilemma is to re-examine the means by which 
the initial assertion of the existence of God is made. Descartes comes to his 
conclusion by using his reason to doubt all other possible explanations, leaving the 
existence of God to be the only possible conclusion. In his argument the necessary 
existence of God is not verifIed because of a positive conclusion, but because after a 
process of sceptical deduction God remains as the only possible explanation. 
Cudworth takes issue with dus approach because by using this form of argument 
Descartes is implicidy assuming that the faculty of reason could, in principle, deny 
27 TISU, p.717, also see John Redwood, Reasoll, Ridimle alld Religioll: The Age qfElllighte/ltJ/eJlt ill Ellglalld, 
1660-1750 (Thames and Hudson, London, 1976), p.55; :1\1 Baldi, 'Cudworth versus Descartes: 
Platonism et sens commun dans la critique de hleditatiolls,' in The Ca1JJblidge Platollists ill Philosophical 
COlltext, ed G.A.]. Rogers et aI, (l<.1uwer, Dordrecht, 1997), pp.173-183, p.174. 
28 TISU, p.725. 
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eveqthing, even the existence of God. What is needed, Cudworth argues, is not 
simply an 0 priOli assertion of God's existence, but a confirmation that the means by 
which that supposition is made, reason, is itself drawn direcdy from the divine. Such 
an argument is oudined in Descartes' ontological proof, but is impossible to verify 
as the form of reason that Descartes employs is sceptical in form. The reasoning 
faculty Cudworth believes man uses to acknowledge the existence of God is, 
therefore, not Descartes' sceptical human reason; radler it is a faculty that has its 
source in the divine. By relating direcdy the means by which we come to know the 
existence of God direcdy to the essential principle of dle divine, Cudworth 
introduces the Plotinian distinction between dle founding principle of divine illtellect 
and the reasoned, perceptive principle of divine tlllderstolldillg. It is this distinction 
that defInes Cudworth's defence of the implicidy Trinitarian form of the divine. 
Before the distinction between the intellect and understanding of the divine 
can be defIned we fIrst need to show how Cudworth argues that man's rationality is 
not simply a human faculty, but a principle that is drawn implicidy from God. 
Cudworth defends the divine source of reason by drawing on Plato's argument for 
the pre-existence of knowledge from jl,imo. In this dialogue Socrates argues that by 
showing that a mathematical principle can be drawn out of the mind of an 
uneducated slave-boy, one can establish the existence of pre-existing intellectual 
principles.29 This premise relies on one key philosophical principle, that of the non-
inferiority of causes; that something cannot be caused by something that is inferior 
in nature to it. Using this argument Cudworth argues that the ability of man to 
29 Plato, iVieno, trans \\l.K.C. Guthrie in The Collected Dialog/les ~fPlato, ed. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (princeton University Press, Princeton, 1961), 81 b-86b. This theory within the 
lviello also led Plato to assert the pre-existence not simply of intellectual principle, but also the pre-
existence of the soul. Although Cudworth accepts the former claim, he rejects the latter. Cudworth's 
view on the pre-existence of the soul will be discussed at greater length in Chapter SLX where 
Cudworth's epistemological ideas will be examined. 
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know of God through reason proves the sources of those ideas in the rational 
principle of the divine: 
The Humane Mind therefore hath a Power of framing Ideas and COllceptions, 
not only of what Actually Is, but also of things which never were, nor 
perhaps will be, they being only Possible to be. But when from out COllceptions, 
we conclude of something, that though they are Not, yet they are Possible to 
be; since nothing that Is not, can be Possible to be, unless there be something 
Actually in Being, which hath sufficient Power to produce it; we do 
Implicidy suppose, the Existence of a God or Omnipotent Beillg thereby, which 
can make whatsoever is Conceivable, though it yet be not, to Exist?) 
The rational powers of the human mind, therefore, are drawn direcdy from dle 
superior intellectual principles that place these principles in the mind of man in the 
first instance. The only logical source of these principles is, Cudworth believes, the 
intellect of the divine. It is because of the divine source of man's rationality that 
Cudwordl believes it is possible for man to appreciate the intellectual 'Paradigm or 
Platform, according to which this S ellsible f,f:7orld was made.,3! The ability of man to 
know of God's existence by man's reason is therefore confirmed, Cudworth argues, 
by the recognition that the rational means of understanding must have its source in 
the intellect of the divine. He argues that man, by recognising that reason has its 
source in the divine, can first verify the existence of God, something which he 
believes Descartes' method unable to do. More importandy, however, he also argues 
30 TISU, p.732. 
31 Ibid., p.734. 
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that the recognition of the divine form of reason tells man not only of the existence 
of God, but also the Trinitarian form that the divine takes. 
This fIrst step in comprehending tile Trinitarian form of the divine comes, 
Cudworth argues, with the assumption that the divine, as a perfect being, does not 
require knowledge of himself. Therefore the rational principle by which man 
recognises and confIrms the existence of the divine must, Cudworth argues, be 
derivative from the founding principle of the divine. It is this distinction, between 
the intellectual form of the divine and the understanding of that divine principle, 
that lies at the heart of Cudwortil's Trinitarianism.32 We can fmd this separation 
between the founding intellectual principle of the divine and tile means of 
understanding and contemplating the divine in Plotinus. In EI11Jetld IlL8, 'On the 
nature and contemplation of the one,' Plotinus makes the distinction between the 
intellect of 'the One' and the means of participating in that intellect. Essentially that 
distinction is between the still source of all creation, 'the One,' and the active 
principle of participation. Plotinus uses the metaphor of the divine as a spring or 
fountain to show how the active principles which come from it differ from the still 
source of this action: 
think of a spring which has no other origin, but gives the whole of itself to 
rivers, and is not used up by the rivers but remains of itself at rest, but tile 
rivers that rise from it, before each of them flows in a different direction, 
remain for a wlllie all together, though each of them knows, in a way, the 
direction in which it is going to let the stream flow; or of the life of a huge 
32 Ibid., p.204. 
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plant, which goes through the whole of it while the origin remains and is not 
dispersed over the whole since it is, as it were, fIrmly setded in the root.33 
This action does not diminish 'dle One,' which is an inexhaustible source. In turn it 
draws all things to 'the One' and reinforces the power and integrity of 'the One.' 
'For all dtings ... are not an origin, but they came from an origin, and this is no more 
all things, or one of them.'34 
Cudworth uses this Plotinian distinction between intellect and 
understanding in the divine to begin his explanation of the Trinity. Cudworth argues 
that the active principle of understanding, that which brings man to a recognition of 
the divine in the fIrst instance, must, logically, be a secondary principle to the single 
intellectual principle of the divine. This distinction, Cudworth argues, exists logically 
because mind and understanding must be viewed in terms of multiplicity and 
therefore has to be secondalY to the united principle of the One. For man to 
appreciate the intellect of the divine, the means of that appreciation, knowledge and 
understanding cannot be the highest good in itself, but must be drawn from and 
reliant upon on a single principle prior to it.35 As Cudworth states: 
Now whatever this Chiefest Good be, which is a Perfection Superiour to 
Knowledge and Understanding; that Philosopher resolves that it must needs 
be First and Principally in God who is therefore called by him, ... The lJery Idea 
and Essence ifGood.36 
33 Elllleads, 3.8.10. 
3+ Ibid., 3.8.9. 
35 TISU, p.S84-S. 
36 Ibid., p.204. 
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Cudworth argues that this appreciation of the difference between intellect and 
understanding is not corrosive of the idea of one true God, or derivative from it. 
Descartes' ontological proof of the existence of God fails, he argues, not because 
his method is incorrect but because Descartes fails to appreciate that the reason that 
tells him of God's existence has its source in the divine. It is the existence of tius 
rational principle of understanding, uniting all creation to the divine, that becomes 
the key term that Cudworth uses to assert the Trinity as the true, united form of 
God.37 
This reflective, rational principle in the divine plays tile same role in 
Cudwortil's thought as the doctrine of accommodation does in Calvinist thought, as 
both explain how man, through the actions of grace, can come to an appreciation of 
the divine. This comparison also shows the fundamental difference between 
Cudworth's thought and Calvinism. Calvin argues that God can only be known to 
man in a form that God makes available to man, in both the extraordinary and 
inexplicable revelation of Christ and the words of scripture. By contrast, Cudworth 
argues that man comes to know tile divine tilfough tile principle of reason which in 
37 It should be noted here that Cudworth's Trinitarianism is defined entirely by his explanation of the 
relationship of the first person to the second, in Plotinian terms between intellect and understanding, 
in Christian terms, between the Father and the Son. Because of this concentration the third term of 
the Trinity, the Spirit, is largely overlooked by Cudworth. He is explicit in rejecting those theories, 
particularly Pagan Trinitarian systems, that seek to make the third hypostasis a distant derivation of 
the divine principle, [Ibid., pp.373,545,550,593]. When the third person is described in any detail it is 
in terms of its co-essentiality with the first and second person. In this sense, Cudworth is keen to 
show how the philosophical understanding of the third person corresponds with the creedal 
explanation of rile filioque form of the procession of the third person, that is 'proceeding from the 
Father alld the Son', [Ibid., pp.559]. Beyond these discussions Cudworth never deals explicitly with 
the nature or form of the third person of the Trinity. This is certainly a structural weakness within his 
argument. This omission, however, can be explained if one reads the essential truth of the Trinity 
coming from rile co-eternal unity of the intellect of the divine with tlle active and perceptive power 
of the divine. This active power of the divine is generally described by Cudworth by reference to the 
second person, the Logo.f. The third person is therefore best understood, within Cudworth's 
argument, as being intimately involved with this active, divine principle. Cudwortll is, however, not 
explicit in explaining the form of tlle third person of the Trinity beyond stressing its co-essentiality 
with the second person within active, understanding, principle [Ibid., pp.579,586]. 
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unfolding the nature of the divine to the mind of man, also unifies man to the 
divine by the same principle. So where Calvinist accommodation stresses the 
distance between God and man, Cudworth's intellectualist theology makes man an 
active participant in the divine principle. 
IV.3.ii. 'The Cabala of the Trinity' 
Cudworth's belief in the existence of a divinely inspired rational thread within 
creation allows us to understand a key element of Cudworth's method. By arguing 
that the true form of God can be found in all elements of creation, Cudworth 
argues that anyone who lives within that creation can know, if only in a hidden 
form, something of the truth of the divine. This means that, although the truth of 
God is confirmed and consummated in the revelation of Christ, something of the 
truth of God's existence was known and available to the pre-Christian pagan world. 
The best example of dus, Cudworth argues, is St Paul's sermon from the Areopagus 
to the unknown God.38 This recognition by Paul of dle essential monotheism in 
Hellenistic religion shows for Cudworth that pagan religion, far from being 
anathema to Christianity, could hold a kernel of truth in it, even if it was 
worshipped and understood in an incorrect f01'1ll. This belief in the existence of a 
seam of revealed truth, wluch runs through all reality, places the TISU as one of the 
last great works of the prism the%gia.39 Cudworth explains dUs position neady, if 
38 Ibid., pp.474-5, see Acts.17:16-34. 
39 The tradition of the p,ism theologia has its roots in the early Church where the alleged writings of 
'ancient theologians,' such as Hermes Trismegistus, Zoroaster and Orpheus, Pythagoras and Plato 
and writings attributed to ~Ioses, Noah and even Adam, were used to convert the pagans. [See: D.P. 
\Valker, The Alldent Theology: Stlldies ill Ch,istiall Platollismfrom the Fijtee!lth to the Eighteellth Celltll!]1 
(Duckworth, London, 1972). pp.1-2; D.\\T. Dockrill, 'The heritage of Patristic Platonism in 
Seventeenth-century English Philosophical Theology,' in The Camblidge Platollists ill Philosophiml 
COlltext, ed. Rogers, et aI., pp.55-77.] Much of the often frustrating content of the TISU can be 
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seemingly paradoxically, at the beginning of his Discotl1:re when he argues, '[a]ll great 
Errours have ever been intermingled with some Truth.'40 Cudworth's desire to make 
this point exhaustively explains much of the heavy erudition of TISU. Cudworth 
catalogues countless forms of pagan religion and gods to confirm tllat all tlleological 
systems have, in essence, relied on an intellectually understood divine principle.41 
Because tllls divine principle was discernible by reason, Cudworth believes he is able 
to account for the seeming corollaries between Christian and Pagan theology as 
examples where Pagan thinkers, through their reason, had unwittingly seen 
explained by Cudworth's use of the prism theologia. Writers working within the prism theologia argue that 
all existing theological and philosophical traditions are, to a lesser or greater extent, a preparation for 
the authentic revelation of Christ. l'vIany of the texts central to the tradition of the P'7sm theologia came 
to be recognised as Christian forgeries. The two best examples of this are the writings of the Pseudo-
Dionysius the 1-\reopagite and Hermes Trismegistus. The texts attributed to Hermes Trismegistus 
were proved to be forgeries by Issac Casaubon in 1614 [Yates, Giordallo Bmllo, pp.398-400]. Francis 
Yates has argued that Casuabon's discovery, as much through the method of analysis he employed as 
through his conclusion, marked one of the great water-sheds between the Renaissance and the early-
modern. Certainly the limited use of the prism theologia by Cudworth and the other Cambridge 
Platonists after Casaubon's writings is one of the factors that had caused them, as Cassirer states, to 
appear to be viewed as out of keeping with the thought of their contemporaries. Cudworth did 
accept Casaubon's theories on the falsity of the Hermetic texts. However, while accepting the 
Hermetic texts to have been Christian forgeries, Cudworth does argue that these forgeries might 
have been based, in some small part, on true Hermetic sources [TISU, pp.287, 713-4]. Despite this 
coded acceptance of something of the Hermetic tradition, Cudworth always backs up his claims with 
additional references to less dubious sources, usually references to more traditional Neoplatonic and 
Patristic sources [yates, Giordallo Brullo, ppA27 -430]. Even though Cudworth is not as uncritical in 
his uses of these sources as many of his forbears, the manner with which he analyses these ideas 
places him firmly in a tradition of renaissance humanism. In the preface to the TISU Cudworth make 
the explicit claim that, because of the scriptural nature of revelation, his work will be one that appeals 
to 'Philology and Antiquity' [TISU, P.A',jj]. We have already seen the manner in which Cudworth's 
style appeals to antiquity, however, it is the philological form of Cudworth's argument that does the 
most to underpin his philosophical style. Cudworth, as a participant in the p'7S(a theologia, assumes 
there to be a unified philosophical system within the world. Cudworth also assumes dlat dus unified 
system relies on a single, common philosophical vocabulary. By understanding this assumption one 
can see the way in wluch much of the heavy burden of quotation and reference within the TISU 
becomes simply lists of occasions where a dUnker has deployed a term next to another thinker's use 
of dlat term, or a sinUlar term. This philological style is in stark contrast to the critical analysis of 
language that underpinned Casaubon's critiques of Hermetic texts, a contrast which is stressed in 
:l\Iosheim's later criticisms of Cudworth's style [yates, Giordallo B171110, pAOO; Hutton, 'Classicism and 
Baroque' pp.225-6]. However, once the nature and necessity for Cudworth, of the weighty erudition 
dlat runs throughout dle TISU is understood, it is possible to [11ld in it the essence and basis of 
Cudworth's intellectualist philosophical system. 
~o Cudworth, Disl'OlIrse, p.l. 
~l It is using this argument that Cudworth explains away dle problem of a seeming polytheism 
suggested by Socrates' last words, where Socrates asks for a Cock to be sacrificed to Asculapius to 
mark his death. Cudworth argues that firsdy, the creation myth in Timaeus relied on, at its heart, 
single creative principle. Secondly dlat Socrates dying wish was recognition of merely a lesser deity, 
derived from dle one. Plato's polytheism, Cudworth argues, was, therefore, derived not from 
conscience, as his monotheism was asserted in the Timae/ls, but was a political gesture not to anger 
the dleological orthodoxy of the Athenian establishment. See TISU pp.398-402. 
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something of the true form of God; a form that is fully realised through the 
revelation of Christ. 
As a consequence, Cudworth argues that it is worthwhile studying Pagan 
thought because those elements which 'followed the free SeJltimellts and Dictates of 
their own IVIinds,' could provide metaphysical insights that not only clarified 
Christian teaching, but gave it historical and philosophical verification.42 In the 
TISU Cudworth is particularly keen to show those Pagan traditions which had 
anticipated something of the Trinitarian form of the divine. Cudworth argues that 
the initial distinction between the intellect and understanding of the divine was a 
central insight of Neoplatonic philosophy. Cudworth also argues that this insight is 
found, if in a hidden form, in many other ancient Pagan philosophical systems. 
Many of these traditions are able to move beyond the recognition of intellect and 
understanding to posit a third attribute within the divine. Through the inter-
relationship between the intellect and understanding of the divine a third principle 
of active, perceptive power is understood. This three-fold nature becomes, for 
Cudworth, the essential stmcture that informs Trinitarian thought in Pagan theology 
and Platonism in particular. Following this schema, Cudworth identifies Trinities in 
Egyptian and Roman theology.43 Such is the power of this tradition in pagan and 
even Jewish thought that he argues that Trinitarianism can be understood as one of 
the central tenets of the Cabala.44 It is in the supposed Trinities of the Cabala that 
-12 Ibid., p.627. 
-13 Ibid., pp.328, 453, 491. 
-1-1 The tradition of the Cabala is similar to, but not synonymous with, the prism theologia. Cabalism is 
an ancient strand of Jewish mystical thought based on the belief that there exists in all reality a 
hidden truth about the divine. However, unlike the prisca theologia, it does not see its necessary 
conclusion in divine revelation of Christ. Rather, at its heart, was a belief that there exists one unified 
truth which, once understood, will unify religion, philosophy and nature together. These truths can 
be uncovered, as in the p,isca theologia, by theological and philosophical means. Therefore, at its heart 
lies the texts of the Old Testament which, Cabalism believes, can, when understood correctly, unlock 
the hidden truth of the Universe. This form of exegesis takes the form of textual analysis and also 
used forms of analysis to decode messages hidden within religious texts, such as the Old Testament 
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Cudworth found the most authentic anticipations of the Christian tradition.45 
Cudworth's defence of the Trinity utilises his belief that central truths about the 
nature of reality, in particular the Trinity, have always been identifiable in differing 
forms throughout histoty. Cudworth's use of the term 'the Cabala of the Trinity,,46 
is particularly instructive for our understanding of the Trinity in his thought. The 
Trinity is 'Cabalistic,' not because it is found exclusively in the Jewish mystical 
Cabala. Rather, the Trinitarian God can be understood as 'Cabalistic' in Cudworth's 
thought because it acts as the term through which all elements of creation can be 
unified with the divine. The Trinity can therefore be detected, in a hidden form, in 
all parts of creation. Although the true Trinity was found in Christ, intimations of 
the Trinity can be detected through much of the theology and philosophy of the 
ancient world. 
Cudworth believes that, outside dIe Judeo-Christian tradition, the Cabala of 
the Trinity is found in its fullest form in the Platonic tradition, i.e. the Neoplatonic, 
which he calls the 'Platonic Trinity.' He views this as incomplete compared to dIe 
Christian Trinity, but finds in the philosophical distinctions that allow for it the 
most coherent explanation of the Trinitarian form of the divine. Cudworth's 
and the Torah. Linked to this is a belief that these methods can be transferred to the study of nature 
to achieve, through the occult practices of magic and alchemy, the purified and true essence of 
nature [Alison P. Coudert, Tbe Impad qltbe Kabbalab ill tbe SeveJlteelltb-Cmtllry: Tbe Life alld tbollgbt of 
FramiJ Va/l Helmollt (1614-1698), (Brill, Leiden, 1999) pp.137-49; Peter G. Sobol, 'The Cabala,' in Tbe 
HiJtol)1 ql Sdmce alld Religioll in tbe 1f7eJtem Tradition: An Encyclopaedia, ed. Gary B. Ferngren (Garland, 
New York, 2000), pp.553-55]. ~Iany of the Cambridge Platonists came into contact with the tradition 
of the Cabala. Cudworth encountered the Cabala d1!ough his role as Regius Professor of Hebrew but 
did not engage widl it as much as Henry More, who was brought into contact with Cabalism through 
his friendship with Anne Conway [see Alison P. Coudert, 'Henry 1Iore, the Kabbalah, and the 
Quakers,' in PhiloJoplJ)l, Sdmte and Religion ill Englalld, 1640-1700, ed. Kroll et aI, pp.31-67, pp.31-8. For 
More's changing relationship to Cabalism, especially through his close association widl Anne 
Conway see Sarah Hutton,AIlJle COIl1JJCl)' (CUP, Cambridge, 2004), and David S. Katz, 'Henry More 
and the Jews' in Hml)' M.ore, ed. Hutton, pp.173-88, pp.174-8]. 
45 TISU, pp.546, 557. 570. This claim must be tempered by the knowledge dlat many of these 
Cabalistic sources, in particular dle Orphic and Hermetic traditions, were almost certainly Christian 
forgeries. See above. 
46 Ibid., p.552. 
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defence of the Trinity along Platonic grounds also carries with it a second motive. 
By explicitly basing his defence of the Trinity in Platonic thought Cudworth places 
himself between two opposing theological criticisms of Platonic philosophy. The 
fIrst, from ortllOdox Christian tlleology, is that Platonism inevitably leads to the 
anti-Trinitarian heresy of Arianism.47 We have already encountered this criticism of 
Platonism in Calvin's persecution of Selvetus, discussed in the previous chapter. 
The second, and directly contrasting criticism of Platonism, came from the growing 
Socinian tradition that claims that the Trinity is a theological perversion of the truth 
of the new covenant brought about by the dangerous mixing of Christianity with 
Hellenistic thought.48 To counter this fIrst accusation Cudworth defends the 
Platonic Trinity from the suggestion that it errs towards Arianism by stressing the 
philosophical coherence of the true Platonic Trinity. However, to counter the 
Socinian claims that the Trinity is a Hellenistic pel version, Cudworth argues that the 
Platonic Trinity is theoretically coherent but philosophically corruptible. This caveat 
allows Cudworth to argue that the Trinity is explicable in Platonic terms, but only 
fully manifested in the revelation of Christ. This fInal claim leads to problems in the 
examination of Cudworth's Trinitarianism because, as Sarah Hutton has argued, 'it 
relies heavily on the very Platonists on whose accounts of tlle trinity he casts 
doubt. ,49 
With this qualifIcation in mind, it is worthwhile examining how, for 
Cudwortll, the Platonic Trinity both anticipates and differs from the Christian 
Trinity. Cudworth is clear that it is the Platonic Trinity which is the most 
-17 Hutton, 'Neoplatonic roots of 1\rianism,' p.143; 11aurice Wiles, Tbe ArdJe()pal Here.!)': Ariallism 
tbrollgb tbe Celltmies (OUF, Oxford, 1996), p.66. 
-18 :McLachlan, SociliiallisllJ, pp.8-20. 
-19 Hutton, 'Neoplatonic roots of Arianism,' pp.140-1; Dockrill, 'Authority of the Fathers,' p.340. 
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sophisticated of the Pagan systems in this respect.50 It is not, Cudworth claims, 
because the Platonic system is peculiar in having a Trinitarian structure; such a 
system is a logical part of true monotheism for Cudworth. Rather it is that, although 
taking an adulterated path, Platonism is based on the same theological and 
philosophical tradition as Christianity. As Cudworth argues: 
This is therefore dlat Platonic Trilliry, which we oppose to the Cbristiall, not as 
if Plato:r own Trillity in the very Essential Constitutions thereof, were quite a 
Different Thing from the Cbristian; itself in all probability having been first 
derived from a Divine or Mosaick Cabala.5! 
For this reason the Platonic Trinity describes with more depdl and subdety than any 
other pagan source the complex relationship between the different persons of the 
Trinity, and is to be respected above all the others. In particular, unlike odler 
monotheistic traditions, the Platonic tradition comes closest to the Christian in 
appreciating the immediacy of the relationship between dle ftrst and second persons 
f 1 T ·· 5? o t le r1il1ty.-
The central strength of the Platonic Trinity is that it best explains this inter-
relationship between the different persons of the Trinity. In particular, Cudworth 
argues dnt it gives the fullest philosophical explanation for the consubstantial 
nature of the Trinity. In this way the Platonic influence on, especially, many of the 
Nicene Fathers is not to separate the persons of the Trinity but to ftrmlyestablish 
50 TISU p.SS8. 
51 Ibid., p.SS7. 
52 Ibid., ppA07-8. 
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the relational unity at the heart of the Trinity.53 It is not the radical transcendence of 
the Platonic 'One' which Cudworth wishes to defend. Rather, Cudworth takes from 
Platonism the fusion between the intellectual principle of the divine and the 
understanding means by which God is known as the principle components of the 
Trinitarian form of the divine.54 
Despite these philosophical strengths, Cudworth still maintains that in 
fundamental areas dle Platonic Trinity is conupt.55 This corruption is, Cudworth 
argues, found in the means of explaining the relationships between the different 
persons of the Trinity. Although in its purest form Cudworth believes dle Platonic 
Trinity had understood dle relational unity at the heart of the Trinity, because this is 
built on philosophical suppositions, rather dlan the confidence given by the 
revelation of the historical person of Jesus Christ, such a system was open to 
corruption. In particular, by stressing too vigorously the supreme nature of dle first 
person, the second and third persons become diminished by association. So 
Cudworth states: 
if it be considered in Visibles, then will the 5 ecolld Hypostasis, be resembled to 
the Image of a Face in a Glass, and the Third to the Image of that Image 
Reflected in another Glass, which depend upon the Oligillal Face, and have a 
Gradual Abatement of the vigour dlereof.56 
53 Ibid., p.579. 
5-1 Hedley, The Platorllck Trinity', p.260. 
55 TISU, p.558. 
56 Ibid., p.581. 
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So, Cudworth suggests, there is in some Platonic philosophy a danger of destroying 
the great strength of the Platonic Trinity, namely the relational unity of the persons 
of the Trinity, by concentrating too clearly on the ftrst person above the others. By 
alluding to St Paul's metaphor of man's appreciation of God only 'through a glass 
darkly,' Cudworth here seems to suggest that this dangerous tendency in the 
thought of some Platonists diminishes not only the second and third persons of the 
Trinity, but also the integrity of their theology. As he vehemently argues: 
Shall we say that the First Hypostasis or Per SOil, in the Platollic Ttiniry, (if not 
the Ch,istiall also) is .. . Setlse/eJJ and Irratiollal, and altogether devoid of JVlind 
and Understanding? Or would not this be to introduce a certain kind of 
Mysteliotls Atheism and under pretence of Magnifying and Advancing the 
Supreme Deity, Monstrously to Degrade the Same?57 
For Cudworth there are two logical dangers created by the corruptions of pseudo-
Platonic thinkers. Firstly, they undermined the relational unity of the Trinity, making 
the separation of intellect and understanding merely the fust step in a hierarchy of 
Gods, thus opening the door to Polytheism. 58 Secondly, and more dangerously, such 
readings suggest that the second and third persons rather than being manifestations 
of the divine are, in fact, separate, created creatures. So Cudworth argues: 
Wherefore we conclude, that tlus ancient Cabala of the Ttilliry, was Depraved 
and Adlliteratedby those Platonists and Pythagoreans, who made either the 
57 Ibid., p.585. 
58 Ibid., p.570. 
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World itself, or else ... all lI!/orlJlillg S otti if the JT/orld, to be the Third Ifypostasis 
thereof, they Mingling Created and Ullcreated Beillgs together, in that which 
themselves notwithstanding call a Trillity of Cattses and of Prillciples.59 
Cudworth argues that it is these pseudo-Platonic theories, rather than the true 
Platonic Trinity, that gave birth to the tritheistic heresy of Sabbelianism and the 
Unitarian heresy of Arianism. Cudworth does not indicate clearly which thinkers are 
to blame for this decline in the Platonic tradition. Certainly Cudworth sees this as an 
adulteration made after Plato and places the blame at the feet of, what he loosely 
describes as, 'Juniour Platonists.' He does at one point suggest that the chief culprits 
might have been Proclus and Iamblichus. This claim is, however, undermined by 
Cudworth's earlier use ofProclus and Iamblichus to defend the integrity of the true 
PI 'T" 60 atoruc nruty. 
Despite his criticisms of Platonism Cudworth still defends the Platonic 
Trinity. In particular, praises the true Platonic Trinity because, although imperfect, it 
created the philosophical ground by which the true manifestation of the Trinity, in 
the incarnation of Christ, could be fully and best understood by man. For tllls 
reason Cudwortll believes he is able to bring the Platonic Trinity into a Cabalistic 
understanding of the Trinity. The true Platonic Trinity, firstly, allowed the spread of 
the truth of Christianity to pagan peoples, as suggested by St Paul's sermon on the 
Areopagus: 
59 Ibid., p.552. 
GO Ibid., p.625. On Proclus compare, for instance, p.626 & 557. 
160 
Wherefore we cannot but take notice here of a Wonderful Providence of 
Almighty God, that tills Doctrine of a Trinity of Divine HJ'PoJtaJeJ, should 
fmd such adnlittance and Entertainment in the Pagan World, and be 
received by the wisest of all their Philosophers, before the time of 
Christianity; thereby to prepare a more easie way for the Reception of 
Christianity amongst the Learned Pagans.61 
The importance of the Cabala of the Trinity is therefore, for Cudworth, to allow 
Christianity to understand more fully, and exist more fruitfully within, tile 
providential plan of the divine. 
IV.3.iii. The Christian Trinity 
Cudworth, in Ills attempts to defend the Platonic interpretation of the Trinity, links 
the Platonic and Christian Trinities through their shared heritage in, what Cudworth 
termed, the 'Mosaic Cabala.' The shared heritage of the traditions comes, Cudworth 
argues, from the influence of Jewish and Egyptian tIleology on Hellenistic 
metaphysics. Despite dlls influence, Cudworth believes that the Hellenistic form of 
dlls tradition inevitably became corrupt. The clarity and coherence of the Platonic 
tradition is identifiable in the thinking of Plato and Plotlnus, but in later 
Neoplatonic tlUnkers the tradition became perverted. Cudworth asserts that one 
fmds the authentic culnllnation of the 'Mosaic Cabala' not in tlle Platonic tradition 
but in the revelation of Christ as LogoJ. To defend the Christian Trinity from tile 
Socinian accusation tllat the Trinity was an Hellenistic petversion Cudworth argues 
61 Ibid., p.625. 
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that the Christian Trinity can be found entirely widllil Scripture which is 'the only 
true Rule and Measure of this Divine Cabala of the Tlilli!}.,62 The Unitarian and 
Tritheistic perversions of the Trinity are therefore, Cudworth believes, caused by 
the perversion of the authentic Cabala of the Trinity. This corruption is most clearly 
seen in Cudworth's criticisms of the pseudo-Platonists. For this reason Cudworth 
argues that the Christian Trinity treads a middle padl between the Arian and 
Sabbelian. The excesses of Arianism and Sabbelianism are only solved by the 
revelation of the new covenant which brought into the light the hidden, cabalistic 
understanding of the triune nature of the divine.63 This, Cudworth argues, is the 
form of metaphysical deduction which was carried out by the Nicene fathers, 'who 
not withstanding made not Plato but the Scripture, together with Reason deducing 
natural Consequences there from, their Foundation.,64 The Church fadlers used 
Platonic thought not to pervert scripture, but to confirm its revelation. For this 
reason Cudworth believes that the Christian Trinity is a more authentic 
understanding of the intellectual form of the divine. In this way he asserts that the 
revelation of Christ perfecdy unlocks the implicidy rational form of the divine, and 
is, therefore, by implication, more reasonable than the pure interpretation of the 
Trinity. Consequendy Cudworth is able to argue that: 
the Chtistiall Trilli!} though there be veq much of MysteO' in it, yet is dlere 
nothing at all of plaill COlltradictioll to the Undoubted Principles of human 
62 Ibid., p.550. 
63 Ibid., p.555. 
M Ibid., p.579. 
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Reason, that is, of Impossibility to be found therein, ... [it is] ... much more 
agreeable to Reason, than that Platollick or Psettdo-PlatollZ'de Trilliry.65 
Cudworth argues that what the revelation of Christ gives the Christian 
Trinity, which is lacking in the Platonic Trinity, is a pure understanding of the active 
principle within the divine being reflective on the principle of the fIrst person and 
also existing, un-created, with the fIrst person. His interpretation of this peculiar 
Christian relationship rests heavily on his understanding of the prologue to the 
Gospel of John, in particular the various clauses defIning the Logos. Crucially, he 
argues that St John the Aposde gave the fIrm assurance of Christ as existing in the 
form of the Godhead from eternity; 'the AO'YO~ or Tf70rd be said to have been, With 
God (this is God the Father) and also itself to Be God (that is not a Creature) yet is it no 
where called Another or S ecolld God.,66 In the person of Christ Cudworth fInds the 
concrete affirmation of the philosophical principle of understanding which is only 
suggested by the Platonic Trinity. Cudworth, again drawing on John's Gospel, 
affirms this point by arguing that, 'the word was made flesh, we look upon this Word 
elle!l ill Flesh as God.'G7 
Despite Cudworth's desire to account philosophically for the united and 
uncreated nature of the Trinity within scripture, his Trinitarianism never 
conclusively explains the co-eternity of the Logos of the Trinity with the Fathel: The 
belief always remains, despite his many protestations to the contrary, that the 
second person exists not simply as an emanation from the fIrst person, but as a 
created by-product of the fIrst person. This suggestion led many of Cudworth's 
65 Ibid., p.560. 
66 Ibid., p.550. 
67 Ibid., p.631. 
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earliest critics to accuse him of pseudo-Arianism.68 The problem of the 
'subordination' of the second person to the first is a recurring problem in all his 
thought. This problem is evident in his early writings. Cudworth, through all his 
work, argues for the active nature of the divine. In his First Sermoll dlis is evident 
when he states of Christ, 'God was therefore illcamated and made mall, that he might Deifie 
tiS, dlat is ... make us pa/takers 0/ the Divine llattlre.'69 In his S ecolld S ermoll he puts more 
detail into dlis assertion. Throughout the Secol1d Sermoll Christ is understood by 
Cudworth to be acting as mediator between man and God, the principle by which 
God is represented to man. In dlls sermon we already find Cudworth arguing that 
dlls mediating role of Christ exists in the Plotinian division of the source of the 
Trinity, in the intellect of the Father and the understanding of the divine in dle 
person of Christ as Logos. His explanation of dlls relationsllip between the fust and 
second persons brings him close to suggestions of anti-Trinitarianism. Christ is, in 
ills language, a being that is 'hypostatically united to the Divinity,' however, the 
mediating nature of the kingdom of Christ made it logically and historically 
subsequent to the Father. Cudworth, by stressing the mediating power of the Christ, 
appears to imply that Christ was created by the Father, thus opening Cudworth up 
to accusations of anti-Trinitarianism.7o 
In the TISU, Cudworth's argument for the relationsllip of the first and 
second persons of the Trinity remains dle same as he asserts in the Secolld Sermoll. 
However the form the argument takes changes. This change comes about, I would 
argue, to counter accusations that the Christo centric argument of the Second Sermoll 
is anti-Trinitarian. In the light of Cudworth's Second Sermon G.R.Cragg's assertion 
68 \V'iles, Archetypal Here.!)', p.68. ~-\lso see Turner, DistOtlr..re. 
69 First Semloll, p.l01. 
7U S ecolld S ermOIl, pp.199-202. 
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that, 'to Cudworth the Incarnation signifies not so much dle word made flesh in an 
historical sense as the eternal incarnation of the Logos,,71 would appear to be only 
pardy correct. Certainly in the TISU we fmd the Trinity discussed almost exclusively 
in Logocentric terms. Cudworth takes this line in the TISU, I believe, to move 
hinlself away from the theological problems of describing the Trinity using the 
historical person of Christ, to a philosophical discussion over the relationship of the 
Logos to the founding principle of the Fathel: TIlls move from a Christocentric to a 
Logocentric Trinitarianism in Cudworth's thought does not, however, lead to a 
change in the emphasis in his writings. In all his writings, he is consistent in his 
belief that the Trinity can only truly be appreciated if the second person is 
understood correcdy. 
It appears that Cudworth, while writing the TISU, was perfecdy aware that 
his description of the active nature of the Trinity would open hinl up to accusations 
of anti-Trinitarianism. Consequendy, in the TISU, we find hinl going to great 
lengths to argue that the Platonic interpretation of the Trinity, far from leading to 
Arianisim, in fact presents the most effective means of defeating dle Arian heresy. 
He argues that Arianism is based on a perversion of Trinitarian theology sinlllar to 
those Trinitarian errors suggested by dle pseudo-Platonists. He cites the councils of 
Nicaea, in 325 A.D., and Constantinople, in 381 A.D., in his defence of the true 
Christian-Platonic interpretation of the Trinity. He believes that these councils, 
wlllch had been called to refute the claims of Arianism, solved this dispute through 
the use of Platonic metaphysics.72 Cudworth asserts that the Nicene formulation of 
71 G.R.Cragg, From Pl/ritallislJJ to tbe Age Of Rea SOli: A Slm!)' ofcballges ill ReligioNs tbo!lgbt lvitbill tbe Cb!trI:b ~f 
Ellglalld, 1660-1700 (CUP, Cambridge, 1950), p.56. 
72 TISU, pp.604-5, 623. For a detailed account of all the fourth-century creedal councils see the 
1\ppendix to Rob Illiffe's paper, 'Prosecuting Athanasius: Protestant Forensics and the 11irrors of 
Persecution,' in NeJvtoll alld Nelvtolliallism: Ne}}J Stl/dies, ed. James E. Force and Sarah Hutton (Kluwer, 
Dordrecht, 2004), pp.113-154. 
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the Logos being of 'one substance with the father,' is essentially a Platonic 
formulation which allows the Nicene fathers to explain how there could be, within 
the Trinity, differing persons which are both independent creations from eternity 
and also part of a consubstantial Godhead.73 He argues that the Fathers, particularly 
Athanasius, were able to describe the consubstantiality of the Trinity through use of 
the term H01J1ootisial1. The Homootlsiall argument for consubstantiality is calling for, 
'not a sameness of singular and Numerical, but of Common or ulliversa/ Essence only; 
that is, the Generita/ or specijica/ Essellce if the Godhead; that the SOil was not a Creature 
but tmly and properly God.'74 This defInition, which allows for both multiplicity in 
nature and a singularity in form, is, Cudworth argues, essentially Platonic in nature. 
By making this distinction between the form and numerical nature of God, 
Cudworth believes orthodox, credal, Christianity establishes an active principle of 
the Logos which exists co-eternally widl the Patheras part of the self-reflective nature 
of the divine. On these terms Cudworth contrasts what he deems to be the true 
HOIJ/OOt/sia/1 form of the Trinity with the MOlloomiall (or singular essence) and 
Heteroot/siall (or multiple essences) found in the theological perversions of Arianism 
and Sabbelianism respectively.7s Cudworth's defence of the Trinity therefore 
deploys Platonic terms not only to explain the doctrine of the Trinity but also to 
direcdy undermine the arguments of anti-Trinitarian heresies. 
Cudworth's argument, far from distancing his Trinitarianism from Unitarian 
heresies, opened him up to renewed accusations of heterodoxy. The fust, and most 
vehement of these attacks, came in John Turner's 1685 work A Discotlrse cOllcernillg 
the Messias. In this work Turner direcdy attacks the central claim of Cudworth's 
73 TISU, p.596. 
N Ibid., p.608. 
75 Ibid.,p.611-2. 
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Trinitarianism, that his HOJJloomiall explanation of the divine can explain both the 
unity and multiplicity of the divine at the same time. Turner argues that it is 
impossible to place onto the term HOlJJootlsial1 the distinction of number but not of 
form. Rather, Turner argues, Cudworth's Trinitarianism describes three Gods of no 
purpose or grounding. Consequendy, the theological wealmesses of Cudwordl's 
argument make Arianism the logical consequence of the Platonic system Cudworth 
champions. Cudworth's system therefore allows, 'a fair passage for AtiallisJJl to enter 
in, and take possession of the minds of his Readers.,76 Turner argues that 
Cudworth's system does not defend the Trinity, rather 'the Learned Dodotlrs hadl 
rendered it, instead of explaining the TJilliry, perfecdy destroys it.,n 
Cudworth is clearly aware of the theological criticisms that his peculiar 
brand of Trintarianism creates. However, despite the possibility of these criticisms, 
Cudworth pursues this argument because it allows him to argue forcefully for a 
system in which the active nature of the divine is central. In the TISU this argument 
develops into a comprehensive metaphysical system within which the active 
principle of the Logos acts as the fulcmm, mediating between man and God. This 
argument is founded on Cudworth's strict intellectualist interpretation of the divine. 
As we shall go on to see, it is this active understanding of the Logos which defmes 
the arguments for moral self-determination and human agency which lie at the heart 
of Cudworth's ethical and political thought. Such is his desire to create an effective 
ethical community that he appears to have been willing to make certain sacrifices in 
terms of orthodoxy for this to be the case. He describes the Trinity, as Turner 
alleges, 'in such terms of latitude,,78 precisely because his active understanding of 
76 Turner, Dis(olIrse, p.xxvii. 
77 Ibid., p.XxL'{. 
78 Ibid., phxxi. 
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God creates the theological and philosophical basis from which the religious and 
political latitude which he wishes to create within human society could develop. 
IVA. Cudworth and the form of the created realm - Cudworth's attack on 
atheism 
The lasting influence of the TISU comes from its arguments against atheism. 
Thomas Wise, one of Cudworth's keenest eighteenth century disciples, described 
the TISU as 'the vastest magazine of reasoning and learning that ever singly 
appeared against Atheism.'79 However, so vast are these attacks by Cudworth that 
they can, at times, mask the Trinitarian argument at the heart of the TISU. The 
TISU should not be understood as an encyclopaedic account of atheism but as part 
of Cudwordl'S defence of the Trinity as dle defming principle of the created world. 
Consequendy like all aspects of his thought, Cudworth's attacks on atheism defend 
and confttm his Trinitarian understanding of creation. For this reason these attacks 
are implicidy political because atheism denies the existence of the divine in the 
world.80 Cudworth believes he must overcome atheism at the outset of his Illte//edNa/ 
System precisely because atheism undermines man's ability to create an ethical 
community. It is only when these atheistic arguments are dispatched, Cudworth 
argues, that the correct intellectual understanding of the creation, in which the 
active principle of the Logos is the defining principle, can be effectively asserted. 
79 Quoted in Birch, 'Life', p.23. 
80 This view of adleism as a perversion from the norm is very well described by ilie tide of Henry 
r-Iore's All Alltidote to Atbeism. The implication being that the correct, Trinitarian form of theism can 
correct and cure ilie woes and errors created by Atheism. See the first chapter of Charles Taliaferro's 
forilicoming EvideJ1ce alld Faitb: Philosopb), alld religioll sillce tbe seventeelltb-ceJ1tIlIJ' (CUP, Cambridge, 
Forilicoming). 
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For Cudworth atheism is not simply a failure to accept the existence of the 
divine, it is a refusal to accept the role of God as the sole determining and judging 
factor in the world. 81 In the TISU Cudworth identifies three forms of atheism to 
attack. The first is 'Absolute Atheism,' typified by the revival in Epicurean 
philosophy by Thomas Hobbes.82 The second is what he terms 'Immoral Theism,' 
which allows for religion but no understanding of natural justice. The third is a form 
of Theism which, although it allowed for God and natural justice, does not allow for 
this to be achieved through liberty from necessity. These final two can be subsumed 
into Cudworth's general critique of theistic determinism, which Cudworth 
recognises chiefly in dle determinism of Stoic theology, and latterly in Calvinism.83 
In the TISU Cudworth predominandy concerns himself with the first of these three 
forms of atheism, 'Absolute Atheism.' Cudworth reserves most of his criticisms of 
'Immoral Atheism' for his unpublished writings on freewill and human agency 
which will be examined in the next chapter of this thesis. 'Immoral Atheism,' in 
Cudworth's view, does not undermine the founding divine principle in the world 
rather it undermines the belief that men can act as independent and equal moral 
actors in a divinely ordained world. 
The purpose of Cudwordl's attacks on 'Absolute Atheism' in the TISU is to 
discredit any arguments which suggest that the world is founded on anything other 
than theistic principles. In the TISU, Cudworth attempts to overcome those 
arguments that oppose his conception of the Trinity by showing that 'Atheist' 
arguments in reality conform, at the most fundamental level, to the metaphysical 
81 Redwood, Reasoll, Ridimle aJ/d Religioll, p.30. 
82 Although Cudworth never names Hobbes in the TISUhis criticisms of Epicurius and Democitus 
are clearly thinly veiled criticisms of Hobbes' philosophy and so it will be assumed that an attack on 
either of these two is implicidy an attack on Hobbes. 
83 TISU p.iv. 
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position that he champions. As we have already seen Cudworth, throughout the 
TISU, constandy defends the doctrine of the Trinity. Consequendy it is possible to 
understand Cudwordl's criticisms of atheism as not only arguments to justify his 
theism, but also arguments that confirm his active, Trinitarian conception of the 
divine. In the TISU Cudworth mainly concentrates his attacks on thinkers that he 
defInes as 'atomical fatalists.'84 Cudworth accuses dlese thinkers of believing that the 
universe was created by merely the random motion of atoms. The world, and all 
that was in it, is, in essence, the sum of parts of a cosmic random motion. Cudworth 
rejects this view out of hand because, he argues, atomic fatalists remove the 
possibility that there is a guiding, incorporeal principle within the world. Cudworth 
argues that these thinkers assert matter, or 'extended bulk,' as the founding principle 
of the Universe. The world could, therefore, only be understood in terms of dle 
mechanical relations of one body to another. 
Cudwordl sees this philosophy as a perversion of the ancient and 
respectable theistic tradition of atomic philosophy founded by the Phoenician 
philosopher Moschus. Far from being implicidy atheistic, he believes that the true 
atomism of Moschus is founded on, and logically reliant upon, theism. It is this 
form of atomism which Cudworth believes influenced Hellenistic thought, in 
particular Pythagoras, and from there the writings of Plato and Aristode. 85 
Cudworth argues that this tradition, in its correct, theological form had been 
resurrected in Cartesianism.86 This form of atomism is, he argues, an acceptable 
means of understanding the world. Firsdy because it accepts that, using the logical 
8.1 Cudworth uses the term 'fatalist' where modern philosophical vernacular would use 'determinist'. 
In this thesis both terms will be assumed to mean the same tiling with reference to Cudworth's 
thought and will tIlerefore be used interchangeably. 
83 TISU pp.3-18. 
86 Ibid., p.174, Cudworth also makes this observation in EIi\1, p.151; FMA979, fo1.144; FiVI.4980, 
fo1.221. 
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dictum 'De Ilihilo Nihil, ill NihiltmJ Nil pom reverti' - nothing can come from nothing 
or go to nothing - there must be an original intellectual principle which causes and 
forms the motion that is observable atomically in the wotld.87 Cudworth uses in his 
defence of the theistic basis of atomism the argument of the non-inferiority of the 
cause which we encountered in his proof of the existence of God. The observation 
that creation is structured in dus manner allows us, Cudworth argues, 'lot/db to 
declare, that the Tf170rld was made 0' God. ,88 
Cudworth argues that dle atomical atheism of the Epicureans at its source 
perverts the central dictum of atomism by suggesting, not that nothing could come 
from nothing, but that 'nothing [materially] could be raised from nothing or reduced 
to nothing.' Consequendy Cudworth accuses these thinkers of making matter, or 
'bulk' the founding principle of all creation. He argues: 
And indeed it was really one and the self-same Form of Atheism, which 
both these entertained, they derived all things alike, from Dead and Stupid 
platter Fotitlitotlsb Moved, the Difference between them being only dUs, that 
they managed it two different ways; Alla:>..imallder in the way of Qtlalities and 
FOI'l1JJ, which is the more Vulgar and Obvious kind of Atheism; but 
Democrittls in the way of Atoms and Figtlres, which seems to be a more learned 
kind of Atheism.89 
By making matter the only substance within creation, Cudworth argues that 
atomical atheists have removed the fIrst cause from the world and in dUs way 
87 TISU, p.30. 
88 Ibid., p.197. 
89 Ibid., p.130. 
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removed the philosophical understanding of God from creation?l By this logic all 
of creation is derived from chance, or what Cudworth terms 'fortuitous motion.' 
The basic premise of this argument, he states, removes the necessity of God from 
creation and therefore denies the central philosophical premise of his thought, that 
God's intellect is the defIning principle of creation.91 
Although there exists in many of these atomical atheists a residual theism 
this is, Cudworth argues, merely a poor mask for atheism. God is used by these 
thinkers in two ways, both of which lead to atheism. Firstly, some of these 
materialist philosophers suggest that a purely materialist understanding of the world 
is acceptable because God's perfection and freedom cannot be limited by the 
mundane matters of the world. Material atomism is used by these thinkers as a 
means of explaining the organisation of the world without recourse to the divine. So 
Cudworth argues, EpiculUs had sought to free God from 'Bellefits and Emplq)!JJJents, 
and doing nothing at all.,92 This conception of the divine is an impossibility for 
Cudworth because it would mean denying the divine as tlle defming principle of all 
reality. This form of atheism, he thinks, can easily be dispatched by the observation 
of the surrounding world. It is, he argues, nonsense to assert that the entire world 
can be understood as simply the actions of local, mechanical motion because if 
nothing comes from nothing, then logically there must be a primary principle which 
was tlle source of tlus motion. Genuine atomism recognises this principle to be 
God. Cudworth argues, therefore, that it is only possible to explain the organisation 
of an atomistic universe if an active intellectual principle is understood to exist prior 
to passive matter. Things of beauty in the world, using his example, a silver cup, are 
911 FMA979, fol.153.b; FM.4980, fo1.252. 
91 TISU, pp.61, 75. 
92 Ibid., p.64. 
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not made by the random movement of the atoms in silver. Rather these mundane, 
passive atoms are moved and influenced by ti1e active principle of the workman to 
mould the silver into the cup. Such is the form and nature of the world that it is 
impossible to understand the form of passive corporeal objects without the 
influence of an active, incorporeal substance on them. In this way the whole world 
can be understood in this framework of the influence of active incorporeal 
principles on passive matter.93 The logical impossibility of this material atheist 
argument, for Cudworth, makes the belief in an incorporeal divine power acting 
prior to the material world the only logical explanation. Reason tells us that this 
Epicurean atheism is incorrect because the world cannot be controlled by material 
principles alone, but by 'the Attributes of another kind of Substance distinct from 
Body.'94 Atheistic systems can be discounted because, Cudworth argues, they reject 
the existence and superiority of incorporeal intellectual principles, making them.95 
Through his critique of the premises of atheism he is able to create an explanation 
of the created world which implicitiy assumes not only the presence of the divine, 
but also the active influence of God in it. In his proof of the existence of God this 
active, forming principle cannot be found directiy in the intellect of the divine. 
Instead it must be found in the principle of understanding which defInes ti1e second 
hypostasis of the Trinity. As with his proof of the existence of God, Cudworth's 
attack on atheism therefore not only confums the existence of God, it also acts as a 
means by which man can implicitiy know the active Trinitarian form of the divine. 
The second form of abuse to the idea of God made by mechanical atheists 
is the way in which God is deployed merely as a means of hiding the reality of their 
93 Ibid., p.28. 
9+ Ibid., p.50. 
95 Ibid., p.417. 
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atheism. This argument is central to Cudworth's attack on the philosophy of 
Hobbes. He argues that theology is used by Hobbes as a veneer of respectability, 
allowing him to 'walk abroad in the masquerade of theism.' God, instead of being 
the source and principle of goodness and love within the world becomes a political 
principle justifying acts which were anathema to the implicit goodness and wisdom 
of the divine. So Cudworth argues that, in Hobbes' thought, God is: 
a meer FigmeJlt or IIlIJe!ltioll of Politicians, to promote their own Ends, and 
keep men in Obedience and Subjection under them, then would they 
doubtless have so framed and contrived it, as that it should have been evel)' 
way Flexible and Compliallt. namely by perswading the world, that whatsoever 
was Commanded by themselves, was agreeable to the Divine T¥7ill, and 
whatever was Forbidden by their Laws, was displeasing to God Almighty, 
and would be punished by him:96 
The above quote shows clearly the voluntarism which Cudworth identifies in 
Hobbes' thought. Cudworth argues that the principle of God is only used in 
Hobbes' thought to legitimise the arbitral)' and absolutist state he is advocating. 
This form of state fails for two reasons. Firstly, as already stated, it is built on a 
false, and even feigned, conception of the divine. Secondly, Cudworth argues that 
Hobbes, by defining society by the arbitral)' dictates of the sovereign alone, is 
undermining the central purpose of political society, the creation of an effective 
ethical community. Consequently Cudworth argues that Hobbes only believes in a 
God who rules over the world, 
96 Ibid., p.698. 
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no othelwise, than by and in these Civil Sovereigns, as his Vicegerents; and 
the only Prophets and Jlltelpreters of his will to men. So that the Civil Law of 
eve1)' COtllltry, and the Arbitrary lf1"ill f!fSovereigns, should be acknowledged to 
be the only]v!eaJtlre of JlIst and Unjust (these being nothing Natt/ral/y such) 
the only Ride if Conscience al1d Religioll. For from Religion thus modelled, Civil 
Sovereiglls might think to have and Absoltfte Powe/~ or an lIifillite Right, of Doing 
or Commanding whatsoever they pleased, without exception, lIothing being 
Ulllawfit! to them, and their Subjects being always Obliged, ill Conscience, 
without the least Scruple to Obey.97 
Hobbes' thought, Cudworth argues, completely de-couples man from any notion of 
individual moral responsibility by placing the arbitrary figure of the civil sovereign 
between the justice of God's wisdom and man's ability to discover that individually. 
Cudworth, by rejecting Hobbes' voluntarist conception of the political nature of 
man, implicidy argues that the political nature of man is not an artificial creation, 
but something that flows unmediated from the divine principle in creation. 
The contrast between Cudworth and Hobbes on this matter is typified by 
d1eir differing views on the creation of the political realm. Hobbes, in this area, 
follows much of the style and form of republican writers during the middle years of 
the seventeenth centu1)'. Writers such as John Milton and James Harrington alluded 
to the Old Testament creation sto1)', and in particular creation as the imposition of 
97 Ibid., p.698, Cudworth here is clearly alluding to the arguments used by Hobbes in Leviatball where 
the political legitimacy of the civil sovereign is equated to the legitimacy God gave Old Testament 
Kings to be his representatives on earth. For instance see, '}cgain, he is to be King then, no otherwise 
than as subordinate, or Vicesegerent of God the Father, as Moses was in the wildernesse; and as the 
High Priests were before the reign of Saul: and as the Kings were after it.', Leviatball, p.518. 
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order on chaos, as a metaphor for the imposition that would be brought about by 
the imposition of order by the Godly republic on the chaos of d1e inter-regnum.98 
We can identify this political metaphor, although in a less explicidy 'republican' 
form, in Hobbes' assertion d1at civil society developed out of the natural chaos of 
state of nature.99 In contrast, we fmd Cudworth explicidy rejecting the idea of 
creation as the imposition of order on chaos. The idea of there being chaos would, 
after all, deny that the intellect and wisdom of God was the eternal founding 
principle of all creation. In the TISU Cudworth deploys the idea of chaos as a foil 
for his own version of creation as part of the perpetual out-flowing love of the 
divine. In all these cases the idea of a chaotic world was contrasted with the true, 
reasoned principle of divine love in creation. Just as the chaotic nature of atonllcal 
ad1eism cannot create beauty in the world, neither can it create a politically just 
society.lOo Political justice and order in society are, for Cudworth, not brought about 
by the imposition of a single will on society, as in Hobbes, rather it grows naturally, 
a collective understanding of the reasoned form and structure of society. By 
rejecting Hobbes' mechanical explanation for the order of the world, Cudworth 
implicidy suggests that man's political position is understood not by force, but by 
the consensual appreciation of the divine principle in creation. This participatoq 
relationship lies at the heart of the political principles in Cudworth's writings. The 
key to this political relationship between man and God is the rational and active 
nature of God understood as Trinity. 
98 David N orbrook, IWritillg ill the Ellglish Republic: Poetry, Rheto/ic alld Politics, 1627-1660 (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1999) pp.330, 400, 470-2. 
99 Leviathall, pp.183-201. 
IOU TISU, pp.79-80, 121-2. 
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In the TISU we can clearly identify Cudworth's recurring themes of the 
Christian life and the ethical community which we have already encountered in his 
early work. What he creates in the TISU is a philosophical structure within which 
man's relationship to the divine in creation is defIned. Cudworth intended to use 
this philosophical and metaphysical groundwork of the TISU to develop a 
philosophically coherent account of these principles in the remaining volumes of 
the TISU. These volumes were, however, never completed in a publishable form. 
The TISU creates the metaphysical framework within which Cudworth can begin to 
explain principles such as human agency, moral responsibility and political 
obligation. This structure relies at all times on the active principle of the divine for it 
to survive and flourish. What we will examine in the next two chapters of this thesis 
is how Cudworth develops these principles, particularly on human agency and 
ethical responsibility, in his unpublished writings. 
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Chapter V - Providence, freewill and human agency 
V.t. Introduction 
This purpose of this chapter is to show how Cudworth develops his theory of 
freewill and human agency from within the Trinitarian metaphysical stmcture he 
defends in the TISU. The main sources of these arguments in Cudworth's writings 
are his unpublished manuscripts on freewill which are now held in the additional 
manuscript collection of the British Library. The manuscripts were probably work 
in progress, never intended for the eyes of more than a handful of Cudworth's 
closest intellectual allies. That being said, they shed light on the principles of human 
agency that Cudworth hints at in his published writings and assumes in his ethical 
and political thought. They were probably written after the TISU, sometime during 
the 1670s and even 1680s.1 The manuscripts can, in part, be read as initial sketches 
for the third part of his projected Illtellectual System. They are, however, also effected 
by contemporary debates, in particular the well known freewill debate between 
Bishop Bramhall and Thomas Hobbes. Cudworth's manuscripts, aldlOugh 
acknowledging those debates, were not written in answer to that debate. Rather they 
should be viewed as Cudworth's contribution to the wider seventeenth century 
debate on freewill of which the Hobbes/Bramhall debate was also part.2 
Consequendy in these disorganised and often rambling manuscripts we can begin to 
put flesh on the bones of the moral and political systems which Cudworth only 
1 See Appendi.x on the dating and ordering of Cudworth's freewill manuscripts. 
2 On Cudwordl on Hobbes and Bramhall see: FAf.4979, fo1s148,148b,152; FM.4980, fo1s160,199, 
274, 276. On the Hobbes/ Bramhall debate see HobbeJ alld Bramhall 011 Liber(J1 alld NeloeJJi(J', ed. Vere 
Chappell (CUP, Cambridge, 1999). 
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begins to hint at in the TISU. In particular the manuscripts, when read in the 
context of Cudworth's Trinitarian system, present the reader widl a powerful 
defence of human agency as existing in this overarching Trinitarian structure. 
Central to these manuscripts is the belief that God is not a passive or 
passionate being, but the constant intellectual thread that exists throughout all 
reality. The wisdom of the divine is confIrmed, Cudworth argues, in the person of 
Christ. Christ as the principle of the Logos acts as the mediating factor between man 
and God; he is at the same time co-eternal with the divine and in sympathy with all 
things within creation. The active principle of the Logos brings man into a full 
participation with the divine as the source of all creation.3 
The central question Cudworth attempts to answer in these manuscripts is 
how the omnipotence of Cudworth's active Trinitarian God can be reconciled with 
the existence of human liberty. If, as Cudworth argues in the TISU, God is active in 
all parts of creation, how can man ever be said to be able to act freely? As was 
shown in the previous chapter, Cudworth's attack on materialist atheism in the 
TISU centres on his belief that there is a single defIning power in the world, God. 
To assert the principle of human agency into the divinely controlled world would 
therefore appear to undermine the omnipotence of God. This is certainly the view 
taken by the voluntarism of Calvinism and Hobbism, where the existence of freewill 
is denied precisely because the very existence of freewill undermines the ultimate 
will of God, in the case of the Calvinists, and the Civil Sovereign, in Hobbes. 
Cudwordl, in contrast, argues that these voluntarist conceptions of the divine do 
not glorify the image of God, but rather limit God by deflning God within the 
parameters of mere will alone, a deflnition which Cudworth argues is more human 
3 FldA979, f01.140. 
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than divine in form. Cudworth turns to the Platonic tradition to give an account of 
God's relationship with the world, within which Cudworth believes human agency 
not only exists, but confIrms the omnipotence and providential care of the divine. 
Cudworth, in his manuscripts, argues that human freewill does not limit the divine, 
rather its very existence is a sign of the broadness and magnificence of the 
multifaceted wisdom of the divine. Human agency therefore becomes in 
Cudworth's theory a principle that confums not only man's humanity, but is also a 
means of confIrming the fecundity of the divine. 
In his manuscripts, therefore, Cudworth's attacks centre on those arguments 
that deny the existence of human agency. In particular, Cudworth attacks the 
differing deterministic systems of Hobbism and Calvinism. Although for Cudworth 
these systems essentially fail because of their voluntarism, it is important to note the 
manner in which Cudworth differentiates between the material determinism of 
Hobbes and the divine determinism of Calvinism. The former can be discounted on 
dle same terms that Cudwordl attacks material atheism in dle TISU. Divine 
determinism however, because it accepts but misinterprets the existence of a divine 
presence in the world has to be analysed with more care and attention. It is with 
Cudworth's distinctions between dle determinism of Hobbes and Calvin that dus 
chapter begins. After this discussion I will show the manner in which Cudworth 
builds his theory of providence and human agency out of his criticism of divine 
determinism. Although this is chiefly an attack on Calvinism, I will argue that just as 
Cudworth attacks Hobbes dlrough his attacks on Epicureanism, so he attacks 
Calvinism as a resurrection of the determinism of Stoic 'Fate.' By making this link 
Cudworth is able to argue that just as Platonism can overcome the philosophical 
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errors of Stoicism, so a Platonically understood Trinitarian Christianity can 
overcome the errors of Calvinism. I will then go on to show how Cudworth 
develops his theories of providence and human agency, in particular his theory of 
the plastic nature of reality and the self-determining power of the soul, by 
overcoming misconceptions over these principles in Stoic thought. By the use of 
Platonic distinctions in these areas Cudworth argues that the providence of God 
should not be understood as one causal chain of necessity. In such a system, 
Cudworth argues, God is bound to the limited human conception of what defines 
power and action. Instead, Cudworth argues that God does not see what is to come 
as a single causal chain, but can comprehend the infInite contingent possibilities 
available within all created reality. Cudworth still believes that there is a regulative 
principle in the mundane world; this is Cudworth's idea of the plastic nature of 
reality. Aldl0ugh this principle exists, he argues that it is precisely because man can 
recognise himself as not being determined by these mundane, plastic regulatory 
principles that he is able to confum his own human agency. He, therefore) believes 
that the life of man is not determined by the pre-existent will of the divine but 
instead exists in a middle realm above the regulatory principles of the mundane 
world. The principle of human agency is defmed by Cudworth as man's self-
conscious recognition of his place above the mundane power of the plastic realm. 
The distinction comes, he argues, from the intellectual power within all men, a 
power which has its source in the active power of the Logos. Cudworth creates his 
system of human agency by taking the principles of Stoic philosophy and infusing 
them with his own Trinitarian metaphysical system. It is through this Platonic 
reformation of divine determinism dlat his theory of human agency, and 
181 
consequently his theories of moral responsibility and ethical self-determination, 
develop. These principles of moral self-determination, I will argue at the conclusion 
of this chapter, defme man in two ways. Firstly, Cudworth believes that man's 
freewill intimately connects him to the created realm, therefore rejecting the 
Scholastic belief in freewill as indifference. Secondly, the acceptance of the fallibility 
of man's self-determining power, which Cudworth accounts for through a 
discussion on the nature of evil, shows how man is morally responsible for his 
actions in the created realm. 
V.2. Cudworth's attack on determinism: Calvin and Hobbes 
In his work, The SovereiglltJ' ofReasol1, Frederick Beiser argues tllat Cudworth's 
critique of Hobbes is synonymous with his criticisms of Calvinism. Beiser asks 
rhetorically, '[w]hat, indeed, was the God of Hobbes but the God of Calvin spelt 
out in material terms?,4 There is certainly sometl1ing in this assertion. Cudworth 
interprets Hobbes' thought as following the voluntarism that he also identifies in 
Calvinism; and many of the arguments which Cudwortll deploys so deftly against 
Hobbes, in particular his defence of tlle eternal and in1mutable nature of morality, 
exist in his thought before he could have read Hobbes' work. However, we have 
also seen, in Cudwortll's distinction in his Secolld Sermoll between 'Sin's freeman' and 
'God's bondsman,' that there exists, for Cudworth, a difference between the ethical 
implications of the Hobbist and Calvinist systems. For Cudworth the difference 
between the systems lies in the different sources from which Hobbist and Calvinist 
determinism initially grows. Where Hobbes could be discounted as failing to 
.j Beiser, The S overeigll!), oj'Reasoll, pp.147 -8. 
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recognise the existence of dle divine, Calvinism had to be criticised for 
misinte1preting the nature and form of God. Before Cudwordl's criticism of 
Calvinism is examined in detail it is first necessary to show how Cudwordl, in dle 
manuscripts, discounts Hobbes' denial of freewill. 
The attack on Hobbes that we encounter in the manuscripts differs very 
litde from those used by Cudworth against Hobbes and other 'material adleists' in 
the TISU. If there is a difference between dle TISU and the manuscripts it is a 
change in emphasis. In the TISU Cudworth concentrates on the logical absurdities 
of the Hobbist account of the created universe. In the manuscripts Cudworth uses 
the same arguments that he uses against Hobbist materialism to reject Hobbes' 
denial of freewill. Cudworth goes about this task, as in the TISU, by attacking what 
he sees as dle contradictions implicit in Hobbes' materialism. Hobbes argues that 
reality can only be explained by the competing physical forces in the world. Freewill 
is, therefore, denied by Hobbes because man was always necessarily determined by 
the external physical forces that played against him. Freedom can, therefore, only 
ever be understood, in Hobbist terms, as the absence of an external physical 
impediment.s Although man can refuse to follow this external impediment, so 
strong are these external forces that the basic human emotions of men would 
necessarily lead to him following these external forces. To justify this position 
Hobbes' used his famous example of the man in the sinking boat: 
5 Leviatball, p.189; also see Hobbes OfUberfJ' alld NetessifJ', p.38. 
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[fjeare and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into 
the Sea for flare the ship should sink, he doth it nevertheless very willingly, 
and may refuse to doe it if he will:6 
One could, Hobbes argues, pay lip service to the idea of freewill; however, so strong 
are the external determining factors in the world that this freewill can never exist in 
any tangible or effective form. Cudworth argues that man, in Hobbes' system, is 
only defined by his relationship to the external world. Because of the physical 
imperative in Hobbes' argument, Cudworth argues that Hobbes creates two levels 
to his argument for necessity over freewill. Fitsdy, Hobbes asserts the cmde notion 
of random physical motion that we have already examined. Secondly, because this 
material reality was the only one that Hobbes allows, the physical imperative of his 
materialism is transformed by Hobbes into a philosophical system of necessary 
certainty.7 Such an argument, Cudworth argues, diminishes God as redundant in the 
world and diminishes man, making him nothing more than the sum of the external 
causes acting upon him.8 Returning to the terminology of Cudworth's Secolld Sermoll, 
this is the realm of 'Sin's freeman.' According to Cudwordl the only reality open to 
the Hobbist man are the hedonistic temptations of the physical world. TIns system, 
Cudworth argues can be discounted on two grounds. Fitsdy, as with his criticisms in 
the TISU, Hobbes' materialism makes inanimate, material form the founding 
principle of reality. This Cudworth believes to be nonsense as it contradicts the law 
of the non-inferiority of causes.9 Linked to this is Cudworth's second criticism, 
6 Leviathall, p.286. 
7 FJVI.4980, fo1.274. 
8 Ibid., fo1.224. 
9 FJU.4982, fo1.51. 
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which is d1at it is not only impossible to account for the existence of the world, but 
also impossible for man to have an intellectual comprehension of the existence of a 
world which is, in Cudworth's terms, created by 'the stupid coincidence of matter.,10 
Implicit in both these arguments is Cudworth's assumption that intellectual forces 
are superior, and therefore prior to, material causes. Consequendy, Cudworth argues 
that not only is it impossible to account for the form and nature of the world in 
material terms alone, but that it is contradictory to make an intellectual 
interpretation of the world which denies the existence of the incolporeal, intellectual 
substance that allows one to come to that conclusion. Hobbist determinism can, 
therefore, be dismissed as a further perversion of a fundamentally flawed 
philosophical system. Now we have seen the manner wid1in which Cudworth 
discounts the determinism of Hobbist materialism we can turn our attention to d1e 
more important argument of the manuscripts, Cudworth's attack on the divine 
determinism of Calvinism. 
The difference, Cudworth argues, between Calvin and Hobbes comes not in 
the form the determinism takes, or the ends it brings about, but d1e initial source of 
that determinism. Cudworth asserts, in the second section of PNI.4982, that the 
material determinism of Hobbes has no 'decrees' at all, in contrast to the divine 
determinism of Calvinism which is entirely dependent on divine 'decrees.' The 
difference, therefore, is that Hobbist determinism is defined by random external 
physical forces, whereas Calvinist determinism is defmed by the internal decrees of 
d1e divine. 11 Hobbes can, therefore, be discounted, in Cudworth's mind, because of 
the logical absurdities in his argument. Calvinism and divine determinism in all its 
10 FJ\1.4979, f01.187. 
11 FM.4982, ILfo1.63. 
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forms, by contrast, is a more acute problem for Cudworth. Calvinism grasps the 
essential tmth of reality, that God is dle animating and active force in the Universe. 
However, instead of allowing the divine to exist as the all-encompassing intellect, 
Cudworth believes that divine determinists limit God to the form of an arbitrary 
being, driven by passion and power. Cudworth accepts the starting premise of 
divine determinism, that God is the sole defining principle in the world. The failure 
of divine determinism, therefore, is not to ignore God as the defining principle of 
creation, but fail to appreciate the power and breadth of God's intellect within every 
part of creation. Such errors, Cudwordl argues, are not a specific fault of Calvinism, 
but a recurring problem in all religion.12 By making this claim Cudworth argues that 
dle problems that one encounters in the determinism of Calvinism mirrors the 
determinism found in Stoicism. As with Cudworth's comparison of Epicurianism 
and Hobbism, Cudworth uses the ancient Stoic system as a foil for his criticisms of 
contemporary Calvinism. This comparison is alluded to in the preface to the TISU 
where Cudworth argues, 'Divine Fate hath flOt olleb been forlJJerb asseJied Iij the Stoicks, 
btlt also of late 0' divet:r Modern Writers.'13 The comparison between the determinism 
of both Stoicism and Calvinism is made more explicidy by Cudworth in his freewill 
manuscripts. Cudwordl argues in Fj\1.4982 that Calvinism and Stoicism present a 
version of a divine determinism which can be differentiated from dle material 
determinism of Hobbes. 14 Both Calvinism and Stoicism, Cudworth argues, are 
defined by their dependence on the existence of positive divine decrees in all parts 
of creation. These divine decrees exist in Calvinism through the will and power of 
God as understood in voluntarist terms. In Stoicism the direct divine presence is 
12 FM.4979, fo1.72. 
13 TISU, p.iv. 
1-1 FMA982, ILfo1.60; also see FM.4980, fo1.313. 
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found in the physical principles of pneuma. Stoic thought believes that the created 
world is defined and controlled by four divinely imbued physical principles of 
pneuma. These were earth, water, wind and flre. All things in creation were 
modiflcations of these basic principles and each of these in turn was defmed by it 
relationship to fire, which was the greatest of these plltfema. 15 Cudworth sees the 
direct presence of God in these physical principles in Stoicism as a corollary to the 
direct influence of the will and power of God in Calvinism. In both divinely 
determined systems the presence of the divine directly determines every facet of 
creation. Man, as part of that creation, is, as a consequence, necessarily determined 
in all things. Man within this determined system becomes 'God's bondsman,' as 
Cudworth puts it in his Secolld Sermon. 
Given Calvin's own hostility to Stoicism, particularly in his writings against 
Seneca, Cudworth's comparison between Stoicism and Calvinism would appear to 
be an odd claim to make. However, Cudworth's comparison was not without 
precedent. Calvin was directly criticised for resurrecting Stoic 'Fate' in his teachings 
on predestination in his Illstitutes. Calvin was so angered by this accusation that he 
added a section to a later edition of his IllStittftes to answer this criticism.16 Cudworth 
is clearly aware of Calvin's assertion and notes Calvin's addition to the Illstitutes 
(LA"Vi.8) in the section from FM.4982 where he most clearly makes the comparison 
between Stoicism and Calvinism.17 Cudworth notes that Calvin does not reject the 
15 Cicero, The Nature ~lthe Gods, trans P.G.Walsh (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997), p.54; Robert 
B.Todd, 'Stoicism,' in The HistoO' ofStiCllce alld Religioll ill the If/estem TraditioJl: All EIID'lopedia, ed. Gary 
B.Femgren (Garland, New York, 2000), pp.132-33. 
16 Illstitlltes, Lxvi.8; \X1endel, Calvill, pp.28-34. For an overview of the place of Stoic philosophy within 
seventeenth century Europe see, Sarah Hutton, 'Platonism, Stoicism and Scepticism and Classical 
Imitation,' in A Compallioll to EI/glish Rellaissallce Literatllre alld ClIlttfre, ed. j\Iichael Hattaway, 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 2000), pp.44-57, especially pp.53-6. For a more general introduction to the 
relationship between Stoicism and Christianity see Marcia L.Colish, The Stoic Traditioll ji'OJlJ AI/tiqllif)' to 
the Eat~, l'vliddle Ages, 2 vols (Brill, Leiden, 1985). 
17 FM.4982, II.fo1.63b. 
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starting premise of Stoicism, that God was the deftning principle of all creation, 
rather Calvin argues that Stoic 'Fate' was in reality an incomplete description of the 
divine influence on the created realm. As Calvin argues: 
For we do not with the Stoics imagine a necessity consisting of a perpetual 
chain of causes, and a kind of involved series contained in nature, but we 
hold that God is the disposer and ruler of all things, - that from the 
remotest eternity, according to his own wisdom, he decreed what he was to 
do, and now by his power executes what he decreed. IS 
Calvin argues that where Stoicism makes the divine the deftning causal principle in 
the created world, in reality God's power and will is directly present at every point 
of creation. Calvin does not reject Stoicism as incorrect, rather he criticises it for 
being incomplete. This same criticism of Stoicism is found in Augustine. Calvin in 
fact begins his discussion on Stoic 'Fate' in the Instittltes by noting the allusions made 
by some between Augustine's theories and Stoic 'Fate.' The relationship between 
Augustine's thought and Stoicism comes out most clearly in the City of God where 
Augustine criticises Cicero's use of Stoicism. In chapters eight and nine of book ftve 
of the City if God, Augustine criticises the manner in which Cicero, in attempting to 
defend the existence of freewill, denies the absolute foreknowledge of the divine. 
Cicero's argument, in denying the true form of the divine in favour of a human 
faculty is, Augustine argues, patently 'madness.,19 Augustine argues that Cicero is, in 
reality, pel\Terting the basis of the Stoic arguments that Cicero claims to be 
18 IIlJlitlleJ, Lxvi.8. 
19 Augustine, Cif)' ~lGod, trans Henry Bettenson (penguin, Harmondsworth, 1984), Y.8. (p.190.) 
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defending. In answer to Cicero, Augustine argues that God must have 
foreknowledge of all things. Although the true Stoic argument is not perfect, 
Augustine argues, it is closer to the truth than Cicero's perverted Stoicism because 
true Stoicism implicitly accepts than God not only has foreknowledge of all things, 
but is the essential cause of all actions in the world.20 Augustine, like Calvin, 
therefore recognises in Stoic 'Fate' something of the truth which both of tllem 
believe is only truly fulfilled in their systems of divine foreknowledge and pre-
determinism. 
Because of tlle arguments made by both Calvin and Augustine with regards 
to Stoic 'Fate,' Cudworth believes he is justified in linking the determinism of 
Stoicism with the Christian determinism of Augustine, and Calvin in particular.21 
Both Stoicism and Calvinism, he believes, argue that God is the source of all things 
and as a consequence that God has a direct power and control over all actions in the 
world. Because of this, both systems, Cudworth argues, assert that within creation 
tllere is a necessary chain of causal motion which has been preordained by the 
divine. In Stoicism tllls is manifested in the principle of 'Fate,' in Calvinism through 
the doctrine of providence. The consequence of tllls causal argument is that 
everything within creation, both good and ill, must have been determined positively 
by the mind of tlle divine. Consequently, for Cudworth, the God of Stoicism and 
Calvinism is corrupt because the preordaining power attributed to the divine makes 
God tlle author of evil. The only saving grace for Stoicism, Cudwortll argues, is that 
tlle torments of the Stoic only occur in life, for the Calvinist they continued through 
20 Ibid., Y.S (p.193); Colish, Stoic Traditioll, II:231. 
21 Cudworth, in FM.49S2, differentiates between the determinism of Augustine, which allows a small 
amount oflatitude for freewill, and Calvinism which follows the same pattern, but allows no room 
for freewill at all, fols 70b-71. 
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into eternity.22 Despite this difference, the determinism of both systems makes each 
equally damned in Cudworth's mind. 
There is, for Cudworth, a threefold problem highlighted by the theistic 
determinism. Firstly, and most importantly, it degrades God. Cudworth believes that 
Calvinists, in particular, by defining God in terms of will and power seek to 
understand and describe God in what are essentially human terms. This 
anthropomorphic position, Cudwortll argues, is responsible for the voluntarist 
accounts of the divine discussed in greater length in Chapter Two. To defIne God in 
terms of power and will is, he believes, to defIne God in the manner that humans 
judge themselves. Instead, he argues that God should be defIned in terms of 
goodness and wisdom, which in their purest form always remain beyond the grasp 
of humans, but which are still recognisable by man tltrough his reason.23 Secondly, 
divine fatalists degrade men by making them merely chattels for the will of God. By 
making man determined in all things Cudworth argues that men are viewed as little 
more than 'little devils,' unable to have anything more than a mechanical, and 
consequently involuntary, relationship to the world.24 Thirdly, the voluntarism of 
divine determinists creates the positive existence of evil which, Cudworth argues, 
completely undermines the basis of morality. If God is the author of evil, by virtue 
of his all-powerful will, tllen morality cannot exist because the equitable judgement 
by God of all men on death, what Cudworth terms 'distributive justice,,25 could not 
occur. Such is the power of this determinism that man cannot be expected to make 
22 FM.4980, fo1.314. 
23 FM.4979, fo1.91; FA'1.4980, f015.193, 297. 
24 Ibid., f01.139. 
25 TISU, pp.v-vi. 
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even the most mundane decisions, let alone take any level of moral responsibility. 
As Cudworth bluntly argues in FM.4980: 
This is ye very condition of those i hypocrtically pretending t Fall of Adam 
& originall Sin & t inability of depraved nature to any supernaturall Good 
t confessing of weh alone they think to be a propitiatmy Sacrifice & highly 
grateful to t Allmighty in t meantime slothfully neglect to use yt Power weh 
really they have, weh is all one in this blunt language of the t Stoick, as if a 
man having hands should not use ym to blow or wipe his nose but sit still 
expecting i God by miracles should do that office for him.26 
The voluntarist understanding of the divine which is implicit in Cudworth's 
criticisms of divine determinism is anathema to Cudworth. Such an understanding 
of the divine not only degrades God and man but makes an equitable system of 
ethics impossible. As Cudworth argues: 
For we say agn i if God be nothing but Arbitrary Self-will indetermined by 
any immutable [form] of Justice & holinesse, he is all t worst i is or can be 
in ye Devill armed wth irresistable power or omnipotence & this is to 
confound Heaven & Earth & Hell togethr, Good & Evill, Holinesse & 
wickednesse or weh is all one to destroy all morality & differences of Good 
& Evill, by making t nature of God devoid of all Morality. 
26 Ibid., f01.38. 
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For an equitable system of morality to exist for Cudworth the specific moral norms, 
which are only found in the wisdom and intellect of the divine, must be identifiable 
freely by all men. For this to be possible Cudworth's system of morality assumes 
that human agency exists. Tlus is impossible whilst human agency is restricted by 
the narrow view of humanity in creation built on the limiting foundations of divine 
determinism. 
Cudworth is in agreement with divine determinism in believing God to be 
active in an essentially atonUstic world. The problem for Cudworth is, therefore, 
how one can account for human agency from within his own atonUstic 
cosmological system. He solves this dilemma by redrawing traditional Calvinist and 
Stoic conceptions of providence and Fate within a broader Neoplatonic framework., 
taking many of the philosophical forms and much of the ternUnology of Stoic 
philosophy and Platonising them. In doing this he removes the implicit determinism 
which fatally limits Stoic principles of moral responsibility and in turn, places these 
ideas of moral responsibility within a broader, Neoplatonic, understanding of divine 
action and providence. Such a process makes it possible, Cudworth believes, to 
account for the latitude of human agency and moral responsibility from widlin dle 
all-encompassing, providential wisdom of the divine. 
V.3. Cudworth's use of Stoicism 
Cudworth's approach to the philosophy of Stoicism at times seems contradictory. 
On the one hand, Stoicism is often disnUssed as a limited and weak philosophical 
system. Stoicism is described by Cudworth at one point as the work of 'pittyfull 
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philosophastors.>27 On the other hand, Stoic thought provides Cudworth, 
particularly in the field of human agency and moral responsibility, with some of his 
most important philosophical structures and terminology. In understanding how he 
believes he is able to reconcile these seemingly contradictory positions we gain 
insight into the philosophical and theological medlOd which Cudworth employs in 
his manuscripts. For Cudwordl the positive principles of Stoicism are never 
accepted in their entirety. Rather he takes them and re-forms and animates them by 
the use of Platonic metaphysical structures. Cudworth's re-forming of Stoicism can 
therefore be compared with his desire to reform determinist Christian thought with 
the dynamism of Platonism. Cudworth attempts to remove the strictures and 
legalism he believes are implicit in divine determinism through the use of his 
Platonism. Cudworth argues that through such a process it is possible to create a 
broader and stronger understanding of man's relationship with the divine in 
creation. 
Despite Cudworth's open hostility to Stoicism, his positive use of Stoic 
principles is not surprising when we consider two points. Firsdy, Cudworth, because 
of the syncretic nature of his philosophical method, was open to using other 
philosophical systems, even if they were flawed in some form or other. Secondly, 
there has always been a close relationship between Stoicism and Neoplatonic 
philosophy.28 Both systems share a view of reality based on the principle of one 
divine being. Also,in Stoicism we find philosophical structures, such as the triad of 
reality - ideal, madlematical, sensible - which mirror closely the trinities of 
N eoplatonism. Cmcially, both believe philosophy and theology to be one and the 
27 Ibid., fo1.202. 
28 P.}derlan, 'Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus,' in The Call/bJidge His/olJ' q(La/er Greek alld 
Earty j\1edielJa/ Pbi/OSOp/!)I, ed. Ii.H. Armstrong (CUP, Cambridge, 1970), pp.14-132, pp.129-132. 
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same truth, as Iamblichus said, 'both systems believe in the identity of the cosmic 
soul with the soul in US.,29 The theological continuities and differences between 
Stoicism and Neoplatonism are shown clearly in Cicero's The Nattlre rifGods. In this 
work Cicero describes a discourse between three eminent theologians: Vellius, an 
Epicurean, Balbus, a Stoic, and Cotta, an Academic. When outlining the theological 
position of Stoicism, Cicero, through the character ofBalbus, stresses that the 
defining principle of God in the world is his reason. This is proved, Balbus argues, 
by the fact that our reason tells us what we know and perceive within the world, 
therefore it must be a principle which is prior to the natural world. As this was the 
principle which was prior, and therefore superior to the world, it must be the 
principle by which God was known. As Balbus argues, '[n]ow if there is nothing 
better than reason and wisdom, these qualities must exist in that which we concede 
is best of all.,3Ll As a consequence, Balbus argues that all things in reality are 
interconnected by this divine nature and reason. In contrast to the stark atomism of 
Epicureanism, Stoicism teaches that the world should be understood not as a 
clashing world of independent forces, but as a continuum.31 It is in the explanation 
of this form and nature of dlls continuum that Stoicism and Neoplatonism differ. 
At the heart of Stoic cosmology lies the divine material principle, or pJ1etlI11a. This 
p"ell1J1a is also termed heg1J1ollikoll by Balbus, meaning that these principles not only 
create the physical reality of the world, but also act as the ruling principles of the 
world which nothing else can overshadow.32 In Stoicism all actions are determined 
by their relationship to these physical principles. The major theological distinction 
29 Quoted in Ibid., p.131. 
30 Cicero, The Natllre of the Gods, pp.17, 54. 
31 D.W.Hamlyn, The Pellgllill History ifPhilosoplJ)' (penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987), p.80. 
32 Cicero, The Nature of the Gods, p.57 also see n.29 p.176. 
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between Neoplatonism and Stoicism is therefore that creation was controlled by 
incorporeal intellectual principles in N eoplatonism, where for Stoicism the world 
was controlled by the physical attributes of the pll1lema. There is, therefore, in much 
Neoplatonism the implicit suggestion that Stoic cosmology leads to the dangers of 
Pantheism. Plotinus, in particular, distanced himself from Stoicism by arguing that 
only the intellectual power, not the physical presence, of the divine can be identified 
in the created universe. Following this line Cudworth, in FM.4979, argues that 
Stoicism can, in some ways be defined as an essentially materialist system.33 This 
difference between the divine as Neoplatonic intellectual power and Stoic material 
presence is of vital importance to our understanding of Cudworth's theory of plastic 
nature. 
Despite these metaphysical problems it is the continuities between Stoicism 
and Neoplatonism that help to explain why Stoicism became influential on the early 
Church. Unlike Epicureanism, but like Neoplatonism, Stoicism teaches that the 
divine' is actively involved in the world. It was also possible to use Stoicism in 
conjunction with the monotheism of the Semitic tradition because Stoicism is 
defined by the single principle of the divine, even if it was realised in the form of 
physical principles. This is the interpretation of Stoicism that we have already 
encountered in Augustine and Calvin's limited recognition of Stoic thought. In 
relation to Christianity whatever Stoicism, because of its materialism, may lose to 
Neoplatonism in the form of metaphysical coherence, it more than makes up for 
with its ethical teaching. The strong ethical stress in Stoicism, rather than the 
metaphysical concerns of Neoplatonism, helps explain why Stoicism was viewed by 
many in the early Church as the primal)' form of pagan knowledge that needed to 
33 FJ\1.4979, f01.144. 
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be countered.34 That being said, many of the ethical teachings of Stoicism became 
intermingled with early Christian teaching. So much so that forgeries of Stoic 
writings which stress its compatibility with Christianity became commonplace in the 
early Church. Perhaps the most famous and influential of these was the claimed 
correspondence between Seneca and St Paul. So widespread was the belief in these 
forgeries that it was even believed by many dlat Seneca had been converted to 
Christianity by St Paul. Although Erasmus was later able to prove that this 
correspondence was a forgery, it does highlight the close relationship that existed 
between Stoicism and Christianity.35 
Cudworth would have been more than aware of dle ethical arguments in 
Stoicism that made it so compatible to certain forms of Christianity. The conflict 
comes for Cudwordl not in the form of the ethical arguments suggested. These are 
of central importance to Cudworth's own ethical the01y. Instead the conflict comes 
in the impossibility, as Cudworth sees it, of reconciling principles of moral 
responsibility to a cosmological system entirely controlled by the material principle 
of pmlema. Cudwordl'S reaction to Stoicism follows the Church Fathers who rejected 
Stoic pandleism and determinism; choosing the Neoplatonic God of providential 
care over the Stoic God of in1manent material force.36 As a consequence Cudworth 
believes Stoicism, because of its dleological assumptions, to be fundamentally 
flawed. In this sense Cudworth's criticisms of Stoicism highlight a central principle 
of all Cudworth's thought, that educal principles must be consistent with the 
metaphysical principles upon wluch they are built. 
3+ Colish, Stoic Traditioll, 1:2. 
35 Ibid., 1:5, II:16. 
36 Henry Chadwick, 'Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought,' in The Cambridge HistolJ' ~tLater 
Greek alld Earb' iliedieva! Phi!osoplJ)', ed. A.H.Armstrong, pp.13 7 -92, p.186. 
196 
Cudworth is certainly not alone in noting the discrepancy between dle 
ethical and cosmological arguments of Stoicism. One explanation for this 
discrepancy is that it is ethical problems, not fundamental philosophical distinctions, 
which are central to Stoicism. Therefore in Stoicism philosophical distinctions are 
always subordinated to the needs of an effective ethical system.37 Another 
explanation given is that a level of moral responsibility is understandable in Stoicism 
if a distinction between the nature of causes is made. This distinction comes out 
most clearly in dle thought of Chrysippus who made. the distinction between 
'antecedent' and 'determining' causes. The former cannot be controlled, the latter, 
which are informed by the former but remain changeable, can be. Chrysippus 
famously describes this distinction through the example of the movement of a 
cylinder down a hill. The cylinder is antecedendy determined to roll down the hill, 
however, man is able, through his free choice, to control whether or not the 
cylinder rolls down hill in the fust place.38 This distinction allows Stoicism to argue 
that in a world determined by 'antecedent' causes, man has the power to 'determine' 
some of these causes. It is by use of this determining power that the strong Stoic 
tradition of ethical self-determination develops. The clearest edllcal example of this 
comes through the Stoic defence of suicide. Stoic edllcal theory argues that all men 
are antecedendy determined to die, however, to a large extent the determining cause 
of this death is largely in the control of the individual moral actor. Suicide can, 
therefore, be explained as the acceptable act of a moral actor: a clear case where the 
actor controls the determining cause, whilst still fulfilling the antecedent cause.39 
37 1ferlan, 'Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus,' p.125 
38 Cicero, De Fato, trans H.Rackham (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1B., 1960), p.239; Colish, 
Stoil' Traditioll, 1:35. 
39 F.H.Sandbach, The Stoil's (Chatto and Windus, London, 1975), p.102;J.1I.Rist, Stoil' Phi/osop/!)! 
(CUP, Cambridge, 1969), p.130. Also see Charlotte Stough, 'Stoic Determinism and l\foral 
Responsibility,' in The Stoil's, ed. J.l\I.Rist (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978), pp.203-232. 
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Stoicism therefore teaches, within the confines of its determinism, a strong tradition 
of moral self-sufficiency and self-mastery. It is these principles which exist, stripped 
of their Stoic foundations, so prominendy in Cudworth's ethical thought. The 
problem Cudworth faces is how to explain this theory of ethical self-determination 
in his theistic system. As has already been stated, for Cudworth morality can only 
exist if there is distributive justice brought about by the judgement of freely-willed 
actions. This is, Cudworth believes, impossible from within the entirety of the Stoic 
system, as the moral responsibility taught by Stoicism is not based on choice action 
but on a moral asceticism where ethical virtue is found in merely assenting to the 
predetermined ends of a materially determined cosmos. 
Cudworth begins his criticism of Stoicism by attacking the principles of 
plltlemo which underpin Stoic cosmology. Cudworth argues that by asserting the 
physical principle of plletlma as the defining term of the universe Stoicism pulls the 
divine down into the material world. This, Cudworth believes, leads to two linked 
problems. Firstly it degrades the divine and secondly it makes all actions not only 
pre-determined, but physically pre-determined by dle will of the divine. To 
overcome this problem Cudworth asserts, using Plotinus' argument oudined above, 
that although creation was unified by the intellect of God, it is not the direct 
presence, but the reflected power of God. 4t1 It is this reflected power, ratller than a 
direct physical presence, which makes all things naturally identify with, and draw 
themselves toward, the divine. At the source of this Plotinian structure is a belief in 
divine action understood as the divine artist. On one occasion Plotinus uses this 
metaphor to describe the world as a stage with humans acting the drama written by 
the heavenly poet. In another metaphor Plotinus describes God as tlle musician: 
~o Fll1.4980, f01.151; TISU, p.464. 
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Of course, the play brings the conflicting elements into a kind of 
harmonious concordance, by composing the complete story of the persons 
in conflict; but in the universe the battle of conflicting elements springs 
from a single rational principle; so that it would be better for one to 
compare it to the melody which results from conflicting sounds, and one 
will then enquire why there are the conflicting sounds in the rational 
proportions [of musical scales]. If, then, the laws of rational proportions 
make high and low notes and come together into a unity - being the 
proportional laws of melody they come together into the melody itself, 
which is another greater law of proportion. 41 
This metaphor is drawn from Plato's LaWJ, book ten, where tlle 'Athenian' describes 
the creation as the artistic product which was necessarily secondary to the intellect 
of the artist.42 The world, with all its conflicting factors, is brought into harmony by 
the 'artistic' form of God's providential wisdom. Cudworth draws heavily on this 
metaphor when he describes the overarching providence of the divine. The divine 
art, as Cudwortll sees it, is the 'unbodied reason of the divine.' In that way it 
touched the world, but became mixed Witll matter or, as Cudwortll put it, 'Fttddled in 
it.'43 The Platonic divine artist is directly comparable to the intellect of the 
Trinitarian God in Cudworth's thought. Reality is touched in all parts by the divine 
art of the intellect of God, but not controlled directly or materially by it. Plotinus 
~1 Elllleads, 3.2.16. 
~2 Plato, LaJvs, trans. A.E.Taylor, in The Collected DialoglleJ rifPlato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington 
Cairns (princeton University Press, Princeton, 1961), 892.b. 
~3 TISU, p.155(2). 
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understood the role of the omniscient God to his creation as that of the 'generalship 
of providence'; judging and guiding all actions in the world, but not determining 
them absolutely.44 Providence is understood in Plotinian terms not as a chain of 
necessarily causal relationships, but as d1e constant process by which all parts of 
reality naturally seek after the divine: 'Everyd1ing in me seeks after the Good, but 
each attains it in proportion to its own power.45 
Following this Plotinian approach, Cudword1 argues that creation is best 
understood, not as a unified whole or necessarily determined causal necessity, but as 
a scale of being wid1 the divine at its head and mundane matter at the base. As 
Cudworth argues in Fl\1.4980: 
Creation is a scale or ladder in web are all degrees of being possible one 
below anod1er, t lowest of all web is matter & Body So i there is a negative 
defect in all things but God but no positive defect pravity or vitiosity in any 
thing as it comes out of Gods hands in any nature yt is no absurdity or 
Con tradiction. 46 
By the use of this scale of being Cudworth is able to contrast this Neoplatonic 
cosmology with the material cosmology of Stoicism, which describes the world in 
terms of the direct physical influence of divine principle on creation. The 
N eoplatonic scale of being, in contrast to divine determinism, allows man to 
appreciate the intellectual influence of the divine on all parts of creation, whilst 
+l Elll!eads, 3.3.2. 
+5 Ellneads, 3.2.3. 
46Fiv1.4980 f01.151; FA1.4970, fols 5,14,88. See also Sarah Hutton, 'Cudworth, Boethius and the Scale 
of Nature,' The Call1blidge Platollists, ed. G.A.]. Rogers, et aI, pp.93-100. 
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allowing elements of that creation, in particular men, a level of autonomy from tile 
direct actions of the divine. 
At the base of this scale of being exists what Cudworth termed the 'Plastic 
Nature of Reality.' Above this 'plastic' realm it is possible to move within this scale 
of being up towards the divine, or down towards the mundane. It is in this middle 
ground tint Cudworth argues human freewill exists. For this to be the case we must 
understand that Cudworth's notion of higher and lower principles not as a crude 
duality between the body and soul, or the corporeal and incorporeal. Rather 
Cudworth follows Plotinus' duality of higher and lower selves.47 Man therefore 
resides not in a conflicting world of material and in1material forces, but in a realm 
where he is free to choose between the higher principles of the divine or the lower 
principles of the mundane. Merging the Platonic and the Christian, Cudworth 
argues that 'the Fall' has made man susceptible to the temptations of base, mundane 
principles. 'The Fall' is, however, not the irrevocable schism of original sin that we 
fInd in Calvinism. Rather man can, through discipline and his freewill, move 
upwards toward the divine. As Cudworth argues in FiH.4980: 
This is t hue attempt of t original of Sin yt it is neither caused by God nor 
by any positive substantiall principle, but t possibility thereof preceeds only 
from y' imperfection & defectibility of Creatures, but actual cause of it is 
never any other t yC rationall Creature itself, not putting forth yt executive 
47 'In fact the substrate to the free principle is the rational form, and that which has come into 
existence from dle rational form and exists according to it, so that the matter will not be dominant 
and the formation come second,' ElIlleads, 3.3.4. 
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power wch it hath towards t higher principle in its nature but by sluggish 
remission & relaxation, sinking down into t lower.48 
Man is a fallible creature, however, he is able to improve himself within this scale of 
being. The providence of God is, therefore, for Cudworth, found in the infinite 
possibilities which are suggested, or as Cudworth put it, 'woven into' this divinely 
ordained scale ofbeing.49 
VA. The Plastic Nature of Reality 
At dle base of this scale of being are dle regulatory principles of the world. Tlus is 
the realm controlled by Cudwordl's 'Plastic Nature.' The 'Digression on dle Plastic 
Nature of Reality' - which forms the forms the final section of chapter three of the 
TISU - is posited by Cudworth to explain the recurring forms and stmctures of the 
natural world. Plastic Nature is, as Sarah Hutton has clearly stated, the 'ignorant 
instrument of a knowing and wise providence, a regulatory principle governing 
operation of the natural world.'so Cudworth uses Plastic Nature to explain the 
existence of mundane and recurring events in the world.sl These plastic principles 
provide, for Cudworth, the foundations of dle created realm. By explaining how 
these principles are drawn from the intellectual power of the divine, rather than the 
inlmediate presence of the divine, Cudworth believes he is able to undermine the 
starting premise of divine determinism. By utilising the difference between the 
.\8 FM.4980, f01.147 . 
.\9 FiV1.4981 , fo1.24; Fi\llA982, III, fo1.66. 
50 Sarah Hutton, 'Aristode and the Cambridge Platonists: the Case of Cudworth,' in 
Pbi/osop!!)! ill the Sixteellth alld Sevmteelltb Cmtlllies: COllversatiolls Ivith Aristot/e, ed. c.T. Blackwell and S. 
Kusukawa (Ashgate, London, 2000) pp. 337-49, pp.342-3. 
51 TISU, pp.147, 151-3. 
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intellectual power of God and the immediate presence of the divine Cudworth 
argues that it is possible to explain the recurring events in the created world whilst 
at the same time allowing a level of creation which is not controlled and defIned 
directly by the hand of God. It is in this level of creation tllat Cudworth believes 
human agency and freewill exist. 
In the 'Digression on the Plastic Nature of Reality,' Cudworth continually 
defInes God through the Platonic metaphor of the divine craftsman outlined above. 
God, in Cudworth's cosmology, is not the idle observer but the active principle 
deflning all parts of reality. Cudworth uses this example to further distance himself 
from mechanical atheists who claimed the world was created by the fortuitous and 
random motion of matter. As Cudworth pithily states: 
the lvlaterial and Mechanical are altogether Unphilosophical, tlle same A/istode 
ingeniously exposes the Ridiculousness of this Pretence after this manner; 
telling us, That it is just as if a Calpenter, Joyner or Carver should give this 
accompt, as the only Satisfactory, of any ArtifIcial Fabrick or Piece of 
Carved Imagery ... that becat/se the Illstnfl/lents, Axes alld RaMJets, Plaills alld 
Chissels, happened to fall so alld so ttpon the Ti1llbe/~ Ctlttillg here alld there, that therefore 
it was hallow il1 one place, and plain ill allothe/~ and the like, alld ry that means the 
whole came to be qjstl(h a Form. For is it no altogether as Absurd and 
Ridiculous, for men to undertake to give an accompt of the Formation and 
Organization of the Bodies of Animals by mere Fortuitous Mechanism.52 
52 Ibid., pp.148-9. 
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Cudworth, by this analogy and attack on material atheism, implicitly makes God the 
source of all creation. This is, however, God not as the immediate force and pre-
determined principle, but the intellectual power that informs all creation. Cudworth 
therefore believes that 'Plastic Nature,' correctly understood, shows how God 
defInes and determines the natural form of creation but is not intimately involved 
with every mundane facet of that creation. He argues that the failure of divine 
determinists is not that they reject the existence of a divine determining principle in 
the world, as material atheists do. Rather it is that they believe this active regulative 
power to be the highest power in the world, where in reality, Cudworth argues, it is 
the lowest and basest.53 The clearest example of this is in Stoicism's insistence on 
physical, rather than incorporeal, intellectual principles defIning reality. For this 
reason Cudworth, in the 'Digression,' describes divine determinists as 'Cosmo-
plastic atheists.'54 By identifying the philosophical errors of divine determinism 
Cudworth believes it is possible to include this mundane determining principle in 
his own system, witllOut falling into the error of absolute determinism. He therefore 
uses these Stoic principles, removing them from the excesses of their determinism, 
to develop an account of the active role of the divine in creation. 55 
J.E. Saveson has argued that the plastic principle in Cudworth's thought is 
synonymous with the third hypostasis of the Neoplatonic Trinity. Saveson states 
that the plastic principle 'is taken persistently from the third hypostasis of the Neo-
Platonists; it is the vital and organizing force in Nature.'56 This assertion would seem 
53 Ibid., pp.172-3. 
54 Ibid., p.146. 
55 Ibid., p.147. 
56 J.E.Saveson, 'Differing Reactions to Descartes among the Cambridge Platonists,' in Tbe JOIln/al ~l 
tbe Histo!)! of Ideas, 21 (1960), pp.560-67, p.561. 
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to be only partially correct. Cudworth is clear that the Plastic principle is not itself 
divine, arguing at one point that: 
though it be a thing that acts for Ellds Attijicialfy, and which may be also 
called the Divine Alt, and the Fate of the Corporeal World; yet for all that it is 
neither God, nor GoddeSJ, but a Low and Imperfect Creature. 57 
Cudworth argues that the error within divine determinism is not the failure to 
recognise the plastic principle in nature, but to make plastic nature synonymous 
with the divine. To do such a thing would be to confuse the individual workman 
with the intellect behind the entire building project, or the instrument as the source 
of the harmonies which are in fact brought about by the skill of the musician.58 
Plastic nature must remain, Cudworth argues, a lower principle, always reliant for its 
existence on the higher principles of the divine: 
For the Plastic Life '!fNattlre is but the mere Umbrage of IntelledNalit)', a faint 
and shadowy Imitation of Milld and Understandillg; upon which it doth 
Essentially depend, as the Shadow upon the Body, the image in the Glass 
upon the Face, or the Eccho upon the Original Voice. So that if there had 
been no Peifed ]"1illd or Illtelled in the World, there could no more have been 
any Plastick Nattlre in it, that could be an Image ill the Glass without a face, or 
an Eccho without the Oligillal Voice. 59 
57 TISU, p.162. 
58 Ibid., p.155. 
59 Ibid., p.172. 
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As the mindless vassal of the divine intellect, the plastic nature in reality contains no 
self-consciousness of its elf. 60 
Saveson's claim would therefore not appear to be backed up in Cudworth's 
writing. However, Saveson does point to an important Trinitarian aspect implicit in 
Cudworth's theory of plastic nature. Cudworth argues that plastic nature, because it 
is mundane, has no consciousness of itself. Man, Cudworth argues, is able to 
distinguish himself from the mundane, regulatory plastic principles of creation 
precisely because he is conscious of the existence of these principles. Consequendy 
because man is conscious of the plastic element in reality man cannot, by 
implication, be solely driven and determined by this slavish plastic nature. It is from 
this assertion that Cudworth develops his definition of human agency. Plastic 
powers are, by definition, un-self-conscious, therefore man's ability to self-
consciously recognise the plastic principles in the world acts as an implicit 
confirmation of the self-conscious power of man. By this confirmation man is 
placed above the slavish realm of the mundane and consequendy above the 
teleological, pre-determined world of plastic nature. Cudworth, therefore, uses his 
theory of plastic nature as a means to an end. It allows him to account for the 
regulatory principles in the world (for example: that grass grows, the sun shines, 
apples fall to the ground etc.), but it leaves enough latitude for him to argue that 
above this mundane level exist the powers of human agency which are an essential 
part of Cudworth's moral theory. Human agency is, therefore, defIned by Cudworth 
as man's recognition of his own self-consciousness. The argument that Cudworth 
uses to defIne human agency as man's self-conscious recognition of himself mirrors 
Cudworth's explanation of man's appreciation of the Trinitarian form of the divine. 
60 Ibid., p.173. 
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As shown in the previous chapter, Cudworth argues that man appreciates the 
reflective power of dle divine by appreciating the difference between the intellect of 
the divine and understanding as the means of that appreciation. The means of 
understanding, he argues, allows man to appreciate not only the existence of God, 
but through dle means of understanding, the reflective Trinitarian nature of that 
divine being. In the case of plastic nature, man, by his self-consciousness, is able to 
recognise himself as existing above the mundane, determined plastic level. Implicit 
in this recognition for Cudworth is an acceptance that this self-conscious power has 
its source in something more than the mundane. That source, just as with 
understanding in the defence of the Trinity, is the active, intellectual power of the 
divine. 
V.S. Human Agency and Moveable Providence 
The reflexive human powers of self-perception and self-determination, which define 
Cudworth's moral philosophy, exist above mundane plastic nature. Man's 
recognition of his human agency comes through his self-conscious recognition of a 
faculty that exists above dle mundane, a recognition which has its source in man's 
participation in, and understanding of, the intellectual principle of the divine. In 
Cudworth's thought the realisation of the power of human agency is deftned by the 
active intellectual and, consequendy, the Trinitarian form of the divine. By defining 
human agency in terms of man's intellectual relationship to the divine Cudworth is 
able to argue that human agency can exist in such a way that does not dinlinish the 
providential wisdom of God. This claim requires Cudworth not only to deftne 
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man's existence solely through the intellectual principles outlined above, but also to 
redefine the nature of divine providence from the form which it is assumed to take 
in systems of divine determinism. Cudworth, by doing this, rejects the notion that 
all creation is controlled by a fixed providential system such as that which merely 
controls the plastic nature. Such a providential plan would not, Cudworth argues, 
allow for the latitude within which human agency could effectively exist. Instead, 
Cudworth argues that above the mundane plastic realm creation is defined by the 
infinite breadth of the divine intellect. Creation is not fIxed by a single line of 
necessary causation defmed narrowly in terms of the will of the divine. Instead 
God's vast intellect can comprehend all the multiple possibilities existent in 
creation. Human agency in this realm of, what Cudworth terms 'moveable 
providence,' does not limit the idea of the divine, as thought by divine determinists, 
but helps to confIrm the breadth of Cudworth's intellectualist God. 
The principle of moveable providence, which is only found in any great 
detail in Cudworth's manuscripts, relies upon Cudworth fIrst removing the 
assumptions of causality and necessity that he believes have allowed deterministic 
systems to gain purchase. For Cudworth the central problem of deterministic 
systems is that they rely on the false assumption that because an action can be 
understood to have been necessarily caused by a previous act, that that necessary 
cause was predetermined to be that cause. The proof of this predestined form of 
determinism, Cudworth argues, relies entirely upon a retrospective judgment. If the 
use of hindsight is removed all that can be known is that that every action must 
necessarily be caused by a sufflcient act. What cannot be said is that the 
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retrospectively recognised cause was necessarily the predetermined cause. As 
Cudworth puts it in FM.4980: 
The necessity of a disjunctive contradictory proposition is so absolute i t 
same thing should either be or not be, no more t it could make it possible 
yt it should both be or not be together Infmite power could no more make it 
possible i Adam should neither eat nor not eat of t forbidden fruit yn i he 
should both eat & not eat of it [or that it] is necessary yt Cato shall kill 
himself in Africa or not kill himself, But it is not, therefore necessary yt he 
should necessarily kill himself, or necessarily not kill himself, & therefore it 
is a childish illogical argumentation If it be not necessary it shall rain 
tomorrow )/ then it must be necessary it shall not rain for neither of yffi 
might come to passe necessarily but contingendy, onely t whole is 
necessary i one or other of y!TI should come to passe necessarily or 
contingendy, it matters not weh; Here therefore The Author did not observe 
t difference between these two affIrmations Tis necessary yt one or other of 
t two should come to passe & this That one or other of yffi must needs 
il 61 come to passe necessar y. 
Cudworth terms his understanding of possible future actions which were logical, but 
not predetermined as necessary causal relationships, the 'disjunctive logical 
necessity.' This idea Cudworth describes in FM.4979 in the following manner: 
61 FiV1.4980, fo1.266. It is interesting to note also that the examples used in this quote, of Adam's 
'Fall' and Cato's suicide, are suggestive of the implicit link that Cudworth believes there to be 
between Calvinism and Stoicism. Both systems ethical arguments being recognisable in these 
examples. Calvinism through the doctrine of original sin and Stoicism through tile justification of 
suicide. 
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So i ye meaning of Disjunctive Logicall Necessity is this, not)/ if one of y" 
Contradictory terms doo not come to pass t other will necessarily will come 
to passe but if one of dlem doo not come to passe anyway (dl0Ugh it be 
contingendy unnecessarily) yet it will be necessary i y" other shall come to 
passe some way or other though it may come to passe contigendy for all {62 
Cudworth uses this principle to explain how acts above the realm of the plastic 
nature can be mistaken as predetermined when they are merely retrospectively 
recognised as being caused by a necessary, but not predetermined, effect. 
The problem, however, remains for Cudworth to explain how such a system 
of ambiguous future actions could exist in a framework controlled by an omniscient 
God. Augustine criticises Cicero's attempt to solve this dilemma d1fough the denial 
of divine foreknowledge in all things. Cudworth's reply to this dilemma is the 
obverse of Augustine's criticisms of Cicero. Instead of denying the existence of 
divine foreknowledge, he argues that the principles of divine foreknowledge as held 
by Augustine and Calvin are, in fact, too limiting and narrow. His argument here 
returns to one of his central reasons for rejecting the divine determinism. When 
attacking Stoicism and Calvinism Cudworth argues that to state that God can only 
conceive of a single chain of causal relations running throughout creation is to limit 
God. He believes dlat such a position reduces dle intellect of God to the human 
principles of will and power. Instead, Cudworth asserts, such is the awesome 
intellect of the divine, that he cannot only foresee all necessary acts, but also all the 
contingent possibilities that occur from that act. The divine intellect is, therefore, 
62 FM.4979, fo1s228-9. 
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not limited to the strictures of an Adamantine chain of predetermined certainty. 
Rather the mind of God, as Cudworth puts it: 
doth infallably know all contingent & free actions though not antecedendy 
by necessary causes weh would destroy the freedom & contingency, but yet 
Consequentially and by ways of Anticipation of Futurity. Soo i the object of 
dus prescience is not causes antecedendy producing such effects but it is t 
consequent truth & futurity yt must needs fall widUn t Comprehensiveness 
of t Divine Understanding i Grasps & presents all futurity in it.63 
Cudworth argues that the intellect of God is so vast that all possible 'futurity' is held 
within it. Actions are, for him, not understood in terms of necessity but 'ambiguous 
possibility.'64 The infinite web of possibility created by this assertion is too vast for 
the human mind to conceive, but not too great for the limidess power of the 
wisdom of God. Man can act freely widUn the vast intellect of the divine because all 
possible actions and contingencies of actions have been foreseen by God. 
Providence, in this sense, is not a limited chain of cause and effect but the limidess 
realm of possibility. Providence is not fL'{ed but 'moveable' within this vast 
intellectual sttucture. 
63 FM.4981, fo1.50. 
6~ F.iH.4979, fo1.210. We can identify this principle of the breadth of God's providential plan in the 
Platonic thought of Cudworth's predecessor Thomas Jackson. As Jackson argues: 'So far is freedom 
of choice or contingency from being incompatible with the immutability of God's will, that without 
this infmite variety of choice or freedom of thought in man and angels, we cannot rightly conceive 
him to be as infinitely wise as his decree is immutable.' Jackson, 1T7orkJ, V:90. 
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V.6. Freewill, moral responsibility and evil 
Cudworth uses this theory of 'moveable providence' as the ethical structure within 
which he is able to unify his two recurring themes of living the Christian life and the 
fulfilment of that life in the creation of the ethical community. To achieve this 
Cudworth takes the language and theories of moral responsibility originally found in 
Stoic thought and places them in the breadth of his theory of moveable providence. 
Cudworth argues throughout his manuscripts that if human agency is understood in 
these terms, it is possible to argue effectively for freewill without diminishing the 
providential power of God. 
The starting point of tllls the01Y is the nature of human will. Human will is, 
for Cudworth, not a despotic power, as in Hobbes, or a fallible power, as in 
Calvinism, but open to change and suggestion from competing principles.65 
Consequently human will is, for Cudworth, a faculty that resides between these two 
extremes; it is 'an amphibious thing, between perfection and nature.'66 The 
implication of this is two-fold. Firstly, Cudworth argues that there are elements of 
human action which are necessarily governed by the mundane, plastic, forces of 
nature (i.e. hunger, thirst, sleep, etc.). Secondly, above these mundane factors there 
exist malleable powers within human will through which man has the potential to 
improve himself by moving towards the divine principles of goodness and justice. It 
is in this latter area that Cudworth believes the human faculty of moral 
responsibility resides. The discerning power of the will in man is governed by man's 
reason. Through his reason man has the potential to rise above the mundane and, 
65 FM.4979, foI5.116, 63; FJ\i1.4980, fo1.38. 
66 FM.4980, fo1.45; IFW7, p.184. 
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used correcdy, man may move into participation with the divine. Man can therefore, 
Cudworth argues, use his reason to move towards the eternal divine principles of 
justice and wisdom. The fact that man has the potential to enter into this 
relationship of participation again confirms for Cudworth the Trinitarian form of 
the divine. The rational means d1at man employs to move towards and recognise 
the eternal truths of the divine must, Cudword1 believes, be drawn from the same 
divine principle of understanding that allows man to know of God's existence and 
intellect in the fIrst instance. Therefore the ethical potential of man is deflned by 
man's implicit acceptance of not only the existence of God, but also God in his 
active Trinitarian form. 67 
Before Cudworth's theory of moral responsibility is explained it is, however, 
important to show how he understands the active faculties, of which the self-
determining ethical faculty is only one. He distinguishes between those human 
actions that are defmed by the mundane, plastic and regulatory principles in the 
world and those which are the self-determined and ethically accountable actions of 
man. Cudworth's starting point in this is the Phaed17ls where Socrates defInes the 
in1mortal part of the soul as that part which 'moves itself' - to atlto eatlto killOtllJ. 68 
This self-moving principle, which Cudworth anglicised to 'autokinsey' in his 
manuscripts, is the self-moving principle which will be discussed at greater length 
later. Below this faculty man is still liable to the forces of external action at the most 
mundane level; these are defmed by the regulatory principles of the plastic nature. 
In the manuscripts Cudworth contrasts the self-moving, auto-kinetic powers of man 
67 F.iV1.4980, fo1.37. In this section Cudworth explicitly links freewill to tlle principle of grace which, 
as we have seen Cudworth, and \V'hichcote before him, identify Witll the principle of reason 
mediated to man tllrough the revelation of the second person of the Trinity. 
68 Hutton, 'Liberty, and Self-determination,' p.89. 
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with the externally moved, hetero-kinetic - 'heterokinsey' as Cudworth terms it-
forces which affect man. These hetero-kinetic forces - which Cudworth says man 
has as much ability to resist as a tennis ball which is struck, or a weather-cock blown 
by the wind - should not be described in terms of ethics or morality as Hobbes and 
odler mechanical fatalists have described them, because no equitable judgement can 
be made over man's ability to control them.69 
Included in dus sub-ethical layer in Cudworth's thought are what Cudworth 
terms 'Epoloustic' forces. 711 Epoloustic actions, Cudworth argues, are those actions 
where there is an equal determination between two competing factors. This form of 
choice made by man can have no blame or moral judgment attached to it. In these 
cases Cudworth argues that man is naturally drawn to the choice of habit. 
Epoloustic determinations therefore differ from hetero-kinetic determinations in 
that man is determined internally, not externally. This distinction, along with 
Cudworth's use of the idea of habit, would seem to make epoloustic determinations 
comparable to the internal regulatory principles in man. Cudworth believes that 
plastic nature is the internal, but mundane determining factor in all parts of creation, 
existing below the level of ethical judgments. In the 'Digression on the Plastic 
Nature of Reality,' Cudworth argues that one of the factors that proves the imprint 
of dle divine intellect on nature is the ability of humans to act from habit. The 
example Cudworth gives is of a musician being able to play half-asleep, that is from 
habit, not from conscious power. As Cudworth puts it: 
69 FM.4980, f01.176; FM.4979, foL91. 
70 The term 'Epoloustic' only occurs within FM.4978 and FJ\1.4980, suggesting that FM.4978 is 
related to FiH.4980. See appendi.. .... on the Cudworth's Freewill manuscripts. 
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HabitJ do in like manner, Gradllalb' Evolve themselves, in a long Train or 
Series of Regular and Aliijidal MotiollJ, readily prompting the doing of them, 
without comprehending that Ali and ReaJoll by which they are directed.71 
Cudworth accepts that man is in many areas of life determined by mundane internal 
and external factors. Externally man can be pushed this way or that, by the hetero-
kinetic power of external forces. Internally man can be drawn to apples over 
oranges simply through the epoloustic determination of habit. Neither of these 
actions should, Cudworth argues, be judged in ethical terms because the 
determination of such actions occurs in a sub-ethical level of natural 
determination.72 In essence Cudworth's use of hetero-kinetic and epoloustic 
determination can be equated to his understanding of Hobbist and Calvinist 
determination respectively. Cudworth believes that neither can effectively account 
for ethical actions of man. This could only come through the self-determined 
power, which Cudworth terms mttexiouJ. 
Cudworth places the moral faculty of autokinsey above the two ethically 
neutral faculties of epoloustic and hetero-kinetic power. For Cudworth autokinsey is 
the characteristic power in human will that brings man up from the level of being 
mere beast. Like the previous human faculties outlined by Cudworth, autokinsey 
can only be viewed as logical if it is understood to be intimately involved with the 
creation in which it exists. In making this assertion Cudworth rejects the view that 
71 TISU, p.157. 
72 """s stated an epoloustic judgment is the morally neutral judgement of habit. If, however, using the 
example stated above, one of the fruits chosen by habit, for instance the oranges, were produced in 
morally reprehensible circumstance (perhaps in apartheid South Africa) then the choice would be an 
ethical rather than habitual, and therefore one on which man could be judged. This is because the 
ethical decision which judges the fmits on tileir Ofigin and production is an intellectual decision 
which, within Cudworili's schema, resides above ilie habitual desire fOf an apple or orange. 
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freewill can be explained by the indifference of the will to the world around it, a 
position found in the moral asceticism suggested by some Stoic ethical philosophy. 
The problem of indifference is, for Cudworth, of more immediate relevance in 
refuting the theory of freewill as indifference in Scholastic and Cartesian thought.73 
Cudworth goes to great lengths to undermine this theory. The central problem with 
indifference is, for Cudworth, that such a theory, by claiming to be indifferent to the 
world within which it resides, can never judge the moral truths that exist implicidy 
within that world. Indifference, as a moral theory, assumes that the starting principle 
of the world was a blind will, without the use of reason. Such a dleory completely 
contradicts the central assertion of Cudworth's moral philosophy, that moral 
judgments can be known because of man's implicit relationship with the intellect of 
dle divine, through reason. This can never be the case, Cudworth argues, if the 
starting point is the indifferent mind as it denies that there is an active, self-guiding 
. th ul 74 power meso . 
. The terminology of this power as autokinsey is drawn from Plato .. 
Cudworth's understanding and use of it, however, owes much to Plotinus. 
Cudworth argues that ot/texiot/J power has three defming characteristics: it is an 
internal power, it is active, and it is self-conscious.75 The otitexiotlJ power of man is 
therefore, by its form, related to the Trinitarian form of the divine. Its source is in 
the incorporeal divine principle which created the world, it was driven by the 
understanding power of the LogoJ and defmed by the active principle of the Spirit. 
The principle of reason which, Cudworth asserts in the TISU, implicidy tells man of 
73 For freewill as indifference in Scholastic thought, in particular Ockham, see Copleston, Histol)' ~l 
Pbi/osop/!)', III:101-3. For freewill as indifference in Descartes see, Descartes, Works, 1:174-9, 234-6; 
Cottingham, Descat1es Didiollal)', pp.86-88; Copleston, History ~lPbi/osop/!)', IY:139-42. 
7-1 FlVI.4979, fols.6, 33. 
75 Ibid., fo1.26; FA1.4980, fols 47, 51. 
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the existence and form of God is, in the manuscripts, shown to have an essentially 
ethical form. The active rational faculty that teaches man of the divine is also the 
means by which man is drawn to and eventually judged by God. This self-
determining, self-moving power in man Cudworth equates with the hegemollic power 
of Stoicism. For Cudworth, however, rather than being the material def111ing 
principles of Stoicism, hegemollic powers are the inner, incorporeal powers peculiar to 
the soul of man. In Ennead 6.8. Plot1nUS stresses that it is precisely because this 
power is immaterial and internal that it could allow man to move towards the 
divine. The exclusive power that alltexiolls, or hegemoni(~ power has in the soul is what 
draws man to God. This power is, however, not an end in itself. It is only a virtuous 
power if it seeks and participates with the intellect of God. As Cudworth argues in 
FM.4980: 
for Power is not Power without respect to Good freewill or self-power is 
nothing but a self-promoting Power to Good or Self-professing Power in i 
Same A free-willed Being is such a thing as hath a Power to adde something 
to its own Perfection.76 
Cudworth attributes this higher principle in the soul of man to the grace of 
God, showing clear afftnities with Whichcote's assertion, outlined in Chapter Three, 
that reda ratio was dle working of grace. Cudworth argues that the grace of God, the 
intellectual principles of the Logos in man, 'excites the free principle' in man. 
Freewill, which is created by the action of this divine principle, is a form of divine 
grace. The active principle of the divine, which is such a central part of Cudworth's 
7(, FiVI.4980, fo1.30. 
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Trinitarian doctrine of God, is found, as the grace of God, in the self-moving power 
which defines Cudwordl's conception of human agency.77 Cudworth, by placing 
divine grace next to the principle of freely willed action, is able to argue for freewill 
in his providential system as the means by which men are equitably judged by the 
distributive justice of God. As Cudworth stated in FM.4980: 
Besides all weh we Xtians believe yl though God be not passionate & passive 
in himself yl after some ages of the world pas.t he humanized his nature in 
our Bl. Saviour Xt & So made it passive & passionate & moveable in him 
who was in all things like unto us & hath a Sympathy & fellow feeling wth 
our humane difficulties & inftrmities ... W lh us so }/ this moveable 
Providence may well be exercised by him imploying his Angells as Emisaries 
& Ministering Spirits every where & coming at last himself visibly to judge 
the world & render to every man according to his works. 78 
At all times Cudworth reminds his readers that this self-determining power in the 
soul of man is not an end in itself but only the means by which the 'liberty,' which is 
only found in the divine, can be found. Therefore despite its virtuous benefits, 
alltexiotls power is by definition fallible. It is through this principle that Cudworth 
deals with the problem of evil. 
Cudworth believes the systems of divine determinism, such as Stoicism and 
Calvinism, fail because they cannot explain the source of evil except as a 
consequence of the will of God. This is anathema to Cudworth. This being said, 
77 FldA981 , fo1.79; FMA979, fo1.224. 
78 FM.4980, fo1.218. 
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Cudworth, as a Christian philosopher, cannot discount or ignore the problem of 
evil. It is through his dleories of ethical responsibility that he believes he is able to 
explain it. He equates the inner, self-determining power of man's soul with the grace 
and understanding of the divine. Although man is drawn to the divine, this remains 
a free choice; man can, if he so wills, reject dle higher principle of his intellect and 
follow the baser principles of the body. It is in this rejection that Cudworth explains 
the principle of evil in the world. Following the interpretation of evil in Plotinus, 
Cudworth believes that evil is not a positive entity, but rather created by man's 
rejection, or privation, of the goodness implicit in God. As Plotinus argues in 
Ellllead 3.2: 
The cause of the wrongs men do to one another might be their effort 
towards the Good; when they fail through their impotence to attain it, they 
turn against other men. But the wrongdoers pay the penalty, being 
corrupted in their souls by their works of wickedness, and are set in a lower 
place; for nodling can ever escape that which is ordained in the law of the 
All.79 
Evil and wrongdoing therefore exist when man's will turns from the higher 
principles of justice and goodness to dle capricious will of the lower self. When this 
occurs man, by rejecting the higher principles of understanding, implicidy rejects dle 
providential power of God, the intellect of God.80 Cudworth's argument here 
follows that of Plotinus in ENl1ead 3.2. where he argues: 
79 Elllleads, 3.2.4. 
80 Elllleads, 3.3.7. 
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Therefore one must 'escape' to the upper world, that we may not sink to the 
level of sense-perception by pursuing the images of sense, or to the level of 
the growth-principle by following the urge for generation and the 
'gluttonous love of good and eating,' but may rise to the intelligible and 
intellect and God. Those, then, who guarded the man in them, become men 
again. Those who lived by sense alone become animals. 81 
Cudworth's self-determining power follows the Plotinian ethical structure of the 
'ethics of escape' discussed in Chapter One. This is, however, not an ascetic 
rejection of the material world, rather it is an intellectual refusal to be controlled and 
defined by the material world alone. 
Cudworth's defence of the rational powers and freedom of man carries with 
it the implicit possibility that man can willingly turn away from God. Consequently 
Cudworth argues that evil, rather than being a positive entity, is a by-product of 
freewill.S2 Evil occurs, Cudworth believes, not because the material world is, by 
defmition, evil, or that God has positively commanded certain things to be evil. 
Rather man, by negating the implicit goods available to him through a rational 
participation with the divine, freely commits himself to the bondage and misery of 
evil. The potentiality and corruptibility which is implicit in man's 'amphibious' 
existence is why, Cudworth argues, all men will, in the end, be judged by the actions 
and choices of their freely-willed actions. The potential corrupting nature of freewill 
is, therefore, in Cudworth's thought, a necessary by-product of a system in which 
81 EII/leads, 3.4.2. 
82 F.MA979, fo1.33; Flllf.4980, fo1.127; FMA981, fo1.28. 
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man could be at once defmed by the providential plan of the divine and at the same 
time accountable for his actions. Despite the cormptibility of man Cudworth freely 
admits that man is able to turn, by his freewill, from evil to the virtues and liberty 
only found in the divine. Freewill is, for Cudworth, the means by which he could 
explain the equitable judgment of man in the compass of the providential plan of 
the divine. As he argues in FM.4980: 
And now we may make up an intire & perfect defmition of this faculty of 
freewill i it is a power over ourselves & our own Actions belonging to 
Beings reduplicated upon ymselves wch is designed by God & Nature for 
Good )/ they may be able to promote ymselves to Good & preselve 
ymselves in y" same but being an imperfect and self-determinable power is 
by accident unavoidably lyable to this Inconvenience i by y" abuse of it we 
may be y" causes of our own Evill & Degeneration & therefore guilty of Sin 
So i according to yO different use or abuse of this power it qualifies men 
either for Comondation or Blame, Rewards or Punishment.83 
Cudworth's understanding of man's ability to recognise moral norms, and how man 
should act on this knowledge, are the subject of the next chapter of this thesis. 
83 FMA980, fols.91-2. 
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Chapter VI - Cudworth's political philosophy: The Ethical 
Community 
VI.l. Introduction 
In this chapter I will examine the way in which for Cudworth the metaphysical and 
ethical principles outlined in dle previous chapters develop into a concrete political 
system. Cudworth's conception of political society, or ethical community as I 
describe it, cannot be found in anyone particular work. Radler it is suggested and 
alluded to through all Cudworth's writings. His conception of ethical community 
exists as the clearest and most concrete example which he uses to explain his moral 
and ethical philosophy. As argued in the previous chapter, his ethical principles, 
particularly his theory of human agency, can only be fully understood as 
developments of his Trinitarian theological position. Likewise, I will argue, 
Cudworth's concrete ethical and political arguments should not be viewed in 
isolation, but are the practical realisation of the ethical and metaphysical principles 
outlined in previous chapters. 
This chapter will begin with a discussion on how Cudworth develops his 
idea of individual moral responsibility through this writings on ethical epistemology. 
This will allow us to see the way in which his abstract principles of human agency, 
found in his manuscripts, develop into ethical and political principles. This 
discussion will necessarily concentrate on his posthumously published Treatise 
COllcernillg Eternal and Immutable j\,1oraliry. Using the practical principles outlined in 
this work it will then be possible to examine in greater detail the way in which he 
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defmes his ethical epistemology as the theoretical groundwork from which the 
responsibility of the moral actor and obligation within the political community 
develops. What we fmd in Cudworth's thought is a subde and complex 
understanding of the nature and form of the political community which grows 
naturally out of his Trinitarian conception of reality. Through an examination of 
arguments in Cudworth's published and unpublished works I shall argue that he 
develops a vision of political society which relies on the near democratic 
participation of its morally self-determined members. This vision of political society, 
I will argue, develops as a direct consequence of Cudworth's Trinitarian theology. 
He therefore develops a vision of the political realm from within his theological 
worldview. To show how he achieves this I will show, flrsdy, how Cudworth 
develops and expresses his theoq of the ethical community as the deflning form of 
the political realm. Secondly, I will show the way in which his understanding of the 
political can help us understand his own ambiguous place within the political 
upheavals of the seventeenth centuq. I will argue that not only is Cudworth's 
philosophy consistent widl his own actions and behaviour, but also dlat these 
theories show him enunciating some of the central principles of the emerging 
features of liberal individualism. 
VI.2. Cudworth's ethical epistemology: The Eternal and Immutable Morality 
Ralph Cudworth's A Treatise Concernillg Etemal and ImJJJutable Morality was flrst 
published in 1731 in an edition prepared by Edward Chandler, Bishop of Lichfleld 
and later Durham. As a work it holds a peculiar place in the histoq of philosophy. 
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Chandler's edition was prompted by the growth in debates on ethical rationalism in 
the eighteenth centUly. Consequently the Ell)!! has often been viewed and 
interpreted out of its original context within these eighteenth century debates; the 
placing of selections from the ElM in L.A. Selby-Bigge's famous collection of The 
British lVIoraiists being a case in point. l Because of the peculiarity of the publication 
of the ElJ\![, of all Cudworth's works, it has been the most open to what one might 
generally call an a-historical inte1pretation. This problem has been dealt with in 
more detail in the Chapter One. It is, however, instructive to highlight at this point 
one particular case of this a-historical interpretation; the neo-Kantian reading of 
Cudworth. As in Cudworth's other writings, the central topic of discussion in the 
EDW is the active faculty of reason. As was shown in the last chapter, Cudworth 
always inte1prets reason as an active principle and, therefore, as implicitly ethical in 
character. However, as a consequence of this, various interpreters of Cudworth 
have argued that this principle anticipates something of Kant's principle of 'practical 
reason.' Consequently many discussions of Cudworth's ethical writings describe his 
theories by the misleading use of Kantian ethical distinctions and language. 
Frederick Beiser argues that Cudworth's epistemological thought was implicitly 
ethical, leading to reason being justified by Cudworth for its 'practical virtues.'z 
Stephen Darwall goes further by arguing that Cudwortll's thought used the 
'internalism of practical reason,' to reject the empirical thought of Hobbes and 
Cumberland, consequently, '[flor Cudworth as for Kant, ethics is possible only if 
pure reason can be practical.,3 These claims carry with them some truth but, as I 
1 Elliff, p.xiv. L.A. Selby-Bigge, ed., The British kforalists, beillg selectiolls from ll7ritersprimipalfy of the 
eigbtemtb cmtlll)', (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1897), pp.813-843. 
2 Beiser, S OlJereigllt)', p.174. 
3 DanvaU, Bristish j\1oralists, pp.l09, 325. 
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have argued in the fIrst chapter, to interpret Cudworth through tllls Kantian filter 
clouds our ability to understand Cudworth's thought on its own terms. It is true to 
say that reason was an implicitly active and practical principle for Cudwortll. 
However, to judge trus on Kantian terms strips Cudworth's claims of their Platonic 
and theological basis. Cudworth views reason as the principle in man that ties man 
to the divine, consequently its active, etlllcal component exists because it is drawn 
from the understanding principle in the divine. The source of tllls active 
understanding principle is for Cudworth not in conttast to a principle of 'pure 
reason' but an active, Logocentric, reflection of the founding intellectual principle of 
the divine. The practical, etlllcal element in Cudworth's principle of reason is 
derived directly from the Trinitarianism implicit in rus thought. Trus Logocentric 
understanding of reason is, therefore, tlle principle wruch not only tells man about 
reality, but also the principle that activates and animates that reality. To strip 
Cudworth's thought of its Trinitarian roots, as the above interpretations have done, 
draws Cudworth into the world of theoretical ethical distinctions wruch he would 
not have recognised. Placing the ELM within the broader structure of Cudwortll's 
thought I will be able to show more clearly tlle theological dimension and 
implications of rus arguments. In particular the EIA;J, like all rus other works, exists 
within a religious system with the Christian Platonic Trinity at the heart. Once tllls 
context has been re-established, Cudworth's active principle of reason can be fully 
understood as the means by wruch man comes to the full recognition of the justice 
of tlle divine intellect in the world. What we encounter in the ELM is a description 
of how men can come to know the absolute norms of divine justice in the world. 
The etlllcal and political arguments wruch Cudworth asserts in the ElM, and in rus 
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other writings, grow directly out of Cudworth's belief that the Trinity, correctly 
understood, is tlle defining principle of all creation.4 
Although the original version of the EI1I1 was almost certainly circulated in 
manuscript it is not known whether Cudworth ever intended to publish the work.s 
From what we know of Cudworth's stated intentions we can, however, tentatively 
place the work in tlle broader context of his published and unpublished works. In 
terms of subject area tlle EIl\1 can be related to Cudworth's planned second volume 
of his Inte/ledual Sjlstem, arguing, as it does, against the view of God as not 'meer 
Arbitrary Will Omnipotent, Decreeing, Doing, alld Necessitating all Actiolls, Evil as 
well as Good, but Essentially Moral, Good alld Just.,6 It may even have been based on 
the initial ideas which Cudworth described as his 'Metaphysical Ethics' in letters to 
John Worthington in the 1660s.7 The title, A Treatise COl1cemillg Etemal alld 11l11l1utable 
jl1oraliry, even relates the work back to Cudworth's M.A. disputations in 1639.8 It is, 
however, impossible to verify exactly when, and for what purpose, the ELM was 
written as the original manuscript is now lost. What can be said for certain is that 
the ELM is not a work on ethics as one might naturally understand it. It is, if 
anything, an epistemological work attempting to explain the means by which things 
can be known with certainty, the basis on which the specifics of the ethics could 
then develop. In this sense it is a prolegomenoll to an ethical work which Cudworth 
failed to complete. That being said, certain ethical and political arguments are 
discussed in the ELM. Also various ethical and political arguments in Cudworth's 
~ TISU, p.690. 
S EDVI, p.xiv. 
6 Ibid., p.v. 
7 Worthington, DiaD', 1:157. 
8 'Memoirs,' p.27. 
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manuscripts, particularly his discussion of political oaths, rely upon assumptions and 
arguments put f01ward in the EINI. 
In the EIM~ Cudworth employs the same apologetic technique he uses in the 
TISU to show not only that those theories which he rejects fail on their own terms 
but also the means by which they fail prove his theory to be correct. So close is that 
theory to that of the TISU that John Passmore argues that the EINI can effectively 
be understood as a set of footnotes to the TISU. 9 This claim is hue to an extent. But 
there are some arguments within the EDVI, in particular political arguments, which 
go beyond the careful line taken in the published TISU. It could be argued that 
Cudworth is willing to go further in these arguments in the EIM because it was a 
work that he never published himself. This being said, there are, in terms of style 
and argument many close affmities between the EIM and the TISU. Cudworth 
utilises many of the same arguments for certainty of ethical knowledge as he earlier 
used to prove the existence and nature of God in the TISU. He again utilises the 
tactic of justifying his position by arguing that the logical impossibility of the ideas 
of those thinkers he attacks leaves his explanation as the only possible alternative. 
These attacks mirror the TISU again by using ancient philosophical figures as thinly 
veiled versions of contemporary dUnkers; most obviously, in the ElM, widl 
Protagoras taking the place of EpiculUs as the philosophical forbear of Thomas 
Hobbes. 
Behind these attacks, as in all Cudworth's thought, lies an implicit 
confirmation of his Trinitarianism. At one point Cudworth gives a clear indication 
of this Trinitarianism through a diagrammatic description of the active form of the 
divine. The intellect and goodness of God is, Cudworth argues, the central point of 
9 Passmore, Ralpb C"dworth, p.29. 
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an infmitely expanding circle. The radii extending from this central point are the 
understanding and wisdom of God. The outer edge of this ever extending circle is 
the will and action of God. Therefore the external workings of God in the world are 
related directly to tl1e infinite intellect and goodness of God by means of the 
wisdom and understanding of God. This tri-partite organisation shows the manner 
in which Cudworth uses his Trinitarian metaphysic to explain and deflne the divine 
principle in the world.lO In philosophical terms the EI1\1 utilises the same theological 
principles outlined at greater length by Cudworth in the TISU. Beyond these 
philosophical sinillarities with the TISU, we also flnd in the EI1\1 explicit ethical and 
political claims which do not appear in the TISU. These claims are always made to 
explain and verify tl1e Trinitarian metaphysical system from within which all of 
Cudworth's thought belongs exists. Before these ethical claims are examined it is 
necessary to show how Cudworth, in the EI1\1, claims that the moral and etlllcal 
certainty of the eternal and in1mutable truths of the universe can be found. 
Cudwortl1 argues all things in creation have their source in the intellect of 
the divine. Ethical norms, therefore, exist within an epistemological structure which 
allows man to know various aspects of creation with certainty. Accordingly 
Cudworth begins his discussion of etlllcs with a general discussion of epistemology 
as he believes that the key to an effective etlllcal community is the collective 
certainty in, and acceptance of, the eternal and inmmtable principles of justice that 
underpin all creation. Etlucal truths exist, for Cudworth, not in simple abstract 
legalistic forms; instead they are discernable in and through man's engagement with 
the created world. As a consequence of tlus he begins his discussion on 
epistemology with an analysis of exactly how it is that man engages with the created 
10 EIJ.\!I, p.27. 
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world. This engagement, he believes, comes from an understanding and 
appreciation of how man intelprets sense data. Cudworth does not believe that 
knowledge can be found through sensoq perception alone. It is impossible, he 
argues, to see knowledge as being drawn from sense alone as knowledge and 
sensation are, by definition, opposing entities. Where knowledge is the inward 
action of the mind, sensation is the external activity of the body. As an external 
activity sense could only come about by the culmination of various combinations of 
local motion. Sense is, in Cudworth's words, the 'dull, confused, and stupid 
perception obtruded on the soul from withoUt.'ll As merely the sum of parts sense 
cannot be the sole source of knowledge because sense, by implication, lacks the 
discerning perceptive power required to create knowledge. Sense, as the 
understanding of local motion, by implication has no self-awareness. It cannot give 
any more understanding than its immediate locality.12 Sense, as 'a drowsy and 
somnolent perception,' by defInition lacks any of the perspective needed to create 
true knowledge.13 In the Ell.1 Cudworth argues that knowledge cannot be 
understood as the projection of external ideas on to the mind of man, as he states 
fIrmly at the beginning of the ED.H, 'the soul is not a mere tabula raJa.,14 Knowledge 
of the created world, in Cudworth's view, has to use a perspective and level of 
intelpretation which is impossible to fmd in sense perception alone. 
In the EIM Cudworth focuses his attack on the implicit fallibility of sense-
perception in Hobbes. Cudworth argues that the logical absurdities implied by 
Hobbes' thought not only make Hobbist arguments untenable, but also make his 
11 Ibid., p.53. 
12 Ibid., p.91. 
13 Ibid., p.56. 
14 Ibid., p.7. 
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own the only possible explanation. As in TISU, Cudworth, in the EIM, relates 
Hobbes' use of sense perception to ancient philosophical systems. In the ElAt 
Hobbes is compared to Protagoras. Cudworth argues that Protagoras starts from 
the assumption that all things in the world are naturally in continual random 
motion. The consequence of this is that all things in the world are relative to each 
other. Therefore, he argues, Protagoras believes he can argue that there is nothing 
constant or absolute in the world. IS In tlus claim Cudworth identifies an implicit 
paradox. By claiming tllat all things are relative, he argues that Protagoras, and 
consequently Hobbes, is claiming that nothing is absolute in the world except for 
the claim, made with absolute certitude by Protagoras, that all things are relative.16 If 
all things are known by sense perception alone, Cudworth argues, it is impossible to 
make tlus claim. Therefore he argues tllat even in those who seek to base all things 
on sense perception implicitly rely on a higher level of interpretation to make their 
theories work. By identifying paradox, Cudworth argues that Protagoras and 
Hobbes implicitly accept the supremacy of reason over sense.17 
The implicit paradox in Hobbist thought allows Cudworth to reassert a 
central prenUse of his philosophy, that intellectual activity is superior to and, by the 
law of the non-inferiority of causes, logically prior to the material world. This claim 
implies a dualism in Cudworth's thought that we have already encountered in his 
proof of the existence of God and his arguments for human agency. John Passmore 
has argued that Descartes is the source of this dualism in Cudworth's thought, going 
to far as to argue that Descartes can be found in every 'nook and cranny' of 
15 Ibid., ppA, 30. 
16 Ibid., p.65. 
17 Ibid., ppA7-8. 
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Cudworth's writing. IS This claim, however, discounts too hastily Cudworth's 
Christian-Platonic heritage. The distinction between the higher and lower principles 
is not one original to the thought of Descartes. A form of dualism is, in fact, 
implicit in most western theistic thought, of which Descartes is merely a part. An 
examination of Cudworth's dualism shows not only the importance of Plotinian 
distinctions in Cudworth's dl0Ught, but also the distance that exists between 
Cudworth's dlOught and that of Descartes. 
Cartesian dualism stresses the absolute distinction between the mind and the 
body.19 In contrast, Cudwordl'S dualism is based on the distinction between the 
higher and lower principles in the mind.20 As Cudworth argues in the ElM: 
There are two kinds of perceptive powers in the soul, one below anodler: 
the first is that which belongs to the inferior part of the soul, whereby it 
sympathizes with the body ... The second perceptive power is that of the 
soul itself, or dlat superior, interior noetical part of it which is free from all 
. h "I passlOn or sympat y.-
Cudworth's dualism places man in a broader position between animal sense and dle 
perfection of the divine. Ethical decisions in his dlOught follow the view, which we 
encountered in his writings on freewill, that man can be drawn in either direction 
towards the higher or lower principles in the created world. Cudworth's dualism, 
18 Passmore, Ralpb ClldlYOl1b, p.ll. For an account of Cudworth's use of and reaction to Cartesian 
philosophy also see Saveson, 'Differing Reactions to Descartes,' pp.560-67; Danton B.Sailor, 
'Cudworth and Descartes,' in Tbe JOlll1lal ~r tbe Histo!]' ~lIdeas, 23 (1962), pp.133-40; Baldi, 'Cudworth 
versus Descartes'; Hutton, 'Ralph Cudworth: God, }\Iind, and Nature.' 
19 Descartes, 1f70rks, 1:185-199, 223; Cottingham, DeJtw1es Didiolla!]', pp.53-4. 
20 Ell\1, p.54; Passmore, Ralpb C"dlYOI1b, pp.56-7; Ellneads 3.3.4. 
21 Eli}!, p.l13. 
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therefore, should be judged in the Neoplatonic framework within which he himself 
places it. In this sense his dualism owes much to his idea of man existing within a 
created realm, which is not defined by polar opposites but is part of the graduated 
scale or ladder of being which we have already encountered. 
One of the consequences of this scale of being in Cudworth's thought is 
that he is more responsive to the influences of sense-perception than he would be, 
were he purely Cartesian. He is hostile to thinkers who claim that sense perception 
can act as an end in itself. However, when understood in conjunction with reason, 
He believes that sense can be used to lead man towards epistemological certitude. 
Because of the physical nature of man the soul and body 'mutually suffer from each 
other.,22 The assertion that sensations could affect the workings of the mind 
distances Cudworth, by his own admission, from the thought of many Platonists.23 
He argues that the soul does not act indifferently from the body, but acts in natural 
sympathy with the body. To make this point Cudworth argues that there are 
effectively three different forms of knowledge that man can come to. The ftrst is 
passion, the second internal sense, and the third external sense.24 Of these three the 
ftrst, passion, can be disregarded as a limited animalistic emotion. The remaining 
two show something of the complex relationship that Cudworth believed there to 
exist between the body and the soul. Internal sense, or what Cudworth also terms 
'pure cognition,' is the form of pure understanding created solely by the working of 
the mind. External sense, or 'sensitive cognition,' involves the mixed labour of the 
mind and body. Because the mind is, to use the term from the TISU, 'fuddled,25 
22 Ibid., p.52. 
23 Ibid., p.51. 
24 Ibid., p.53. 
25 TISU, p.155(2). 
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with the body it can, in certain circumstances, be prompted and drawn to 
conclusions by external stimuli.26 The source and knowledge of these judgements, 
are, for Cudworth, the eternal and immutable truths which have their source in the 
divine. The ability to gain access to these truths through the appreciation of 
mundane knowledge is merely another means by which the existence of these 
eternal and immutable truths can be proved. 
In the cases of pure and sensitive cognition the deftning principle is the 
intellect of man. The intellect acts as a determining principle in verifying 
information fed to it to determine the truth or othelwise of a particular claim. The 
means of veriftcation is the comparison of received data to, what Cudworth terms, 
'inward characters written within itself.>27 Although the impetus for the creation of 
knowledge can come from external factors, the appreciation of knowledge is always 
an internal action, '[fJor knowledge is not a knock or truust from without, but 
consisteth in the awakening and exciting of the inward active powers of the mind.'28 
This interplay between the mind and the external world means that Cudworth is 
able to reject Hobbist and Cartesian claims once again. The necessity of the intellect 
in the creation of knowledge allows Cudworth to dismiss Hobbist materialism, 
making dle man superior to a brutish animal who is more than merely the sum of 
his external sensations.29 Secondly the symbiotic relationship between the intellect 
and the body means that Cudworth is able to reject Descartes by arguing that it is 
possible to account for man as more than a mechanism. 30 
26 ElM, p.52. 
27 Ibid., p.60. 
28 Ibid., p.60. 
29 Ibid., p.98. 
30 Ibid., p.SS. 
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Cudwordl's concentration on ilie internal power of ilie intellect over 
sensory perception in man means dlat in ilie ELM we encounter much ilie same 
reflexive language that we found in Cudworili's freewill manuscripts. At one point 
Cudworili describes knowledge as not '''ilie perception of things abroad without ilie 
mind", but ilie mind comprehending itself.,31 On dlls point Cudworili's Platonism 
comes most clearly to ilie surface. Not only quoting Plotinus, Cudworili also cites 
Boethius on dlls point, commenting dlat: 
knowledge is not a passion from anything wiiliout ilie mind, but an active 
exertion of ilie inward strengili, vigour, and power of ilie mind displaying 
itself from wiiliin, and the intelligible forms by which iliings are understood 
or known are not stamps or impressions passively printed upon ilie soul 
from wiiliout, but ideas vitally protended or actively exerted from wiiliin 
its elf. 32 
It is Cudworili's Platonism that allows him to make the direct comparison between 
dlls internal principle and the principle of ilie divine. The internal, discerning 
principle of ilie mind is, by defInition for him, incorporeal. In iliat way it is not only 
distinct from the corporeal reality of sensory perception, it is also direcdy related to 
dle infmite and incorporeal principle of the intellect of the divine. The 'innate 
cognoscitive power' of dle soul of man is drawn direcdy from, and judged by 
intellectual principles in ilie divine.33 Knowledge, ilierefore, is the innate power of 
drawing intelligible conceptions from wiiliin the mind. Knowledge of the nature of 
31 Ibid., p.135. 
32 Ibid., pp.73-4. 
33 Ibid., p.75. 
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an external object, for instance, does not come from the implicit nature of that 
object: whether it is itself hard or soft, square or triangular, etc. Rather lmowledge 
of its form comes from the mind's ability to recognise and compare the various 
combinations of local motion that make up that object to intellectual principles held 
within the mind. Only by this comparison to innate principles in the mind is man 
able to come to an effective knowledge of the object. 
Epistemological certainty may be attained, for Cudworth, through the 
comparison and verification of a sensory perception with an eternal truth. Because 
this eternal truth has its source in the intellect of the divine it is not a sutprise that 
he uses in this discussion in the EIlv[ many of the same arguments he uses in his 
proof of the existence of God in the TISU. The clearest example of this is the way 
in which he uses the lvlello in the EIM to account for the form and source of 
knowledge in the mind of man. Cudworth argues that in the material world a 
geometrically perfect triangle can never occut. Such is the imperfection of the 
created realm that a perfect triangle could not, he argues, be known by the 
experience of external phenomena. By contrast, Cudworth argues that d1e mind of 
man can conceive of a perfect three sided object the sum of whose three angles 
equal 180 degrees. The ability of man to recognise triangular objects in nature has a 
two-fold purpose for Cudworth. Firsdy it shows the way in which man's intellect, 
rather than his sense perception, teaches man that d1e object is a triangle, as the 
imperfections of nature could never create the perfect geometrical form found in 
d1e mind. Secondly he argues, following his proof of the existence of God, that the 
perfection of this intellectual form proves the source of this idea in the mind of 
God. Consequendy Cudworth argues that man's mind cannot create perfect 
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geometrical principles on its own. The only source for these perfect mathematical 
forms is, he argues, the intellect of the divine.34 
The explicit Platonism in Cudwordl's epistemology opens hinl to the 
accusation that his belief in the innate discerning power of the soul is a form of the 
Platonic theory of recollection. This accusation is particularly pertinent because of 
Cudworth's explicit use of the ]I/lello, the clearest defence of the Platonic theory of 
recollection. This theory of recollection, or allamllesiJ~ fttsdy places Cudworth in 
conflict with the arguments of empiricism, particularly after innatism had been so 
effectively attacked by John Locke in the second chapter of his Essqy cOllcerning 
HtllJlall Ullderstalldillg. Secondly, and perhaps more importandy for Cudwordl, 
suggestions dlat his epistemological theory is identical to that found in Plato leads to 
accusations dlat he implicidy holds to the un-Christian, but firmly Platonic, principle 
of the pre-existence of the soul. 
As we have already seen, in the 1\1ello Socrates argues that knowledge is not 
taught so much as drawn out from knowledge which pre-exists in the mind. The 
task of the teacher is not to give knowledge but to coax from the pupil the 
knowledge locked in the mind of the individual: 'knowledge will not come from 
teaching but from questions, he will recover it for hinlself.'35 The assumption of 
Plato's theory is that the soul of man possesses dlls knowledge because of its pre-
existence from its present, embodied form. In the 1\1el1o Socrates argues that the 
ability of the slave boy to grasp the basics of geometry merely through the 
questioning of the teacher is proof that dlls knowledge is held in the soul from 
eternity. In places Cudworth would seem to be in agreement with dlls idea of the 
3~ Ibid., p.60. 
35 Plato, liteI/O, 85d. 
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immortal and eternal nature of the soul from which knowledge is known and drawn. 
However, because of his Christian heritage, Cudworth rejects the belief that 
knowledge is drawn from the eternal life of dle soul because to accept this theory 
would mean accepting the pre-existence of the soul. Cudworth's colleague Henry 
More certainly accepted the pre-existence of the soul.36 However, for Cudworth this 
belief is unacceptable as the perpetual creation of souls is a sign of dle majesty of 
God. If souls pre-existed before they were joined with the body, Cudworth argues, 
God becomes merely a spectator after his initial work of creation is done. As 
Cudworth argues in the TISU: 
The effect of such a F[ypothesis as this [the pre-existence of souls], to make 
men think, that there is no odler God in the World but Blind and Dark 
Nature. God might also for odler good and wise Ends, unknown to us, 
reserve to himself the continual exercise of dns his creative power, in the 
successive Production of new Souls.37 
Cudworth therefore rejects the theory of recollection as it would have necessitated 
his acceptance of the pre-existence of dle soul.38 In Cudworth's thought knowledge 
36 Henry ]\Iore, 'The Prxexistency of the SOUL,' in Hem), lv[ore: Tbe Complete Poems, Alexander B. 
Grosart, ed. (Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1969), pp.119-128. See in particular p.119: 
For I would sing the Prxexistency 
Of humane souls, and live once ore again 
By recollection and quick memory 
1\,11 what is past since we first we all began. 
But all to shallow be wits to scan 
So deep a point and mind to dull to clear 
So dark a matter; but Though, 0 more then man! 
Areade though sacred Soul or Plotill deare 
Tell what we mortals are, tell what of old we were. 
37 TISU, p.44. 
38 Dominic Scott, 'Reason, Recollection and the Cambridge Platonists,' in Platollism alld tbe Ellglisb 
Imagillatioll, ed. Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton (CUP, Cambridge, 1994), pp.139-150, p.145. 
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is formed by the internal rational power of the mind participating in the intellect of 
the divine, rather than through the recollection of locked away, pre-existing, 
knowledge. The internal power of the mind for Cudworth is not a means of 
accepting the pre-existence of the soul, but rather a means of confirming dle 
relationship between man's rational, understanding faculty and the intellectual 
principle of the divine. The mind of man does not, in its internal working, recognise 
its pre-existence as Hemy More claims. Rather, Cudworth argues, the mind has a 
'diaphanous power' which can recognise the intellectual forms within the created 
world and recognises the source of these intellectual forms, in their purest and most 
perfect form, as coming from the founding intellectual principle in the divine.39 
Cudworth's epistemology recognises that knowledge exists for man when, in the 
words of John Passmore, it is known exclusively 'in our mind.' Cudworth makes 
knowledge reliant on the belief that the knower and known are identical. The 
problem of certainty is, therefore, solved for Cudworth when knowledge is 
comprehended and verified by the internal power of the mind.40 By recognising that 
these ideas exist in the intellect of the divine and also that the means of dus 
recognition is drawn from God, Cudworth again affIrms his belief in the Trinitarian 
form of the divine. 
VI.3. Moral Certainty 
As has already been stated, the ElM is itself not a work on ethics as such, but its 
dleories on epistemological certainty lay the building blocks for the creation of an 
39 ElkI, p.77; Scott, 'Reason,' p.147. 
·10 Passmore, Ralph C"d}/J0I1h, pp.31-2. 
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ethical realm of self-determined individuals. Cudworth argues that just as 
madlematical principles can be proved to exist in a perfect form in dle mind of 
men, so ethical principles can be known with the same mathematical certitude.41 
Such a claim naturally places Cudworth close to the claim of Benjamin Whichcote's 
aphorism that '[i]n ]v[orality, we are sure as in Mathematics.,42 As his use of the ]I/[eno 
shows, Cudworth believes that ethical principles can be known through the same 
process by which mathematical principles are known, by the intellect judging and 
understanding the form and nature of the created realm. Or, as Cudworth put it, 
'they are all as it were ectypal prints ... and derivative signatures ... from one 
archetypal intellect, that is essentially the ratioJ1es of all things and all verities.,43 
On dle most practical level Cudworth argues dlat dlls can be shown by 
refuting the nominalist belief dlat ethical norms can be determined by the mere 
naming of things. This position, which Cudworth believes has been revived by 
Hobbes, can be shown by Hobbes' claim, from De CO/pore, that '[t]here is nothing in 
the world ... universal by names.,44 Such a claim, Cudworth argues, fatally confuses 
dle means for the ends. Words are an important means to transport and transfer 
knowledge. They are, however, only the means of transport. Just as a physical, 
external stimulus could remind the mind of some innate principle, so words on the 
page will bring out of the mind of man the 'inward anticipations of learning.,45 
Without the intellect of man to inte1pret or understand these words they nlight as 
well be litde more than 'several scrawls of lines of ink drawn upon white paper.,46 
Ethical principles, therefore, cannot be created or rescinded with the stroke of dle 
~1 EIlI1, p.88. 
~2 \\lhichcote, AphorisJJJs, 298. 
~3 ElM, p.131. 
~~ Ibid., p.116. 
~5 Ibid., p.99. 
~6 Ibid., p.99. 
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pen; they are, like all forms of knowledge, based on eternal and immutable ethical 
principles created by the intellect of the divine. 
That is not to say that Cudworth believes that this way of knowing and 
understanding ethical principles is infallible. Errors can occur, but as with 
Cudworth's explanation of evil in his freewill manuscripts, this is not from any 
failing in the divine principles, but because of the fallibility of the mind of man.47 
However, if the mind is working correcdy it is, Cudworth argues, 'clearly and 
mathematically demonstrable from what we have already proved that there is some 
eternal mind.'48 Man, therefore, has to 'listen to one and the same original voice of 
the eternal voice which is never silent.,49 The source of this voice is the intellect of 
God understood in the form of Trinity. Cudworth does not believe that the 
perceptive power which man uses to know the divine is found direcdy in the 
intellect of the divine. Rather, as Cudworth argues in the ElM, it is found in the 
second person, the Logos, which Cudworth describes in the ED\;[ as 'the eternal and 
flrst-begotten offspring of the fIrst original goodness, the fountain of all thingS.'5Ll 
The Logocentric perceptive power which Cudworth oudines in the ED\;[ is identical 
to dle divine power of understanding which Cudworth argues for in the TISU. The 
Logos acts as the divinely ordained means by which man can come to know of the 
existence, form and nature of the divine in the world. Consequendy Cudworth's 
ethical writings can be read, like his theological writings, as conflrming his 
Trinitarianism. The source of ethical knowledge and the conflrmation of that 
knowledge is deflned by this Trinitarian conception of the divine. 
~7 Ibid., p.136; Passmore, Ralph ClIdlJl0l1h, p.22. 
48 EDH, p.130. 
~9 Ibid., p.132. 
50 Ibid., p.132. 
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As the principle of the divine intellect permeates every aspect of reality it 
necessarily becomes the means by which, according to Cudworth, an ethical 
community can be created. All ethical principles have their source in the intellect of 
the divine. Any man, as long as he attempts to understand these truths in the correct 
way, can come to the same conclusion as other members of the community. 
Cudworth argues that by asserting the unifying power of the divine intellect, his 
theory allows him to overcome the uncertainty created by Cartesian radical doubt 
and the arbitrariness created by Hobbist nominalism. So just as Cudworth argues 
that the written word can be understood because it stimulates intellectual principles 
in the reader, so it is possible for men to exist harmoniously in an ethical 
community because the members of that community 'partake of one and the same 
intellect. ,51 
Beyond these comments on the creation and maintenance of the ethical 
community there is very little in the EIM to suggest in what form Cudworth 
envisages this ethical community being constituted. However, in Cudworth's 
manuscripts there are some suggestions of the form that Cudworth believes the 
ethical community would take. It is clear from the ELVI and from the desire to allow 
for 'Distributive or Retributive Justice' that Cudworth makes in the TISU, that this 
ethical community would be made up from independent, self-determining and, 
eventually, independently judged moral actors.52 In this way Cudworth rejects the 
ethical legalism of contemporary Calvinism. Ethical legalism, like denials of freewill, 
implies, for Cudworth, tllat man could not be held personally responsible, or be 
individually judged, for his actions. 53 
51 Ibid., p.131. 
52 TISU, p.v. 
53 Beiser, S overeigllty, p.163. 
241 
Cudworth's attack on ethical legalism can also be shown by his 
concentration on goodness over duty in his ethical writings. Although duty and 
obedience are important, it is more important for Cudworth that obedience is given 
freely for the action to carry any form of ethical validity. 54 From tlus position we can 
begin to place many of Cudworth's early attacks on the dangers of 'self-love,' found 
most clearly in Ius First S ermOIl, in a broader ethical and political framework. Self-
love is such a problem for Cudworth precisely because he stresses the importance 
of the individual in IUs ethical theory. In a system such as Hobbes' the dangers of 
selfish egotism are, arguably, removed by the imposition of a strict, legalistic ethical 
code on all in civil society. However, Cudworth rejects this because such a system 
denies the importance of the individual in the ethical community. Cudworth, in this 
sense, makes a rod for his own back, asserting on the one hand the dangers implicit 
in the excesses of individualism, whilst hying to create an ethical system entirely 
based on the virtuous actions of individuals. There is, therefore, a constant danger 
in Cudworth's ethical thought of a descent into the hedonism of self-love. He 
appears to be aware of, and willing to risk, this danger. He is confident that the 
dangers of self-love can be defeated if the virtues and liberty which he believes can 
be found in the divine are asserted as the central aim of humanity. As he argues in 
his Fint Sermon: 
[h]appinesse is nothing but that inward sweet delight, that will arise from the 
Harmonious agreement between our wills and Gods will. There is nothing 
0+ Passmore, Ralph ClldJ}JOI1h, pp.51, 68. 
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contrary to God in the whole world, nothing that fights against him but Self 
will. 55 
This release from selfishness allows man to discover the liberty which man can only 
fmd in the love of God. Following the dictates of Christ as the principle of the 
divine intellect means that man 'will not be put us in a State of Bondage, but of 
Perfect Liberty.'56 
Cudworth's terminology here is interesting. Hobbes, for instance, makes no 
qualitative distinction between actions that are done by 'freedom' or those carried 
out through 'liberty.' Cudworth at times does, like Hobbes, use these terms 
interchangeably, discussing, for instance, both the 'freedom of the will' and the 
'liberty of the will.' However, Cudworth at times, particularly within his 
manuscripts, makes a qualitative distinction between the actions of 'freedom,' and 
the state of 'liberty.' In this sense, for him, all men possess freewill. This allows men 
to aspire to become, in the terms of the Secolld Sermoll, 'God's freeman.' Man's 
freewill is also a fallible faculty leading as it can to life as 'Sin's freeman.' The 
bondage which comes from the sinful life is a direct consequence of man's freedom, 
and consequently men are responsible for these sinful actions. 'Liberty,' by contrast, 
is used by Cudworth to describe both a faculty and a state. A state of 'liberty' in 
Cudworth's thought only occurs when man's virtuous action leads to pure 
communion witll the divine. Cudworth therefore makes a particular linguistic 
distinction between the 'freedom' and 'free powers' which man possesses and the 
'liberty' which he is attempting to achieve with those powers. For Cudworth all men 
55 First Scm/Oil, p.98. 
56 Ibid., p.126. 
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are free, but only those who follow the higher principles of the mind can achieve 
liberty. As Cudworth argues in his Treatise 011 Freewill, 'he who has liberty has 
conquered himself. ,57 
In Cudworth's writings this distinction comes out clearly where he contrasts 
bondage and liberty as the opposing choices of man's free actions. In his 
manuscripts Cudworth describes this choice in terms of the political conflict that 
exists in 'the little-commonwealth of man.' This interesting turn of phrase vety 
neatly describes Cudworth's ethical theory and his views on freewill. The 'little-
commonwealth of man' is used by him to describe the form of ethical adjudication 
which exists in all men. Key to this decision is the reflective aNtexiolls power in the 
soul. Cudworth describes this self-reflective faculty as the 'soul-endoubled upon 
itself.' He believes that this atltexiotls faculty in man is naturally fallible and open to 
error. But, as he argues in FMA980, 'in i little common-wealth of man's soul i 
naturall Understanding & certain Knowledge is i Law of Justice & Rule by weh it 
should be governed.,58 Cudworth argues that, despite the possibility of failure, it is 
only through a society governed by self-determined moral actors that man is able to 
achieve the happiness and liberty which is found in the divine God.59 
VIA. The Political Oath - the practical basis of the ethical community. 
Cudworth's vision of politics, like his ethical theoty discussed above, is reliant upon 
and is a natural progression from his overarching Trinitarian intellectual system. 
Despite the efforts of some seventeenth centuty politicians and political theorists, 
57 IFlf7, p.167. 
58 FM.4980, fo1.58. 
59 FldA979, fols.10, 20. 
244 
the political realm is not, Cudworth argues, divorced from the theological basis of 
reality. Radler, the political is simply anodler manifestation of the divinely informed 
nature of reality. This reality is, as we have seen Cudworth argue throughout his 
writings, found in its fullest and truest form in the Trinity. For man the fullest 
manifestation of this divine is found, he argues, in the correct use of the faculty of 
freewill. He believes that the existence of eternal and inmmtable ethical norms can 
be recognised by man because of dleir basis in the intellect of the triune God. The 
same recognition is available, Cudworth argues, when man moves from ethical 
concerns to more broadly political principles. As Cudworth states in the TISU: 
there are yet other PhaenoJJJe!la, no less Real, though not P/?yJi%gical, which 
AtheiJtJ can no way SallJe; as that of Natural JUJtice, and HoneJty, Duty, and 
Obligation; the true Foundation bodl of EthitkJ and PolitickJ; and 
the .. . Liber!)' ofWTill, properly so called.6C! 
Freewill, when used correcdy, lifts man from his baser emotions to the higher 
virtues of justice and equity, principles only found in dle liberty of the divine. TIllS is 
a common theme dlroUghout all Cudworth's writings. There is, however, a political 
necessity implicit in his thought. He believes that man can, as a self-determined 
moral actor, learn and know the correct, ethically virtuous path to take in life. 
However this life is, he argues, futile if it remains a private concern. The ethical life 
implies for him the discarding of personal concerns and private interest for the 
greater good of the wider community. In the preface to IllS Fint Sermoll Cudworth, 
perhaps a litde sycophantically, suggests that the Members of the House of 
60 TISU, p.690. 
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Commons if they considered the public good, would 'reflect so much lustre and 
honour and honour back upon yourselves.'61 We flnd the same argument in the 
TISU. In the concluding paragraph Cudworth calls for a society in which the good 
of the public always rises above the wants of the private individua1.62 It is in this 
political aspect in the mature writings of Cudworth, of civil society defmed and 
controlled by the dictates of divine justice, that we flnd the fullest expression of 
Cudworth's belief in living the Christian life through the creation of an ethical 
community. This political theme of the ethical community as the completion of the 
Christian life follows the principles that we fltst encounter in Cudworth's early 
. . 63 
Wtltillgs. 
Cudwordl's intentions in this endeavour are clear, but in his published 
works there is very litde to make one believe that these claims are litde more than 
the idle wishes of a cloistered academic. To fmd the true implications of Cudworth's 
political utterances we therefore have to delve below the surface of not only these 
sections of his published works, but also sections of his manuscripts, to flnd exacdy 
how Cudworth envisaged such an ethical community taking shape. The clearest 
indications of Cudworth's arguments on this front are through his discussions of 
the use of conscience and oaths in political matters. It is not a surprise to see 
Cudworth drawing on these examples in his writings. The codiflcation of matters of 
conscience in oaths was a recurring political tool throughout the seventeenth 
century. As David Martin Jones argues, 'the oath ... constituted a singular 
mechanism for attempting to secure an English tllliverJitaJ, a unifled and 
61 Cudworth, 'Preface,' p.39. 
62 TISU, p.898. 
63 Ibid., pp.697,896. 
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incorporated English body politic.'64 Oaths acted as political punctuation marks 
through the political upheavals of the century, with nine different oaths being put 
forward in Cudworth's lifetime, seven of which were put forward during the twenty 
years between the outbreak of the Civil War and the Restoration.65 Cudworth, as a 
prominent member of University community, would have been required to take 
many of these oaths. At the minimum he would have been required to take the 
'Solemn League and Covenant' to keep his fellowship during the Earl of 
Manchester's purge in 1645, and the oath of allegiance at the Restoration to keep his 
place as Master of Christ's. It is not clear whether Cudworth was required to take 
the oaths attached to the Clarendon Code but if he had, he would have had to 
openly deny his previously taken 'Solemn League and Covenant.'66 The use of these 
oaths as political instruments opens up two readings of Cudworth's attitude to the 
political. On the one hand, Cudworth's apparent willingness in acquiescing to the 
changing political climate would seem to conftrm the common view of Cudworth, 
and the other Cambridge Platonists, as politically quietist. However, viewed in 
conjunction with his writings on these issues, a much more subtle and politically 
astute image of Cudworth is presented to the reader. Cudwortll's use of the political 
oath, when understood in the context of his arguments for freewill and moral 
responsibility, shows how Cudworth believes it is possible to rise above the 
contemporary political wrangling that accompanied these oaths. Cudworth instead 
asserts the oath as a practical means by which the individual could show his ethical 
responsibility and moral goodness in the political society. 
6.\ David Martin Jones, COllscie/1ee alld Allegiallce ill S eventeel/th eel/til!]' Ellglalld: The Political sigllijil;allCf rif 
Oaths alld EllgageJlleJlts (University of Rochester Press, Rochester, NY. 1999), polS. 
65 Ibid., pp.11S, 272-81. 
66 The Clarendon Code explicitly called on the taker to reject the 'Solemn League and Covenant,' see 
Ibid., p.280. 
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The clearest means of examining Cudworth's writings on this area is by a 
comparison with Hobbes' writings on the same issue.67 Quentin Skinner argues that 
Hobbes' arguments for oaths and allegiance to political authority should be 
understood in dle context of the 'Engagement Crisis' which inlmediately followed 
the execution of the King in 1649. Following the regicide there was a pressing need 
to legitimise the new political regime in a form that would make it more than simply 
the usutper to the authority of the King. One of the clearest defences for the new 
regime came in John Milton's 1650 The Tell/Ire ifKillgs alld iVIagistrates. In this Milton, 
as chief propagandist to the Commonwealth, defends the regicide in terms of 
natural law. The King had been lawfully executed, Milton argues, because Charles I 
was acting as a tyrant. The regicide was therefore the re-assertion of the natural right 
of men to limit dle powers of government.68 Milton's argument would, however, 
never create obligation to the new regime from those who believed that the King 
ruled by divine right. From this impasse developed a new form of argument for 
allegiance, where political allegiance was based solely on the de facto power of the 
regime. Allegiance was drawn not from philosophical or theological principles, but 
67 I have, in this thesis, attempted at all times to defIne Cudworth's thought on his own terms, not, as 
John Passmore argues, simply as a negative reaction to Hobbes' thought [passmore, Ralph C"dlIJOrth, 
p.ll]. However, because the explicit political arguments within Cudworth's thought are so scant it is 
tempting to defIne Cudworth's political arguments simply by showing the manner in which he 
negates the explicidy political arguments of Hobbes. Jon Parkin argues that many seventeenth 
century political arguments can be defIned simply as reactions to Hobbes. Parkin argues that such 
was the importance of Hobbes to the political and moral problems of the day that to criticise 
Hobbes was to implicidy enter into the political debates of the time [parkin, S cieJIce, Religioll alld 
Politics, p.223]. I would argue that, with regards to Cudworth, the obverse of this claim is, in fact, 
correct. Cudworth is political not because of his criticisms of Hobbes, rather, Cudwordl's thought is 
by its vei)' nature politically minded. As a consequence, Cudworth is drawn into political debate with 
Hobbes not simply because he disagrees with Hobbes on theological or philosophical principles, but 
precisely because the positive political element within his thought will inevitably lead him into 
conflict with Hobbes. Therefore I am examining Cudworth's defence of political oaths widl 
reference to Hobbes, not because dley are deflned in reaction to Hobbes, but because Hobbes' 
argument creates for us the clearest political context within which we can understand the full 
implications of Cudworth's theoi)'. 
68 Skinner, Visiolls, III:288; John :Milton, Political 1f7 fitillgs, ed. Martin Dzelzainis, (CUP, Cambridge, 
1991), pp.9-10. 
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from the physical power of the regime to maintain and control the political order. 
The chief defenders of this de fado argument in England at the time were Anthony 
Ascham and Marchamont Nedham. Skinner argues that Hobbes, although at the 
time living in exile in France, was writing in the context of this debate. Although 
J.G.A.Pocock has argued that many of these de fado arguments drew on the Old 
Testament covenants of the power of dle elected Kings of Israel, Skinner argues 
that dle strength of the de fado argument was its 'secular' nature.69 Hobbes argues, 
primarily in Leviathall published in England in 1651, that political obligation is 
defIned entirely by dle human emotion of fear which initially created political 
society. Obligation is defmed by man's overriding human emotion of the fear of not 
being dragged back into the chaos of the state of nature. Oaths are therefore, 
Hobbes argues, not of central importance because the form of words in an oath 
cannot bind a man more surely to civil society than the bond already created by 
fear.70 Although Skinner does not conclusively prove Hobbes' relationship to the 
Engagement crisis, we can recognise the way in which Hobbes' arguments would 
have been popular to those politicians wishing to legitimise a civil society created by 
dle fall of an axe.71 
69 J .G.A.Pocock, The Po/itim/ 1f7orkJ qjJalJleJ Hanillgtoll (CUP, Cambridge, 1977), p.36; Skinner, 
ViJiollS, III:303. This divergence in interpretation of the defado arguments used in the Engagement 
crisis highlights, I believe, the subde differences between the medlOdologies of Pocock and Skinner. 
As I have extensively argued in Chapter One, both Pocock and Skinner rely upon a medlOdology 
which analyses the linguistic context within which a work was written. However, I also argue that 
Pocock comes to this methodology dlrough a reflection on historical practice. Skinner asserts the 
philosophical premises of his methodology first and comes to historical practise second. Skinner, 
therefore, is much more systematic in the use of his language based interpretation than Pocock. It is 
not a surprise, I would argue, to see Skinner intetpret this debate in secular terms because such a 
strict methodological premise, when applied stricdy, fails, as I have argues in Chapter One, to 
appreciate the breadth and depth of theological belief in the seventeenth century. Because Pocock is 
not so restricted by a pre-existent method, he is, in contrast, willing to see more of the historical and, 
in this case, theological nuances of the de fado arguments of the Engagement crisis. 
70 Leviathall, pp.198, 201. 
71 Skinner, ViJiollJ, III:304. 
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From Cudworth's perspective there are two major failings of Hobbes' 
theory. Firstly, it diminishes the political power of the individual. Hobbes' theory 
does demand the twin obligations of the subject's obedience to the magistrate and 
the obligation of the magistrate to protect the individual. However, the individual's 
obligation is not created in the ethical realm of intellectual activity, but rather by the 
base human reaction of fear. Secondly, a system that bases obligation solely on the 
de facto power of the political authority undermines the ability to create a stable 
political community. This is because Cudworth believes that such a society would 
not be based on rationally verifiable principles of justice, but on who possess the 
largest sword.72 At the heart of Cudworth's criticisms is his intellectualist belief that 
justice cannot be created by arbitrary power.73 Political society can, therefore, never 
be asserted simply by the will of the sovereign but, as with all parts of creation, it 
must be understood as a manifestation of the intellect of the divine. Consequently 
Cudworth's political argument is always reliant on what he sees as the correct 
understanding of the principles that underpin political society. This argument comes 
out most clearly in Cudworth's manuscript FM.4980: 
they might have agreemts & Lawes & a leviathan Commonwealth, but yn 
there could be no other obligation upon any to keep those lawes but only 
from there own private Utility of wch ymsleves were Judges, no obligation 
truly morall in yt wch would be called Injustice, ye breach of Lawes & 
Covenants.74 
72 Jones, COl/sciellce, pp.153, 164. 
73 TISU, pp.103, 890. 
7-t FMA980, fol.9. 
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Cudworth, as in his ethical arguments, argues that the community is only bound 
together by a collective understanding of the absolute moral norms found in the 
divine. This is only achieved if all in that community learns to place aside their lower 
desires and move, through their freewill, to the higher principles of the divine. 
Interestingly Cudworth does not doubt that a Hobbist Civil Sovereign could create 
effective laws. Rather he argues that that principle of justice would have been 
arrived at though such a corrupt method as to make that society untenable. For 
instance, Cudworth argues, it is possible to imagine a polity governed by a Leviathan 
which would state that murder is unjust. Such a conclusion, Cudworth believes, is in 
keeping with eternal and immutable ethical norms. However, Cudworth argues that 
because the Leviathan's legitimacy in coming to this conclusion comes from his de 
facto power, he can only prohibit a man from killing another man through an equally 
destructive threat of force. The laws of the Leviathan dlerefore cannot bind men to 
them because they do not appeal to the higher, intellectual principles of justice 
which; through the individual verification of the members of that community, bind 
that community togedler. The vicious circle created by this Hobbesian logic, 
Cudworth argues, simply leads to the splintering of the society, not because the 
original law is wrong, but because the legitimacy of the law is based on a political 
justification that cannot morally bind man to it. He points out the implicit paradox 
he sees in Hobbes' use of private utility in the TISU: 
Civil Obedience, cannot be derived ... from men's P,ivate Utility onely, because 
every man being Judge of this for himself, it would dlen be Lawful for any 
subject, to Rebel against his Sovereign Prince and to Poyson or Stab him, 
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whensoever he could reasonably perswade himself, that it would tend to his 
own Advantage.75 
Cudworth argues that Hobbes' argument therefore, in one move, both diminishes 
the dignity of man and undermines the foundation of the ethical community. 
For Cudworth the foundation of any society must always be the wisdom and 
justice of the divine. Man, through his freewill, is presented by God the means by 
which this community can both be created and exist as a reflection of the intellect 
of the divine. Central to this community is, Cudworth argues, the correct 
understanding of the oath within the political society. In using this argument 
Cudworth follows the central seventeenth century belief, undermined by Hobbes' 
argument, that oaths form the basis of the political organisation of the state. So 
Cudworth argues in FM.4980: 
Promises, Pacts, Covenants, & Promisi01Y Oaths wch men take as a security 
to ymselves & flrmly acquiesce in ym wn they are made by vertuous persons 
w
ch 
are t foundations of politicall societies.76 
What lies behind the use of the oad1, Cudworth argues, is the principle of freewill. 
As he goes on to say in FM.4980, 'Promises, Covenants & promisory Oaths would 
be Errant N onsence if a man had no-more power over his future Actions yn a 
weather-cock hath of standing North or South tomorrow.,n An oath can only ever 
cany any moral weight if man has freely entered into the oath and accepts that all 
73 TISU, p.698. 
76 FM.4980, f01.177 
77 F.i\;[.4980, f01.177. 
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oaths have been entered into willingly by the other members of that community. 
The binding quality of an oath carries with it not only an obligation to keep a 
promise to God, but also a recognition that this promise also requires man to keep 
and maintain his obligations to the other members of the community. The central 
building block of Cudworth's political principles, the oath, consequendy carries widl 
it dual obligations to God and man. In doing so, it maintains Cudworth's central 
ethical principle, already stated, that 't great duty of t x ian laws is to love God & to 
love men.'78 
VI.5. Political Obligation 
Cudworth's argument for political obligation is a logical development of his ethical 
theory. For this reason obligation is not created, as in the Hobbist state, through the 
force and power of the civil sovereign, but through the participation of the 
individually morally responsible individual in a divinely ordained reality. Cudworth's 
theory of political obligation is, therefore, another facet of his overall philosophical 
project. The founding principle of political obligation is, Cudworth argues, the 
principle of justice implicit within his intellectualist principle of the divine. Man is 
therefore obligated to the justice of God as the founding principle of reality. As he 
argues in the TISU: 
The Right and Attthori(y of God himself is Founded in Justice; and of this is 
the Civil Sovereignty also a certain Patticipation. It is not the meer Creattlre of 
78 FM.4983, foLlOO. 
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the people, and of men's U;7ill, and therefore Allllihilable again by their Wills 
at pleasure; but hath a Stamp of Divinity upon it.79 
Cudworth argues that political society grows naturally out of the intellectual 
principle of the divine in the world. It is not the creation of some compact founded 
on fear or necessity, but the practical means by which and through which man 
comes to fulftl his ability to live the ethically virtuous life. As the above quote 
shows, political society in his theoty develops naturally out of the eternal principles 
of justice in the world. He completely rejects Hobbes' belief that political society is 
formed by the creation of an artificial body politic. In contrast, he argues that 
political society cannot be created, or man obligated to that society, through the 
artificial and violent commands of an absolute mler. Rather, dle just political society 
is based upon the ability of the individual political actor to understand the 
commands given as the natural and lawful commands of a just mler. This 
confirmation is brought about by man recognising in just political commands not 
the command, but the implicit justice that lies behind those commands. As 
Cudworth comments in FM.4983, 'y": Lawgiver has power to inforce his laws with 
reasonable penalty, but no Lawgiver has just right to inforce his laws beyond 
equality and justice.'so The means of ensuring this obligation is created, he argues, 
from each individual's ability to use his reason to recognise the implicit justice, or 
odlerwise, of a command. 
There is an implicit weakness created by Cudworth's system. By making 
obligation dependent on the individual judgment of the justness or otherwise of a 
79 TISU, p.896. 
80 FiVI.4983, fo1.22. 
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specific command, Cudworth opens himself up to accusations of political anti-
nomianism. Arguably political stability would be impossible in Cudworth's system, 
because a man can, if he so chooses, refuse to obey any command that he believes 
to be unjust. Cudworth appears to be aware of this problem. He addresses the 
problem in two ways. Firstly he argues that, although natural justice is the founding 
principle of political society, society cannot be so reflexive as to meet and judge 
every situation with an appeal to natural justice. Consequently he argues that 
principles of natural justice over time become codified into principles of 'positive 
justice.' These principles of positive justice are freely commanded by the political 
leader. The obligation to them is, however, not invested in the power of the 
commander, but in the assumed natural justice of the command.s1 Secondly, 
Cudworth further maintains the stability of political society by arguing that 
obligation to the commands of positive justice should be followed not simply 
because they follow natural justice, but because to follow legitimate political 
authority is itself a command of natural justice. This argument for political 
obedience as a natural good comes out most clearly in his fmal remarks in the TISU. 
There he argues that: 
Conscience and religion oblige subjects actively to obey all the lawful 
commands of the civil sovereigns or legislative powers though contrary to 
their own private appetites, interest and utility; but when these same 
sovereign legislative powers command unlawful things conscience, though it 
81 EIlvl, p.2l. 
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here obliges to 'obey God rather than man,' yet does it, not withstanding, 
bli . 82 o ge not to reslst. 
Cudworth, in this published work, argues that even if the positive commands of the 
civil sovereign are deemed by the individual to be contraq to natural justice, the 
desire to resist is negated by the overriding obligation to the dictate of natural justice 
not to resist. Cudworth's arguments for political obligation do, however, vaq from 
this strict line if we examine those occasions where Cudworth deals with the same 
issue in his unpublished writings. One could go so far as to argue that this final 
clause in the TISU is an attempt by Cudworth to allay any fears that the moderate 
theological and philosophical position advocated in the TISU would necessarily 
undermine the political stattfJ q1lo. This assertion would seem to be backed up when 
we compare this argument from the TlSU with his use of the same arguments in the 
ElM. In the EI1\1, which was not published during Cudworth's lifetime, Cudworth 
presents a far more subtle argument for political obligation, within which he 
believes that in certain cases natural justice can, and should, lead to the resistance of 
the positive commands of an arbitrary ruler. 
When dealing with the same issue of political obedience in the EI1\1 
Cudworth does not make non-resistance, as he does in the TISU, a dictate of natural 
justice. Instead he stresses tl1at the overarching obligation in political society is that 
all political commands correspond to the dictates of natural justice. Positive 
commands remain, but only as pragmatic and, consequently, malleable principles. 
Man is, therefore, only obliged to follow positive commands if they still follow the 
dictates of natural justice. In Cudwortl1's terms, the covenant made by man to the 
82 TISU, p.899. 
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political community is not binding in itself. The covenant does not in itself create a 
new moral entity, rather new covenants are only modifications of man's existing 
obligation to the eternal and immutable dictates of natural justice. Cudworth does 
recognise that part of this obligation is to the person of the commander however, 
unlike in the TISU tIlls is not a blind obedience, but an obligation that could be 
refused if dle dictates of natural justice were circumvented by the commander. An 
obvious example of this would be that of the duty of the soldier to ills superior 
officers. In war time, assuming the war is itself a just cause, a soldier is obliged to 
follow the orders of ills superior officer. The soldier is following a positive 
command, such as attacking a village, willch, because of the specific context of that 
positive command, follows the natural justice implicit in that struggle. However, if 
dle same positive command to attack the same village is given in peacetime the 
soldier would be obliged to refuse to follow the positive command because at that 
point in time the positive command was running contrary to the dictates of natural 
justice. As Cudworth argues in the EIl\1: 
And it is not the mere will of the commander that makes these positive 
things to oblige or become due but the nature of things appears evidendy 
from hence because it is not the volition of every one that obligedl, but of a 
person righdy qualified and invested with lawful authority. And the liberty 
of commanding is circumscribed within certain bounds and limits, so that if 
any commander go beyond the sphere and bounds that nature sets him, 
which are indifferent things, ills commands will not at all oblige.s3 
83 ElhI, p.21. 
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Cudworth argues that when the positive commands of the commander move 
beyond the bounds of natural justice they no longer oblige man to follow dIem. He 
offers in the ElM a sophisticated defence for a limited right to resistance. 
Cudworth argues that this occurrence would be impossible in a correcdy 
formed political society. His ideal society is united by the collective realisation of the 
higher, collective virtues found in the divine. The unifying principle being, as in all 
his moral writings, the belief that the eternal and inlmutable principles of justice are 
available to all men through the use of their reason. Cudworth presents us with a 
belief in the ability of a society to understand the collective good which mirrors 
closely the principle of the 'General Will' from Rousseau's Social Contract. In the 
Social COlltract Rousseau argues that a society which is correcdy formed will naturally 
come to a collective understanding of what is good and just for that society. 
Collective judgement is Rousseau's 'General Will' which rises above the 
agglomeration of private interests which Rousseau termed the 'Will of All,' and sees 
dIe collective interests of the community as paramount.84 Cudworth describes dus 
collective political will when he says that: 
Wherefore COl/science also, is in it self not of a Pn'vate and Pattial, but of a 
Publide and Commoll Nature; it representing Divi!1e Laws, lmpattial Justice, and 
Equity, and the Good if the Jf/Thole, when clashing with our own Se(fish Good; 
and P,ivate Utility. This is the only thing, dlat can NaturallY COllsociate Mankind 
together, lay a Foundation for Bodies Politick. 85 
8+ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social COl/trad al/d Discollrses, trans G.D.H.Cole (Evelyman, London, 
1913), pp.274-6. 
85 TISU, 898. 
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In Rousseau's case, the General Will gains its collective strength from the shared 
social and political experiences of the body politic. In Cudworth's case, the unifying 
principle is the existence of the eternal and immutable principle of justice found in 
the intellect of the divine. Cudworth's theory, similar to Rousseau's, relies on the 
existence of a society made up of autonomous moral actors to exist. Only in a 
society made up of morally autonomous, self-determined individuals can the 
collective principles of natural justice be known with certainty by all men. 
Cudworth's political principles when examined in detail present us with a powerful, 
almost democratic defence of the equality of all men as moral actors. 
For Cudworth the only constant factors in political society are the principles 
of natural justice that underpin it. The organisation of that society could change as 
the political institutions of a society are, in Cudworth's mind, simply the pragmatic 
structures which ensure that the dictates of natural justice are fulfilled within a 
specific context. For instance, an aristocracy is to be respected, Cudworth argues, 
because it may, at a certain point in time present the most effective form of 
government, not because it personally holds any natural virtues in itself. As 
Cudworth argues pithily in FM.4983: 
Nothing does so crave ye esteem of a Nobleman to himself as t sense of his 
honour or greatnesse; this he estemes naturall: but if he do go back, but to 
of 7 ages: he wd see from how Iowa degree they are risen to ye condition 
they are in i they will see it is rather owing to t industry or fortunes or to t 
injustice of their ancestry they fmd they are the possesser of t advantages.86 
86 FiH.4983, f01.21. 
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Cudworth's desire to concentrate on the underlying principles of political society 
rather than the surface machinations also allow us to understand his supposed 
political quietism with more accuracy. 
Far from eschewing the political realm, Cudworth creates a theological and 
philosophical system which places the obligations of the political realm as a central 
principle. For him, man's overriding obligation is to God's justice. Consequently 
one can argue that Cudworth was willing to move easily in his allegiance between 
different regimes in the middle decades of the seventeenth century because each 
were, in Cudworth's eyes, acceptable creators of positive justice, as long as they 
maintained the fundamental principles of natural justice. That is not to say that he 
submitted to political authority on principle, as he suggests in the TISU. 
Throughout the 1660s Cudworth was continually under attack from hostile parties, 
often those with influence in Court. Many of these attacks were precipitated by 
Cudworth's willingness to oppose the wishes of his superiors on points of principle. 
His personal stress on principle, over blind obedience and duty, comes out most 
clearly in his conflict with Ralph Widdrington during the 1660s. Widdrington was a 
fellow of Christ's from 1639 till his death in 1688. He was one of only three fellows 
of Christ's College, including Henry More, to survive Manchester's purge. In 1660 
he was ejected from his fellowship by Cudworth for 'contumacy and neglect of 
statutes.,87 Widdrington took his case directly to the King and appears to have used 
this to catalogue complaints against Cudworth, many of which alleged Cudworth's 
lax religious obselvance and discipline in the College. At one point Widdrington 
complains of the irregular practice in the Chapel and the lack of surplices. 
87 Peile, Biographical Registel; 1:421-2. 
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Cudworth's failings included, for Widdrington, a certain vanity in dress and his 
closeness to the previous protectorate regime. As Widdrington claims: 
when the King and gove1'11ment are restored it no salve in Dr Cudworth to 
wear a velvet coat in the exchange among Merchants and Presbyterians and 
a cassock when he visits a bishop and both upon the same day. Well had ti1e 
complainant been t protectors chaplain or favorite or pensionary or 
advocate to break the laws and bring in the Jews had he preached to 
humour the rebels in a short cloak open sleeves and 36 dozen ribband at his 
knees.S8 
Although these accusations may seem trivial they show two things. Firstiy, the 
extent to which Cudworth was remembered in the years of the Restoration for his 
close involvement with the Protectorate regime. Secondly, when compared with 
Cudworth's own claims and defences over the same period, whilst remaining loyal 
to ti1e King, Cudworth never denies his links or relationship to the protectorate 
regime. This is in stark contrast to Widdrington. Widdrington, like Cudworth, 
prospered during the inter-regnum, being made public orator of the University in 
1650. However, in his appeals to the King over his ejection, Widdrington 
consciously distances himself from his promotions in the 1650s, clainling never to 
have had anything to do with 'ti1e usurper.,S9 This, Widdrington claims, was in stark 
contrast to Cudworth who, Widdrington alleges, did: 
88 Cambridge University Library Manuscript, .Mm.5.45, Notes 011 tbe Alaster's rifGod's HO/lse alld Cb,ist's 
College, fol.15. 
89 On taking the Engagement in 1650 \\1iddrington became public orator and Professor of Greek, 
Peile, Biograpbical RegisteJ: 1:422; CULMS.Mm.5.24.fo1.20. 
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zealously adhere to the usurper whilst he lived .... and in a profane 
lamentation worship him after he was dead did t complainent style that 
excreable villain 'our sun a man of wonders the great prince whose memoq 
is blessed' or after this the complain tent blaspheme and write Richard 'the 
levin of all eyes' and 'a light risen up in darkness.'9o 
Despite Widdrington's protestations to the contraq, Cudworth appears to have 
been an obedient, but not submissive subject of the King. On two occasions he 
resisted Royal mandates for dle election of fellows to Christ's, and, in opposing 
Widdrington, angered many of Wid dring ton's supporters in Court, including 
Widdrington's brother, Sir Thomas Widdrington, at that time a member of dle 
council of state.91 Widdrington was eventually re-instated to his fellowship in 1661 
by the King's bench. What the affair does show is, flrsdy, how Cudworth's own 
actions were driven by principle rather than political pragmatism or quietism. At the 
time of the Restoration, when Cudworth's own position was not secure, crossing 
the brother of a councillor of the King does not seem to be actions of an 'other-
worldly' academic. Secondly it shows that although political authority was generally 
to be obeyed, Cudworth did not believe that it should be followed for its own sake. 
It is possible to compare Cudworth's attitude to changing political authority 
to his earlier stated advocacy for comprehension in religious belief. Widdrington, in 
his letters of complaint to the King, writes that Cudworth continually states: 
90 CUL.l\fS.rvIm.S.24.fol.16. 
91 Peile, Biographital Register. I:466. 
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the old dear plea for liberty of conscience and for allowing eveq conceited 
fellow to follow the light within and to do eveqthing upon a principle of 
acceptance as this is to men who desire a greater latitude to walk in than our 
ill . 92 statute w penult. 
Widdrington explicidy attacks two of the central tenets of Cudwordl's theory of 
moral responsibility. Firsdy, he attacks Cudworth's belief that dle individual, 'eveq 
conceited fellow,' is the best judge and arbiter of his own moral actions. Secondly, 
Widdrington alludes to the 'latitude' or breadth of approach within which Cudworth 
believes these ethical principles could exist. The ethical life for Cudworth does not, 
as Widdrington argues, need to be limited and defined by structures or 'statute.' 
Instead Cudworth believes the form of the ethical life can be changeable and 
moveable as long as the central principles of the Christian life are maintained. In 
Chapter Three we saw how Cudworth defmed this community, in terms of Church 
government, as a 'Noah's Ark' of comprehension, including all diverse threads of 
the Christian religion within it. Cudworth argues that dle same latitude in political 
organisation and form could be countenanced as long as the central principle of 
justice is maintained. 
There is no evidence that Cudworth, in his writing, advocates the wholesale 
reform of the political community as argued for by groups such as the Levellers. 
However, what Cudwordl does advocate is a reformation in the method by which 
the legitimacy and sovereignty of a political society is defmed. Political freedom is 
created, he argues, by the collective appreciation of the divinely inspired principles 
of justice in the world. Consequendy man is only able to achieve the liberty found in 
92 CUL.1\IS.1\Im.5.24.fols 14b-15. 
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the divine in a world defined and controlled by morally determined individuals. The 
political community, he believes, has to be liberated from the legalism of statute and 
fixed organisation as an end in itself. These forms and institutions must be 
understood as the pragmatic constructs around which the fundamental, divinely 
inspired, principles of justice and equity can be maintained. What we fInd in 
Cudworth is a shift in the justifIcation of political legitimacy away from the 
traditional principle of self-preservation or divine fIat, to a legitimacy which is 
entirely defmed and maintained by the individual. Cudworth's argument for political 
legitimacy and obligation relies on the self-conscious movement of man away from 
the bounds of ethical legalism, to the position of individual moral responsibility. To 
borrow the terminology from Cudworth's Second Sel7JlOI1, political legitimacy is 
created when man develops from 'God's bondsman' to 'God's freeman.' The course 
of this legitimacy lies in the ability of the individual intellect to come to know with 
certainty the justice of a political institution. The source and confirmation of this 
legitimacy relies on the existence of human agency which is formed and confirmed 
through Cudworth's belief in the active power of the triune God. 
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Chapter VII - The Cambridge Platonists and The Latitudinarians 
VII.t. Introduction 
The task of this thesis has been to reconstruct the political arguments of Ralph 
Cudworth. By stressing the Trinitarianism implicit in all Cudworth's thought I have 
been able to not only identify the political arguments in his thought, but also show 
the manner in which he develops a sophisticated defence of a political society 
created and maintained by the moral obligations of each individual in that society. 
Cudworth's Trinitarianism not only allows us to see this political aspect with more 
clarity, but also the manner in which he develops a comprehensive system of human 
agency, moral responsibility and freewill as the building blocks of an ethical 
community. As we saw in the last chapter, this allows us to understand Cudworth's 
own political oudook with more clarity. In addition, these political principles suggest 
that he may have been influential on the development of the liberal political 
principles which first found a voice in the late-seventeenth century. The task of this 
concluding chapter is to examine whether Cudworth's ideas, especially dleir 
Trinitarian aspect, carried any weight and influence beyond the borders of his 
published and unpublished writings. 
To do this I will examine the thought of the Latitudinarians, and John 
Tillotson and Edward Fowler in particular, since I believe this group was most 
obviously influenced by Cudworth. I will argue that this political aspect of 
Cudworth's impact, particularly with reference to the Trinitarian debates of the late-
seventeenth century, has been ignored because of the manner in which other 
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historians have chosen to interpret the political ramifications of these Trinitarian 
debates. It is with an examination of this latter point that I will begin, discussing 
what I shall term the neo-republican intelpretation of cile politics of the Trinitarian 
debates. This neo-republican position, promoted most forcefully by JCD. Clark, 
JG.A. Pocock, and JA.I. Champion argues that the political nature of the 
Trinitarian debates is identifiable when this debate is seen as an anti-Trinitarian 
critique of the Trinitarian and Christological nature of the ecclesial theology of the 
established Church.! In this context Pocock and Champion argue that the anti-
Trinitarians develop a republican critique of the confessional nature of English 
society. Their calls for a new republican civic humanism, Pocock and Champion 
argue, helped begin cile dismanding of the allcieJl regime in England, and also 
provided the key political argument of the Enlightenment. I will not challenge cius 
argument. Rather I will call into question whether the cileological and political 
context drawn by this neo-republican intelpretation provides the only context 
within which we can interpret the political consequences of the Trinitarian debates 
of the late-seventeenth centuq. I will argue, taking a lead from Cudworcil, that we 
can find a middle position between the high-Churchmanslup and cile anti-
Trinitarian republicanism suggested by cius neo-republican reading. This, what I will 
term, proto-liberal argument defines the Trinity not in ecclesial and sacerdotal 
terms, but stresses the importance of the Trinity in understanding the moral 
responsibility of the individual in society. In this way I will interpret the political 
implications of the Trinitarian debates not simply by reference to cile institutional 
! These arguments are found most clearly in the following works by these authors: J.C.D. Clark, 
Ellglish S oriet), 1682-1832: IdeoloJ!Jl, sorial stmctllre alld political practil'e dlllillg the allrien regime (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1985); J.G.A. Pocock, Barbmism alld Religioll Vol. 1 : The Elllightenmellts ojEdJllard Gibboll, 
1734-1764 (CUP, Cambridge, 1999);J.G.A. Pocock, 'Within the Margins: the defInitions of 
orthodoxy,' in The 1l1m;gills qfO,1hodoxoy; Heterodox lf7,iti'{g alld Cllltllral Respollse, 1660-1750, ed. Roger 
D. Lund (CUP, Cambridge, 1995), pp.33-53; and Champion, Pi/lars q{Pliestl'raft. 
266 
justifications of the Trinity, as the neo-republican intel-pretation does, but also 
examine the manner in which the Trinity, as a key term in the intellectual make-up 
of seventeenth century England, was invoked during this period to express and 
define some of the key political principles of liberalism. This proto-liberalism is 
found, I will argue, most clearly in the thought and political actions of the 
Latitudinarians. I will argue that, contrary to claims of much recent scholarship, the 
Latitudinarians should be interpreted as developing direcdy out of philosophical and 
theological positions first suggested by the Cambridge Platonists. This is most 
marked in defences of the Trinity written by Edward Fowler and John Tillotson, 
both of which owe great debt to Cudworth. I will then examine the manner in 
which Fowler and Tillotson use the Trinity as the theological underpinning of their 
arguments for religious toleration and comprehension. By doing this I will argue 
that Cudworth's thought creates the basis out of which the Latitudinarians 
developed concrete political arguments, particularly through their various attempts 
to draft a bill for religious toleration and comprehension in the 1680s. Implicit in 
these arguments are the principles of moral self-determination and ethical 
community, themes which are central to Cudwordl's own thought, and principles 
which provide the basis for the political theory of liberalism. 
VII.2. Politics and the Trinity: The neo-republican account of the anti-
Trinitarian debates of the late-seventeenth century 
Reconstructing the influence of religion on the development of political principles is 
a complex process. There is litde doubt that religion and religious conflict has 
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played a major role on the development of the modern world. Until recently this 
influence has, however, been broadly interpreted negatively. The classic example of 
this is what has come to be known as the Whig interpretation of histoq. Whig 
historicism argues that during the seventeenth century in particular the superstitions 
of religion were discarded in favour of rational, scientific secularism. This growing 
secularism allowed for the freedom of thought and expression from which modern, 
enlightened, principles developed. In the opening chapter we encountered 
something of this Whiggishness in the treatments of the Cambridge Platonists by, 
amongst others, Ernst Cassirer and Arthur Lovejoy. Another secular analysis of the 
early-modern period, the Marxist interpretation of history, argues that it was during 
this period that the bourgeois capitalist class first developed. Consequently the 
English Civil War became for historians, such as Christopher Hill and C.B. 
MacPherson, the necessary bourgeois revolution of Marxist historical analysis.2 Both 
the Whig and Marxist interpretations rely on the crude equation according to which 
the level of modernity in a society is inversely proportional to the amount of 
religion in that society. Thinkers such as the Cambridge Platonists, because of their 
conscious theism, sit very much on the un-modern side of this divide. 
In reaction to these interpretations there has been an increased emphasis on 
the more subtle and important role that religion has played as a context in which the 
ideas of modernity first developed. As part of this process there has been an 
increased concentration by historians on the importance of religion in every facet of 
the early-modern period. If not the first, certainly the most provocative exponent 
of this revisionist analysis has been J.CD. Clark. In his Ellglish Sodety 1682-1832, 
2 For instance see Hill, lJ:7orld Tumed Upside D01Jl/I; C.B.lIacPherson, The Political Theo1)! rjPossessive 
I"dividualism: Hobbes to Locke (OUP, Oxford, 1962). 
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Clark stresses the profound theological and confessional nature of the English state 
well into the eighteenth century.3 Clark continually stresses the importance of 
religion to English and British society through the 'long eighteend1 century.' By 
doing this he rejects the belief, implicit in Whig and Marxian analyses, that 
modernity developed during this period through the removal of the superstitions of 
religion from various parts of society. Contradicting the assumptions of Whig 
historicism, he argues that the radical ideas which grew out of the early-modern 
period were not marked by d1eir secularism, but in fact by their religious basis. The 
radical ideas of this period should not be understood through their rejection of 
religion. Rather, he argues, radical ideas during this period can be identified as an 
heterodox religious reaction to the orthodox Christian assumptions of the English 
confessional state. Nowhere is this heterodox reaction so marked, Clark argues, as 
in the political implications of the rejections of the doctrine of the Trinity by 
Socinians, Arians and Deists.4 The problem one fmds with Clark's provocative 
thesis is that while overturning many of the easy assumptions of Whig historicism, it 
paradoxically accepts, in part, one of the key premises of Whig historicism; that 
orthodox theism is anathema to modernity.s Clark, by stressing the religious basis of 
3 Clark, English Society, see especially pp.1-7. 
4 Ibid., p.277. This analysis is also used by Pocock and Champion. See Pocock, Barba/ism alld Religioll, 
p.27; Pocock, 'Within the Margins'p.36; Champion, Pillars of Priest craft, p.101. 
5 Clark states that eighteenth century society 'had three essential characteristics: it was Anglican, it 
was aristocratic, and it was monarchical. Gentlemen, the Church of England, and the Crown 
commanded an intellectual and social hegemony.' [Clark, Ellglish Solie!)', p.7]. Another example of an 
intellectual histOt"y, this time of tlle seventeenth century, which argues that the religion witllln a 
thinkers tllOught makes it implicitly unmodern and impossibly far off is John Dunn's influential 
account of Locke's T1JJO Treatises o/GovemllJent. In iliat Dunn famously argues tllat 'I simply cannot 
conceive of constructing an analysis of any issue in contemporary political tlleory around the 
affirmation or negation of anything Locke says about political matters.' [Dunn,Johll Lo,ke, p.x.] Dunn 
has, in recent years, attempted to modify his claim that there is nothing 'living' in fue thought of 
John Locke, IT ohn Dunn, '\\lhat is Living and \\lhat is Dead in fue Political Theory of John Locke,' 
in Illterpretillg Political Respollsibili!)': Esserys 1981-1989 (polity Press, Cambridge, 1990), pp.9-25]. 
However as lain Hampsher-1Ionk has rightly pointed out, although Dunn attempts to salvage 
something from Locke's thought, Dunn, because of his implacable belief fuat religion is anathema to 
fue principles of the modern world, still interprets Locke's political ideas as divorced from modern 
liberal principles [Hampsher-Monk, 'History of political thought, pp.167-8]. 
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England in the early-modern period as the key factor that separates it from the 
modern world, implicitly accepts the teleological assumption of Whig historicism: 
that the orthodox tenets of religion have to be removed for modernity to exist.6 
Such a Whig assumption has severely hampered our understanding of the 
Cambridge Platonists. Clark's thesis, for all its attempts to understand the subtleties 
of religion, only understands orthodox theism within the institutional constructs of 
the established Church. This was, of course, one of the main forms that this 
orthodox theism took during this period. However, by choosing this interpretation I 
believe Clark's argument relies on an extremely two-dimensional analysis of the 
nature of orthodox Trinitarian theism during tlus period. As I shall argue, it is 
possible to find 'modern' ideas in this period developing not simply from heterodox 
positions, as Clark believes, but also from within an orthodox theistic position, an 
orthodox position that does not rely on the established institution of the Church for 
its coherence or validity. 
Clark's thesis did not develop out of a vacuum. Although its provocative 
and polenlical nature marks it out from the Whig rustories that he argues against, 
Clark is conscious of the debt his thesis owes to those historians of the previous 
generation who first began to dismantle the assumptions of Whig historicism.7 With 
respect to the political consequences of the doctrine of the Trinity, one can trace 
Clark's analysis back to Hugh Trevor-Roper's essay, 'The Religious Origins of the 
Enlightenment.'8 In this essay Trevor-Roper does much to explode the myth that 
Calvinism provided the intellectual and social basis for progressive thinking during 
6 For a fuller discussion of the implicit paradox in revisionist histories of the early-modem period see 
John Coffey, Pmemtioll alld Toleratioll ill Protestallt Ellglalld, 1558-1689 (Longmans, Harlow, 2000), 
pp.6-10. 
7 Clark, Ellglisb Sode!)', pp.1-8. 
8 Hugh Trevor-Roper, 'The Religious Origins of dle Enlightenment,' in Religioll, tbe Reformatioll alld 
S odal Cbt1llge, (MacMillan, London, 1967), pp.193-286. 
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the early modern period. By stressing the restrictive and conservative nature of 
Calvinist societies during this period Trevor-Roper is able to argue that progressive 
ideas during the seventeenth centuty developed out of what Edward Gibbon 
describes as the 'secret reformation.,9 Gibbon argues that since the reformation 
there has existed in the reformed tradition a liberal element not restricted by the 
confines of doctrine. The intellectual heart of this tradition, Gibbon argues, is the 
humanism of Erasmus. This humanism led to a 'spirit of freedom and moderation.' 
Gibbon goes on to name the chief members of this liberal Erasmian tradition as, 
'the Arminianism of Holland, Grotius, Limborch, and Le Clerc; and in England 
Chillingworth, the Latitudinarians of Cambridge .. " Tillotson, Clarke, Hoadley.'lU 
Trevor-Roper uses Gibbon's analysis to argue dlat dle traditions of the 
Enlightenment developed from this humanist free-thinking tradition.ll Using the 
colloquial, rather than theological interpretation of the term, Trevor-Roper stresses 
the 'Socinian' nature of this freethinking tradition. In particular he argues that use of 
reason, particularly in the field of biblical scholarship allowed for the effective 
rejection of the structures of Calvinism and space for the development of the 
intellectual trends that led to dle Enlightenment. 12 
J.G.A. Pocock in particular has taken issue with elements ofTrevor-Roper's 
assertion that English Enlightened principles developed in a general way out of a 
humanist free-thinking tradition in England. 13 Pocock and also J.A.I. Champion, in 
9 Gibbon, Declille alld Fall, VI:128. 
10 Ibid., VI:128, n.45. 
11 This free-thinking humanist tradition is again confirmed by the eighteenth century thinker 
.Anthony Clarke who described a free-thinking tradition of Erasmus, Grotius, Chillingworth, 
Herbert, \V'ilkins, \X7hichcote, Cudworth, tIore, Tillotson, and Locke. Cited in Isabel Rivers, Reasoll, 
Grace alld, Selltimellt: A St1l0
' 
Of the Lallgllage qfReligioll alld Ethics ill Ellglalld, 1660-1780,2 vols (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1991 &2000), II. p.24. 
12 Trevor-Roper, 'Religious Origins,' pp.206-220. 
13 See in particular] .G.A. Pocock, 'Post-Puritan England and the Problem of the Enlightenment,' in 
Cultllre alld Pol;tics: From Plllitallislll to the ElllighteJlllleJlt, ed. Perez Zagorin (University of California 
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contrast to Trevor-Roper's colloquial use of 'Socinian,' argue that the Enlightened 
principles of late-seventeenth century English d10ught are found in the theological 
Socinianism of the anti-Trinitarian debates. This analysis shares the assumption of 
Clark's work dlat radical ideas during this period existed in the form of a heterodox, 
but still religiously inspired, reaction to the orthodoxy of the established Church. 
The political implications of the Trinitarian debates of the late-seventeenth century 
are therefore defined in this neo-republican interpretation by the radical reaction to 
the institutional and authoritarian form of the established Church. Both Pocock and 
Champion argue that the Socinian attacks on the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity 
helped to develop a republican civic humanism which was a mark of the 
Enlightenment. 14 This neo-republican interpretation of the anti-Trinitarian debates 
does not, I believe, present us with a full account of the political implications of the 
Trinitarian debates during this period. Although one must concede that this neo-
republican reaction to the orthodoxy of the established Church occurred during this 
period~ it was not, I would argue, the only political argument identifiable in the 
Trinitarian debates of the late-seventeenth century. The neo-republican 
interpretation rests on the assumption that dle Trinity was used in the established 
Church solely as a means of maintaining the Apostolic and jure divillo legitimacy of 
the episcopacy and hereditary monarchy. Pocock in particular argues that after the 
Restoration the Church gained political legitimacy from the assertion that it was the 
authentic body of Christ on earth. The sacerdotal and Apostolic nature of the 
Church meant that redemption was only found in the orthodoxy of the Church. 15 
Press, Berkeley, 1980), pp.91-111, p.93. Compare with Trevor-Roper, 'Religious Origins,' pp.217-
220. 
I~ Champion, Pi/lars ~lPliesto(Jjt, p.278. 
IS Ibid., p.118. 
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The Church's established, Erastian form in turn gave legitimacy and authority to the 
re-established monarchy. The short hand recognition of this theological-political 
union being the rallying cry (popular with polemicists on both sides of the 
argument), 'No Bishop. No King!'16 The means of attacking the established English 
confessional state during this period was, for the neo-republican analysis, to 
undermine tile theological basis of the Church's authority: the doctrine of the 
Trinity. Socinian and later Deist thinkers were able to utilise the biblical exegesis 
created by Erasmian humanism to cast doubt on the divinity of Christ. If the 
divinity of Christ could be undermined, then the whole theological-political 
structure could be brought down. Clark, Pocock, and Champion argue that it is in 
tius form of radical thinking that the great steps forward to modernity, hinted at by 
Gibbon, were made in early-modern England. 17 
It is not my intention to dispute this neo-republican interpretation of the 
anti-Trinitarian debates of the late-seventeenth century as there is much in it wruch I 
believe is correct. Rather I will argue that there is space in this intelpretation to 
account for those thinkers, such as the Cambridge Platonists and tile 
Latitudinarians, mentioned by Gibbon, but who fall outside the boundaries created 
by this neo-republican analysis. In particular, I will argue that a fuller account of the 
political nature of the doctrine of the Trinity, such as that which we have 
encountered in Cudworth's thought, allows us to understand a theologically 
coherent, moderate tradition that existed in English thought during this period. This 
proto-liberal intelpretation of the political implications of the Trinity is, arguably, 
more influential on English thought than the neo-republican tradition. The neo-
16 Pocock, '\\lithin the margins,' pp.40-47. 
17 Clark, English Sotiety, p.282. 
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republican analysis of these debates is limited in my view by its reliance on a 
structural and institutional account of the established Church during the late-
seventeenth century. Consequently it argues that during this period a belief in the 
Trinity became synonymous with an acceptance of tlle Apostolic and sacerdotal 
form of the Church. This strict high-Church position was certainly maintained in 
the immediate aftermath of the Restoration. The strict Erastianism of the re-
established Church can be found in the great opposition there was during the reign 
of Charles II to comprehension and toleration in the. Church. This opposition was 
typified in the collection of laws that have come to be known as 'The Clarendon 
Code.'18 This Erastian consensus was, however, broken down by the Revolution of 
1688. With the ascension to the throne of William and Mary it became increasingly 
difficult for the Church to maintain the belief that it provided the litre divino 
legitimisation for a monarchy which had gained the crown in far from divinely 
inspired terms. Pocock argues that it was tlus conflict between the jtllr: divino claims 
of the established Church and the de facto nature of the Willianlite settlement which 
allowed for the neo-republican attacks outlined above to gain such purchase. As if 
to mirror the radical nature of the anti-Trinitarian, republican position, this conflict 
created a group of high-Church clerics who refused to accept that the Church could 
legitimise the de facto nature of the Willianlite settlement. These Tory 'non-jurors' 
establish for Pocock the polar opposites to the anti-Trinitarian republicanism facing 
it in this debate. As a consequence of the polarisation of this debate, Pocock argues 
that nliddle position of tllOse who remained loyal to tlle Church after the Glorious 
Revolution became increasingly pragmatic and conselvative as it attempted to 
18 On the conflict in the established Church on questions of comprehension and uniformity during 
the reign of Charles II see Coffey, Persemtioll alld Toleratioll, pp.167 -182. 
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reconcile the jtlre divino right of the Church with the de jo{10 power of the Williamite 
setdement. Those maintaining this middle position therefore came under attack 
from both sides. The non-juror high-Churchmen attacked the legitimacy of the 
established Williamite Church. The neo-republicans exploited this seeming 
illegitimacy to continue their attacks on dle political role of dle Church and the 
conupt nature of the authority of 'priestcraft.'19 
The implication of the neo-republican analysis is dnt because of the 
theological and political paradoxes present in this middle position such a position 
lacked, by defmition, a metaphysical core. As a consequence Pocock, in particular, 
argues that the apostolic and prophetic core of the Church becomes reduced by 
these thinkers to merely a source of rational moralism.2il This neo-republican 
analysis, because it only understands the theological principles of this period within 
the confIDes of the institutional suuctures of the established Church, is unable to 
allow there to be a coherent theological basis to this middle position. I would argue 
that the political conflicts brought about by the Glorious Revolution did not 
polarise the debate in telIDS of the doctrine of the Trinity, leaving a pragmatic, 
theologically wishy-washy, rump left in the middle.21 Rather the political and 
theological fall-out created by the Glorious Revolution splintered, rather dnn 
polarised, the intellectual debates over the political implications of the doctrine of 
the Trinity. This splintering brought to the surface a moderate seam of thought now 
known as Latitudinarianism within which the Cambridge Platonists played a 
defming role. This group defIDe the Trinity not as a bulwark of the apostolic Church 
but as a rational principle that defIDes human agency and moral self-determination. 
19 Pocock, 'Post-Puritan England,' pp.100-5. 
20 Ibid., ppJ 00-1. 
21 Pocock, '\\1ithin the margins,' pAO. 
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The Trinity is used by these thinkers to underpin the moral responsibilities of the 
individual in society, a society that the Latitudinarians believed was best founded on 
the principles of a unified and tolerant Church community. 
VII.3. The Latitudinarians and the doctrine of the Trinity 
To establish the coherence of this Latitudinarian response to the Trinitarian debates 
of the late-seventeenth century, it is first necessary account for the membership of 
this Latitudinarian group. The term Latitudinarian is generally used to describe a 
collection of London based, liberal, Anglican divines who found preferment 
following the Glorious Revolution.22 Chief amongst their number were John 
Tillotson, Edward Stillingfleet, Simon Patrick, Edward Fowler and Gibert Burnett. 
However, as Gibbon's survey of the 'secret reformation' shows, the Cambridge 
Platonists were also known by the sobriquet Latitudinarian. In fact the term 
Latitudinarian was first coined in the 1660s in Cambridge as a term of abuse against 
the Cambridge PlatonistS.23 It has, however, been common in recent scholarship to 
22 The classic account of the life and work of many of the Latitudinarians comes in Gilbert Burnet's 
Histo!)' ~li\1J' Olllll Time. This was expanded in 1902 by H.C.Foxcroft's edition of many of Burnet's 
diaries and notebooks as A sllpplelJ/eI!t to BlIrnet's Histo!)! ~O\fy OlPIl Time. In recent years there has been 
growth in studies specifically on the Latitudinarians. Chief amongst these has been Louis G. Locke's 
1954 study, Tillotsoll: A Stt/c!y ill SeueI!teelltb amtll!)! Literatllre. rdore general surveys have included: 
Barbara Shapiro, Probabili(y and Cel1aillfJ! ill S euelltemtb celltmy Ellglalld: A Stmb' ~ltbe Relatiollsbip betlllfell 
Natllral S ciellce, Religioll, History, LallI alld Literatllre, (princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983); 
W.J\LSpellman's Tbe Latitt/dillaJialls alld tbe Cbllrcb ~lEllglalld, 1660-1770; Isabel River's excellent two 
volume Reasoll, Grace alld SelltiJJJeI!t, and various essays John Spurr, chiefly, "'Rational Religion" in 
Restoration England' in Jot/mal oftbe History ~lIdeas, 49 (1988), pp.563-585, and, "'Latitudinarianism" 
and the Restoration Church' in Tbe Histol7cal JOllmal, 31 (1988), pp.61-82, also essays in Kroll et al. 
ed., Pbilosop/!)', Sciella alld Religioll ill Ellglalld, 1640-1700. 
23 Although I will argue in this chapter that the Cambridge Platonists and the Latitudinarians should 
only be considered as different generations of the same liberal theological and philosophical 
movement, for the sake of clarity I will use the traditional descriptions of the two groups to avoid 
confusion. It is, however, interesting to note at this point that the term 'Latitudinarian' was first 
coined in Cambridge in the 1660s. In a letter to Anne Conway, Henry More complains that in 
Cambridge during the 1660s those who opposed the Cambridge Platonists would 'Push hard at the 
Latitude men as they call them, some in their pulipitts call them sons of Belial, others make the 
Devill a Latitudinarian,' [1-\nne Conway, Tbe CO/llJla)! Letters: The Con'espolld8llce ~r Alllle CO/llPq)!, 
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ignore or down play the relationship between the Cambridge Platonists and the 
Latitudinarians, painting dle Cambridge Platonists as ivory-towered academics in 
contrast to the metropolitan worldliness of the Latitudinarians. Barbara Shapiro's 
defInition is indicative of this view. 'Their lives were spent rather differendy,' 
Shapiro points out: 
the Platonists preferring the retired scholarly life to the hurly burly of an 
active city pulpit, or efforts to gain the high ecclesiastical posts which could 
enable them to pursue actively their moderate policies. It was Wilkins, 
William Lloyd, Sprat, Stillingfleet, Tillotson, and Gilbert Burnet, not the 
Platonists, who became deans, bishops, and arch-bishops.24 
N ext to the practical Churchman ship of the Latitudinarians, the Cambridge 
Platonists' philosophical theology has been read as a luxury ill-suited to the 
practicalities of seventeendl century England. As W.M. Spellman argues, 'the 
speculation of the cloister and the college were ill-suited to the demands of dle busy 
urban parish.' The obverse of this view is that the Latitudinarians are seen as 
intellectually dlin. Popular in their time but lacking the rigour and power of the 
Cambridge Platonists. Spellman again argues that the Latitudinarians, compared to 
the Cambridge Platonists, 'seem to be without ... spiritual commitment or 
ViS(Ofllltess COIllJlq)', Hml)' More alld their F,icilds 1642-1684, ed. Marjorie Nicolson, revised by Sarah 
Hutton (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), p.243]. 
24 Shapiro, Probabili!J' alld Ce!1aill!J', p.107. It is more likely that the ecclesiastical preferment the 
Cambridge Platonists received was as much to do with the theological-political make-up of 
Restoration England as with any conscious desire on the part of the Cambridge Platonists to distance 
themselves from the realities of the seventeenth century. All the main Cambridge Platonists accepted 
the act of Uniformity. This allowed \\lhichcote to take up his various livings in London after 1660, 
also both Cudworth and More were also Prebendaries of Gloucester CathedraL However preferment 
beyond tllls most likely limited because of the perception, by the hierarchy of the Restoration 
Church, of tlle Cambridge Platonists as willing accomplices Witll the Protectorate. 
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otherworldly direction, often emerging as little more than complacent heralds of 
religious rationalism and tepid moralism.'25 
This clear separation assumed by some recent commentators is at odds with 
the contemporaty assessment of the relationship between the two groups. Although 
there are obvious differences in style between tlle Cambridge Platonists and tlle 
Latitudinarians, the closeness of the relationship between the Cambridge Platonists 
and the Latitudinarians is difficult to deny. Many of the latter school were educated 
by the Cambridge Platonists at Cambridge. The obvious examples being Simon 
Patrick, who came under the influence of John Smith whilst a student at Queens,' 
and John Tillotson who was a student and later fellow of Clare Hall under 
Cudworth. The Latitudinarians can also be interpreted as developing from a 
tradition of anti-Calvinist Puritanism which, as we saw in Chapter Two, 
characterises tlle development of the Cambridge Platonists.26 In fact Isabel Rivers 
attributes the general antipathy of the Latitudinarians towards Calvinism to the 
influence of ' :le Cambridge Platonists on the education and intellectual 
development of many of the Latitudinarians.27 This pedagogical debt is shown by 
the fact that Simon Patrick preached the sermon at the funeral of John Smith and 
Tillotson fulfilled the same task at the funerals of both John Worthington and 
Benjamin Whichcote. Perhaps most tellingly, the earliest defences of the Cambridge 
Platonists, as 'men of latitude' were published by members of the later group. Chief 
25 Spellman, Latitudillarialls, pp.116 & 2. Also see John Gascoigne, Camblidge ill the Age of the 
Elllightellmellt: S denee, religioll, alld politics jlmJ/ the Restoratioll to the FrendJ Revoilltioll (CUP, Cambridge, 
1989), pA2. 
26 A polemical pamphlet published in 1706 titled All Histolical Aa;ollllt if Comprehensioll alld Toleratioll. 
From the Old PURITAN to the Nell! LATITUDINARIAN; Jvith their colltill!leS projects alld Desiglls, ill 
oppositioll to 0111' more Orthodox Establishmellt, makes this link explicitly, This pamphlet is also of interest 
in that it describes this tradition as passing directly from the Cambridge Platonists to the 
Latitudinarians, and from Cudworth and Tillotson in particular, pp.42-6L 
27 Rivers, Reasoll, Grace, alld Sentimellt, 1:30. Also see, Locke, Tillotsoll, p.18; Mark Goldie and John 
Spurr, 'Politics and the Restoration Parish: Edward Fowler and the Struggle for St Giles Cripplegate' 
in Ellglish HistO/im! Revielv (1994), pp.572-96, p.582. 
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amongst these defences are Edward Fowler's The Principles and Pradices ojCeltaill 
JI10derate Divines oj the Chtlrch oj England (greatlY mis-tlnderstood) Tn/a' Represented and 
Difellded, and Simon Patrick's A bliif accotll1t if the New Sed ojLatittide-mell together with 
some rif/edions 1IPOl1 the New Philosopf?y.28 This link is made more explicit by Joseph 
Glanvill, a disciple of Hemy More, in his account of the fictional 'University of 
Cupri,' a thinly veiled allusion to Cambridge of the time. In tllls he describes a 
gallery of portraits of the luminaries of 'Cupri Univeristy.' Glanvill describes by the 
use of anagrams 'Cupri-Cosnlits' which included both members of the Cambridge 
Platonists and the Latitudinarians. Making no distinction between the two groups, 
Glanvill includes in his roll-call of the 'Cupri-Cosnlits,' Cudworth, Whichcote, 
Patrick, George Rust, Snlith, More, and Stillingfleet.29 Other recent commentators 
have been more willing to follow the accepted line of members of the group by 
noting the obvious links between the Cambridge Platonists and the Latitudinarians. 
Moving beyond the obvious distinctions of style and geography G.R. Cragg argues 
that, 'Stillingfleet, Tillotson, Patrick, Fowler and Burnet ... nlight modify the 
teachings of the Platonists, but the imprint of the older men was upon them to the 
end.'30 This imprint is nowhere found more clearly, I believe, than in the theological 
28 Edward Fowler, The Primiples alld Pradices ~fCe'taili j\1oderate Divines of the Ch/lrch ifEllglalid (greatD' 
mis-Nllderstood) TI7ID' RepreseJIted alld D~fellded (London, 1670); S.[imon] P.[atrick], A bri~fac(o'lIlt ~fthe 
Neill Sed ifLatit/lde-JJJeJI together JIIith some reflediolls /lPOIl the Neill Phiiosopl!J', (London, 1662). This latter 
text was only published under the initials S.P. although it is widely accepted to be from the hand of 
Simon Patrick. John Gascoigne has argued that Patrick published this defence of the 
Latitudinarianism of the liberal Cambridge Divines, of which he was one at the time, after he was 
denied the Presidency of Queens' [Gascoigne, Cambridge, pp.35,41]. John Spurr has cast doubt on the 
accepted belief that Patrick was the author of this tract [see Spurr, '"Latitudinarianism''' p.70]. 
29 Jackson I. Cope, "'The Cupri-Cosmits": Glanvill on Latitudinarian anti-Enthusiasm' in The 
Hfilitiligtoll LibralJ' QflarterD', "A,\TII:3 (1954), pp.269-86, pp.273-85 
30 Cragg, From Pflritallislll to the Age ~fReasoll, p.60. The quote continues, 'In ethics, the Cambridge 
Platonists established a tradition which determined the character of English moral philosophy for a 
century and a half. In political theory they interpreted the idea of sovereignty in a way which Locke 
expanded, popularized, and established as the ruling principle in English political thought. But the 
Cambridge Platonists are not important simply because of the nature and extent of their influence. 
They represent as profound a restatement of Christianity as English theology has produced, and their 
unswerving conviction of the grandeur and scope of the divine activity gives to their writing a dignity 
and a persuasive power which neither the changes of fashion nor the passage of time have obscured.' 
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and ethical understanding of the doctrine of dle Trinity in the writings of the 
Latitudinarians. This is most clearly visible in works on the Trinity written by two of 
the leading Latitudinarians: Edward Fowler's Cef1aill Propositiolls By which the Doctline 
if the Tlini!J' is so Explailled, ftrst published in 1694, and John Tillotson's Sermons 
COllcemillg the Divillity alld Incarllation q/otlr Blessed Saviotlrwhich were written in the 
early 1680s but published in 1693. If we place these two accounts of the Trinity in 
the context of the political implications of the anti-Trinitarian debates of the late-
seventeenth centU17 we can see the Latitudinarians take a coherent middle position 
within this debate, a position that has its intellectual basis in Cudworth's doctrine of 
the Trinity. 
What is of particular interest in both these works is the manner in which 
Fowler and Tillotson deftne the Trinity in a way which places them between the 
opposing Socinian and high-Church accounts of the Trinity. Tillotson, in particular, 
published his Sermons as a direct riposte to high-Church critics who believed that his 
reliance on reason in his thought made him tend towards Socinianism. Implicit in 
these high-Church criticisms, which Fowler also faced, was the belief that the 
Apostolic nature of the Church could only be maintained with a sound doctrine of 
the Trinity at its heart. In this context bodl Fowler and Tillotson's replies are 
interesting for two reasons. Firsdy their defences of the Trinity, to borrow Richard 
Aaron's phrase from another context, 'breathe with the spirit of a Cudworth.,3! Both 
betray a debt to Cudworth's Platonic and Logocentric account of the Trinity which, 
as we have already seen, is the central term of Cudworth's moral and political 
thought. Secondly, both Fowler and Tillotson consciously avoid deftning the Trinity 
as dle theological basis of dle jure divillo legitimacy of the established Church. These 
31 Richard Aaron, JolJll Lod~e (OUP, Oxford, 1971), p.27. 
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influential divines use the Trinity in a manner which falls outside the theological-
political context of the Trinitarian debates suggested by the neo-republican 
interpretation of historians like Pocock.32 What Fowler and Tillotson present instead 
in these works is an intellectually coherent middle position in which the Trinity is 
the Cudworthian principle by which man knows not only his own moral 
individualism, but also the moral and political responsibilities of that individualism 
within the broader community. 
Edward Fowler is in the minority of the Latitudinarians in that he was not 
educated at Cambridge. Instead he received his education at Corpus Christi College, 
Oxford, the former college of Thomas Jackson. Despite this, Fowler appears to 
have quickly fallen under the influence of the Cambridge Platonists. As we have 
already seen, his 1670 work, The PrillcipleJ alld Practii'eJ ofCeJtaill Moderate DivineJ if the 
Church ifEnglalld, was one of the fIrst public defences of the Cambridge Platonists 
as Latitudinarians. He also benefIted from the patronage of Henry More, becoming 
a Canon of Gloucester Cathedral in 1676 when More resigned his place on the 
Cathedral Chapter in Fowler's favour. Fowler was also close to the Cudworth 
family. Fowler was, with John Locke and Edward Clark, one of the executor's of the 
will of Cudworth's wife Damaris. He was also a benefIciary of that will, receiving 
from Mrs Cudworth a 'broad mirror' which had belonged to Henry More and a 
share with the other executors of the remainder of her estate once her eldest son, 
John Cudworth, had received £350.33 
32 Tillotson's position outside neo-republican context of the Trinitarian debates in and out of the 
established Church is conftrmed by the posthumous criticisms of Tillotson by the non-juror Charles 
Leslie in his The Charge q{ S Ot7l1iallism Agaillst Dr Tillotsoll (ollsidered, III Examillatioll q{ S olJle S erl/lOIlS He 
has lateIJI Published 011 pm pose to dear hill/selffrom the Ill/plltatioll . . . B)I a Tme SOli oftbe Chlln-/; (Edinburgh, 
1695). 
33 Christ's College r'iIS.77, The If:7ill q{Da!JIaJis ClldJll0l1h. 
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Fowler's PropoJitiol1S take the form of 28 arguments by which he believes one 
can account for the Trinity on the rational grounds as given by the Nicene Fathers. 
In this endeavour Fowler recognises explicitly his debt to Cudworth.34 In this way 
this work should not be viewed as an original work, but as a pamphlet which 
outlined simply the rational defence of the Trinity defmed by Cudworth's TISU. 
Fowler's PropoJitiol1S are primarily aimed at defending this defInition of the Trinity 
against accusations, one imagines, similar to those made by Turner in his DiJcoJl1'Je 
COllcernillg tbe ]vIeJJiaJ, that such a Platonic and rational defence of the Trinity 
inevitably leads to Socinianism. For this reason Fowler concentrates his attack on 
what he perceives to be the misplaced belief that the rational explanation of the 
second person being rationally subordinate to the fIrst person of the Trinity 
necessarily means that the second person is created. This, Fowler argues, is a 
deliberate misinterpretation of the Trinity by Arians and Socinians. Fowler argues 
that the relationship of the second person to the fIrst is that of a necessary 
emanation. This Neoplatonic defmition, which we have already encountered in 
Cudworth, is enough, Fowler believes, to dispute the belief that 'there was at least a 
Moment of Time when the Son was not; and that He is a Creature.,35 Fowler again 
alludes directly to an argument Cudworth uses in the TISU arguments when he 
defInes this emanation using the metaphor of the relationship of the light to the sun. 
Fowler argues: 
Ligbt doth exist by necessary Emanatioll from the Still, and therefore the Still 
3-1 Edward Fowler, Celtaill Propositiolls Bji IvhidJ the Doctlille ~lthe HOD' Tlilli()' Is so Explailled, Auordillg to 
the Allcient Fathers as to speak it !lot COlltradicto!)! to Natural Reasoll. (London, 1719), no.28. 
35 Ibid., no.21. 
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was not before the light which proceeds from thence in Order of Time, 
though it be in Order of NattilY! before it.36 
Fowler uses this metaphor to defIne the Trinity as a substantive unity, which still 
maintains a distinction in the persons of the Trinity. This defInition again follows 
Cudworth's controversial H01JJoottJiall understanding of the consubstantial nature of 
th T ·· 37 e nruty. 
Fowler's defence, primarily because of its form, shows us litde more than 
the presence of Cudworth's Trinitarianism in Fowler's thought. Despite this, 
Fowler's PropoJitiollJ are of interest for two reasons. Firsdy, they show the clear 
power and respect with which Cudwordl'S arguments for the Trinity were held after 
his death in 1688. Secondly, it shows the manner in which Cudwordl's rational 
defence of the Trinity was deployed to express a form of Trinitarianism which not 
only refutes Socinianism, but also denies the high-Church, apostolic def1nition of 
dle Trinity. In this manner we can see in Fowler's PropoJitiollJ a defence of the 
Trinity which falls outside that suggested by dle neo-republican interpretation. 
In the same year that Fowler's PropoJitiollJ appeared, Tillotson, at the time 
Archbishop of Canterbury, published his SermollJ Concerning The DivinitJ' and 
Incarnation if ottr BleJJed Saviotll: Tillotson published these sermons to refute anti-
Trinitarian accusations made against him.38 The SermollJwere originally preached 
during two successive Christmastides in 1679 and 1680 at St Lawrence Jewry where 
Whichcote was minister. Tillotson's defence of the Trinity, like Fowler's, betrays an 
36 Ibid., no.18, compare with TISU, p.595, 'Both the Fatber alld the SOli is God: Bllt be as it }Ilere all 
Exuberallt FOlllltaill, this as a Strea", de/illed from hitJ/: He like to the 51111, This like a Rq)1 extmded from the 
SUII.' 
37 Fowler, Cel1aill Propositiolls, no.22. 
38 Locke, Tillotson, p.93. 
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intellectual debt to the Cudworth and the TISU in particular. Tillotson's SermoNs also 
allow us to see more clearly than is shown in Fowler's PropositioNs how the 
Latitudinarians develop their characteristic moral and ethical teachings out of their 
Cudworthian Trinitarian position. Tillotson's intellectual debt to Cudworth is 
matched by the high personal regard with which each held the other. As previously 
mentioned Tillotson was a student and later fellow of Clare Hall whilst Cudworth 
was Master there in the 1640s and 1650s. In 1664 Cudworth preached and later 
published a sermon given at Lincoln's Inn whilst Tillotson was chaplain there. In 
the same year Cudworth, during his dispute with Henry More as described in 
Chapter Four, asks John Worthington in a letter to seek Tillotson's advice on how 
Cudworth could best publicly acknowledge his debt to Archbishop Sheldon.39 Also 
Cudworth was, late in life, complementary about Tillotson's work on devotion.4t1 
This respect was reciprocated by Tillotson, in his sermon at Benjamin Whichcote's 
funeral in 1684, where he described his former Master as the 'ancient and 
learned ... Dr Cudworth.'41 
Tillotson's SermoNs take the form of an exegesis of the clauses of the 
prologue to John's Gospel. To overcome accusations of anti-Trinitarianism he 
continually stresses the existence of the second person of the Trinity, the Logos, 
from eternity. The eternal nature of the Logos places it, he argues, within the unified 
understanding of the triune Godhead. To explain the complicated relationship of 
the Logos to the first person of the Trinity, the Fathe/~ Tillotson relies on the 
39 Worthington, Dia!)!, II:142. 
40 Fk[.4983, fo1.104. 
41 John Tillotson, The Jf70rks ~r the il10st RevereJId DrJolJII Til/otsoll, Late An-hbishop ~l Callterb/l!)I: 
COlltaillillg Flli)! FOllr S e/7J10IlS alld Discollrses, 011 severa/Occasiolls. Together with the R;t!e Of Faith (London, 
1696), p.268. 
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Neoplatonic metaphor of the first person as an emanating fountain. He defines dle 
relationship of the Logos to the Father in the following terms: 
The Evangelist, adds ... the same was ill the beginllillg with God, that is though the 
TJ:7ord was truly and really God, yet was not God the Fathel; who is the 
Fountain of the Deity, but an Emanation from him, the only begotten Son 
of God from all eternity with him. 42 
The Neoplatonic nature of this emanation is further reinforced by Tillotson's 
interpretation of the Logos not merely in the form of the person of Christ but as the 
principle of reason.43 The Logos, Tillotson argues, is not simply a guiding principle, 
but also the creative principle in the world. This creative nature implicit in the Logos 
allows Tillotson to distance himself from criticisms of Socinianism by arguing that 
the Logos as a creative principle cannot itself be a creature.44 Tillotson's 
interpretation of the eternal nature of the Logos follows almost exacdy that which we 
find in Cudworth. The Logos fulfils the role of the active and creative principle in the 
divine, manifesting and reflecting the intellectual source of the divine. Tillotson's 
separation between the intellectual source of the divine and the perceptive and 
creative nature of the Logos follows Cudworth's Plotinian distinction between 
intellect and understanding in dle divine. 
Tillotson, like Cudworth, finds historical credence for the Logos as the 
creative principle in the world from the ancient theology of the Jewish Cabala and 
-12 John Tilltoson, Sef7JJOllS COllcemillg the DiviflifJ' afld Iflcamatioll of 01lr Blessed Saviollr (London, 1693) 
p.23 . 
.j3 Ibid. p.24 . 
.j-l Ibid. p.38. 
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Platonic tradition. Tillotson argues that in both traditions the Logos is used to 
describe the efficient cause in the world. So Tillotson argues: 
And so likewise Philo the Jew calls him fry whom God made the World, the J¥7ord if 
God, and the SOil if God. And Plato probably had the same notion from the 
Jews which made Ameiitls, the Platollist, when he read the beginnings of St 
Johns Gospel to say, this Babarian agrees with Plato, makiJlg the Word ill the order 
if the Prillciples; meaning that he made the TJ;7ord the Ptinciple or efficient 
Cause of the World, as Plato has done.45 
Tillotson therefore follows the ptisca theologia, which is so prevalent in the TISU, by 
arguing that ancient wisdom was ultimately fulfilled in the Gospel revelation of 
Christ as Logos. 46 
Tillotson, although recognising these Cabalistic and Pagan sources, does not 
rely on them as heavily as Cudworth. Tillotson prefers instead to base his _ 
interpretation primarily on the revealed truth of Christianity. Tillotson argues that 
without this revealed truth the ancient knowledge of the Logos as a creative principle 
can only descend into 'fancies and conceits.' The central failure of the 'jewish 
Cabalists and the Schools of Pythogoras and Plato' was that they lacked the correct 
structure within which to interpret the Logos as both God and creator.47 Without the 
revealed truth of Christ as Logos they simply revert to a 'confused Genealogy of 
DeitieJ·.'48 The purpose of John's prologue is, for Tillotson, to refute and deny pagan 
~s Ibid., p.9. 
~6 TISU, p.557. 
~7 Tillotson, S erlJlOIlJ, p.12. 
~8 Ibid., p.12. 
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interpretations of Logos, replacing them with the full revealed tlUth of Christ as 
Logos. As Tillotson puts it in his fIrst sermon: 
the Evangelist shows that all this fanciful Genealog)! of DilJine Emal1atiol1 ... was 
a mere conceit and imagination: and that all those glorious Tides did really 
meet in the A1essias which is the IT/ord, and who before his Incarnation was 
from all eternity with God, partaker of his Divine Nature and Glory.49 
The vehemence of Tillotson's criticism of pagan thought would, as already stated, 
appear to distance him from Cudwordl. Tillotson in dus sense relies much more on 
biblical proofs in his sermons than Cudworth who, as we have seen, bases much of 
his defence of the Trinity on the specifIc claims of Plato and Plotinus.5o 
Despite his attacks on the validity of pagan and ancient theology, Tillotson 
maintains a N eoplatonic stmcture for not only the eternal creation of the Logos but 
also the internal structure of the Trinity. Tillotson, like Cudworth and Fowler, uses 
dle metaphor of the sun and the rays of light from the sun to explain dle 
relationship of the Logos to the Father. He argues the Logos is 'God by participation 
of the Divine Nature and Happiness together with the Fathel; and by way of 
derivation from dUs as the light from the Sun.' This quote, is, he argues, the 'best 
and fIttest that can be given' for the mystery of the Trinity.51 Tillotson, again like 
Fowler, uses dUs metaphor to distinguish between the unifIed substance of the 
Trinity and the distinct persons of dle Trinity. Here, as with Fowler, he follows 
Cudworth's contentious interpretation of the Homootlsiall form of the triune God. 
49 Ibid., p.16. 
50 TISU, p.5S0, compare with Tillotson, Semlolls, p.l2S. 
51 Tillotson, Semlolls, p.36, also see TISU, p.59S. 
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This interpretation for the relationship of the Logos to the Father allows Tillotson to, 
as he says, 'describe to us that which is commonly called the Divine and so any thing 
I could ever see properly enough, the distinctioll rfpenoll in the Deity.52 
Tillotson's concentration on the biblical proofs of the Trinity in a 
Neoplatonic framework allows him to counter the threats and accusation of 
Socinianism made against him. He argues that the characteristic rational biblical 
exegesis of Socinianism, by concentrating on the words alone, fails to appreciate the 
full meaning and truth of scripture. For this reason he derides Socinian opponents 
of the Trinity for claiming they have reason on their side. As with Cudworth's 
defence of the Trinity, Tillotson argues that Socinians cannot claim to have reason 
on their side if they propagate a theory which undermines the Trinitarian God as 
the source of that reason.53 The incompressibility of the Trinity to human reason 
should not allow man to undermine the implicit and infinite rationality of the 
T · 'ty 54 r1lli . 
Tillotson's concentration of the correct, rational, appreciation of the Trinity 
did not remove accusations of Socinianism made against him. As we saw in Chapter 
Three, Socinianism had long been used as a shorthand for those who brought too 
much of the principle of reason into theological debate. This was certainly the case 
with the non-juror Charles Leslie who continued to accuse Tillotson of Socinianism 
after his death in 1695. Perhaps alluding to the Platonism of Tillotson's defence, 
Leslie argues, 'he does not really believe it; tho' he endeavours with all his Art, to 
cast a Mist before the Reader's Eyes, in other Expressions, which to some might 
52 Tillotson, S ertJIOIlS, p.23. 
53 Ibid., pp.115-8. 
5~ Ibid., p.162. Tillotson's argument here mirrors Cudworth's assertions in the TISU that the 
Christian Trinity, 'dlough a mystery,' is still more reasonable in form than any other explanation of 
dle Trinitarian form of the divine, TISU, p.560. 
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seem Testament, as A,ills and his followers did. ,55 It is not a surprise to find Leslie, 
as a non-juror, criticising Tillotson's supposed Socinianism as undermining the 
authority and legitimacy of the Church. Leslie's high-Church response to Tillotson 
fits the neo-republican interpretation of high-Church Trinitarianism outlined above. 
However, like Fowler, Tillotson never attacks Socinianism and anti-Trinitarianism 
for undermining the legitimacy of the Church. Consequendy we find in Tillotson 
and Fowler's Trinitarianism an appreciation of dle Trinity made from in the 
established Church which does not fit the structure suggested by the neo-republican 
interpretation. As we have seen, Tillotson relies on, what he argues is, the authentic 
reason of the Trinity to provide the most effective means of undermining the 
dangers of Socinianism. It is in the use of this argument that he and Fowler present 
a third position which falls outside the neo-republican interpretation. This third 
position, as Tillotson goes onto conclude in the fourth of his sermons, places the 
end of the Trinity not in the apostolic legitimisation of the established Church, but 
in the moral responsibility of the individual. 
For Tillotson the end of the Trinity always resides in the practical and moral 
code that it teaches man. The Trinity, he argues, is the fulf:tlment of redemption of 
man and reconciliation of God to man.56 The Logos is a principle of inward 
reformation which leads to outward change. He states in his fourth sermon, '[a]ll 
that He hath done for us withottt tiS will avail us nothing, unless we be inwardlY 
transformed and renewed in the Jpirit if ottr mind.s: unless we become /lew creattlre/57 Far 
from being a 'complacent herald of. .. tepid moralism,'58 both Fowler and Tillotson 
55 [Charles Leslie], Tbe Cbarge if SotiliiallislJJ Agaillst Dr Tillotsoll aJilsidered. III Examillatioll ~r SOllie Sermolls 
He bas lateD' Pllblisbed 011 Pili pose to clear Himselffrom tbat Imputatioll . . . BJ' a Tme S 011 ~r tbe CbllnfJ 
(Edinburgh, 1695), p.i. 
56 Tillotson, S ermOIlS, ppA 7, 18i. 
57 Ibid., p.217. 
58 Spellman, Latitlldillmialls, p. 2 
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present sophisticated defences of the Trinity which have their basis in Cudworth's 
thought. Tillotson, more than Fowler, then shows how the practical teachings for 
which the Latitudinarians are remembered develop directly from tlus Cudworthian 
understanding of the Trinity. Tlus inward transformation carries with it a basic 
assumption that the rewards of the transforming power of tl1e Trinity brings with it 
the demands of service towards God. This is, however, as with Cudworth, not to 
take the form of an inward looking asceticism, but through an active, tolerant and 
humble outward life. Tillotson argues tl1at man cannot nillror God in the form of 
divinity or nliracles, but can resemble the ethically driven life 'Innocencey, Humility, 
Meekness and Patience.,59 
It is possible, as we shall see below, to establish this link between the Trinity 
and teachings on moral and political responsibility in Fowler's otl1er writings. In this 
way it is possible to see how both Tillotson and Fowler, as leading figures in the 
late-seventeenth centuq Church, teach that the Trinity brings man to an inward 
moral reformation, a theoq that nillrors Cudworth's own belief in the moral 
responsibility of man. The Latitudinarians' continual instance on the moral nature 
of Christianity has led many, as already stated, to down play the intellectual and 
theological core of their thought. However, if we place the Latitudinarians together 
with the Cambridge Platonists we can identify a theological core to their moral and 
ethical rationalism. This moral rationalism is explicable in the Latitudinarians if we 
understand that for them all activity is implicitly ethical. The actions of grace are 
therefore synonymous with virtue.60 This elision between activity and grace is 
explicable when all life is understood, in Platonic terms, as the participatoq activity 
59 Tillotson, Sermolls, p.233. 
60 Rivers, Reason, Graa] alld S8IltitJIeJlt, 1:74-5. 
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of man in all parts of a divinely ordained creation. Therefore by restating the 
intellectual roots of the Latitudinarians in the theology of the Cambridge Platonists 
one can identify an intellectual coherence which underpins the active and practical 
nature of Latitudinarian teaching. 
VilA. A proto-liberal theology of Toleration 
As we have seen, it is possible to identify the clear influence of Cudworth on the 
intellectual development of the Latitudinarians. By way of conclusion I would like to 
argue that this influence can be identified not only in the moral and religious 
teachings of the Latitudinarians, but also in the explicit political actions of the 
Latitudinarians in dle [mal decades of the seventeenth century. In particular I 
believe dlat if the philosophical and theological basis of the Latitudinarians is 
recognised we can identify a deeper and more profound context within which to 
understand the debates for religious toleration and comprehension that existed in 
late-seventeenth century England. The Toleration Act of 1689 allowed for freedom 
of religious expression only for those who conformed to the doctrine of the Trinity. 
The existence of this clause in the Toleration Act has allowed some neo-republican 
interpreters of this period to argue dlat the Trinitarianism of the Toleration Act 
confirms the existence of the confessional form of the English state at the time. The 
explicit denial of religious toleration to anti-Trinitarians and their continued 
subjection to the penalties of Elizabethan and Jacobean law, is seen by the neo-
republican interpretation as a sign of the lengths to which the political establishment 
would go to maintain dle theological and politicallegitimisation of the English 
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confessional state.61 The problem with this explanation is that the major movers in 
the drafting and passing of the Toleration Act, the Latitudinarians, did not, as we 
have seen, use the Trinity to defend the established Church in the apostolic terms 
suggested by the neo-republican intetpretation. In fact, as we shall go on to see, they 
actively distanced themselves from the apostolic legitimisation of the Church. 
Although a high-Church defence of the apostolic nature of the Church did exist, 
this was not the motivating factor in the Latitudinarians' desire for an explicitly 
Trinitarian form of toleration. Instead, I would argue that the Latitudinarians defend 
the Trinity as a theological and philosophical justification of the morally responsible 
individual. Not only did this use of the Trinity inform their views on 
comprehension and toleration but it also informed their understanding of how 
political legitimacy was created. 
Many of the Latitudinarians were active in attempts to extend the 
boundaries of the Church of England to other denominations. They wished to 
create through comprehension not merely the toleration by law of certain moderate 
sects but the acceptance of most Trinitarian denominations in the established 
Church. For this reason the Latitudinarians believed tllat an established Church that 
appealed to individual morality and faith over institutional and sacerdotal 
justifications would be more effective in attracting dissenters who at the time 
existed outside the established Church.62 This concentration on moderation and tlle 
individual has its source in the Cudworthian Trinitarianism we have already seen 
advocated by Fowler and Tillotson. Moderation and tolerance towards dissenters is 
clearly identifiable in the actions of many of the Latitudinarians. Tillotson, although 
61 Clark, Ellglish Sodef)l, p.283. 
62 Rivers, Reasoll, Grace alld S el!tifJIel!t, 1:98. 
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often fierce in his attacks on Roman CadlOlicism, never criticised Trinitarian 
dissenters in his sermons and Edward Fowler was highly censured for protecting 
dissenters in his Parish of St Giles Cripplegate.63 Something of Fowler's moderation 
can be found in his 1670 Prillciples. AldlOugh stressing his obedience and conformity 
to the Church of England, Fowler also states that he is open and accepting of non-
conformity.64 One of Fowler's protagonists declares early on in the dialogue 'I 
declare for my part, and I care not who knows it, that I love with my whole heart a 
sober and peaceably minded Nonconformist, as much Conformist I am myself.,65 
These liberal views drove the Latitudinarians to become principal movers in 
the attempts to bring about tolerance and comprehension in the Church of England 
in the final two decades of the seventeenth century. The major aim of the 
Latitudinarians was to bring stability to the Church through wider comprehension in 
the Church. Tillotson was active in the drafting of a bill for comprehension which 
was presented to Parliament in 1681 by Daniel Finch, son of Heneage Finch, 
dedicatee of Cudworth's TISU, and nephew of Anne, Viscountess Conway, friend, 
pupil and correspondent of Henry More.66 Although this bill failed this did not 
prevent Tillotson, Patrick, Stillingfleet and Fowler continuing their efforts to bring 
comprehension to the established Church. This was hampered by Court and Church 
opposition to the principle of toleration through the fmal years of dle reign of 
Charles II and the brief reign of James II. However, new impetus was brought to 
63 Ibid., 1:46; Goldie and Spurr, 'Politics and the Restoration Parish.' 
6.\ Fowler, Prilldples, pp.323. This is a defence of the episcopacy as tile form of Church government. 
Fowlers claims to conformity never suggest, or draw on, tile apostolic nature and defence of the 
established Church. 
65 Ibid., p.28. 
66 Roger Thomas, 'Comprehension and Indulgence,' in From UlltlO/7JJif)! to Uility, ed. Geoffrey F.Nutall 
and Owen Chadwick (SPCI(, London, 1962), pp.189-255;John Spurr, 'The Church of England, 
Comprehension and the Toleration Act of 1689,' in Ellglish Histo/ital Revielv, 104, (1989), pp.927-46, 
p.936. The Finch family provided protection and support for both the Cambridge Platonists and tile 
Latitudinarians, see, Gascoigne, Cambridge, pp.45-8. A full examination of the role and place of ilie 
Finch family in these debates is needed. 
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d1e claims for comprehension following ilie Revolution of 1688. The Toleration Act 
which was eventually passed was effectively a codification of previous Royal 
proclamations for indulgence (wiili ilie exception that Catholics remained excluded). 
TIlls process, in which many of ilie Latitudinarians were heavily involved, was 
intended as d1e first part of a double-headed Parliamentaq action which would have 
seen comprehension introduced on d1e back of dlls initial Toleration Act. This 
process was masterminded by Daniel Finch, by dlls point the Earl of Nottingham. 
The bills, however, were drafted and brought forward through the efforts of the 
Latitudinarians. The plan to introduce comprehension failed and the limited 
religious freedom of the Toleration Act was ilie only concrete political aclllevement 
of ilie political activities of d1e Latitudinarians.67 
The failure of the Latitudinarians' plans for religious comprehension should 
not dinllnish their importance in ilie political debates of the late-seventeenth 
centuq, nor should it dinllnish their place in d1e development a of liberal, tolerant 
tradition in English iliought. At ilie heart of the proto-liberal arguments of the 
Latitudinarians is belief in the moral integrity of the individual, a belief which is 
founded on a Cudworthian interpretation of the Trinity. The development of dlls 
principle of moral individualism through to explicit political arguments is found 
most clearly in the writing of Edward Fowler. As we have seen, Fowler, in his 
PropoJitiollJ~ clearly accepts Cudworth's Platonic defence of d1e Trinity. However, 
because of the brevity of the PropoJitiollJ we need to look deeper into Fowler's work 
to how he uses the Trinity to defme his ilieoq of the moral and political integrity of 
the individual. The explicit political implications of Fowler's Trinitarianism can be 
identified in his Plilhip/eJ, where he argues iliat the priesiliood of Christ is not given 
67 Thomas, 'Comprehension and Indulgence,' pp.233-53. 
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privately to his apostles but publicly to all men. Fowler therefore rejects one of the 
central tenets of the sacerdotal justification for the authority of the established 
Church, that the authority of the Church was created by the apostolic succession of 
the Priesthood. Fowler believes that tlle priesthood of man was given to all 
collectively. This is, of course, a teaching central to reformed Christianity and 
therefore cannot be viewed as peculiar to the Latitudinarians or the Cambridge 
Platonists.68 However, if Fowler's claim is viewed in the light of his use of Cudworth 
and in the political context of the Trinitarian debates. of the time, we can interpret 
Fowler's use of this central argument of the reformed tradition as a continuation of 
Cudworth's belief in the active and divinely inspired rational faculty within all men. 
This link to Cudworth is made even more explicitly by Fowler when, within his 
Pliflciples, he identifies the divine nature of this rational faculty through an allusion to 
Cudworth's belief in the eternal and inlmutable nature of morality and the 
intellectualist principles that they assume. As Fowler's interlocutor Theophillus 
states: 
There is all eternal Reasoll, wi!)! that which is good should be so alld reqtfired, and wi?} 
that which is evil should be so and forbidden; which depellds Ilot so much 011 the dilJille 
will as the divine nature.69 
Through the rational recognition of these principles, Fowler argues that man is able 
to make his outward moral actions an expression of his inward reformation. Again 
in a very Cudworthian manner, Fowler argues that, '[m]oral righteousness ... 
68 Fowler, Plillciples, p.326. 
69 Ibid., pp.12-13. 
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consisteth in the Regulation of both the otttward and inward man, according to the 
unchangeable Laws of righteousness.,7o Fowler argues that the necessarily ethical 
nature of this inner reformation of man leads man, as in Cudworth, inevitably to a 
political position. Fowler acknowledges that the moderation that he is suggesting 
would be interpreted by many as undermining the authority of the Church and dle 
King.71 Despite these accusations, Fowler argues, lil(e Cudworth, that a political 
community should be legitimised by the collective will of the members of that body 
politic. He, therefore, follows Cudworth in developing a proto-liberal account of the 
legitimisation of the political community, one dlat holds the priesthood of all 
believers as its founding principle. Fowler in his Plillciples creates a coherent political 
structure in which the ethical implications of man's individualism can be realised. 
What we fmd in the proto-liberalism of the Cambridge Platorusts and the 
Latitudinarians is a response to the political upheaval of the seventeenth century, 
which places man's relationship to God as Trinity at its heart. This proto-liberal 
response rejects bodl the Erastian defence of the Trinity of high-Churchmen and 
the republicanism implicit in dle anti-Trintarianism of the time. The former 
argument, the Cambridge Platonists and the Latitudinarians argue, diminishes their 
belief that all men are the rightful heirs to the priesthood and divinity of Christ. 
They reject the latter argument because, by denying the divinity of Christ, anti-
Trinitarianism denies the active rational principle which defmes man's humanity in 
the world. The middle, proto-liberal position is therefore defined on both sides by 
its explanation of human agency and moral self-determined individualism as 
developing from within the doctrine of the Trinity. The Trinitarianism of the proto-
70 Ibid., p.119. 
71 Ibid., p.332. 
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liberal position exemplified by the Cambridge Platonists and the Latitudinarians also 
suggests a more coherent context within which to understand the debates of 
toleration and comprehension. The proto-liberal response, with its concentration of 
the Trinity as defming human agency and moral responsibility characteristic of 
humanity, allows us to begin to understand why some dissenters were tolerated but 
only if they upheld the doctrine of the Trinity. Dissent was acceptable as long as the 
defming term of reality, the Trinity, was maintained. The proto-liberal position of 
the Cambridge Platonists and the Latitudinarians defines political legitimacy through 
consensual actions of individuals in society. Such an argument places them clearly at 
the forefront of arguments of liberal individualism. Liberal individualism was 
traditionally seen in Whig historicism as one of the great English contributions to 
the Enlightenment. As I argued at the beginning of this Chapter, it is no longer 
possible to accept the traditional Whig interpretation of the organic development of 
liberal individualism through the supposed decline in the power and influence of 
religion in the late-seventeenth century.72 As Clark has shown, it is not possible to 
interpret the seventeenth or the eighteenth century in terms of a period in which 
was society gradually de-theologised. However, tills does not mean, as Clark 
suggests, that this period, because of its theology, was implicitiy conselvative. I 
believe that it is possible to fmd in the writings of the Cambridge Platonists and the 
Latitudinarians a radical and forward looking account of political society which is 
based firmly in the boundaries of Christian orthodoxy. Tills perspective, I believe, 
suggests that is possible to give fuller account of tile theological origins of English 
liberalism than has previously been shown. An account that would, I believe, 
72 The explicit link that exists between Latitudinarians and the political liberalism espoused by late-
seventeenth century \\lhigs is clearly described by the anonymous author of All Histol7m/ Atto/lIlt, 
which states 'a /T7hzgg is no other that a Lqy Latitlldilla/7all.' p.57. 
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necessarily place the metaphysical, ethical and political insights of Ralph Cudworth 
at its heart. 
298 
General Conclusion 
The thesis has provided the first comprehensive survey of the ethical and political 
ideas in the thought of Ralph Cudworth. This process has necessitated not only an 
examination of the explicit political arguments in Cudworth's writings, but also a 
revaluation of the nature of political arguments in seventeenth century thought. In 
particular I have shown how political arguments can develop directly out of 
theological principles, particularly in Cudworth's case out of his doctrine of the 
Trinity. These arguments, as described in the philosophy of Ralph Cudworth, show 
that orthodox theological principles influenced political debate in a positive manner. 
As I argue in the previous chapter it has been traditional, especially in the 
historiography of the late-seventeenth centul)" to view political ideas as developing 
against the theological orthodoxies and religious structures of the day. However, as 
this thesis has shown, we are able to appreciate a deeper understanding of 
seventeenth centul), political debate if we are willing to accept that seventeenth 
centul), political debate existed in forms and structures that differ from those we 
recognise today. 
By exploring this relationship between the theological and the political in 
Cudworth's thought I have had to re-examine two important contexts which affect 
our understanding of the Cudworth's thought. The fltst of these contexts is the 
important question of why, in my view, the Cambridge Platon1sts have constantly 
been misinterpreted. This was the subject of the fltst chapter of this thesis. The 
second of these contexts, which help us understand Cudworth's thought, are the 
intellectual and historical contexts out of which the Cambridge Platon1sts 
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developed. Of these contexts, which I outline in Chapters Two and Three, the most 
important is the complicated relationship that Cudworth, and the other Cambridge 
Platonists, had as Puritans who rejected the voluntarism implicit within 
contemporary Calvinism. 
With these contexts in place I have been able to reconstruct the political 
ideas in Cudworth's thought by showing how these ideas grew directly out of his 
theological principles. The most important of these theological principles is 
Cudwortll's Doctrine of the Trinity which, I have shown, runs through all his 
thought. Cudworth's Trinitarianism develops directly out of his intellectualism. The 
Trinity explains not only the form of the divine, but also the means by which man 
comes to know the principles of justice implicit in God. Key to this understanding 
is the distinction that Cudworth makes between the intellect of the divine, as the 
central principle of God, and the understanding of the divine, as tlle active principle 
which tells man of tlle divine. Cudworth equates this active principle, which he takes 
from Plotinus, with reason. Man therefore is able to move toward and appreciate 
the justice of the divine through the use of his rational faculty. 
The ability of man to choose to move freely towards the principles of justice 
implicit in the divine lies at the heart of Cudworth's defence of freewill which was 
the subject of the Chapter Six of this thesis. In his defence of freewill, which is 
found in Cudworth's extensive unpublished manuscript collection, Cudworth places 
man within a broad vision of the providential plan controlled by the intellect of 
God. As this built on Cudworth's intellectualism Cudwortll argues that he is able to 
reject tlle determinism implicit in voluntarist systems, both theistic and mechanistic, 
of causal effect. Instead Cudworth argues that the vastness of the mind of God can 
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conceive not only a necessa1)T chain of future events, but all possible future events. 
Cudworth therefore defmes human agency as the ability for man to determine his 
own path within this providential web of future possibility. 
Cudworth's theory of man's ethical self-determination acts as the founding 
principle upon which his political ideas develop. In Chapter Six I argue that 
Cudworth develops this system by arguing that the perfect political society is one 
where all members of that society live by laws which they can all recognise through 
their reason as corresponding with the eternal and immutable truths defmed by the 
mind of man. Cudworth's ethical community therefore creates a political society 
where the legitimacy of that community is defmed collective recognition by all 
members of that community of the just laws that control that community. These 
laws are not controlled by the express will of a sovereign or magistrate, but 
maintained by the freely willed actions of all the members of that society. Cudworth 
argues therefore that political society is based upon the equality that all men have as 
creations of God, and the ability that all men possess, through their reason to 
recognise the justice implicit in the laws created by an ethical community. This 
structure is based on Cudworth's assertion that all are equal members of this 
community by virtue of the rationality that they all possess through the active and 
rational revelation of God as Trinity. 
In Chapter Seven I show the way in which the political and ethical structure 
which Cudworth develops out of his doctrine of the Trinity influenced those who 
followed him. Most importantly I show the way in which the characteristic moral 
teachings of Latitudinarian divines, especially John Tillotson and Edward Fowler, 
rest on Trinitarian principles fIrst espoused by Cudworth. Not only does tlus give 
301 
credence to the Latitudinarians who have traditionally been viewed as intellectually 
light-weight, but also creates a fuller understanding of the political and theological 
context of the comprehension and toleration debates in which the Latitudinarians 
played a central role. If the theological and Trinitarian context which lies behind 
these debates is fully understood it is possible, I believe, to recognise the thought of 
Ralph Cudworth as providing the theological and intellectual core to these early 
defences of ethical self-determination and liberal individualism. 
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Appendix - Cudworth's Freewill Manuscripts 
A.t. Introduction 
The purpose of this brief appendix is to describe the form, style, composition and 
age of Cudworth's freewill manuscripts. Cudworth's freewill manuscripts are 
recognised to be the British Libraty Additional Manuscripts 4978-4982. In this 
thesis I have also included FA1.4983, which is traditionally titled 'On the Eternity of 
the Torments,' as part of this group because it deals, in brief comments made by 
Cudworth, with many of the issues dealt with in FM.4978-4982. Of this collection 
the manuscript which most obviously stands alone is FA1.4978. It is the only one of 
the complete manuscripts to have been published, as A Treatise if Freewill in 1838 in 
an edition by John Allen. Of the remaining manuscripts by far the most substantial 
and complete manuscripts are FM.4979 and FM.4980 which both run to well over 
250 folios each. FM.4981 contains two distinct sections. The fIrst section covers the 
vast majority of the pages being a sustained attack on 'divine fatalism.' Added to the 
end of this volume is a summaq chapter of his arguments on freewill of 11 folios in 
length. This has recently been published as 'On the Nature of Liberum Arbitrium' 
in an edition by J .L.Breteau which appears as an appendix to the 1997 collection, 
The Cambridge Platollists in Philosophi{'{/I COlltext. 1 Finally FM.4982 is a collection of 
three shorter, and unrelated sections of manuscript which have been bound by the 
British Libraq into one volume. 
I Ralph Cudworth, 'Additional 11anuscript no.4981 (On the Nature of Liberum Arbitrium),' 
introduced by ].L.Breteau, in The CalJlblidge Platollists ill Philosophii'al COlltext, ed. G.A.]. Rogers et al 
(Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1997), pp.219-231. 
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To date the only comprehensive survey of these manuscripts appears as an 
appendix to John Passmore's Ralph Cttdworth - All Jl1te/pretatioll. In this Passmore 
attempts to place the manuscripts into chronological order based on the differing 
handwriting styles within the manuscripts. This ordering is based on what Passmore 
describes as the 'natural assumption' that there was a steady and identifiable 
development in Cudworth's writing from a traditional Elizabethan 'secretary' hand, 
to a more modern 'Italian' or 'Italic' hand. In this analysis Passmore concentrates 
particularly in Cudworth's inconsistent use of the letters 'c' and 'e.' Using this 
method Passmore categorises the freewill manuscripts into four distinct groups: 
Group 1: FM.4982 BkII, FM.4980 (old 'c' and 'e'). 
Group 2: FM.4982 BkIII, FNI.4979, FNI.4981 (erratic 'c' and old 'e'). 
Group 3: FM.4978 (new 'c' and old 'e'). 
Group 4: FM.4982 BkI (new 'c' and erratic 'e') 
Passmore's thesis is based on two assumptions. Firsdy that Cudwordl's handwriting 
style changed gradually and consistendy over this time. This is possible, Passmore 
claims, if one compares Cudworth's letters with his manuscripts. Secondly, 
Passmore assumes that Cudwordl used the same writing style in both his letters and 
his manuscripts. 
Although dlls dlesis is persuasive it does begin to fall-down upon 
examination. Passmore struggles to explain why Cudworth's hand will change 
between several types in one page. Passmore explains dlls by suggesting that 
Cudworth may have begun a passage in an older style halfway down a page and then 
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returned to the same sheet some years to fill in around this initial work in what 
Passmore judges to be a later hand.2 Despite the peculiarities of Cudworth's 
working habits I believe that Passmore's explanation of how Cudworth wrote his 
manuscripts can be dismissed for four reasons. Firstly, if we are to believe 
Passmore's assertion that Cudworth began sections half way down a page at some 
point and tllen return to the manuscript some years later to complete the process, 
Cudwortll was very consistent in this practice. There are, by my reckoning, very few 
sections of the freewill manuscripts which begin half way down a page with no text 
around it. In the most substantial manuscripts, that is FA1.4979 and FM.4980, 
Cudworth uses all the pages available to him. Secondly Passmore's theory cannot 
explain why Cudworth on occasions corrects and amends sections written in 'Italic' 
hand in what he judges to be the earlier 'secretary' hand. Thirdly, Passmore's theory 
cannot explain satisfactorily how and why Cudworth's hand often changes abruptly 
mid-sentence. Such changes would, I believe better explained by a change of stylus 
rather than by a baroque working habit.3 Fourthly, as we shall come on to see, there 
are philosophical sinillarities between certain manuscripts, which are not held in 
others, which would appear to transcend the groupings suggested by Passmore's 
analysis. This is particularly the case with the obvious sinlliarities which exist 
between FM.4978 and FM.4980, which Passmore places in his Groups 1 and 3 
respectively. 
Although Passmore's analysis is instructive I think, for the reasons outlined 
above, it has to be viewed as flawed. I will below layout the evidence for a more 
detailed analysis of Cudworth's freewill manuscripts. To do this I will examine not 
2 Passmore, Cud/po/th, p.108. 
3 See FAI.4979, f01.194; FAL4981 fols 51,79. 
305 
only the handwriting style, but also paper watermarks, Cudwordl's references to 
published works, and the internal arguments of the manuscripts to establish a new 
chronology for Cudworth's freewill manuscripts. 
A.2. Handwriting and Style 
Although I do not hold to Passmore's handwriting thesis as a means of dating the 
manuscripts it is instructive to examine dle differing styles of handwriting that 
Cudworth uses within the manuscripts to allow us to understand more fully the 
method Cudworth employed whilst composing his manuscripts. Cudworth's hand 
falls into three distinct styles: style [1] is a plain Italic script, style [2] is an angular 
secretaq hand, and style [3] (which is almost exclusively in FM.4979) is a rounder 
secretaq hand. It has been suggested that [3] is dnt of an amanuensis. However I 
would argue that all three hands are Cudwordl's. Evidence for this comes in two 
forms. Firsdy, there exists in more than one hand a common spelling inconsistency. 
Cudworth has a tendency at times to reverse the letters within a word on certain 
occasions. Two clear examples of this appear in FM.4979 where both [2] and [3] 
reverse the letters 'i' and 'n' within a word. On f01.16 Cudworth uses [3] to spell 
'contingent,' 'contnigent,' then on fo1.21 he uses [2] to spell 'in;' 'ill.' Secondly, the 
evidence linking the all three handwriting styles to Cudworth comes in the manner 
that the styles change abrupdy within the text. As already stated, Passmore explains 
this as an idiosyncrasy in Cudworth's working method. However the fact that these 
styles often change mid-sentence would appear suggest a change in stylus, rather 
than a change in the time of composition or penman. Three examples of this are, 
306 
firstly, FNI.4979 fol.194 where [3] changes to [1], second, again in FM.4979, f01.194, 
where [2] changes to [1] mid-sentence, and thirdly FM.4981 fo1.47 where [1] 
changes to [2]. 
If we accept, as this evidence would seem to show, that all three hands are 
Cudworth's this gives us an insight into Cudworth's working methods. Generally 
speaking the manuscripts are written in long sections of continuous prose on the 
recto side of each sheet. 'Ibis is almost always done in a single style, most 
commonly style [1]. These sections appear to have been written in long single 
sessions with Cudworth making little in terms of correction of amendment as he 
wrote. There are also, in contrast to Cudworth's published works, relatively few 
direct quotes, in stark contrast to the TISU. Following the writing of the 
manuscripts Cudworth then appears to have come back to the manuscripts at a later 
point to correct and amend his text. These amendments are generally written in style 
[2]. Cudworth marks the existing script with a mark, usually a capatalised letter of 
either the Roman or Greek alphabet. He then adds comments of extra information 
on the facing, verso page. The fact that Cudworth often mixes the symbols by 
which he mark amendments and alterations on the same page (i.e. in Fi\1.4979 
fols.47b-48 where Cudworth uses both Roman and Greek letters to mark 
amendments) suggests that Cudworth returned to and revised these manuscripts 
more than once. 
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A.3. Paper 
Cudworth's manuscripts are written on three different sizes of paper bound into 
booklets of differing length. Most, that is FM.4980-4982 are written on sheets that 
are approximately 14.5" by 9',' FAl.4979 is on 12" by 8" paper, and FJ\1.4978 is on 
9" by 7" paper. If we examine the watermarks of these manuscripts it is possible to 
give rough start dates after which the manuscripts were written. Although this is 
rather approximate and inexact, it does add to the picture of how and when 
Cudworth wrote the manuscripts. All the volumes, except FM.4982 which is a 
collection of 3 separate sections collated together by a later librarian, use the same 
water mark throughout the volume, consistent across the booklets that make up 
that volume. This would seem to back up my premise that the manuscripts were 
composed by Cudworth as single projects and not dipped in and out of as Passmore 
suggests. The approximate dates suggested by the watermarks are as follows. Both 
FJ\1.4980 and the first section of FJ\1.4982 use a coat of arms water mark which 
originates after 1680,4 FM.4981 uses a fleur-de-lis water mark dating from after 
1670,5 and FJ\1.4979 uses a 'foolscap' watermark dating from around 1671.6 
AA. Reference to published works and authors 
Throughout the manuscripts Cudworth constantly refers to other authors, most 
notably and consistently, Thomas Hobbes. Cudworth does refer explicitly to the 
-I Edward Heawood, WatemJarks ~lthe 17'h alld 18th Ce!ltllries (The Paper Publications Society, 
Hilversum, 1950), no.678. 
s Ibid., no.1785. 
6 Ibid., no.2003. 
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published debates between Hobbes and Bishop Bramhall, however, as the last of 
these, Bramhall's Castigations 0/1111' Hobbes, was published in 1658, this does not assist 
us in the accurate dating of the manuscripts. However if we examine not simply the 
publications that Cudworth refers to, but also the manner with which he refers to 
dlem, we are able to draw more definitive conclusions over the dating of 
Cudworth's manuscripts. The only manuscript this form of evidence is helpful with 
is F1I1.4979. Firsdy in F1I1.4979 Cudworth describes Hobbes as 'the Late author of 
Necessity.'7 This could be simply refer Hobbes as the. resent author of works on 
necessity. However if it referred to the 'Late author' as the deceased author, then 
this would place this manuscript after Hobbes' death in 1679. Secondly Cudworth 
describes Hobbes' philosophy as making God a 'Leviathan or Behemoth.'8 This 
mirrors Cudworth's style in the TISU where he says that the civil sovereign is 'no 
Leviathall.'9 What places the composition of F1I1.4979 later than the composition of 
the TISU is the fact that Hobbes' work Behemoth, was not published until after 
Hobbes' death in 1679. 
A.S. Internal comparisons 
Although Cudworth's freewill manuscripts are generally seen as a single unit it is 
possible to differentiate between the different manuscripts. Although it is not 
possible to use these internal differences to suggest defInitively which manuscripts 
were written fIrst, by examining the manner with which specifIc arguments develop 
7 FM.4979, f01.125. 
8 Ibid., f01.149. 
9 TISU p.896. 
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within the manuscripts it is possible to surmise that some manuscripts develop and 
expand ideas suggested in a previous manuscript. 
It is possible to tentatively link FA1.4979 with the first section of FM.4981. 
TIlls link is made by Passmore who shows that the reference in FM.4981 to a 
second chapter on divine prerogative is almost certainly to the second chapter of 
FM.4979.1O TIlls link would also appear to be logical as FM.4981 and FA1.4979 deal 
broadly with the differing problems of divine and mechanical fatalism respectively. 
TIlls group, wIllch I shall describe as Group I, can be differentiated from the other 
manuscripts - in particular FM.4980 - by the use of further internal evidence. 
Cudworth a more sopIllsticated philosopIllcal vocabulary in 4980 than in Group I to 
describe human agency and moral faculties. The nature of these arguments within 
Cudworth's manuscripts has been discussed at length in Chapter Five. The main 
difference comes from Cudworth's additional use in pj\1.4980 of the term 
'epoloustic'in addition to the terms 'autokinsey' and 'heterokinsey,' wIllch both 
appear in the manuscripts in Group 1. The term 'epoloustic' also appears in 
FM.4978. 
These two pieces of internal evidence would seem to suggest that FM.4978 
and FM.4980 can be placed together as a group - what I will call Group II. TIlls 
leaves the individual sections bound together in FM.4982 unaccounted for by tllls 
grouping. Although Passmore suggests that the first section of FM.4982 could be 
linked to Group I, there is nothing to link the other manuscripts bound together in 
FM.4982 to the composition of the otller, more substantial manuscripts. 
10 Passmore, Clld}/JOI1h, p.lll. 
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A.6. Conclusion 
Passmore argues that some of these manuscripts 'were probably written before the 
appearance of the True IJlte/ledual System, perhaps a good many years earlier.'ll I 
believe that the evidence as outlined above shows this assertion to be incorrect. 
Although it would be nai,re to think of the freewill manuscripts as being 
synonymous the suggested third section Cudworth's entire Intellectt/al System, it is 
possible, I believe, to show that the manuscripts were composed after the 
completion of the TISU in 1671. This would therefore substantiate claim I make in 
Chapter Five that the manuscripts should be read in the light of the philosophical 
and theological principles which Cudworth outlines in the TISU. It is, however, I 
believe not possible from the present evidence to order the manuscripts other than 
as two different groups of manuscripts which Cudworth worked on some time after 
1671 and, in the case of Group II, after Hobbes' death in 1679. 
That being said I would argue that Group I, on the balance of the evidence, 
would appear to be the fuller and more philosophically sophisticated account of 
freewill of the two groups of manuscripts outlined above. This is merely conjecture 
made on the rather flimsy evidence of the more complete forms of the manuscripts 
as works in their own right (in particular when FM.4979 and FM.4980 are directly 
compared.) If this conjecture is correct tllen that would push the production of 
Group I into the 1680s, after the composition of Group II. If this theory is correct 
then it is possible to suggest that FM.4978 is an abridgment of the ideas of 
FM.4980. This then could have been used by Cudworth to either create interest for 
the later publication of FMA980, or as a more manageable version of Cudworth's 
11 Ibid., p.112. 
311 
~ 8' ~ ~ ('p 
..j:::.. rJJ 
\0 r-t-
00 ~ 
0 n 
n 
0 
~ 
i:l 
r-t-
0 
H) 
~ 
iY 
~ 
r-t-
n 
~ 
:t 
'< 0 
M 
& 
('p 
i:l 
~. 
J:!.. (1) 
vrJJ l.J.> 
>--'-
N t-< 
"'. ~
'" <:l 
~ 
~ 
"". ~ 
v~· 
~ g-: 
n 
iY 
::1 (1) 
~ 
0.. 
S· 
Bibliography 
1. Manuscripts Consulted 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Library (CUL) 
Mm.1.38: Notes 011 the E:>..ptllsiol1 and Recantation if Dalliel Scar;gil. 
Mm.5.45: Notes 011 the Masters if God's Hot/se alld Christ's College. 
Cambridge: Christ's College 
Box 77: Notes 011 Ralph CtldwOIth inc!tldillg letters from Johll CtldwOIth f.f7hitebrook to Johll 
Peile, Master if Christ's. 
John Mitchell, Personalities if Chtist's. 
Cambridge: Emmanuel College 
Manuscript 48: Dirediol1s for a S ttldmt if the University. 
London: British Library (BL) 
Additional Manuscript, 4297: Miscella11Cous papers if Thomas Birch. 
Additional Manuscripts, 4978, 4979, 4980, 4981, 4982, 4983: CttdwOIth's Freewill 
Matlllscripts. 
Oxford: Bodleian Library 
Tanner Manuscripts, 39, 44, 46, 49,58,92,290. 
2. Primary Sources 
Anon., All histOlical Accottllt if Comprehellsioll and Toleration. From the Old PURITAN to 
the new LATITUDINARIAN; with their cOlltil1!led pro/eds alld Designs, in 
oppositioll to Ott1' more olthodox Establishmmt (London, 1706). 
Anon., Great alld Good news for the Chtlrch ifEnglal1d, If thry please to accept thereif: or the 
Latittfdillarian Christians Most Humble Address alld Advice To all the Imposillg 
C/el:g)Il\1en if the said church fry What Ilames or Titles soever Dignijied or Distillguished 
(London, 1688). 
Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica, 5 vols, translated by the Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province (Christian Classics, Westminster MD, 1981). 
Augustine, The City if God, translated by Hemy Bettenson (penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1984). 
Burnet, Gilbert, A supplemeJlt to BlIl'IJet's HistolJl if IJ!)I OWl! time, edited by H.C. Foxcroft 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1902). 
History if My own time, 2 vols, edited by Osmund Au), (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1897-1900). 
Calvin, Jean, Illstitutes if the Christiall Religion, 2 vols, translated by Hem)' Beveridge 
(James Clark & Co., London, 1962). 
313 
Cicero, De Fato, translated by H. Rackham (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
MA,1960). 
The Natllre if the Gods, translated P.G. Walsh (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1997). 
Conway, Anne, The COllwq)' Letters: The CorrespolldeJlce if Anile, Viscottntess COllwqy, 
HeJlry More, and theirjtieJlds, 1642-1684, edited by Marjorie Nicolson, revised 
by Sarah Hutton (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992). 
Cudworth, Ralph, 'Additional Manuscript no.4981' (On the Nature of Libetum 
Arbitrium) introduced by].L. Breteau, in The Cambridge Platollists in 
Philosophical COlltext, edited by G.A.]. Rogers et al (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1997), 
pp.219-231. 
A Discotme cOllcerning the trlle 110ti0l1 if the Lord's slipper (London, 1670). 
A S ermoll Preached bifore the Home if Commons. March 31st 1647 in The 
Camblidge Platollists, edited by c.A. Patrides (Edward Arnold, London, 1969). 
A Sermoll Preached to the HOllotlrable Society ifLincol/1es-In/1e (London, 1664). 
A Treatise COllcemil/g Eterl/al al/d ImJJJlltable Reality, edited by Edward Chandler 
(London, 1731). 
A Treatise COllcerlling Eternal and Immtltable Reality, edited by Sarah Hutton 
(CUP, Cambridge, 1996). 
A Treatise 011 Freewill, edited by]. Allen (London, 1838). 
A Treatise 011 Freewill in A Treatise COl/cernillg Etemal alld Inmmtable Reality, 
edited by Sarah Hutton (CUP, Cambridge, 1996). 
'Preface' to A S erlJ10Il Preached bifore the Honollrable The HOllse if COJJJJJJOIlS, Oil 
March 31'1, 1647: Beillg a dqy ifPtlb!ic Hllmiliatioll (London, 1647). 
Systema illtelledt/ale htlitls tllliversi, translated by Johann Lorenz Mosheim Gena, 
1733). 
The True Illtelledtlal System if the UllivetJe: The First Part; Lf7herein, All the Reasoll 
alld Philosopl?} if Atheism is COlljtded; and Its Impossibility Demonstrated (London, 
1678). 
The Ullioll f!fChlist alld the Chtm:h ill a shadow (London, 1642). 
Cudworth the elder, Ralph, A ComJJJeJltaJie or E:>..positioll, ttpOIl the first Chapters if the 
Epistle to the Galatialls: pellned fry ... M,: W. Perkills. Now published for the benifit if 
the Chllrch, alld colltillt/ed with a stpplemeJlt tpon the sixth chaPteJ~ fry Raft ClldwOJth 
(Cambridge, 1604). 
314 
Culvenvell, Nathaniel, All Elegant alld Learlled Discollrse 011 the Light ofNattlre, edited 
by Robert A Green and Hugh MacCallum (University of Toronto Press, 
Toronto, 1971). 
Descartes, Rene, The Philosophical U70rks ofDescClItes, 2 vols, translated by Elizabeth S. 
Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (CUP, Cambridge, 1967). 
Fowler, Edward, Celtaill Propositiolls By which the Doctrine of the Hofy Triniry Is so 
E:>..plained, According to the Allcient Fathers as to speak it IlOt COlltradictory to 
Nat1lral Reasoll (London, 1719). 
The Ptimiples and PractiteJ~ Of cettain Moderate Divilles of the Church of Ellglalld. 
(great!y mis-ullderstood) T17Ify Represented and Defended; TVherein (I?J the wqy) Some 
Controversies, of 110 meall impoltance, and SllCcillCtfy discllssed ill A Free Discourse 
between to Intimate Fliends (London, 1670). 
Gibbon, Edward, The Decline and Fall of the Romall Empire, 7 vols (I'v1ethuen & Co., 
London, 1906). 
Hobbes, Thomas, Behemoth or The Lollg Parliamellt, edited by Ferdinand Tonnie 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990). 
Leviathall, edited by C.B. MacPherson (penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968). 
1I1all alld Citizen (De Homine alld De Cive), edited and translated by Bernard 
Gert, Charles T.Wood, and T.S.K. Scott-Craig (Hackett, Indianapolis, 1991). 
'Of Liberty and Necessity' in Hobbes alld Bramhall Oil Liberty alld Necmiry, 
edited by Vere Chappell (CUP, Cambridge, 1999). 
'The Question concerning Liberty and Necessity' in Hobbes and Bramhall 011 
Liberty and Necessiry, edited by Vere Chappell (CUP, Cambridge, 1999). 
Holdsworth, Richard, Praelectiones Theologicae, edited by Richard Pearson (London, 
1661). 
Jackson, Thomas, The Works of Thomas Jackson, D.D. 12 vols (OUP, Oxford, 1844). 
[Leslie, Charles], The ChCll;ge of S ocinianisJJJ Agaillst Dr Tillotsoll cOllsidered. III Examinatioll 
of Some S ermolls He has latefy Published Oil pm pose to clear Himse!f from that 
Imputation ... By a T17Ie SOil of the Chltr1:h (Edinburgh, 1695). 
Locke, John, All Essq), COllcernillg Humall Understallding, edited by Peter H. Nidditch 
(OUP, Oxford, 1975). 
Some Thoughts concernillg Edllcation, edited by John W. and Jean Yolton 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989). 
Two Treatises q/Government, edited by Peter Laslett (CUP, Cambridge, 1960). 
U;7ritilzgs on Religioll, edited by Victor Nuovo (OUP, Oxford, 2002). 
315 
Milton, John, Political !f7ritillgj', edited by Martin Dzelzanis (CUP, Cambridge, 1991). 
More, Henry, All Antidote to Atheism O/~ All Appeal to the Nattlrall Factllties if the jI.1illd if 
1I1an, If7hether there be IlOt a God, in A Collectioll if Philosophical If/'litings (London, 
1662). 
All E:xplallatioll if the Gralld lI1Jstery if Godlimss (London, 1660). 
The Complete Poems if Dr Hem), 1I10re (1614-1687), edited by Alexander B. 
Grosart (Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1969). 
P[atrick], S[imon], A brief aCCOlll1t if the Ilew sect ifLatitude-meJl together with some rif/e{1iolls 
UpOIl the New Philosopl?J (London, 1662). 
Pierce, Thomas, Auroxamx(!Wtr; or Se(/-col1deJJlI1atioll (L~ndon, 1658). 
Plato, Gito, translated by Hugh Tredinick, in The Collected Dialogues if Plato, edited by 
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1961). 
Etttl?Jphro, translated by Lane Cooper, in The Colleded Dialogues if Plato, edited 
by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1961). 
Laws, translated by A.E. Taylor, in The Collected Dialogues qlPlato, edited by 
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1961). 
1I1eJlo, translated by W.K.C. Guthrie, in The Collected Dialogues if Plato, edited 
by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1961). 
Phaedl7{s, translated by R Hackworth, in The Collected Dialogues qfPlato, edited 
by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1961). 
Ti1J1aetls, translated by Benjamin Jowett, in The Collected Dialogues if Plato, 
edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1961). 
Theatettts, translated by F.M. CornEord, in The Collected Dialog1tes if Plato, 
edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1961). 
Plotinus, The Ellneads, translated by A.H. Armstrong (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge MA, 1967-1988). 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Sodal Contract, translated by G.D.H. Cole G.M.Dent, 
London, 1993). 
316 
Smith, John, S eleded Disco/lrsed (London, 1821). 
Tillotson, John, S enJlOIIS COllcemillg the Divinity and Illcarllatioll if 0111' Blessed Savio/II' 
London, 1693). 
The TP'orks if the Most Reverend DrJohll Tillotsoll, Late Archbishop if CallterbNry: 
COlltaillillg Fifty FONr Sel7Jl0llS alld Discollrses, 011 selJeralOccasiollS. Together with the 
RlIle if Faith (London, 1696). 
Turner, John, A Discourse COllcemillg the ]vlessia ... To which is prifi:x:ed a large priface, 
asseJtillg alld explail1illg the Dodrine if the Blessed Trillity agaillst the Late writer if the 
IlltelledNal System (London, 1685). 
Whichcote, Benjamin, }.1oral alld Religious Aphorisms, edited by W.R. Inge (Elkin 
Mathews & Marrot, Ltd., London, 1930). 
'The Manifestation of Christ and the Deification of Man,' in The CambJidge 
Platollists, edited by C.A. Patrides (Edward Arnold, London, 1967). 
'The Unity of the Church maintained by sincere Christians,' in The Cambridge 
Platollists, edited by c.A. Patrides (Edward Arnold, London, 1967). 
'The Use of Reason in the Matter of Religion,' in The Camblidge Platollists, 
edited by CA. Patrides (Edward Arnold, London, 1967). 
Whichcote, Benjamin, and Anthony Tuckney, 'Eight Letters of Dr Anthony 
Tuckney and Benjamin Whichcote,' in Moral alld ReligioNs AphOlisms, edited 
by Samuel Salter (London, 1753). 
Worthington, John, The Diary alld Correspolldellce if DrJohll lf701thillgtOIl, edited by 
James Crossely and Richard Copley Christie (The Chetham Society, 
Manchester, 1847-1886). 
3. Secondary Sources 
Anon., 'Memoirs of Ralph Cudworth D.D.,' Author if The Intelledual System,' The 
Presellt state rif the Republic rifLetters, AvII, January 1736, pp.24-38. 
Aaron, Richard, Johll Locke (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971). 
Armstrong, A.H. ed., The CambJidge History qlLater Greek alld EarlY MedielJal Phi/osopl?)! 
(CUP, Cambridge, 1967). 
'Plotinus,' in The Cambridge History qfLater Greek alld EarlY Medieval Philosopl?)!, 
edited by A.H. Armstrong (CUP, Cambridge, 1967), pp.195-268. 
Armstrong, Brian, Calvillism alld the AJJryral1t Here!)': Protest alit SdJolastilisJJJ aile! 
Humallism ill Sevellteenth-Century Fral1ce (University of Wisconsin Press, 
Madison, 1969). 
317 
Ashcraft, Richard, 'Anti-clericism and authority in Lockean political thought,' in 
The Mar;gillJ if OtthodoY;f Heterodox If/ritillg alld Ctllttlral RespollJe, 1660-1750, 
edited by Roger D. Lund (CUP, Cambridge, 1995), pp.73-96. 
'Latitudinarianism and toleration: historical myth versus political history,' in 
PhiloJopf?y, ScieJ1ce alld Religioll ill Englalld, 1640-1700 edited by Richard Kroll et 
al. (CUP, Cambridge, 1992), pp.151-177. 
Baldi, IvI, 'Cudworth versus Descartes: Platonism et sens commun dans la critique 
de NIeditatiollJ,' in The Cambridge PlatolliJtJ ill PhiloJophi(al COlltext edited by 
G.A.]. Rogers et al (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1997), pp.173-83. 
Barnes, Jonathan, The Olltologiml At;gtlJ1Jent (MacMillan London, 1972). 
Beiser, Frederick C, The S otJereigllty ifReaJoll: The difellce if ratiollality ill the earjy EllgliJh 
El1lighteJ1mellt (princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996). 
Bendell, Sarah, Christopher Brooks, and Patrick Collinson, A HiJtory ifEmm{{lJt(eI 
College (Boydell, Woodbridge, 1999). 
Benz, Ernst, The ]v[)lJtiml S otln;eJ if Germall ROJ1Jalltic PhiloJopl:!y, translated by Blair 
Reynolds & Eunice M. Paul (pickwick Publications, Allinson Park, P A, 
1983). 
Birch, Thomas, 'An Account of the Life and Writings of R. Cudworth D.D.,' in 
Ralph Cudworth, The Tnle Illtelledtial Sj'JteJ1J if the UllitJel'Je (Richard Priestly, 
London, 1820), fIrst published in 1743, pp.2-37. 
Bray, John, Theodore Beza'.r Dodtille ifPredeJtillatioll (B.De Graaf, Nieuwkoop, 1975). 
Breward, I, 'The Importance of Perkins,' in The Jotlmal ifReligiotlJ HiJtory IV:2 
(1966), pp.113-28. 
Bush Jr, Sargent, Carl J Rasmusse, The Libral)! ifEmJJlalltlei College Camblidge, 1584-
1637 (CUP, Cambridge, 1986). 
Cassirer, Ernst, The Platolli( RellaiJJall(e ill Ellglalld, translated by James P. Pettegrove 
(Thomas Nelson and Sons, London, 1953). 
Chadwick, Hemy, 'Philo and the beginnings of Christian thought,' in The Camblidge 
HiJtol)' if Later Greek alld Earjy Medieval PhiloJopl?JI, edited by A.H. Armstrong 
(CUP, Cambridge, 1967), pp137-92. 
Champion, ].A.I., The Pi/la!J ifPlieJtcraji Shaken: The Chtlrch ifEllglalld and itJ EllemieJ, 
1670-1730 (CUP, Cambridge, 1992). 
Clark,].C.D., The Eng!iJh Sode!)! 1688-1832: Ideolo!!)!, Social St17ldtlre and Political 
Practice dtlting the Allciell Regime (CUP, Cambridge, 1985). 
Coffey, John, Pemctltioll and Toleratioll ill ProteJtallt Ellglalld, 1558-1689 (Longmans, 
Harlow, 2000). 
318 
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, ColeJidge 011 the SelJenteellth-Centtl!)', edited by Roberta 
Florence (Duke University Press, Durham NC, 1955). 
Colie, Rosalie L., light alld Elllightel!1Jlellt: A StttrfJl 0/ the CambJidge Platollists alld the 
DtltchArmillialls (CUP, Cambridge, 1957). 
Colish, Marcia L., The Stoic Tradition Jrom AI/tiq1lity to the Earfy lvliddle Ages, 2 vols 
(Brill, Leiden, 1985). 
Collingwood, R.G.,AI7Atttobiograpl[y (OUP, Oxford, 1939). 
Cope, Jackson I., '''The Cupri-Cosmits:" Glanvill on Latitudinarian Anti-
Enthusiasm,' in The Httlltillgtolllibra!)' Qttatterfy :1..\TII (1954), pp.269-86. 
Copleston, Frederick, A Histo!)1 o/PhiloJOpl?J, 9 vols (Burns and Oates, London, 
1946-1975). 
Costello, William T., The Scholastic CttrrictlitlJJJ at Earfy Seventeenth-century CambJidge 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1958). 
Cottingham, John, A Descat1es Didiol/a!)1 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1993). 
Descat1es (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986). 
'Force, Motion, and Causality: More's critique of Descartes,' in The Camb/idge 
Platollists ill Philosophical Context, edited by G.A.J.Rogers, et al. (I<luwer, 
Dordrecht, 1997), pp.159-71. 
Coudert, Allison, 'Henry More, the Kabbalah, and the Quakers,' in Philosopl?J S[iellce 
Religioll, edited by Richard Kroll et al. (CUP, Cambridge, 1992), pp.31-67. 
The Impad 0/ the Kabbalah il1 the S evellteenth-centtllJl: The Life alld thought 0/ Frclllcis 
Merctl!)1 val/ Helmollt (1614-1698) (Brill, Leiden, 1999). 
Cragg, G.R., From PtIlitallis1J1 to the Age o/Reasoll: A Sttlcfy of the Challges ill Religiotts 
Thought withill the Chtm:h 0/ Ellglalld, 1660-1700 (CUP, Cambridge, 1950). 
ed. The CambJidge PlatollistJ (OUP, Oxford, 1968). 
The Chttn:h alld the Age ((/Reasol/, 1648-1789 (Hodder & Stoughton, Bristol, 
1962). 
Cranston, Maurice, Johll Locke: A Biograpl?J (OUP, Oxford, 1985). 
Darwall, Stephen, Blitish Moralists alld the Illternal 'Ottght': 1640-1740 (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1995). 
Davenport, Paul Miles, ll/loral Divinity with Til1cture q/ChJist? All Illtelpretatioll qfthe 
Theology o/Bel!jaJ1Jin If7hichmte, Fotllldero/Camblidge PlatollislJJ (H.Th. Peeters, 
Nimegen, 1972). 
319 
Davis, Horton, fI70rship alld Theology ill Ellgland: From Alldrewes to Baxter alld Fo.x~ 
1603-1690 (princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975). 
Dixon, Philip, Nice alld Hot Displltes: The Dodrille if the Ttinity in the SeveJlteeJlth CelltulJl 
(T&T Clark, London, 2003). 
Dockrill, D.W., 'The Authority of the Fathers in the Great Trinitarian Debates of 
the Si'Cteen Nineties,' in Studia Patristica, 2-.."VIII:4 (1990), pp.335-47 
'The Fathers and the Theology of the Cambridge Platonists,' in Sttldia 
Pattistica,2-..\TII:1 (1982). pp.427-39. 
'The Heritage of Patristic Platonism in Seventeenth-Century English 
Philosophical Theology,' in The Camblidge Platollists ill Philosophical COlltext, 
edited by G.A.]. Rogers et al. (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1997), pp.55-77. 
Donelly S.]., John Patrick, Calvinism alld Scholasticism ill Vermigi's dodtine if Mall alld 
Grace (Brill, Leiden, 1976). 
Dunn, John, 'The Identity of the History ofIdeas,' in Philosop!?}, Politics, alld Society, 
Fourth Series, edited by Peter Laslett, W.G. Runicimann, and Quentin 
Skinner (Blackwell, Oxford, 1972), pp.158-73. 
The Political Thottght if Johll Locke: A HistO/ical Accoullt if the AJ!,tlmeJlt ~f the Two 
Treatises ifGovemmellt (CUP, Cambridge, 1969). 
'What is living and What is Dead in the Political Theory of John Locke,' in 
IllteJpretillg Politkal Respollsibility: Essq)'s 1981-1990 (polity Press, Cambridge, 
1990), pp.9-25. 
Emilson, Eyjolfur Krajalar, PlotilUls alld Sellse Perceptioll: A Philosophical Stll& (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1988). 
Fletcher, H.F., The Illtelledllal Development ifJohll iVIilton, 2 vols (University of Illinois 
Press, Urbanna, 1961). 
Friedman, Jerome, Michael Servettls: A Case Sttlqy in Total HereD' (Librairie Droz S.A., 
Geneva, 1978). 
Gasccoigne, John, Camblidge ill the Age if the ElllighteJlJJ1ent: Science, Religion, and Politics 
From the Restoration to the Frellch Revolutioll (CUP, Cambridge, 1989). 
Goldie, Mark, 'The Reception of Hobbes,' in The Camblidge HistolJ' of Political Thottgbt, 
1450-1700, edited by J.H.Burns, with the assistance of Mark Goldie (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1991), pp.589-615. 
Goldie, Mark, and John Spurr, 'Politics and the Restoration Parish: Edward Fowler 
and the Struggle for St Giles Cripplegate,' in Englisb Historical Review (1994), 
pp.572-596 
320 
Greene, Robert A., 'Whichcote, the Candle of the Lord, and Synderisis,' in The 
Journal if the HistolJl(gJdeas, 52 (1991), pp.617 -644. 
Gysi, Lydia, PlatollistJJ alld CaJiesiallisJJJ ill the Philosop!:!)' of Ralph CtfdwOIth (Herbert 
Lang, Bern, 1962). 
Hall, A. Rupert, HeIllJ' More (CUP, Cambridge, 1990). 
'Henry More and the Scientific Revolution,' in Hellry lvlore (1614-1687) 
Tercelltellary Stt/dies, edited by Sarah Hutton (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1991), p.37-
54. 
Hall, Roland, 'New Words and Antedatings from Cudworth's "Treatise on 
Freewill,''' in Notes alld Otfelies, 205, (1960), pp.427 -32. 
'Cudworth: More New Words,' in Notes alldQtte1ies, 208, (1963), pp.313-14. 
'Cudworth and his Contemporaries: New words and antedatings,' in Notes 
and Qtlelies, 220, (1975), pp.313-14. 
Hamlyn, D.W., The Pengtlill HistolJ' ifU'7esterll Philosopl!y (penguin, Harmondsworth, 
1987). 
Hampsher-Monk, lain, 'The History of Political Thought and the Political History 
of Thought,' in The History if Political Tho/tght ill Natiollal COlltext, edited by 
Dario Castiglione and lain Hampsher-Monk (CUP, Cambridge, 2001), 
pp.159-74. 
Harper, George, The NeoplatonisJJJ q/lf'7illia1JJ Blake (University of North Carolina 
Press, Chapel Hill, 1961). 
Harris, Ian, The Milld ifJohll Locke: A Stuc/)' if Political TheolJ' ill its Illte!le(itial Settillg 
(CUP, Cambridge, 1994). 
Harrison, Peter, 'Religioll' alld ReligiollJ ill the Ellglish EnlightelltJJeIlt (CUP, Cambridge, 
1990). 
Heawood, Edward, U'7aterl1larks if the 17'h alld 18t/1 Celltlllies (The Paper Publications 
Society, Hilversum, 1950). 
Hedley, Douglas, Colelidge, Philosopl?), alld Religioll: Aids to Rej7edioll alld the Mirror qf the 
Spilit (CUP, Cambridge 2000). 
'The Platonick Trinity: Philology and Divinity in Cudworth's Philosophy of 
Religion,' in Philogie lIlld Erkelllltis, Beitrage Zif Begriffulld Problem 
friihneaZlzeitlicher Philologie, edited by Ralph Hafner (Max Neimeyer Veralg, 
Ttibingen, 2001), pp.247-63. 
Hemy, John, 'Hemy More versus Robert Boyle: The Spirit of Nature and the 
Nature of Providence,' in Hellry 1I10re (1614-1687): TercelltellalJ
' 
S tt/dies, edited 
Sarah Hutton (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990), pp.56-69. 
321 
The Scientijzt Revoltttion and the OJigillJ if Modern S(iente (palgrave, Basingstoke, 
2002). 
Hill, Christopher, "Milton and the EllgliJh Revolt/tion (Viking Press, New York, 1977). 
The World Tttmed UpJide Down: Radiral IdeaJ dt/rillg the EllgliJh Revoltttioll 
(penguin, Harmondsworth, 1991). 
Hutton, Sarah, Alllle COllwqy (CUP, Cambridge, 2004). 
'Aristotle and the Cambridge Platonists: the case of Cudwortll,' in PhiloJopl?), 
ill the Sixteenth alld Seventeenth CenttllieJ: COllverJatiollJ with AriJtot/e, edited by 
C.T. Blackwell and S. Kusukawa (Ashgate, London, 2000), pp.337-49. 
'Classicism and Baroque - A Note on Mosheim's footnotes to Cudwortll's 
The Tlue Intellectual System of the Universe,' in Johallll Lorenz lIioJheim: 
Theologie in JaJlIlhttg.ifeld von PhiloJophie, Philologie tllld GeJthide, 1693-1755, edited 
by Martin Mulsow (Harrasovitz, Weisbaden, 1997), pp.211-27. 
ed., Hem), lIiore (1614-1687) Tertentenary Stt/dieJ (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1991). 
'Liberty and Self-determination: Ethics Power and Action in Ralph 
Cudworth,' in Del nemJaJio a! pOJJible. DeterlJ1illiJ1Jl0 e LibeJta nel penJe/io Allglo-
OlandeJe de XVII Jemlo, edited by L.Simonutti (Angeli, 2001), pp.81-97. 
'Plato in the Tudor Academies,' in Sir ThomaJ GreJham and GreJham College: 
StttdieJ ill the Intelledt/a! HiJtoJ), if London 011 the Sixteenth and Seventeellth CenttllieJ, 
edited by Francis Ames-Lewis (Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999), pp.106-24. 
'Platonism, Stoicism and Scepticism and Classical Imitation,' in A Compallion 
to EllgliJh RenazsJante Literatt/re alld Cttltt/re, edited by Michael Hattaway (OUP, 
Oxford, 2000), pp.44-57. 
'Ralph Cudworth: God, Mind, and Nature,' in Religion, Remon and Natttre in 
Earb iliodem Ettrope, edited by Robert Crocker (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2001), 
pp.61-76. 
'The Neoplatonic Roots of Arianism: Ralph Cudworth and Theophilus 
Gale,' in Socil1ialliJm alld itJ Role ill the Cttltt/re ifXVI-th to XVIII-th CentmieJ 
edited by L. Szczucki and Z. Ogonowski (PWN - Polish Scientific Publisher, 
Warsaw, 1983), pp.139-45. 
'Thomas Jackson, Oxford Platonist, and William Twisse,' in Jot/mal if the 
Hzstory if IdeaJ, 39 (1978), pp.635-52 
Illiffe, Rob, 'Prosecuting Atllanasius: Protestant Forensics and the Mirrors of 
Persecution,' in Newtoll alld NewtonianiJJJ1: New StlldieJ, edited by James E. 
Force and Sarah Hutton (I<luwer, Dordrecht, 2004), pp.113-54. 
Inge, W.R., 'Introduction,' to Benjamin Whichcote, lIioral alld Religiot/J Apho/iJJJ1J 
322 
(Elkin.Matthews, London, 1930), pp.iii-x. 
The Platollic Traditioll in Ellglish ReligioNs Thought (Longmans, Green & Co., 
London, 1926). 
The Philosopf?y ofPlotimls, 2 vols (Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1918). 
Jayne, Sears, Plato ill Renaissance Ellglalld (I(luwer, Dordrecht, 1995). 
Jones, David Martin, COl/science and Allegiance in Sevellteel1th-CellttIJJI Ellglalld: The 
Political SigllijiCaJ/(,(} of Oaths alld EllgageJJlents (University of Rochester Press, 
Rochester, NY, 1999). 
J ones, Rufus M., Spi/ittlal Reformers qfthe 16th and 17th Centmies (Macmillan, London, 
1928). 
Katz, David S., 'Hemy More and Jews,' in Hem)' ]V!olrJ (1614-1687): Tercelltellary 
Studies, edited by Sarah Hutton (I(luwer, Dordrecht, 1991), pp.173-188. 
Kendall, R.T., Calvill alld Ellglish Calvil1ism (OUP, Oxford, 1979). 
Kenny, Courtney, 'Cudworth's Manuscripts on Future Punishment,' in The 
Theologkal RetJiew, 61 (April 1878), pp.267-280 
Kroll, Richard, 'Introduction,' in Philosopl!)" Sciellce, alld Religioll ill Ellglalld, 1640-1700 
edited by Richard Kroll, et al. (CUP Cambridge, 1992), pp.1-28. 
Kroll, Richard, Richard Ashcraft and Perez Zagorin, Philosopl?}, S,ience, alld Religioll ill 
Englal/d, 1640-1700 (CUP, Cambridge, 1992). 
I<rook, D, 'The Recantation of Daniel Scargill,' in Notes alld Queries, 198 (1953). 
pp.267 -280. 
Lake, Peter, 'The Laudian Style: Order, Uniformity and the Pursuit of the Beauty of 
Holiness in the 1630s,' in The Earb Stuad Chtm:h, 1603-1642, edited by 
Kenneth Fincham (Macmillan, Oxford, 1993), pp.161-185. 
Leedham-Greene, E.S., Books ill Camb/idge Il1ventolies, 2 vols (CUP, Cambridge 
1986). 
Levine, Joseph M., 'Latitudinarians, Neoplatonists and the Ancient Wisdom,' in 
Philosopl!)" Sciellce alld Religion ill England, 1640-1700, edited Richard Kroll, et 
al. (CUP, Cambridge, 1992), pp.8s-108. 
Linnell, c.L.S., 'Daniel Scargill, "A Penitent Hobbist,'" in Chttrch Quade,.!)' RetJiew, 
320 (1955), pp.256-6s. 
Lipton, David R., Ernst Cassim:' The Dilemma of a Liberal Intelledttal ill Gerlllal!)l, 1914-
33 (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1978). 
Locke, Louis G., Tillotson: A Sttf{fy 011 Sevellteenth-Celltttry LiterattllrJ (Rosenkilde and 
323 
Bagger, Copenhagen, 1954). 
Lovejoy, Arthur 0., 'Kant and the English Platonists,' in Essqys Philosophical and 
P!Jchologica!.· In hOllor if TfYilliaJJJ james 0; his colleagtles at ColtlJJJbia Ulliversity 
(Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1908), pp.263-302. 
The Great Chaill ifBeillg (Harper Row, New York, 1960). 
Maclear, James Fulton, 'Popular anticlericism in the Puritan Revolution,' in The 
jottrnal if the Histo!]! if Ideas, AvIl:4 (1956), pp.443-70 
MacPherson, C.B., The Political Theo!]! if Possessive Illdividualism: Hobbes to Locke (OUP 
Oxford, 1962). 
Malcolm, Noel, 'Thomas Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology' (PhD Thesis, 
University of Cambridge, 1982). 
Manning, Brian, 'The Levellers and Religion,' in Radical Religioll ill the English 
Revolutioll, edited by J.F.MacGregor and B Reay (OUP, Oxford, 1984), 
pp.65-90. 
Marshall, John, john Locke: Resistallce, Religioll alld Respomibility (CUP, Cambridge, 
1994). 
Martin, Raymond, and John Barresi, Nat1lralizatioll if the Sou!" S e(f alld Personal Idmtity 
III the Eighteellth-Celltmy (Roudedge, London, 2000). 
Martineau, James, Ijpes if Ethical Theo!]!, 2 vols (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1885). 
Martinich, A.P., Hobbes: A Biograp!!)! (CUP, Cambridge, 1999). 
The Two Gods ifLeviathall: Thomas Hobbes Oil Religion alld Politics (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1992). 
McAdoo, H.R., The Spirit qjAllglicallisJJJ: A SJII'V~! qjAl1glicall Theological method ill the 
Sevmteellth cmttt!]! (Adam and Charles Black, London, 1965). 
McGrath, Alister E., A 4fe ifjohll CaMn: A Sttlrfy in the Shaping if Western Ctllture 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1990). 
Ch/istiall Theology: All IlltlVdm:tioll (Blackwell, Oxford, 1997). 
RqorIJJatioll Thought: All IlItlVdtldioll (Blackwell, Oxford, 1993). 
The Intelledual OligillS if the EtllVpeall Rqol7JJatioll (Blackwell, Oxford, 1987). 
McLachlan, H. John, Soril1iallism ill the Sevmteenth-Cellttll)' Ellgland (OUP, Oxford, 
1951). 
McNeill, John T., The Histol)' alld CharaderifCa/tJillisJJJ (OUP, Oxford, 1954). 
324 
Merlan, P, 'Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus,' in The Camblidge HistolJ! q/ 
Later Greek alld EarlY Medieval Philosopl?}, edited by A.H. Armstrong (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1970), pp.14-132. 
Mill, ].S., Disseltatiolls and Dis('tlSSiolls: Political, Philosophical, and HistoJical 4.vols 
Longmans, Green, Reader, Dyer, London, 1854-1875). 
Mintz, Samuel 1., The Hlmting rfLeviathal1: SelJel1teellth-cellttllJ! Readiolls to the 
1I1ateliaiism Moral Philosopl?} rfThomas Hobbes (CUP, Cambridge, 1962). 
Muirhead, John H., The Platollic Traditioll in Allglo-Saxoll Philosop!:?J: Studies ill the HistolJ! 
rfldealism ill Ellglalld alld Amelica (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1931). 
Mullet, Michael, Calvill (Routiedge, London, 1989). 
Newsome, David, Two Classes rfMell: Platollism alld Englisb alld Romalltic Tho/tgbt 
Oohn Murray, London, 1974). 
Nicolson, Marjorie, 'Christ's College and the Latitude-Men,' in Modem Philology, 27 
(1929-1930), pp.35-53 
Norbrook, David, TJ:7ritillg ill the Ellglisb Repllbli(:' PoetlJ!, Rbetoli(~ alld Politics, 1627-1660 
(CUP, Cambridge, 1999). 
O'Meara, Dominic J., Plotilltls: All Illtrodlatioll to tbe Elllleads (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1993). 
Pacchi, Arigo, 'Hobbes and tile Problem of God,' in Perspedives rfTbomas HobbeJ~ 
edited by G.A.]. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988), 
pp.171-188. 
Parker, T.M., "'Arminianism and Laudianism" in Seventeenth-century England' in 
S ttldies ill Chtlrcb HistolJ!, vol. 1 , edited by C.W. Dugmore and Charles Duggan 
(Nelson, London, 1964), pp.20-34. 
Parkin, Jon, 'Hobbismll the Later 1660s: Daniel Scargill and Samuel Parker,' in Tbe 
Histmical Jotlmal, 42 (1999), pp.85-108 
Sciellce, Religion, and Politics ill Restoratioll Ellglalld: Richard Cumber/and's De 
Legibt/s Naturae (Boydell, Woodbridge, 1999). 
Passmore, John, Ralph Ctldwolth: All Illte/pretation (CUP, Cambridge, 1951). 
'The Identity of the History of Philosophy,' in Tbe Histoliograpl!y rf tbe History 
ofPbilosop!:?J, History alld Tbeory, Beiheft 5, (1965), pp.1-32. 
Patrides, c.A. ed., The CambJidge Platollists, (Edward Arnold, London, 1967). 
Paul, Robert S., The AssemblY oftbe Lord: Politics alld Religion ill tbe WestminsterAJJeJJZbIY 
and the 'Grand Debate' (T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1985). 
325 
Peile, John, Biographical RegiJter if ChriJt'J College 1505-1905 alld if the earlierfotllldatioll, 
Gods houJe, 1448-1505 (CUP, Cambridge, 1913). 
Pocock, J.G.A., BarbariJ1JJ alld Religion: Voltl1JJe One, The Elllightell1JJeJlt if Edward 
Gibboll, 1737-1764 (CUP, Cambridge, 1999). 
'Post-Puritan England and the Problem of the Enlightenment,' in Culttlre alld 
Politic.r: From PmitalliJJJz to the Elllightell1JJeJlt, edited by Perex Zagorin 
(University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980), pp91-111. 
The AllcieJ1t COIIJtitutioll and Feudal Law: A Jtuqy ifEl1gliJh HiJtolical Thotlght ill 
the SeventeeJ1th CeJ1ttll)l (CUP, Cambridge, 1957). 
'The History of Political Thought: A Methodological Enqull-Y,' in PhzioJopl?}, 
Politic'J alld Society, Second Series, edited by Peter Laslett, W.G.Runcimann 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1967), pp.183-202. 
The Political IT/orkJ ifJaJJJeJ Harrillgtoll (CUP, Cambridge, 1977). 
'Time, History, and Eschatology,' ill PoliticJ, Language, alld Time: EJJ'q)lJ Oil 
Political Thought alld HiJtory (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960), 
pp.148-201. 
'Within the margins: The defmitions of orthodm .. y,' in The J..1aJ;giIlJ if 
OI1hodo>ry, Heterodox IT/riting and ClIltural ReJpollJe, 1660-1750, edited by Roger 
D. Lund (CUP, Cambridge, 1995), pp.33-53. 
Porter, H.C, Riformatioll alld Readioll ill Tudor Camblidge (CUP, Cambridge, 1958). 
Powicke, Frederick J., The Camblidge PlatolliJtJ: A Sttlrfy 0.M.Dent and Sons, London, 
1929). 
Redwood, John, ReaJoll, Ridicule alld Religion: The Age if ElllighteJ1JJJeJlt ill Ellglalld, 1660-
1750 (Thames and Hudson, London, 1976). 
Rist, John, PlotilltlJ: The Road to Reali!)1 (CUP, Cambridge, 1967). 
Stoic PhiloJ'opl:!)1 (CUP, Cambridge, 1969). 
ed. The StoicJ (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978). 
Rivers, Isabel, Remoll, Grace alld S elltiJJJeJ1t: A S tttcfJl if the Lal1gttage ofReligioll and EthicJ 
ill Ellglalld, 2.vols (CUP, Cambridge, 1991-2000). 
Rogers, G.A.]., 'Descartes and the English,' in The Light ifNattlre: EJJq)lJ ill the 
HiJtory and PhiloJopl?} if ScieJ1ce preJeJlted to A. C. Crombie, edited by J.D.North 
and J.J.Roche (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1985), pp.281-302. 
'John Locke: conservative radical' ill The J..laJ;gillJ if0J1hod0>9I: Heterodox 
Writillg and CJllttlral ReJpome, 1660-1750, edited by Roger D. und (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1995), pp.97-116. 
326 
'Locke and the Latitude-men: Ignorance as a Ground of Toleration,' in 
Philosopl?J, Science, alld Religioll ill Ellgland, 1640-1700, edited by Richard Kroll, 
et al. (CUP, Cambridge, 1992), pp.230-52. 
'More, Locke, and the Issue of Liberty,' in HelllJ .More (1614-1687) 
Tercelltellary Sttldies, edited by Sarah Hutton (1<Juwer, Dordrecht, 1991), 
pp.189-99. 
'The Other-worldly philosophers and the real world: The Cambridge 
Platonists, Theology and Politics,' in The Cambridge Platollists ill Philosophical 
COlltext: Politics, 1I1etapl?Jsics & Religioll, edited by G.A.]. Rogers, et al. 
(1<Juwer, Dordrecht, 1997), pp3-15. 
Rogers, G.A.]., J.M.Vienne and Y-C Zarka eds, The Cambtidge Platollists ill Philosophical 
COlltext - PoliticJ~ Metapl?Jsics & Religion (1<Juwer, Dordrecht, 1997). 
Sailor, Danton B., 'Cudworth and Descartes,' in The JOllmal of the History of Ideas, 
23 (1962), pp.133-140 
Sandbach, F.H., The Stoics (Chatto and Windus, London, 1975). 
Saveson, J.E., 'Differing Reactions to Descartes among the Cambridge Platonists,' 
in The Jottmal of the History ofldeas, 21 (1960), pp.560-567 
Schmitt, Charles B., Atistotle alld the Rellaissance (Halvard University Press, 
Cambridge NiA, 1983). 
Scott, Dominic, 'Reason, Recollection and the Cambridge Platonists,' in Platollism 
alld the English Imaginatioll, edited by Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1994), pp.139-50. 
Recollection alld Experience: Plato:r TheolJl ofLeamillg alld its SlIcceJSors (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1995). 
Sedley, David, 'Stoicism,' in The Concise Rotttledge Ell0'dopaedia ofPhilosopl?J (Roudedge 
London, 2000). 
Selby-Bigge, L.A., ed., British MoraliJts, 2.vols (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1897). 
Shapiro, Barbara J., Probability alld Celtaillty ill SelJellteenth-Centllry Englalld: A Sttt(fy of 
the Relatiollship betweell Natural Science, Religion, History, Law alld Literatllre 
(princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983). 
Skinner, Quentin, 'A Reply to my Critics,' in Mealling alld COlltext: QJlentill Skill/ler alld 
his Gitics, edited by James Tully (polity Press, Cambridge, 1988), pp.231-88. 
'Meaning and Understanding in dle History of Ideas,' in History alld Theory, 
VII:1 (1969), pp.3-53. 
VisiollJ of Politics, 3.vols. (CUP, Cambridge, 2002). 
327 
Sobol, Peter G., 'The Cabala,' in The History of Sciellce alld Religioll ill the l17este1'l1 
Tradition: An En0'ciopaedia, edited by Gaty B. Ferngren (Garland, N ew York, 
2000), p.553-55. 
Spellman, W.M., The Latitudinarians alld the Church ofEnglal1d, 1660-1770 (University 
of Georgia Press, Athens GA, 1993). 
Spurr, John, 'The Church of England, Comprehension and The Toleration Act of 
1689,' in Ellglish Histolieal Review 104, (1989), pp.927-946. 
"'Latituinarianism" and the Restoration Church,' in The Histon'cal Jourllal, 31 
(1988), pp.61-82. 
'''Rational Religion" in Restoration England,' in J07l1'l1al of the HistolJ' of Ideas, 
49 (1988), pp.563-585. 
Stough, Charlotte, 'Stoic Determinism and Moral Responsibility,' in The Stoics, edited 
by John Rist, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978), pp.203-32. 
Taliaferro, Charles, EvideJ1ce and Faith: Philosopl?), alld Religion since the SelJellteeJ1th-CeJ1ttlry 
(CUP, Cambridge, forthcoming). 
'The Trinity and Natural Reason: Lessons from Cambridge Platonism,' in 
The Ho!y Ttinity, edited by Melville Y. Stewart (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2003), 
pp.167-78. 
Taylor, Charles, 'The Hermeneutics of Conflict,' in lvleallillg and Context: QtleJ1till 
Skillner alld his C,itics, edited by James Tully (polity Press, Cambridge, 1988), 
pp.218-230. 
Thomas, Roger, 'Comprehension and Indulgence,' in From Ulliformity to Ullity 
edited by Geoffrey F. Nuttall and Owen Chadwick (SPCK, London, 1962), 
pp.189-255. 
Tigerstedt, E.N., The Decline alld Fall of the Neoplatollil' il1telpretatioll of Plato (Societas 
Scientiamm Fennica, Helsinki, 1974). 
Todd, Richard, 'Stoicism,' in The History of Science and Religioll ill the WTeste1'l1 Traditioll: 
All EIl0'clopaedia, edited by Gaty B. Ferngren (Garland, New York, 2000), 
p.132-33. 
Trentmann, John A., 'The Authorship of "Directions for a Student in the 
Universitie,''' in Trallsadions of the Camblidge Bibliographical Society, VII (1978), 
pp.170-83 
Trevor-Roper, H.R., An:hbishop Laud, 1573-1645 (l'vIacmillan, London, 1962). 
Catholics, Allglicans, alld P7IritallJ (Seeker & Warburg, London, 1987). 
'The Religious Origins of the Enlightenment,' in Religion, the Rrformatioll and 
328 
Social Challge (NIacmillan, London, 1967), pp.193-236. 
Tuck, Richard, 'The Contribution of History,' inA Compallioll to COlltempol'tll)! Political 
PhiloSOp0!, edited by Robert E. Goodwin and Philip Petit (Blackwell, Oxford, 
1993), pp.72-89. 
Tucker, Robert C, PhilosoP0; alld A1yth ill Karl Marx (CUP, Cambridge, 1972). 
Tulloch, John, Ratiollal Theology alld Christiall Philosopl?J 011 Englalld ill the S evellteellth 
CmtllIY, 2 vols (William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh, 1874). 
Turner, Frank M., The Greek Heritage ill Vietoriall Btitaill (Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1981). 
Twigg, John, The Ulliversity qfCambridge tlIld the Ellglish Revoilltioll, 1625-1688 (Boydell 
Woodbridge, 1990). 
Tyacke, Nicholas, Anti-Calvillists: The Rise rdArmilliallism, c.1590-1640 (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1987). 
'Arminianism and English Culture,' in Blitaill alld the Nether/allds, lJOitl1J!e 7, 
Chtlrch and State sillce the R~forlJJatioll, edited by A.CDuke and CA.Tamse 
(NIartinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1981), pp.94-117. 
'Archbishop Laud,' in The EarlY Stlltllt Ch"rch, 1603-1642, edited by Kenneth 
Fincham (NIacmillan, Oxford, 1993), pp.51-69. 
Verene, Donald Philip, 'Introduction,' to Ernst Cassirer, Symbol, Myth, alld C"lttlre: 
Essq)IJ alld Leett/res qfEmst Cassire,~ 1935-1945, edited by Donald Philip 
Verene (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1979), pp.1-45. 
Vickers, Brian, 'Introduction,' to Ocmlt alld S cimtific A1elltalities ill the Rmaissallce, 
edited by Brian Vickers (CUP, Cambridge, 1984), pp.1-55. 
Walker, D.P., The Amimt Theology: Sttldies ill Christiall Platollism from the Fifteellth to the 
Eightemth Celltlll)! (Duckworth, London, 1972). 
Wallace Jr, Dewey D., PlIrital1J alld Predestillatioll: Gl'tlce in Ellglisb Protestant Tbeology, 
1525-1695 (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1982). 
Wendel, Fran<;;ois, Calvin: The Ong,ills alld DelJelopJJlmt if his Religio/ls Thought, translated 
by Philip Maireat (Collins, London, 1963). 
White, Peter, PredeJtillatioll, Polit]!, alld Polemic: COllfliet and COIlSellSIlJ ill tbe EllgliJh 
Church jI'OJJl the R~for/Jlatioll to the Civil U:7ar (CUP, Cambridge, 1992). 
Wiles, Maurice, Anve!ypal Here!JI: A,iallis!}! through the Cmtmies (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1996). 
Wolterstorff, Nicholas, 'John Locke's Epistemological Piety: Reason is the Candle 
of dle Lord,' in Faith and PhilosoP0;, 1 (1984), pp.572-591 
329 
Yates, Francis A., Giordallo Brllllo alld the Hermetic Traditioll (Roudedge and Kegan 
Paul, London, 1964). 
Yeats,W.B., Collected Poems ifrT7.B. Yeats (Macmillan, London, 1933). 
Zaehner, R.C., lI1ystidsm: Sacred alld Profalle. All 1l1q1/iry into some Varieties if 
Praetemattlral Expeliellce (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1957). 
330 
II.3.ii. Emmanuel College and Puritan Cambridge in the early-seventeenth 
century 
The anti-Calvinist debates of the 1590s should be understood as existing within the 
general Puritan outlook of Cambridge of the time. Such was the power of the 
Puritan tradition of Cambridge that many of the graduates of the University set out 
to the parishes with a missionary zeal to maintain the Puritanism they had 
experienced in Cambridge. Parishes were seen as 'the chief animating force for the 
spread of Puritanism among all classes.'54 This meant that Cambridge, and also 
Oxford, were not separate from, but integrally involved with, the religious and 
political climate of the country. Control of the theological output of the University 
could also influence the nature of religious observance and political will within the 
country, so much so that Cambridge and Oxford were described as 'nurseries and 
foundations of our Church and commonwealth.'55 Consequently, the control of 
colleges and internal University appointments became matters of national political 
interest. The headship of a college was a recognised stepping stone to higher 
religious and political office. It was common for there to be Royal interference in 
the elections of the heads of colleges.56 
In Cambridge the most enthusiastically Puritan college was Emmanuel. 
Although fellows and graduates of Emmanuel were often sympathetic to Calvinist 
theology, it is a common mistake to see the Puritanism of Emmanuel, and the 
54 John Twigg, The Universiry of Cambridge and the E nglish Revolution, 1625-1688, (Boydell & Cambridge 
University Library, Woodbridge, 1990) p.1S. 
55 Quoted in Ibid., p .3. In a similar vein Gilbert Burnet, who was, unusually for high ranking 
Anglican clergyman, not a graduate of the two English Universities, commented that, 'Oxford and 
Cambridge are two such vast bodies, in which the whole nation is so much concerned.' See Gilbert 
Burnet, A supplement to Burnet's History of my OWll time, ed. H .C. Foxcroft (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1902), p.214. 
56 Twigg, The Universiry ofCambridge pp.7-8. 
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